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JIHADI AUDIOVISUALITY AND ITS 
ENTANGLEMENTS:  
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Christoph Günther and Simone Pfeifer
W ith his political cartoons, the Copenhagen-based Sudanese artist Khalid Albaih offers his analyses of the socio-political situation and 
everyday life in the Middle East and North Africa. Many of his cartoons criti-
cise militant movements in the region and the global military and political 
involvement of local and international actors in conflicts such as that in Syria. 
In one of his recent cartoons, ‘Scarecrow’ (Figure I.1, overleaf), he responds 
to US President Donald Trump’s announcement via Twitter of the killing of 
Abū Bakr al-Baghdādī. Alongside the image, Albaih’s comment on Facebook 
on 28 October 2019 relates his cartoon to the killing of Bin Laden:
#Khartoon - The Scarecrow -#Trump announces the killing of #albagdadi 
(he was announced dead 8 times as I remembered) this person was seen 
twice in two videos years apart. Just like Bin Laden this operation took 
place close to the election and of course just like Bin Laden another a [sic] 
scarier scarecrow emerged very soon after. Treat the cause not the illness.
Albaih’s comment points to the social construction of evil antagonists like 
bin Laden and al-Baghdādī. Unlike the widely circulated iconic image of 
Osama bin Laden, the depiction of al-Baghdādī’s face on the scarecrow is 
based upon one of his few video appearances in jihadi video productions, 
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the rarity of which stands in stark contrast to the frequency of references to 
him in Western news media. The image of al-Baghdādī’s head stuck on the 
scarecrow alludes to imagery of the penal-code atrocities of Islamic State (IS) 
decapitation videos, and at the same time threatens to scare off any actors 
planning to rebuild the devastated landscape.
Albaih publishes his work via his own Facebook website Khartoon!, as 
well as through Instagram and other social media platforms, and interacts 
with his followers. Incorporating the different viewpoints he has encountered 
living in Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Denmark as a Muslim artist and 
activist, through his work Albaih engages with very different kinds of actors. 
With his stated aim of ‘[talking] to people that don’t agree with you’ he has 
also encountered supporters of different jihadi movements on social media. 
In a conversation with Larissa-Diana Fuhrmann, Albaih noted that ‘some of 
them retweet my stuff’ (16 December 2017) and said that he had also chatted 
with them about the meanings of his cartoons.
The cover of this book, with Albaih’s cartoon, and the opening of this 
Introduction showing it embedded in the Facebook post raise the central 
Figure I.1 ‘Scarecrow’ (© Khalid Albaih).
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issues of the edited volume Jihadi Audiovisuality and its Entanglements. Not 
only does Albaih appropriate global and jihadi image repertoires in his work 
in order to articulate his critical comments on social and political develop-
ments; he also harnesses social media to circulate his work, reaching militant 
jihadi as well as Muslim activist and Western audiences. Like Albaih, actors 
from jihadi groups and movements are part of media infrastructures and 
actively appropriate global media for their own purposes. The forms of media 
and audiovisuality they create cannot be seen in isolation from the manifold 
entanglements they are embedded within.
With this volume, we put forward the notion of jihadi audiovisuality as 
a relational heuristic with which to examine the visual and auditory practices 
of individuals and collectives who either identify themselves and their actions 
as epitomes of the contemporary jihadi current or reference such practices in 
their work. We see these as interrelated within the framework of jihadi audio-
visuality’s entanglements, which encompass, inter alia, the output of global 
media as well as different journalistic and scientific fields, and the domains of 
security authorities.
For our purposes here, we use the adjective ‘jihadi’ to describe a specific 
realm of human experiences set within particular socio-political trajectories 
that are established through social interactions, the simultaneity of bodily 
and technical mediation and cultural artefacts in the form of texts, sounds 
and (moving) images. The term ‘jihadi’ does not thereby define the inherent 
quality of any of these elements, but rather is an attribute that is ascribed 
by a range of actors –  internet users, artists, activists, militants, journalists, 
politicians, ideologues and researchers –  to a certain kind of ideology, doc-
trine, habit, attitude, and the media through which this is expressed. In other 
words: while this volume focuses strongly on jihadi imagery and audio, we 
situate these articulations within a global communicative web, and we seek to 
provide perspectives that relate the production, dissemination and formative 
audiovisual linkages of jihadi imagery and sound to various forms of engage-
ment and appropriation.
By bringing the historical and cultural entanglements of jihadi audio-
visuality to the fore, we aim to transcend disciplinary boundaries and go 
beyond the limits of analyses that focus on jihadi ideology. The contribu-
tions to this volume provide complementary perspectives that locate ideology 
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and doctrine in aesthetic practices integrating, for example, material and 
 embodied perspectives. Many of the contributions provide rich examples 
of ethnographic or fieldwork-based research, showing that empirical studies 
of jihadi audiovisuality do not only produce knowledge of ideas and their 
manifestations in texts, images and sounds. They also exhibit a thorough 
consideration of ethical and methodological challenges (see Sold, Abay and 
Junk, Chapter 2, and Carvalho, Chapter 3), make it clear that researchers 
and  journalists are part of the entanglements and the politicised and secu-
ritised discourses they study (e.g. de Koning, Moors and Navest, Chapter 
1), and provide insights into how different groups of Muslims respond to 
discourses about jihadism (e.g. Salzbrunn, Chapter 7). Moreover, our volume 
opens a wider perspective that extends beyond the ideologies, strategies and 
media output of the contemporary jihadi current, to take into considera-
tion the expressions of culture and aesthetics that evolve around them. This 
includes examining how jihadi actors establish their discursive authority by 
appropriating religious symbols, media and texts, and addressing specific 
publics, as well as how such components are (re-)appropriated by activists, 
artists and religious authorities as a means of contestation (see e.g. Dick and 
Fuhrmann, Chapter 12).
Calling for a focus on the cultural and aesthetic aspects, as well as every-
day practices, of jihadi thinking and action, we wish to draw attention to the 
ways in which religio-political movements that invoke the Islamic notion of 
jihad to legitimate their (violent) actions deploy a rich audiovisual symbolic 
repertoire to appeal to adherents from diverse contexts. This repertoire ranges 
from a focus on materiality and matter –  ‘clothes, beard, haircuts, face-veil, 
manners of walking, greeting, drinking water, [and] eating’ (Svensson 2012: 
197) –  to expressions of belonging like poetry, singing, diction, and certain 
forms of communitarisation. Additionally, specific concepts of the social and 
the political are also part of this repertoire, like the staging of flags, military 
equipment and other signifiers of soldierly prowess as both markers of social 
identity and expressions of ittibāʾ, that is, the imitation of the early Muslim 
community. Borrowing from Stoever’s (2016) conceptualisation of the sonic 
color line as ‘the process of racializing sound’ where ‘listening became a racial-
ized body discipline’ (2016), we understand this expression of dominance 
and resistance as the drawing of an audiovisual faith line enacted in the realm 
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of the quotidian by means of different forms of media to distinguish ‘true’ 
Muslims from everyone else.
Jihadi groups and movements such as IS have become media-savvy 
entrepreneurs of identity (Günther 2021, forthcoming). With the increasing 
accessibility of ‘new’ forms of media like video and audio cassettes since the 
1980s, and digital communication technologies from the 1990s onwards, 
jihadi actors have used such technologies to promote their cause, distribute 
their messages to win support and intimidate their opponents (Corman and 
Schiefelbein 2006; see also Atwan 2015; Bunt 2003, 2018). Especially since 
the rise of IS and its digital media strategy of producing and disseminating 
professional and high-quality images, videos and sounds for a wide variety of 
audiences, journalists, policy groups and researchers alike have paid height-
ened attention to jihadist media production intended to antagonise (e.g. 
Winter 2015, 2017; Krona and Pennington 2019). What is more, Gruber 
(2019: 126) cogently observes that ‘many of us have proved liable in boost-
ing the group’s global presence and appeal’ through our work and our own 
comport as consumers of these digital audiovisual media.
The vast body of policy briefs, reports and strategy papers that docu-
ment jihadists’ online activities and media strategies are produced within a 
political and military framework committed to combating terrorism (a few 
recent examples include Almohammad and Winter 2019, de Leede 2018 
and Ayad 2019). This volume, however, dedicates more space to building 
on the efforts of more rigorous scholarship focused on the ‘symmetric dual-
ism’ and mutual referencing of audiovisual regimes and practices between 
jihadi groups and their opponents (Gruber 2019; Mitchell 2011; della Ratta 
2018; Shaw 2015). For our conceptualisation of Jihadi Audiovisuality and its 
Entanglements, research is therefore essential that firstly focuses on the jihadi 
audiovisual lexicon and its logics (Ostovar 2017). It is this sonic and visual 
repertoire, with all its local, historical, social and cultural contingencies, that 
shapes the ability of jihadi actors to powerfully manifest their ideas of the 
world and the transcendent through audiovisual means. This perspective 
affords drawing attention to the operational qualities of images of violence 
in general (Eder and Klonk 2017) and the agency of images of terror in par-
ticular (Kraidy 2017). These images stand for the events in which they were 
taken and ‘the event of viewing it’ (Azoulay 2012: 252). The visibility and 
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public display of these images (Friis 2018) relate the different events to the 
specific digital publics. This leads to the examination of how jihadi media and 
communication have both modified and been changed by the technologies 
of the social web (e.g. Ramsay 2015; Lohlker 2019) and discussions about 
the transformative dimension of ‘fast-moving, self-propelled’ imagery on the 
internet that evades regulation and control (Bolt 2012). Secondly, we have 
been inspired by recent scholarship which highlights how people’s experi-
ences are productive of and produced by the digital sphere (e.g. Mühlhoff et 
al. 2019), and which draws attention to different actors’ engagements with 
the jihadi audiovisual claim for dominance, including (but not limited to) 
forms of creative dissent such as satire and humour (Ramsay and Alkheder 
2020; Kraidy 2018).
Whereas a focus on military strategy and related ideology characterises 
most scholarship on the jihadi current, recently interest has emerged to 
examine ‘the everyday life’ and the cultural and social dimensions of jihadi 
groups and movements. Most notably, the edited collection Jihadi Culture 
(Hegghammer 2017b) focuses on poetry, music, dreams and cinematography 
(see also Krona and Pennington 2019). Hegghammer (2017a: 2) differenti-
ates ideology in terms of doctrine and aesthetics, remarking that ‘the literature 
on jihadism has mostly treated ideology as synonymous with doctrine that is 
a set of ideas transmitted through language and internalized through cogni-
tion’. While we welcome Hegghammer’s insight, we do not see the military, 
ideological and cultural productions of knowledge and meaning as distinct 
domains but instead emphasise their intermingling. We therefore take his 
apt statement as a starting point from which to develop jihadi audiovisuality 
as a field of research in itself that is not restricted to the analysis of the role 
of religion and/or ideology. This also means complementing and deepening 
the examination of various aspects of jihadi iconography, aesthetics and sonic 
representation with qualitative empirical and ethnographic approaches that 
focus on the practices and contextualisation of the everyday lives of oppo-
nents and supporters of jihadist groups.
While some ethnographic research has pointed to aspects of identity and 
of belonging to a ‘counterculture’ (Hemmingsen 2015), and to the gendered 
dimensions of online jihadi engagement (Carvalho 2018), others are con-
cerned with historical contextualisation and a shift in perspective, not only to 
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explain why European Muslims support militant movements and depart for 
war, for example, to Syria (Kublitz 2019), but to analyse how jihad is being 
presented as a solution to, for example, missing supranational interventions 
to humanitarian crisis (Li 2020). What is common to this anthropological-
ethnographic engagement is a critical and reflexive stance towards socially 
constructed categories such as radicalisation or securitisation (Fadil et al. 
2019). In line with this critical approach to research, we recognise the impor-
tance of addressing the ethical challenges that arise when conducting empiri-
cal research in the field of jihadi audiovisuality.
Methodology, Ethical and Legal Framework
The methodologies underlying the chapters in Jihadi Audiovisuality and its 
Entanglements are as varied as the disciplinary backgrounds of their authors. 
These range from visual and musical analysis to iconology and more theoreti-
cal investigations to covert observation and digital ethnography. Since schol-
arship on the jihadi current is highly politicised and securitised, a reflective 
approach to security, violence and Islam has become a major issue of debate. 
The three contributions in the section on the Methodological and Ethical 
Challenges of Empirically Grounded Research on Jihadism (A) seek to inspire 
critical self-reflection and to raise awareness among researchers about the pos-
sible consequences of doing empirical (online) research on jihadi audiovisual-
ity, addressing issues such as transparency and anonymity. They also provide 
an ethical basis for understanding contributions to the volume that relate to 
similar methodologies, for example Salzbrunn’s examples from Tunisia and 
Switzerland in her theoretical contribution (Chapter 7) or Berg’s chapter 
(Chapter 11), which draws on extensive fieldwork in Lebanon with Hamas 
and Hizbullah. Each approach comes with its own trajectory of engagement 
in ethical debates, three branches of which are of particular interest for this 
volume.
A first stream of research in terms of ethical considerations can be iden-
tified here that critically engages in the trajectories of terms such as radi-
calisation (see e.g. Fadil et al. 2019) and reflects on the ethical challenges of 
researchers’ positionality as part of this field (Gauvain 2018). The contribu-
tion by de Koning et al. (Chapter 1) demonstrates how researchers themselves 
are part of the entanglements of politicisation and securitisation. The authors 
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indicate how the interests of governmental, university and media institutions 
can have significant consequences for researchers and their interlocutors. 
They emphasise the need for researchers’ institutional protection, especially 
when researching controversial topics like the visuality and aurality of jihadi 
communication. Furthermore, de Koning et al. explore the limits researchers 
face and the possibilities they have to resist the identities imposed upon them 
and to defend the principles of privacy and non-discrimination.
Second, empirical social science and ethnographic fieldwork-based 
research on jihadi audiovisuality demands a thorough consideration of ethi-
cal challenges. Engagement with the digital in militant fields is particularly 
critical, as it often involves generating research data by accessing (online) 
spaces that are not intended for a broad public (see also Ess 2009; Zimmer 
and Kinder-Kurlanda 2017) or relate to the challenges of digital ethnogra-
phy while being part of the securitised research funding system (Fuhrmann 
and Pfeifer 2020). In her contribution, Carvalho (Chapter 3) is particularly 
concerned with the role of the researcher in digital research as she examines 
access to the field, and the gendered dimensions of fieldwork via Facebook 
and offline. Carvalho also outlines the legal frameworks pertaining to digital 
research and recounts how she was obliged to comply with different regu-
lations imposed by nation-states and universities, and different platforms’ 
terms of services. Sold et al. (Chapter 2) also address the close interrela-
tionships between ethical and legal challenges that emerge when tracing 
new trends and engagements by jihadi actors in social media and digital 
environments. Focusing on the requirements of the European General Data 
Protection Regulation and related ethical considerations when working with 
data obtained via social media platforms, they provide examples from their 
own research in the field of radicalisation and extremism. Relating their 
ethical considerations of privacy, transparency, trust and security to the legal 
principles of proportionality, adequateness, data economy and anonymisa-
tion, they develop a framework for designing research with social media data.
The third branch follows the tradition of questioning the ethics of aes-
thetic projects that deploy images of violence and atrocities, as has been 
most notoriously done by Sontag (2004), as well as by art historians and 
in cultural studies research (see e.g. Batchen et al. 2012). With regard to 
the visibility of violence in IS videos, Krona (Chapter 5) points to viewers’ 
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ethical responsibility towards the victims portrayed in such videos, which 
leads him to the broader question of whether researchers who show and 
further circulate such audiovisual material contribute to the reproduction of 
the violence and humiliation. Additionally, Pfeifer, Fuhrmann and Wevers 
(Chapter 8) discuss the active and participatory but nonetheless ethically 
questionable role of victims in re-enactments of violence in which their 
participation is not always voluntary, especially in cases where it is unclear 
whether performing victims knew the script of videos that they would live 
to survive or were subjected to genuine mortal fear. Taken together, these 
ethical and methodological considerations form the basis of our understand-
ing of Jihadi Audiovisuality and its Entanglements that we will explore in the 
three following subsections.
Sensation, Mediation and Audiovisuality
In his now-classic edited volume, Foster proposed the dialectics of vision 
as the physical process of sight and visuality as a ‘social fact’ (Foster 1998; 
see also Rose 2011: 6). Mirzoeff (2006: 76) complicated this dialectic and, 
shifting attention back to the original meaning of the term coined in mid-
nineteeth-century England, proposed that visuality should be understood as a 
complex ‘engagement with the politics of representation in transnational and 
transcultural form’, encompassing forms of resistance. Expanding on discus-
sions about vision and visuality, Grasseni’s (2004) theoretical and meth-
odological notion of ‘skilled vision’ conceptualises vision as a multi-sensual 
practice that is neither an individual activity nor a social representation of 
experiences, but is rather a learned and situated social activity: ‘a sensory 
practice that needs “educating and training in a relationship of apprentice-
ship and within an ecology of practice”’ (Grasseni and Gieser 2019: 6, citing 
Grasseni 2004: 41).
Extending beyond the initial emphasis on vision, these considerations 
have recently been re-examined, with Grasseni and Gieser (2019: 12), 
Willkomm (2016) and others introducing the concept of ‘skilled listening’ as 
a learned practice that makes sense of, orders or categorises audible impres-
sions. This addition not only reflects the observation that ‘audition and inau-
dition are [. . .] equally learned capacities that are constantly being honed’ 
(Daughtry 2015: 19). It also feeds into a paradigm shift in sound studies 
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where greater attention is being paid to the ways in which ‘environments, 
spaces or processes are not simple vehicles, coordinates, or channels of audi-
tory perception, but parts of feedback loops in which matter and meaning 
mutually influence one another’ (Erlmann 2018: 12; authors’ translation; 
see also Daughtry 2015: 122). Consequently, audition and inaudition are, 
just like vision and not seeing, embedded in specific mediating formations, 
routines and contexts.
To further define these contexts, we suggest that skilled listening and 
vision are practices that are produced by and productive of the different 
sensory regimes that ‘produce, reproduce and change power relations’ (Pels 
1996: 378). Expanding on Metz’s ([1977] 2000) notion of scopic regimes 
and Daughtry’s (2015) work on auditory regimes, we use the concept of sen-
sory regimes to refer to socially acquired, culturally learned, technologically 
extended and highly dynamic techniques of sensation. They are sometimes 
local, sometimes global, often interconnected, always historically, culturally 
and epistemologically contingent, and intersect in complicated ways.
Together with collective and individual bodies of knowledge, sensory 
regimes are key to the ways in which ‘interpretive communities’ (Fish 1982) 
collectively produce the meaning of any cultural artefact. They mediate the 
sonic and the visual through learned, performative and socially embedded 
techniques of (not) looking and (in)audition as well as through (political) 
ideologies, life histories, memories and experiences. As such, sensory regimes 
shape the ways in which we do or do not listen to and see ourselves, others and 
the world around us, and hence our capacity to perceive, appreciate, classify 
and interpret certain sounds and images. Discussing the Hollywood-esque 
style of Islamic State’s videos as an appropriative strategy, Zywietz and Beese 
(Chapter 4) make it clear that the potentiality of jihadi audiovisuality lies in 
the group’s ability to imitate aesthetic practices and viewing habits. These have 
evolved around visual patterns, motifs, codes and metaphors, as well as around 
narrative devices and technical tools used in film and television across the 
globe. Moving images are both communicative acts and aesthetic practices.
They not only connect to many sensory regimes simultaneously through 
their composition of visuals and sounds, use of lighting, camera angles, vol-
umes, tonality and editing, but also provide hooks for latching onto familiar 
audiovisual codes. It is exactly these audiovisual codes of IS videos that Ali et 
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al. (Chapter 9) respectively apply in their web videos and pedagogical digital 
youth work.
The configurations of people’s sensations and their receptivity thus shape 
the ways in which images and sounds are accorded specific qualities and 
assume a certain kind of status (e.g. as truth or evidence). This applies regard-
less of any ‘power’ inherent in a medium itself to change the social reality by 
‘enchanting or affecting people’, that is, to spark emotional, intellectual and 
physical responses. It should be remembered, however, that these configura-
tions are contingent on ‘a recursive feedback loop, subject at any given time 
to stabilising and destabilising influences’ (Grayson and Mawdsley 2019: 
433). Expanding on Bleeker’s (2008: 1–2) observations on the visual, we 
want to further emphasise that our (in)abilities and (limited) horizons of 
knowledge result in us always perceiving more, and always perceiving less, 
than what is there to be heard and seen, because our sensations are ‘rerouted 
through memory and fantasy, caught up in threads of the unconscious and 
entangled with the passions’. Furthermore, our sensations appear to alter 
the mediations we encounter and to transform us at the same time. In other 
words, the creation of knowledge and meaning through the sonic and the 
visual is never static, but rather always in the making, resonating between 
people and their socially acquired and culturally learned (in)abilities, material 
artefacts, cultural contexts and technological mediators.
Despite this highly volatile structure, we suggest that many actors seek 
to control the meanings attributed to the audiovisual media they produce 
by tailoring content to accustomed modes of seeing as outlined above. They 
also deploy auditive and visual elements such as postures, ‘costumes, props, 
make-up, hairstyle, spaces as a stage or scene (setting, in Goffman’s terms) to 
construct images for their sensitive effects’ (Mandoki 2007: 146; emphasis 
in the original). Many of the contributions to this volume address the work-
ings of such elements in terms of how our attention as viewers is potentially 
managed and how we are implicated in what we see. For example, Günther 
(Chapter 6) shows how specific settings are affectively loaded and accorded 
a certain meaning by the use of particular colour schemes to brighten or 
darken scenes. Krona’s (Chapter 5) analysis of the ways in which violence 
is staged for the camera reveals the techniques by which producers invite 
distant audiences to relate to and understand what they are shown. Ali et al. 
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(Chapter 9) compellingly demonstrate how strategies of ambiguity, used in 
their online youth work to combine familiar elements like jihadi anāshīd (a 
cappella chants or hymns) with new ideas and contexts, have successfully won 
the critical engagement of young viewers.
Similarly, accessibility, and their audiences’ experiences of immediacy, 
are further regulated through the use of voice and words, and the style chosen, 
as well as the rhythm, tone volume, intonation and many more variables that 
are all produced by and productive of body posture and motions –  hence 
displaying markers of social identity that people can relate to. Reflecting these 
considerations, some of the contributions to this volume attend in particular 
to the ways in which listening ‘can orient people within their environments, 
connect them with affective stimuli, and open their bodies up to violence and 
pain as well as to knowledge and pleasure’ (Daughtry 2015: 6). Weinrich 
(Chapter 10) and Berg (Chapter 11), as well as Dick and Fuhrmann (Chapter 
12), all show how the discursive and formal aspects deployed in the pro-
duction and performance of anāshīd render the chants powerful modes of 
production of meaning and knowledge while simultaneously intermingling 
with other modalities. These three chapters, in varying degrees, also illustrate 
what Eisenlohr (2018) has called ‘sonic movements’, that is, the capacity 
of various acoustic parameters to trigger a sense of being moved, felt as an 
embodied experience by the listener. This is not a matter of a simple  stimulus–
response chain, but of a resonance sensed in the listener’s body, which blurs 
the boundaries between subject and object and is  particularly significant in 
the experience of acoustic forms of expression in religious contexts (Allesch 
2013: 49–52). Eisenlohr (2018: 49) also emphasises this when he writes that 
the acoustic movements resemble the spatial movements of an imagined or 
actual person. Just as many other examples, such as various forms of religious 
processions, testify, Berg’s contribution (Chapter 11) makes it clear that, 
especially in public performances of anāshīd, correlations and overlapping of 
physical, spatial and acoustic movement can be observed. For a co-present 
audience, the sensory experience is moulded by ‘the natural and architectural 
environments that absorb, reflect, amplify, and distort sounds’ (Daughtry 
2015: 35) as well as by visual, olfactory, haptic, thermal and other stimuli.
Producers’ endeavours to allow us to see and hear some things but not 
others do not necessarily result in unambiguous representations, however. 
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There are many instances where efforts are made to limit the polysemy of 
specific lexic, spatial, sonic and visual components as much as possible. In 
doing this, producers seek to prove their capacity to construct an audiovisual 
presentation that expresses their authority and aestheticises their classificatory 
power. At the same time, they play with the full creative repertoire that pro-
duces ambiguity, in order to cater to the diversity of their audiences’ capaci-
ties, horizons of knowledge, memories and emotions. Weinrich (Chapter 10) 
demonstrates this lucidly when she traces the allusions to (and appropriations 
of) various musical genres and styles found in the development of jihadi 
anāshīd. These are, in turn, potentially destabilising factors that offer potential 
for the contestation of authority asserted through audiovisual presentations. 
In discussing several forms of appropriation of Islamic State’s nashīd Íalīl 
al-Íawārim, Dick and Fuhrmann (Chapter 12) offer one case that illustrates 
such contestation very vividly and shows the subversive force of creativity and 
humour. More often than not, however, the relational character inherent in 
these mediations is obscured so that it becomes difficult to discern the ways in 
which we as an audience are implicated in what we see and hear.
Against this complex backdrop, we define audiovisualities in the plural 
as a relational heuristic for analysing the multiple and highly volatile links 
between people’s sensation, the mediations they encounter, and the modes 
deployed to create meaning and knowledge. These links are established 
through distinct manifestations of visual and auditory experiences and prac-
tices: the use of specific tonalities and styles of speech, representations of 
certain habits, the deployment of certain technologies, and the creation and 
appropriation of mediations and various forms of engagement with them. 
This involves (inter alia) significant parts of the sensory field and essential 
modalities of knowledge and meaning-making through which individual and 
collective identities are enacted. Hence, we attend to discursive and embod-
ied practices that have material effects and are often hard to distinguish from 
the prosthetic technologies that connect one’s body to the world outside (Jay 
2008). The contributions in this volume therefore not only scrutinise the 
discursive and embodied modes of (moving) images and sounds, but also 
explore their specific forms of mediation, focusing on the performativity, 
materiality and audiovisuality of media productions. This also necessitates a 
focus on the formal aspects of images and sounds, as well as attention to the 
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dynamics that emerge through the reciprocity of matter and meaning in the 
spatial, technical, processual or bodily contact zones between images, sounds 
and human actors.
The Jihadi in Audiovisuality
While the constellations described above are applicable to many instances 
of human interaction, this collection sheds light on the specificities of jihadi 
audiovisualities. In order to identify the inherent particularities, we draw on 
Gilbert Ramsay (2015: 55), who suggests that ‘the sum total of all that is 
“jihadi” does not add up to jihad, but rather to its man-made allegory’. Li 
(2020: 108) further helps to clarify this point: ‘what requires understanding is 
not jihad’s “Islamicness” or lack thereof, but rather how the jihad performed 
the work of universalism, of processing difference.’ Following this assertion, 
the concept of jihadi audiovisuality enables us to distinguish and examine the 
ways in which people identify visual and auditory practices and experiences 
as an expression of jihad. Jihadi audiovisuality in our sense encompasses how 
people’s auditory and visual practices and experiences are productive of and 
produced by: the visualisation and sonification of contemporary forms of 
jihadi engagement; the set of ideas, norms and values transmitted through 
audiovisual media; the processes of production, distribution, collection and 
consumption of jihadi audiovisual content; the discursive and non-discursive 
practices of processing and engaging with them; and ‘even the way in which 
information is ordered and structured by the Web’ (Ramsay 2015: 77). 
These material and immaterial configurations are, significantly, not inher-
ently bound to any specific region, culture or even religion, although jihadi 
ideologues and some of their critics routinely argue otherwise. On the con-
trary: rephrasing Deborah Poole (1997: 8–10), we suggest that the affective 
potency of Jihadi Audiovisuality and its Entanglements is contingent upon an 
audiovisual economy that interrelates people in disparate places who may not 
share a common language, geographical origin or class, but nonetheless share 
a common identification with the Arabic nisba jihādī or the active participle 
mujāhid as an allegory that helps to relate their social identities, practices and 
experiences to a wider collective.
In the case of Islamic State, for example, it could be argued that –  at 
least in the territories under its command –  the group managed to shape and 
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control a distinct body public not only by exerting a range of authoritative 
measures, but also through its creation of a soundscape comprising a range 
of sonic events. Calls to prayer sung by members of the ªisba forces, the 
public performance of anāshīd, the screams of victims of atrocious violence 
and people shouting to warn others against immediate aerial bombardments 
can all be considered part of these sonic events –  all the more effective in 
combination with the simultaneous silencing of certain musical instruments, 
musicians, church bells, and versions of adhān different from jihadi variants 
of the Muslim call to prayer. Add to this the sounds of drones, fighter jets, 
weapons, and the various other ‘belliphonic’ (Daughtry 2015) expressions 
brought about by the war between IS and its opponents, and the transforma-
tion of the soundscape becomes overwhelming. In many instances, members 
of IS have cited such sonic events as evidence of the group’s existence and 
power. Considering the sound of an American fighter jet to be equally inte-
gral to this soundscape as the voice of Abū Bakr al-Baghdādī, they construct 
an ontological framework within which all of these sounds are inherently 
bound to the mujāhidīn’s modes of creating knowledge and meaning –  hence 
jihadi by their very nature.
The establishment of a scopic regime as part of jihadi audiovisuality can 
be described in a very similar way. Many of the examples mentioned above 
also rely on visual components –  as well as haptic, olfactory and other sensual 
stimuli. Members of jihadi forces who regulate public life on the ground are 
usually identifiable from their demeanour and uniforms, while public perfor-
mances of anāshīd are just as carefully stage-managed, as are public corporal 
punishments or burnings of destroyed musical instruments. The remains 
of civilian houses clouded in black smoke are as prominent in the visual 
field as the fighter jets (and sometimes drones) that caused such devastation. 
Further features of the scenery include the remnants of obliterated shrines, 
mausoleums and graveyards, as well as the military defences, bureaucratic 
buildings and IS media kiosks –  most of which bear the black banner that 
is the jihadi totem. When audiovisual representations of these and similar 
scenes are circulated, they not only provide evidence that jihadi life is a real-
ity, but also testify to the power of jihadi actors to impose upon audiences 
their particular interpretation of what is to be seen and heard. Moreover, the 
camera’s gaze (and the ways in which it is sculpted in post-production) shapes 
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the link between the sensations experienced by mujāhidīn and the mediations 
they encounter. It manifests their visual experiences and relates the persons 
depicted to their ideology, actions, cultural practices, experiences and modes 
of creating knowledge and meaning, all of which are rendered jihadi.
The same argument can be made with reference to (moving) images 
appropriated from a range of TV and film productions (see Zywietz and 
Beese, Chapter 4). These are not only incorporated to save jihadi groups from 
having to stage monumental battles at great expense. They fulfil an important 
function, because they evoke well-known ways of how global audiences per-
ceive historical or contemporary events, developments and people. Dislodged 
from their original context and transposed into jihadi audiovisuality, they 
offer an audiovisual experience that is filtered through specific lenses toned 
by jihadi ideology. A similar effect also feeds into a very simple, yet powerful 
intermingling of several modalities in the use of the epigraphy and/or recita-
tion of the shahāda, that is, the Muslim profession of faith, as the audiovisual 
opening of videos. Jihadi actors use this device to instil in the audience a sense 
that they participate in a sanctified event created and performed by ‘true’, 
authentic Muslims to perform and enact ‘true’, authentic Islam. This marks 
the video as not only conforming to but also (re)asserting the self-evident, 
natural superiority of divine ordinances and those who serve them –  the 
mujāhidīn. Using the shahāda as an integral element of jihadi audiovisuality 
is thereby a means to exert classificatory authority, the power to define social 
order, and a source of aesthetic self-legitimisation.
Although the work done by jihadi ideologues and their supporters to 
shape jihadi audiovisuality relies on the production, appropriation and dis-
semination of various audiovisual elements, it does not end with the manifold 
forms of incorporation traced by several contributors to this volume. Rather, 
it includes the possibility of exerting authority by (re-)classifying any image 
or sound within the jihadi ideological framework, for example by assigning it 
a position within binary categories such as ªarām/ªalāl or kuffār/muʾminīn.
Entanglements and the Performativity of Images and Sounds
As outlined above, our title Jihadi Audiovisuality and its Entanglements is to 
be understood in a double sense. First, we locate audiovisual media produc-
tions and their dissemination by jihadi groups and movements within a field 
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of global media aesthetics and practices with culturally distinct manifesta-
tions. This helps us to identify the ways in which jihadi actors incorporate 
various artefacts and techniques of material and immaterial culture, re-codify 
them, and appropriate them to articulate their cause. Practices of cultural and 
aesthetic appropriation have been productive lenses with which to analyse 
IS’s use of the orange prison jumpsuit as rhetorical resistance (Richey and 
Edwards 2019) or the co-option of constitutional discourses for legitimis-
ing the state project of IS (Bruscella and Bisel 2019). With their analytical 
intervention, Zywietz and Beese (Chapter 4) describe three different types of 
interpretive, practical-technological and expressive appropriation that they 
apply to IS media output to ‘(en-)counter the Islamic State’. Refining this 
theoretical underpinning, Günther (Chapter 6) examines the specific format 
of narratives of conversion to show how key concepts of Islamic intellectual 
history are appropriated to attract followers. Similarly, anāshīd have been 
appropriated by IS supporters in order to, for example, legitimise the claim 
for a ‘righteous’ caliphate, as Dick and Fuhrmann (Chapter 12) show.
Secondly, we consider cultural and aesthetic expressions that evolve in 
response to jihadi media output as part of the wider field of jihadi audiovisu-
ality. This includes examining how various people use aural and visual means 
to engage with jihadi expressions in multiple acoustic, visual and audiovisual 
forms to subvert or resist jihadi audiovisuality. Again, the different sonic 
and visual appropriations circulated in various –  mainly digital –  contexts, 
using techniques like memes, humour or re-enactments, are discussed in 
several contributions to this volume. The producers of these contestations 
range from Muslim activists and religious authorities (Pfeifer et al., Chapter 
8) to anonymous authors of digital content (Dick and Fuhrmann, Chapter 
12) and artists or publicly-funded social workers and former supporters of 
jihadi groups and movements (Ali et al., Chapter 9). These contributions 
also highlight and problematise researchers’ institutional entanglements –  for 
example, in educational programmes to counter radicalisation or in work 
intended to undermine the effectiveness of IS’s visual output. De Koning et 
al. (Chapter 1) reflect on how their own roles and performances are part of 
public discourses about ‘jihadism’ and demonstrate their entanglements with 
jihadi audiovisuality as researchers.
In short, the contributions point to the logics and techniques of different 
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forms of appropriation and the linkages forged by jihadi audiovisuality that 
connect supporters, religious leaders, civil society actors, artists, activists, 
journalists and researchers. Mimesis, memetics, re-enactment, camouflage 
and humour are just a few of the strategies various actors use to engage with, 
subvert, or resist. We propose framing this setting as Jihadi Audiovisuality and 
its Entanglements: as a communicative web that is shaped by socio- political 
contexts, by the ways in which actors deploy practices of appropriation, 
media technologies and rhetorical strategies and by the interaction of multi-
sensory stimuli.
Examining audiovisual artefacts as ‘products’ of media practices (Dang-
Anh et al. 2017; Schüttpelz 2006), we consider the performativity of images 
and sounds that are at play in practices of engagement with jihadi images 
and sounds. This performativity is at least twofold: Pfeifer et al. (Chapter 8) 
describe the embodied and performative practices involved in the produc-
tion of re-enactments of IS decapitation videos as one link in a media chain 
that connects embodied experiences of spectatorship to the production of 
new aesthetic forms. Building on Jeffrey Juris’s (2005) concept of the ‘per-
formativity of violence’, Krona (Chapter 5) combines practical-instrumental 
dimensions with symbolic-expressive characteristics to shift from a focus on 
the embodied practices towards the representational interpretation of the per-
formative violent act. In his view, the violent acts in the decapitation videos 
are re-mediated and re-contextualised by visual means. Taken together, the 
two approaches to the performativity of the visual and the bodily and per-
formative engagement inherent in audiovisual practices recognise the ‘mutual 
reflection between objects, images and bodies’ (Bolt 2004: 8).
Organisation of the Book
While our considerations are based on an approach that emphasises the 
complex interweavings of multi-sensory stimuli and receptions, many of the 
contributions to this volume are based upon examples that focus on specific 
auditory or visual processes. We have therefore structured the book into four 
thematic sections: (A) Methodological and Ethical Challenges of Empirically 
Grounded Research on Jihadism; (B) Visualising Jihadi Ideology and Action; 
(C) Appropriating and Contesting Jihadi Audiovisuality; and (D) anāshīd: 
Soundscapes of Religio-Political Experience.
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The contributions in section A are devoted to the ethical and methodo-
logical challenges of doing empirically based and ethnographic research in 
the highly contested and politicised field of jihadi social media environments 
involving different groups of people engaged in and with these environ-
ments. The contributions firstly draw attention to how the position of the 
researcher in relation to research ethics and security has become a major issue 
of debate (Fadil et al. 2019). Secondly, they address the new questions that 
arise regarding research design and strategies, data management and legal 
aspects when doing digital research in this field. Thirdly, the chapters in this 
section review how the internet, particularly social media and messenger 
services, have proven to be fruitful ground for new and experimental research 
into the workings of online jihadi networks.
Contributions in section B focus on the ways in which jihadi ideo-
logues, groups and movements use audiovisual media to articulate their 
cause. Groups such as IS have explicitly announced that media work is 
akin to jihad on the battlefield, and therefore have invested heavily in 
the cinematic sophistication and aesthetic quality of their communicative 
productions by employing skilled professionals. They appropriate the prac-
tices and conventions of global media production and adapt formats and 
aesthetic trends from television, film and popular culture. Contributions 
to this section employ theoretical and methodological approaches from 
film studies, media studies, Islamic studies and the sociology of religion 
to examine the visual rhetoric, graphic and cinematic design principles, 
and the techniques of meaning construction used in jihadi videos and 
imagery.
Contributions in section C are concerned with the practices through 
which activists and artists appropriate jihadi videos, images and sounds 
to defy, resist or oppose jihadi ideology and action. The chapters focus on 
examples of civil society commitment and artistic creativity that engage with 
and react to jihadi image, video and sound production. The different forms 
of engagement with jihadi material work as a form of cultural resistance, 
and they shed light on the interlinkages between different groups of actors 
opposed to jihadi movements. These groups nonetheless differ in the narra-
tives and discourses they relate to and the digital publics they engage with. 
Ultimately, this section also points to the dynamic interrelations between 
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anti-Muslim and militant Islamist discourses and strategies (see Ebner 2017), 
with a focus on audiovisuality.
Section D brings together contributions that examine the often under-
stated but highly significant aural dimension of jihadi mediations. The 
contributions focus on a cappella hymns (Arab. anāshīd), which comprise 
a widespread genre of cultural and religious expression by Muslim actors, 
ranging from Sufi chants to Indonesian Pop-anāshīd. The chapters delin-
eate the compositional conventions used in jihadi anāshīd as well as the 
ways in which they reflect pre-Islamic traditions of music, song and poetry. 
This also reveals how anāshīd tie in with extra-textual characteristics such 
as rhythm, vocal timbre and melodies, which are influenced by nationalist 
songs, military marches and global pop culture. They thereby help to forge 
a connection between the listeners and the songs –  even before the lyrics are 
considered. Contributions to this section draw on theoretical and methodo-
logical approaches from musicology, ethnomusicology, Islamic studies and 
cultural studies in order to better understand the musical and poetic structure 
of anāshīd, as well as the religious, cultural and social contexts within which 
these chants and corresponding performative practices are embedded.
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ON SPEAKING, REMAINING SILENT AND 
BEING HEARD: FRAMING RESEARCH, 
POSITIONALITY AND PUBLICS IN THE 
JIHADI FIELD
Martijn de Koning, Annelies Moors and Aysha Navest
In April 2016, we published our article ‘Chatting about marriage with  female migrants to Syria’ in the peer-reviewed journal Anthropology Today 
(Navest et al. 2016).1 This was a short explorative piece based on an experi-
mental method of private chatting that focused on how Dutch-speaking 
women who had travelled to jihadi-held areas in Syria entered into marriages. 
Our article, which criticised the often-imposed label ‘jihadi brides’, offered 
new insights into how and where such women entered into marriages and 
how the proclamation of the caliphate affected the conclusion of marriages. 
Our last paragraph commented briefly on the prevalent framing of these 
women as either victims of unscrupulous jihadi men or as militants in their 
own right. Neither notion fitted well with how most of the women presented 
themselves to us in the private chats.
Nine months later, a journalist of an upscale Dutch daily, the NRC 
Handelsblad (hereafter NRC), authored a three-page article about our publica-
tion, which he presented as ‘Cyberjihadism’ at the University of Amsterdam. 
He accused the junior researcher, Navest, of jihadist sympathies, and the 
 1 This research project is funded by the ERC advanced grant ‘Problematizing “Muslim 
Marriages”: Ambiguities and Contestations’ (Grant number: 2013-AdG-324180). 
28 | part a
seniors, de Koning and Moors, of a lack of transparency –  because we had 
kept our interlocutors anonymous. He also expressed concern that the study 
could potentially hinder the work of the security services, as it could be used 
by lawyers defending female migrants to Syria in terrorism trials.2 This not 
only led to a huge public outcry in the media, but also sparked twenty-two 
parliamentary questions, and resulted in the university announcing a reflec-
tion audit.
In this contribution, we discuss how these events can help us to under-
stand the effects of the politicisation of a research field (Wright 1998).3 
The main challenge we faced was how to respond when a variety of actors 
reframed our research project, from a contribution to academic debate on 
controversial marriages to an instantiation of jihadism in academia. The case 
we present here highlights the polemics that come about in and through 
public debate when conducting ethnographic research in the jihadi field, 
working with interlocutors considered ‘repugnant’ (Harding 1991). Such 
processes of politicisation also need to be seen in the context of growing 
ethno-nationalism, which has targeted Muslims in particular (Bracke 2013; 
Moors 2014; Fadil et al. 2019; Van Es 2019).
In discussing the formats that such responses to being targeted may 
take, we build on insights from writers who have engaged with similar 
issues in other fields (Butler 2009). Those addressed may take over the terms 
by which they are interpellated, or they may, depending on the positions 
they find themselves in and the discursive space available to them, reject 
or ignore the terms of address. Such styles of responding not only vary 
between individuals or collectives; even a single person may simultane-
ously draw on different elements of these various formats.4 Sarah Bracke 
(2011), who analysed how women involved with ‘political Islam’ in The 
Netherlands ‘talk back’ to the dominant national discourse on women, 
Islam and emancipation, shows how those who reject the terms by which 
they are addressed may accept the broader frame of address, while those 
 2 For a more extensive analysis of the NRC article and its aftermath see Moors (2019a). 
 3 See also de Koning et al. (2010) and Schmidt (2017).
 4 Similarly, in his analysis of how minorities respond to racialised ascriptions, Didier Fassin 
(2011: 424) points to the various positions that subjects may take in response to being 
interpellated.
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who embrace the terms by which they are addressed may simultaneously 
resignify them. In our case, the notions both of remaining silent and speak-
ing up also need further qualification. Brian Larkin (2014), who discussed 
how the use of loudspeakers by competing Muslim and Christian groups in 
northern Nigeria engendered violence, analysed how people may cultivate 
inattention as ‘a conscious, willful act and not simply an inability to attend’ 
(2014: 1006). Remaining silent may, then, have different meanings, vary-
ing from an inability to speak because one is silenced to a conscious act of 
refusing to engage. Turning from silence to speaking up, bell hooks (1986), 
reflecting on her experiences of growing up in a black community in the 
US South, highlights the difference between speaking and being heard. 
Defining ‘talking back’ as ‘speaking as an equal to an authority figure’ 
(1986: 123), she emphasises that it is not simply a matter of emerging from 
silence to speech, but of making ‘a speech that compels listeners, one that 
is heard’ (1986: 124).
This contribution focuses on how we, as authors, have positioned our-
selves in the field and how we have responded, both individually and col-
lectively, to the various ways in which we have been addressed. Up until 
now, our publications have been authored by the senior researchers, although 
draft versions were always shared among the three of us to ascertain that we 
all agreed to the content (Moors 2019a/b; Moors and de Koning 2018). In 
this multi-vocal contribution, we use a different format in order to focus on 
the particular ways in which each of us has been interpellated. We are posi-
tioned differently in academia as well as in society, in terms of professional 
seniority and visible markers of gender, religion and generation, which has 
strongly affected our interactions with particular publics. With different, and 
sometimes overlapping, circles of friends, family and colleagues, each of us 
not only had to take into consideration and engage with different individuals 
and publics, but we were also addressed in different ways –  sometimes by the 
very same individuals and publics.
In order to present our multiple voices, we draw on a wider range of 
sources and use a different style of writing from in our previous publications. 
Rather than using publicly available sources only, we also draw on e-mails 
that we wrote and received, field notes we kept in the course of the process 
and, especially, posts from our three-person WhatsApp group. This enables 
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us to provide a ‘real-time’ narrative, to enhance the multivocality of this 
article and to include affective elements (ranging from joy to indignation) 
and coping mechanisms, such as humour, which may enable readers to better 
understand why we responded in the ways we did.
In order to make our different voices discernible in the text, we cite both 
the WhatsApp conversations and e-mails, which we have translated from 
Dutch into English. When one of us is speaking in the text, we use the term 
‘I’. When we use ‘we’ to refer to just two of us, the names are mentioned; 
otherwise ‘we’ refers to all three authors. In the following, we present how 
the affair unfolded, the ways in which we were addressed, individually and 
collectively, how we responded, and how voice, positionality and publics 
emerged in different configurations for each of us.
Act I: Happiness and Excitement: Cool Research!
We start our tale with the publication of our article in Anthropology Today, 
in April 2016:
05-04-16, 18:44 –  Martijn de Koning: In case you did not yet see it, our 
article is online with Anthropology Today.
05-04-16, 18:48 –  Aysha: oh is it already done 😀? Cool, I am going to 
look right now
06-04-16, 21:50 –  Aysha: [. . .] Received today a message from our research 
field, will include it in my profile document. Do you have a link to the full 
article? I have a lot of fans (my parents😁), they cannot wait to read it
We were very pleased that our article had been published in Anthropology 
Today. It was the perfect slot for a brief exploratory text, as it was both peer-
reviewed and quickly published. The latter was important to us, because our 
field was changing so rapidly.
Aysha: For me this was even more special, as it was my first publication.
As Dutch academia strongly encourages researchers to share their find-
ings with the wider public, something we also value. Martijn had contacted 
some journalists to see whether they would be interested in reporting on the 
publication in Dutch.
Martijn: I had established a good working relationship with several 
journalists while doing research on Salafism and militant activism. Soon a 
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journalist from NRC, Andreas Kouwenhoven, expressed an interest in our 
research. I sent him the article and he seemed to like it.
14 July 2016: E-mail Kouwenhoven: Hi Martijn, here is the text. It will 
be in the newspaper tomorrow, otherwise Saturday or Monday. It would be 
great if you could have a look at it. Cool research!
In the draft article, he summarised some of our findings and related 
them to the trial of a female returnee from Syria, Laura H. But that article 
was never published. NRC’s editorial team did not consider it sufficiently 
newsworthy. We began to look for another outlet, yet before we had found 
one, something else happened.
Act II: Supporting the Violent Jihad? Seriously?
Martijn: In early October 2016, out of the blue, I was contacted by the same 
journalist. He enquired whether a post he had found on an online forum, 
that dismissed certain stories about sexual slavery of foreign women who 
travel to IS-held areas in Syria as untrue, was evidence that Aysha was biased 
in favour of jihadists. He also asked who she was married to –  he suspected 
that her husband might have jihadi sympathies –  as well as requesting other 
personal information about her:
06-10-16, 18:23 –  Martijn de Koning: I have sent you an email from 
Andreas Kouwenhoven (NRC). He has all kinds of questions about Aysha 
. . . [. . .]
06-10-16, 23:08 –  Martijn de Koning: to be honest, in my interactions 
with journalists I am used to a lot, but I almost fell of my chair in surprise 
[. . .]
06-10-16, 23:09 –  Aysha: Yeah, honestly, I was also shocked.
06-10-16, 23:09 –  Aysha: But that is not at all relevant for the substance of 
the research project
Annelies: I quickly began to have doubts about this journalist, who seemed 
to have changed his position quite dramatically regarding an article he had 
described as cool research just a few months earlier. Following the advice of a 
senior colleague specialised in research ethics, I decided, as the project leader, 
to become the spokesperson for our project. I only answered the question 
related to the content of the article, the story about sexual slavery, which 
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had already been investigated and found to be a hoax before Aysha allegedly 
referred to it.5 But I refused to answer any questions that invaded Aysha’s 
privacy. The journalist then complained to the public relations department 
of our university about my refusal to engage in discussions about the family 
relations of a member of our team. The head of public relations called me and 
advised me to go and have coffee with the journalist to defuse the situation. 
So I did.
Annelies and Martijn: We were, to put it mildly, astonished by the accu-
sations of ‘jihadist sympathies’, which seemed so far-fetched. We were, of 
course, aware that Aysha had known some women before they had left for 
Syria, which had been one of the reasons we wanted to have her in our team. 
Working very closely together in the course of the research project, we had 
never witnessed any indication of a ‘pro-IS bias’. On the contrary.
Annelies: On 18 October, I met the journalist over coffee and spoke with 
him for at least an hour and a half. He appeared nervous; all the more so 
when I said I wanted to record our conversation, which in the end he agreed 
to. Within the first five minutes, it became evident that ‘the beginnings’ of 
the affair preceded the publication of our article. He explained that he was 
not really interested in Aysha, but in someone else close to her, with whom 
he had a long-standing issue. He was not interested in the other two authors 
of the article, Martijn and me. I explained that it was common in our field 
not to record or even ask for the official names of interlocutors, and that this 
was also stipulated by the ethics committee of our funding body. We agreed 
to have another conversation after I had consulted Martijn and Aysha. More 
specifically, the journalist asked me to ask Aysha directly whether she sup-
ported the violent jihad.
Annelies and Martijn: Odd as it may seem, in the end we agreed to do 
as he asked. It seemed the only way to avoid a publication that we feared 
could have very harmful consequences for Aysha, who was then on pregnancy 
leave. We were all too aware that in the political climate of the time, if an 
upscale newspaper claimed that a junior Muslim researcher had expressed a 
 5 Reuter, C. (2013), ‘Sex jihad’ and other lies: Assad’s elaborate disinformation campaign. 
Der Spiegel, 7 October 2013. Available at <http:// www.spiegel.de/ international/ world/ 
assad-regime-wages-pr-campaign-to-discredit-rebels-a-926479.html> (last accessed 7 
October 2019). 
speaking,  remaining s ilent and being heard | 33
pro-jihadist position online, her –  and our –  refutation of that claim would 
not undo the harm to her.
Aysha: My excitement about the publication of the article rapidly turned 
into astonishment and frustration when the journalist only asked questions 
about my private life and not about our research. It even came to the point 
that Annelies and Martijn had to question me about my stance towards the 
violent jihad (which I do not support in any way). This was a very unpleasant 
situation for all three of us.
Annelies and Martijn: On 17 November, we went together for a second 
conversation with the journalist. He acknowledged that publishing his accu-
sations could have ‘fatal consequences’ for Aysha. Yet our faith in her seemed 
only to fuel his suspicions. Why would we believe her when she said that she 
did not support IS? And our arguments for maintaining anonymity seemed 
to him only further evidence of our complicity; he simply refused to believe 
that that could be common practice in our field.
Annelies: On 15 December, I received the journalist’s draft article and 
a list of on-the-record questions. I answered the questions about the con-
tent of our article, our research ethics and methodology, but again I refused 
to answer those that concerned private information. I did, however, after 
consulting Aysha, give him her e-mail address so that he could pose those 
questions directly. Guided by our public relations department, I also advised 
her that it might be wise to provide brief answers in order to avoid selective 
quotations:
15-12-16, 12:06 –  Aysha: Jihadists amongst family and acquaintances 😂?
15-12-16, 12:07 –  Annelies Moors: He very often uses the word jihadists 
. . .
15-12-16, 12:08 –  Aysha: Yeah, am curious who all those jihadists in my 
circle are supposed to be . . .
Aysha: I decided only to answer that I do not support the violent jihad in any 
way.
Annelies and Martijn: While we found it difficult to take the whole 
affair seriously, we were also becoming increasingly concerned for Aysha’s 
safety. We were well aware that an NRC article would immediately be 
picked up by shockblogs, and its often aggressive publics. The journalist 
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sent his draft article to the PR department and our university’s upper hier-
archy became involved: Annelies was invited to visit the Rector. Perhaps 
this invitation should have alarmed us more than it did at the time. We 
were, however, far more concerned about the potential consequences for 
Aysha than about our employer. And we still simply could not believe that 
our carefully-worded three-page article could actually be read as a pro-
jihadist text: . . .
15-12-16, 12:57 –  Annelies Moors: so, now I am going to see the rector 
this afternoon . . .
15-12-16, 13:01 –  Martijn de Koning: The rector??? Next, we will be 
invited for an audience with the pope . . .
15-12-16, 13:01 –  Annelies Moors: Well, in this way you get to meet 
people
15-12-16, 13:08 –  Aysha: Hahaha! In spite of my irritation, I have to laugh 
[. . .]
15-12-16, 13:11 –  Aysha: I am flattered that he thinks that I am capable of 
misleading you both without any effort
15-12-16, 13:12 –  Annelies Moors: We feel less flattered of course . . . 😄
15-12-16, 13:12 –  Aysha: Yes, that is understandable 😂
15-12-16, 13:12 –  Annelies Moors: We are depicted as a bunch of fools
15-12-16, 13:13 –  Aysha: Yes that is a bit nasty of him 😬 I am really won-
dering which societal purpose is served by this
Annelies: So, I went to see the rector after having replied to the journalist. 
She had also invited the Dean. It was a very civil, friendly conversation. The 
Rector expressed her full confidence in me, and, just as importantly, appeared 
to understand and sympathise with my concerns about Aysha. She made a 
vague reference to the possibility of doing an audit if things got out of hand, 
which I had no problem with as long as it would be undertaken by auditors 
familiar with our field. The Dean seemed slightly less at ease and stressed 
that he would like to be kept informed about any developments in what 
had become ‘our case’, including my correspondence with the NRC. In the 
meantime, the journalist’s attempt to disqualify our article with the editor 
of Anthropology Today failed. The editor simply pointed out that Aysha had 
stated that she did not support the violent jihad, that the article had been 
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peer-reviewed, and that maintaining interlocutors’ anonymity is common 
practice in anthropological research.
Shortly before Christmas, we were informed that the NRC had post-
poned publication of the article, and Aysha gave birth to a son.
The whole episode had not yet reached the public eye, but the ways in 
which positionality was at stake had already became evident. From the start 
of the affair, the journalist had only focused on the private life of the junior 
researcher. He had consistently tried to push the seniors to distance them-
selves from the junior researcher. The seniors were at most collateral damage. 
Our university officials were very supportive, yet they were also concerned 
about reputation management. What would happen when this became a 
public affair?
Act III: Doing Serious Harm
In mid-January 2017, the journalist announced that his article would be pub-
lished and, on 17 January, the NRC article was indeed published. With the 
headline ‘Sister Aicha: Cyberjihadist and UvA-scientist’ and pre-announced 
the day before as ‘How cyberjihadists got to influence an academic study of 
IS’, the three-page report with colour illustrations immediately sparked a 
huge amount of negative publicity. On the same day, the university issued our 
extensive response to the article online, adding at the bottom: ‘To stimulate 
scientific debate about the methodology used in this research, the University 
of Amsterdam will invite external experts to reflect on this case’:6
18-01-17, 14:41 –  Aysha: I am very shocked by his article, especially because 
he presents me as some kind of jihad recruiter and also tries to destroy you 
both completely [. . .]
18-01-17, 14:50 –  Aysha: I find his statement very scary . . . Next thing, I 
will have youth services at the door . . .
18-01-17, 14:52 –  Aysha: Or do I exaggerate a bit.7
 6 Reactie UvA-onderzoeker op artikel ‘NRC’ (Reaction UvA-researcher on article ‘NRC’), 
17 January 2017. Available at <https:// www.uva.nl/ content/ nieuws/ nieuwsberichten/ 2017/ 
01/ reactie-uva-op-artikel-nrc-handelsblad.html> (last accessed 5 November 2019).
 7 Aysha’s concerns were by no means unfounded. Not long before, a couple from a nearby 
town had been accused of planning to travel to Syria, and their children had immedi-
ately been removed from their care. When it soon become clear that the suspicions were 
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As we had predicted, shockblogs such as GeenStijl attacked us as well as the 
university, while its English-language counterparts, such as Jihadwatch and 
Breitbart, also picked it up. We received personal hatemail.
Aysha: Most of my direct relatives did not read Kouwenhoven’s article, 
because they read the regional newspaper and not the NRC. Many of them 
only knew about the publication when I told them about it. Their reaction 
was that these accusations could not possibly be true. Although my conver-
sion to Islam had caused mixed feelings within my family, my relatives had 
immediately recognised that it did not change me as a person. Consequently, 
they were certain that I did not support the violent jihad. Unlike my mother, 
most of my relatives did not realise that the publication could have a hugely 
negative impact on my future career and, even worse, endanger my personal 
safety. They just regarded it as a tedious event. My mother was keenly aware 
of these effects and hence very worried about my well-being. Her concerns 
were all the more intense as I had given birth just one month before the 
publication.
Meanwhile, a host of parliamentary questions had been posed, raising 
aspects ranging from the validity of the research method, our interlocutors’ 
presence in Syria and the potential use of our article in court cases to the 
name of one of our interlocutors and whether the response of the university 
had been adequate.8
We were still confident that once the focus shifted to the actual content 
of our article it would be evident to all that there simply was no case:
19-01-17, 01:45 –  Aysha: I am really curious, the uva was also going to 
investigate the affair, right? That is, the research process
19-01-17, 01:46 –  Annelies Moors: Yes, but it is still not clear how they 
will do that. It is very good that from the start we paid a lot of attention to 
ethical issues.
19-01-17, 01:47 –  Annelies Moors: Is Ubaydah not asleep?
 groundless, the children were returned. Available at <https:// www.volkskrant.nl/ nieuws-
achtergrond/ het-kalifaatgezin-uit-huizen~b27f8362/ > (last accessed 5 November 2019).
 8 Rijksoverheid. Available at <https:// www.rijksoverheid.nl/ documenten/ kamerstukken/ 
2017/ 02/ 22/ antwoorden-3-sets-kamervragen-inzake-jihadonderzoeker-uva> (last accessed 
5 November 2019). 
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19-01-17, 01:50 –  Aysha: yes, he is.
No, eating🙈. But with closed eyes, so good hope that he will fall asleep 
quickly
What keeps you awake at this time?
19-01-17, 01:51 –  Annelies Moors: Updating my email, all this stuff with 
the NRC takes a lot of time . . .
20-01-17, 17:20 –  Annelies Moors: Hi Aysha, the NRC will not publish 
my letter to the editor . . . grgrgr
20-01-17, 17:32 –  Aysha: Does not really surprise me
Annelies and Martijn: To our surprise, the NRC refused to publish our 
response to the article. The newspaper also completely disregarded the letter 
to the editor that Professor Thijl Sunier, who was completely misquoted in 
the article, had sent. There was no possibility of a rebuttal.
By then, the Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research (AISSR) 
had issued an official statement about the affair on its website, which ended 
as follows:
The AISSR, aiming to stimulate exploration of the quality, integrity and 
ethics of research, is organizing a ‘reflection-audit’ by external experts to 
broaden the discussion of the scientific integrity of this research project 
specifically, and on this kind of difficult-to-research topics in general. This 
specific case and the results of the reflection-audit will form the basis of a 
workshop on issues of transparency, personal bias, and ethics regarding 
anonymity and openness.9
The tremendous media attention and the large number of parliamentary 
questions had made a difference, as this was a substantial shift from the 
announcement of a few days earlier: the terms ‘audit’ and ‘integrity’ now 
replaced the ‘discussion’ about methodology.
Then, on 26 January 2017, Pieter Duisenberg, MP for the right-wing 
liberal party, joined the fray. To start a debate in Parliament, using our arti-
cle as ‘a source of inspiration’, he raised the issue of ‘political homogeneity 
 9 The text has been removed from the university’s website, but can still be found at Archive.
org: https:// web.archive.org/ web/ 20190529204033/ https:// aissr.uva.nl/ content/ news/ 
2017/ 01/ discussing-integrity-and-ethics.html (last accessed 8 March 2020).
38 | part a
at university’, pointing to his concerns about a lack of ‘diversity of views’: 
‘Research such as about those ladies who are with IS and liked it very much 
there, that is all allowed.’ In one sentence, he both misrepresented the con-
tent of our article and argued that allowing such research was problematic, 
rather ironically packaging his complaints as a call to uphold the ‘diversity of 
views’:10
31-01-17, 16:52 –  Aysha: Hallo both, how are you doing?
Sorry have not yet been able to view the documents to see if anything is 
missing. I am planning to do this . . .
Unfortunately things are not going so great at the moment. [. . .]
31-01-17, 16:57 –  Annelies Moors: Don’t hesitate to ask for help in time
[. . .]
31-01-17, 17:01 –  Aysha: Yes, [. . .] they’re on top of it. That is good. The 
problem is that care providers seem obsessed with antidepressants. I would 
rather not have that, so I have to look for an alternative. Thank you for your 
words ❤
By early February we, and Aysha in particular, had been heavily targeted 
by the media, both offline and online, by a wide range of influential actors. 
We had not realised how convincing the journalist’s presentation of the case 
could be to those who had not read our article. And hardly anyone read it, 
not even after it was made freely available via Open Access. Having provided 
an extensive response online, and having been denied an opportunity to 
respond in the NRC, we agreed with our PR department that we should not 
respond to each and every accusation. It seemed better to observe how the 
controversy would unfold.
Act IV: Publicly Pushing Back while under Investigation
The moment we decided that we needed to act publicly came when a journal-
ist who worked for the right-wing weekly Elsevier used our case as the basis of 
a very negative column about our anthropology department:11
10 Scienceguide: VVD wil onderzoek politieke voorkeur wetenschappers. Available at <https:// 
www.scienceguide.nl/ 2017/ 01/ vvd-wil-onderzoek-politieke-voorkeur-wetenschappers/ > 
(last accessed 8 March 2020).
11 Sterkenburg, N., Onder antropologen, Elsevier, 28 January 2017.
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13 February 2017. E-mail Annelies to Elsevier, ‘[This journalist] wrote an 
excellent article on the Alt Right in the same issue. But how could she 
write such an abysmal text ‘Amongst anthropologists’? [. . .] Copy–paste, 
no sources, pretending to have talked to people in person, a long list of 
inaccuracies . . . I attach our article as the author obviously did not read it’
Annelies: To my surprise it worked. The next issue of the magazine included 
both a rectification and my long letter to the editor, and it offered to do a 
1,500-word interview about my life and work:12
24-02-17, 21:38 –  Aysha: Good evening! How are you? [. . .] Annelies, 
good to see that your letter has been published, I think it is strong.
24-02-17, 21:41 –  Annelies Moors: True, good that it is published, but it 
was a bizarre bad piece . . .
It was interesting that whereas the more liberal NRC, generally considered 
a ‘quality daily’, gave us no opportunity to respond, the more right-wing 
weekly Elsevier did. The next months became a rollercoaster. As our ‘talking 
back’ started to take effect, we were also confronted with new surprises.
Annelies: One of my colleagues invited me to do a guest lecture for our 
first-year anthropology students on methodology, ethics and valorisation. I 
agreed to do so, because if there was one group of people entitled to discuss 
the case with us, it was our own students:
10-03-17, 09:06 –  Annelies Moors: The students were very open and inter-
ested, a relief, they asked open questions.
10-03-17, 09:09 –  Aysha: hahaha yeah that is unique nowadays.
10-03-17, 09:09 –  Annelies Moors: That is why it is really more important 
to spend time with students than with journalists . . .
But not all went well. We inadvertently discovered that on 14 March an 
assistant professor at another Dutch university had written a blogpost for 
SHARIAsource, in which he claimed that the NRC had discovered that ‘the 
research assistant was the owner of a Twitter account that appeared to sup-
port ISIS. This claim was neither confirmed nor denied by the researchers.’13 
12 The letter to the editor was published on 24 February, the interview on 1 August.
13 Originally posted at Shariasource blog: <https:// islamiclaw.blog/ 2017/ 03/ 14/ the-ongoing-
public-debate-on-islam-in-the-netherlands/ > (last accessed 8 March 2020).
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This was outrageous. Aysha had never had a Twitter account, and even the 
NRC had included Aysha’s statement that she was not a supporter of IS.
Annelies: This time with the support of our research director, I wrote a 
strongly worded complaint to the editor-in-chief of the SHARIAsource blog. 
Within a few days, the blog post was substantially revised, ‘by the editors to 
correct factual errors’. Talking back seemed to work, but it was hugely time- 
and energy-consuming.
In the meantime, the auditors had appeared on the scene.
Annelies: I had been approached for an appointment with the auditors. 
After repeatedly requesting the university hierarchy, on 6 March, the evening 
before the appointment, I finally received the terms of the audit as well as 
the names of the auditors: one was a professor of medical ethics, the other a 
professor of culture and identity in Africa. Not really ‘our field’.
We were unpleasantly surprised to learn what issues the audit was to dis-
cuss. Rather than focusing on our research methodology and the content of 
our article, it was to focus on the need to disclose researchers’ political views 
in publications, including those held prior to commencing employment; on 
the permissibility of using anonymous sources; and on obligations to make 
data available in the interests of Open Science.
Annelies: Together with the fact that I was notified at extremely short 
notice and that I was told to come alone, the procedure began to feel more 
like a security interrogation than an academic investigation . . . The meeting 
with the auditors was, however, cordial. They stated their desire to have an 
open discussion, reassured me that no ‘crazy stuff’ would happen that would 
make us unhappy, and said we would have a conversation before publication 
of the report. Nonetheless, some of the questions they asked seemed odd, 
such as whether I knew who the researchers in my group were married to . . . 
Once again, I found it hard to take the questions seriously. Afterwards, we 
had a good laugh in the larger research group about my new responsibility 
of registering the nature and quality of intimate relationships, with someone 
jokingly raising the spectre of making a formal complaint against me for 
infringing on her rights to privacy . . .
Annelies: I approached the Dean to let him know that none of the 
researchers in my team recorded the names of their interlocutors, and once 
again reiterated our contractual obligations to maintain anonymity. While he 
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did not seem particularly interested to hear that, my comment that the whole 
thing seemed like a panic reaction led him to exclaim, ‘What should we have 
done then, it was in the NRC !’
This made us realise again how much positionality mattered. Whereas 
no one in Aysha’s circle read the NRC, it was easy to imagine how uncom-
fortable our university officials must have felt about the affair, especially 
when they were confronted about it by people from their own social circles, 
their colleagues at the university, and possibly officials from the ministry of 
education.
Martijn and Aysha were also invited to meet the auditors. Annelies 
decided to accompany Aysha. Although the conversations were once again 
civil, we all began to feel increasingly ill at ease, sensing that the auditors were 
on a fishing expedition.
Aysha: At one moment they referred to me as ‘part of the community’ 
(of our interlocutors). I felt very uncomfortable and immediately pointed out 
that I had never been part of any community of people intending to travel to 
jihadi held areas . . .
Then suddenly, in late May, the auditors became very interested in our 
research material. Whereas they had initially only asked for a list of the kinds 
of material we had (‘we do not need to see it, just a list to get an idea’), 
they now wanted to see the material itself. Although that seemed to go well 
beyond the ambit of an academic reflection audit, we did not object.
Annelies: I had already provided them with a very detailed account of 
how we had worked. Then, on 23 May, they sent the secretary of the audit 
commission to my room to look at our material. I had printed out examples 
of different kinds of material, such as chats, weekly updates and profiles. She 
looked at them and we chatted a bit, then she left and came back again to 
tell me that the auditors wanted to take the material with them. I told her 
that they were welcome to have a look at it in my presence, but that under 
no circumstances would I hand over confidential material. A few days later I 
received an e-mail saying that this was not necessary.14
We were puzzled. Why this sudden interest in our material to the extent 
that they made the highly unusual request to take it away with them? Was 
14 E-mail, 29 May 2017.
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this on their own initiative or had other parties become interested in a short-
cut to gain access to our material? We honestly do not know and probably 
never will.
As it turned out, responding to specific publics, whether Elsevier readers, 
our first-year students or SHARIAsource, was effective, even if it cost us a lot 
of time and energy. Our feelings about the audit were more ambivalent. We 
had been eager to participate, expecting to be given a chance to engage with 
an ‘audience’ familiar with our field –  a chance to be heard. We were then 
taken aback when we learned what kinds of questions were to be discussed, 
but we were all too well aware that refusing to participate would be inter-
preted as having something to hide. At the same time, we were starting to 
become concerned about the silence of our university officials on issues that 
they could easily have clarified. That we were contractually obliged to refrain 
from registering the names of our interlocutors was well-known to them, but 
they did not publicly confirm it.
Act V: The Audit Report as a Public Document –  and its Afterlife
Finally, on 12 June the draft audit report was completed and sent to Annelies 
to share confidentially with others, with a request for a response within two 
days . . .
13-06-17, 14:12 –  Aysha: I find the way in which they describe the research 
process really a bit strange, I would have been working too much by myself? 
[. . .]
13-06-17, 22:11 –  Aysha: Their conclusions etc. really surprise me
13-06-17, 22:12 –  Annelies Moors: Us too, huge waste of time
13-06-17, 22:12 –  Aysha: I had emphasised that I thought that we had 
really intensively analysed the material together
13-06-17, 22:13 –  Aysha: It sometimes sounds as if I have been making it 
all up sitting in the attic, and then once in a while shared a result with you 
. . .
13-06-17, 22:15 –  Annelies Moors: If they had been more positive about 
us, they could have become targeted themselves by the NRC . . .
13-06-17, 22:16 –  Aysha: I am curious what our journalist will do with 
such a report
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13-06-17, 22:17 –  Annelies Moors: We will cross that bridge when we get 
to it
Annelies: I confidentially shared the report with a few colleagues who were 
familiar with our kind of research or with issues of ethics and integrity, some 
of whom had also been interviewed by the auditors. They were unpleasantly 
surprised by what they read, and some of them communicated their concern 
to our research director.
In our response, we carefully pointed out the many factual mistakes, 
omissions, instances of suggestive language use, and the virtually total absence 
of our lines of argumentation, which made it impossible for readers to under-
stand our motivations for our actions. On 21 June, we received the second 
version, which included some corrections but still had lots of old as well as 
some new problems. We responded quickly, but the report had already been 
sent to the board of the university. There was evidently no time for the discus-
sion that had been previously promised:
26-06-17, 20:03 –  Aysha: I am still astonished about their points of view, 
and, as you say, why is my background relevant and yours not? I would 
never expect people with their academic background to act like this. My 
bad.
26-06-17, 20:10 –  Aysha: Yes, honestly, I am really stunned [. . .] During 
the conversation they acted like that, very understanding . . . and then 
when you read this, you wonder what has been the use of all those conversa-
tions and efforts (especially by Annelies and you)
[. . .]
26-06-17, 20:11 –  Aysha: And then that piece about my career and safety 
being endangered, and then still putting ‘the blame’ for that on our actions
Annelies: I finally decided to seek legal advice. I approached our chief scien-
tific integrity officer, and wrote a note to all parties involved that we did not 
consent to the publication of the report because of its substantial bias and 
factual mistakes, which would be harmful for us and create an unsafe work-
ing environment for our research group. The auditors did not respond and 
I never heard from them again. I was invited by the Dean and the research 
director, who both tried to convince me that the report was not harmful and 
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that it simply presented a difference of opinion in an open debate. What they 
seemed unwilling to admit was that this supposedly open debate was not 
taking place on a level playing field. The auditors were presented as a higher 
authority, as ‘external experts’, and the Board of the university had the power 
to decide whether to publish their report or not.
Martijn and Annelies: Then we were invited to meet the Rector. It was 
obvious that no one was pleased with the report. The university Board would 
not endorse the text, nor its recommendations. They would put it online 
(because they felt they had committed themselves to doing so), but would 
accompany it with a statement confirming that we had worked in accord-
ance with ethics and integrity regulations, and they would also upload our 
response. This might sound like a reasonable course of action and may have 
been well-intended, but knowing the field, we immediately realised what 
would happen: the report would be used to disqualify our work and the 
university’s positive evaluation would be ignored. We suggested postponing 
publication in order to make time for a discussion with the auditors first, but 
that possibility was not entertained.
On 11 July, the reflection audit report went online, together with our 
response. After thanking the auditors, the university called for a critical dis-
cussion of the report’s recommendations, and ended with the university once 
more expressing their confidence in us.15 For the Board of the university, this 
was the end of the affair.
The next day, the NRC (more precisely, the very same journalist who had 
started the affair) wrote an article about the report under the heading ‘Advice 
to UvA: Improve research anthropologists’, focusing on the auditors’ asser-
tion that researchers’ personal backgrounds can have an impact on research 
results. That we had worked according to the ethics and integrity regulations 
was not mentioned in his article.
Annelies: Very early that morning I received an e-mail from our research 
director with a link to the NRC article. His e-mail started with, fair enough: 
‘I know you told me so.’ He also informed me that the published article was 
15 Text available at Archive.org: <https:// web.archive.org/ web/ 20190530050709/ http:// aissr.
uva.nl/ content/ news/ 2017/ 07/ research-audit.html> (last accessed 8 March 2020).
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an improved version of a far worse text that the journalist had sent him for 
comments.
We did not hear again from either the Dean or the Rector. As far as 
they were concerned, the case was closed. The interview with Elsevier was 
published a few weeks later. The journalist responsible had done a great 
job, dealing with ‘our case’ in a balanced way. It was very well received, and 
marked another turning point in the affair.
Martijn: That’s not to say that we didn’t face further problems. Two 
examples. When I was called as an expert witness in the trail against Laura 
H. (coincidentally the same case that was discussed in Kouwenhoven’s first 
article on our research in July 2016) the prosecutor cited the audit report 
to disqualify my statements. And in the weeks preceding an Islamophobia 
conference I co-organised in September, online attempts were again made 
to discredit my work by trying to provoke the university or our funder 
(Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research) to respond. When these 
institutions did not respond (perhaps lessons had been learned by then) the 
agitation died down, but we did require extra security at the meeting.
Aysha: A few months later, I was with my family in the library, when a 
local police officer rang my husband up and asked him whether I could tell 
him more about the identity of our interlocutors. My husband explained that 
I could not because of the rules about maintaining anonymity. The police 
officer then tried to persuade him to probe me nonetheless, pointing out that 
his intention was to help the women concerned. My husband then told him 
to contact Annelies.
Annelies: No one contacted me.
Although our university had issued our critical response to the audit 
report online, we did not feel that our lines of argumentation had been heard. 
With the exception of a few comments made in private, no one in a position 
of authority ever acknowledged that anything had gone wrong. Hence, in 
our response to the audit we announced that we would start a small project, 
‘No escape: an auto-ethnography of the securitisation of academic research’.
Discussion: on ‘Talking Back’, Remaining Silent and Speaking Out
From the very beginning of the affair, we were forced to take part in a strug-
gle over the framing of our case. By actively talking back, we attempted to 
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circumvent the ways in which we were addressed. When the media hype 
centred on the allegations that our junior researcher harboured pro-jihadist 
sympathies, we responded, first in private to the journalist and then publicly, 
by redirecting attention to the content of our article, puzzled that it could 
possibly be read as ‘pro-jihadist’. Throughout the affair we have consistently 
followed this line. We have very much welcomed questions about our meth-
odology and the content, while firmly explaining our reasons for refusing 
to answer questions that infringed the right to privacy of fellow researchers 
(Moors 2019a).
We recognise that, in speaking back, we were not fully able to escape the 
terms by which we were addressed. This became evident when we included a 
statement in our first response that none of the three authors supported the vio-
lent jihad. Such an announcement is not without its problems. Condemning 
only Islamic State and those who fight for it implicitly means relegating the 
more than 14,000 torture victims of the Assad regime to a lower position 
in the ranks of victimhood. Should we not also have condemned the Assad 
regime? We did not provide such contextualisation because we knew that it 
could easily have been read as apologetic for Islamic State. Furthermore, we 
were also taken aback when we realised how the force of security discourse 
was present not only in our response, but also in that of our university. In 
her answer to one of the parliamentary questions, the Minister of Education 
had stated: ‘The University of Amsterdam has indicated to the Minister of 
Education, Culture and Science that it explicitly renounces statements that 
support the violent jihad, even if these have been made by its employees.’ We 
are not aware of any other case where a university board has made a public 
statement of that kind.
Nonetheless, our assertion that none of us supported the violent jihad 
was not only evidence that we had submitted to the discourse of security; it 
also was an attempt to subvert the terms by which we had been addressed. In 
our responses, we have always spoken as a collective voice, since all three of us 
were responsible for the article in Anthropology Today. This was diametrically 
opposed to how the journalist had operated. His main strategy had been 
to put the blame on the junior researcher, hoping that the seniors would 
distance themselves from her. In a similar vein, the auditors had tried to 
differentiate between the junior researcher and the seniors by stating in their 
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report that they were only concerned about how ‘the Muslim background’ 
of the junior researcher might have influenced the analysis. The seniors sup-
posedly had no relevant backgrounds worthy of scrutiny. When we raised 
this issue, there was a substantial divide in the ways people responded. While 
other researchers in our field, especially those of Muslim background, imme-
diately recognised the discriminatory nature of the distinction made, neither 
the auditors nor our university administrators seemed able to understand –  or 
willing to admit –  that singling out the Muslim researcher could possibly be 
considered problematic.16
Our early attempts to circumvent the ways in which we were addressed 
had little effect. We simply were not heard. This was partly because our text 
was only published on the university website, and therefore only reached a 
limited public, while the NRC’s refusal to publish our letter to the editor 
denied us access to the domain in which we were being spoken about. At the 
same time, at the onset of the affair, we also fell into silence because we were 
simply dumbstruck. We had found it hard to believe that the public would 
take the journalist’s story seriously and we were overwhelmed by the often 
aggressive reactions.
In hindsight, however, there was also a moment when we should have 
remained silent but did not do so. That was when we agreed to take part in 
the reflection audit. We should have realised that this exercise was doomed 
from the outset, not only because of the lack of checks and balances and the 
auditors’ lack of expertise in our field, but especially because of the nature of 
the questions posed, which simply followed the accusations of the NRC. We 
should have done no more than issue a formal statement that investigating 
the political activities of co-authors is not only unethical, but within hier-
archical employment relations also possibly illegal, and that registering the 
official names of our interlocutors would have meant a breach of contract. 
And we should have left it at that. But instead we participated, believing that 
the audit was intended to provide an opportunity for a serious discussion 
of our article’s content and our research methods and ethics. Moreover, we 
16 Didier Fassin (2011: 420) notes a similar divide with respect to the reception of stories of 
racial discrimination.
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feared that remaining silent could easily have been read as unwillingness to 
defend our research, our department and our discipline.
In short, we allowed ourselves to become part of a public performance in 
a theatrical setting, perhaps best described as a theatre of the absurd. In our 
responses, we have consistently stated the negative consequences of publicly 
investigating the personal backgrounds of researchers. We tried to shift the 
focus to the research itself, to how we had worked and to the content of the 
text that we had published. But neither the NRC nor the auditors were willing 
to engage in such a rational discussion about content. It was an affair in which 
affect ruled and in which anti-Muslim sentiments had become normalised, 
among many publics, including academia. We were caught in a combination 
of a generalised repulsion vis-à-vis our interlocutors and a strong sense of 
distrust vis-à-vis us as researchers, in particular the junior Muslim researcher. 
And we had not realised that we were up against strong institutional forces. 
Under pressure from growing competition from other media, especially online 
formats, the NRC was in dire need of clicks and likes. Hence its editorial board 
favoured a sensationalising article that framed our work as a contribution to 
‘Cyberjihadism’ over the earlier more accurate draft article. At the same time, 
universities, governed according to the rules of new public management and 
its celebration of the market, were in competition with each other for students 
and funding, as a result of which they had become increasingly sensitive to 
external pressure and the dictates of reputation management.
In retrospect, it is hardly surprising, then, that it was hard to be heard 
in a setting in which the force of the discourses of security and radicalisation 
was so strong. Yet, gradually, through our addressing various sub-publics, 
our perseverance had some effect. It was helpful that a report by the Review 
Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services (CTIVD) criticised the 
AIVD and confirmed our analysis.17 The interview in Elsevier was the first the 
paper had ever conducted with an anthropologist, and it was very successful. 
When we published an updated version of our Anthropology Today article in 
a Dutch popular-scientific journal, including some of the chats, there was 
17 De wetenschap, de NRC, en de veiligheidsdiensten, CLOSER, <http:// religionresearch.
org/ closer/ 2018/ 05/ 31/ de-wetenschap-de-nrc-en-de-veiligheidsdiensten/ > (last accessed 5 
November 2019).
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no negative response at all (Navest et al. 2018). We have since been invited 
to speak at conferences and to publish about our case. We also managed to 
spark a highly productive discussion about ethics in anthropological research 
and beyond, which led to the publication of guidelines for anthropologi-
cal research (de Koning et al. 2019).18 Ultimately, then, we have been able 
to circumvent the terms by which we were addressed, and have been able 
to effectively ‘turn the tables’. We still work together as a team and con-
tinue our WhatsApp group. Yet harm has been done, especially to the junior 
researcher, and it has become painfully clear to us that we cannot assume that 
our institutions will support us when needed.
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DESIGNING RESEARCH ON 
RADICALISATION USING SOCIAL 
MEDIA CONTENT: DATA PROTECTION 
REGULATIONS AS CHALLENGES AND 
OPPORTUNITIES
Manjana Sold, Hande Abay Gaspar and Julian Junk1
Introduction
In recent years, the analysis of data retrieved from social media has become  increasingly important for researchers, particularly for those conducting 
research on radicalisation and extremism. The rise in the use of social media 
as a data source can be attributed to three main factors. First, more and 
more people are now online –  and that naturally includes jihadists and other 
extremists; second, a new quality of interaction is observed in social networks 
–  in terms of speed, network density and the use of various audiovisual for-
mats; and third, an extremely large pool of data can be accessed and used 
to develop and test hypotheses, for instance by means of automatic evalua-
tion systems (Golla et al. 2018: 89–90). It is, therefore, not surprising that 
research is increasingly being conducted using data obtained via platforms 
such as Facebook (Błachnio et al. 2013; Caers et al. 2013; Manca and Ranieri 
2013; Nadkarni and Hofmann 2012; Wilson et al. 2012), Twitter (Klausen 
 1 We are grateful for the helpful comments by the anonymous reviewers and the editorial 
team regarding earlier drafts of this chapter. In addition, our special thanks go to Sakina 
Ramharak, who helped us with editing this chapter.
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2015: 5–6; Dhir et al. 2013; Williams et al. 2013), YouTube (Snelson 2011) 
and Instagram (Highfield and Leaver 2015).
However, working with social media and audiovisual formats as data 
sources brings its own challenges. While the existing repertoire of research 
methods and designs can often help us to analyse textual and audiovisual data 
from social networks, there are some specific hurdles for empirical research in 
this data field. These challenges are particularly pertinent when investigating 
radicalisation processes and their interrelationships with audiovisual content. 
Communication patterns are becoming increasingly diverse, with combina-
tions of different types of textual and audiovisual data often being used within 
a single thread or post. Platform shifts are common, seamlessly achieved by 
linking a communication thread on one platform/app to another conversa-
tion on another platform/app –  often incorporating different participating 
profiles, though not necessarily different individuals. A sense of anonymity 
when engaging via multiple virtual identities and avatars has aggravated these 
tendencies. Furthermore, communication on social platforms is increasingly 
moving in encrypted, closed spaces, and this tendency is more pronounced 
the more radical a group or an individual becomes. The legal situation for 
researchers working with social media has also changed considerably in recent 
years. Data protection regulations issued by national bodies have not nec-
essarily become stricter, but have gained more public attention and have 
become more differentiated. In addition to all of these issues, ethical consid-
erations present a potential minefield –  researchers need to balance societal 
and scientific interests against the individual right to privacy, in a field that is 
politically sensitive and contested.
This chapter aims to briefly trace these recent developments and to pro-
vide guidance to help researchers take account of the various requirements of 
the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and related ethi-
cal considerations when designing empirical research using data from social 
media platforms. We have identified these considerations in the course of our 
work investigating  Salafist and Salafist jihadist radicalisation in Germany at 
the nexus between online and offline communication patterns. In addition to 
other data, we investigated textual as well as audiovisual data obtained from 
Facebook profiles and Telegram.
In our research, we build on a broad definition of radicalisation. We 
designing research on radicalisation | 53
understand radicalisation as the increasing fundamental challenge to the legiti-
macy of a normative order and/or the increasing willingness to fight the insti-
tutional structure of this order (Abay Gaspar et al. 2019: 20). Radicalisation 
in this sense is related not only to violence and actual physical deeds, but also 
to non-violent forms or phases and to rather rhetorical means. With regard 
to Salafist jihadism, however, the aspect of violence is critical. But what does 
Salafist jihadism actually mean? Salafism in a broader sense can be understood 
as a modern, fundamentalist and transnational current in Sunni Islam that 
propagates a literal interpretation of the Quran and the Sunna and strict 
adherence to the example set by the righteous predecessors (Biene et al. 2016: 
18). At the moment when Salafist conceptions place the forms of rule and 
law that were primarily valid in early Islam above the constitutional order, 
Salafism becomes a political ideology (Farschid 2014: 161). The addition of 
jihadism to this political Salafism (Salafist jihadism) refers to the willingness 
to use force to achieve objectives as theologically legitimate and necessary. As 
outlined in the introduction of the volume, this encompasses a range of actors 
and practices –  many of them are linked to global and social media strategies 
(Günther and Pfeifer, Introduction to this volume: 4).
On the basis of our research experiences in this field, we give an over-
view of some key ethical and legal considerations that can serve as a basis for 
prudently designed empirical research projects. This contribution is forward-
looking and solution-oriented. We highlight some ideas in the debate on 
research using social media that draw attention to challenges and show how 
they can be viewed as opportunities for the adaptation of research designs.
Diversity of Online Communication Forms
Recent research demonstrates that communication patterns among radicalis-
ing individuals and groups are becoming increasingly diverse. This is revealed 
not only by the wide range of different formats being used within single com-
munication threads, but also by the quantity of different threads with varying 
degrees of overlaps in terms of participating profiles, topics and  material 
shared.
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Plurality of data points
A common pattern is the constant back and forth between different types of 
textual and (audio-)visual data. The technical functionalities of user interfaces 
simplify and even incentivise audiovisual uploads and the algorithmic rank-
ing of certain types of material. Furthermore, cultural developments (e.g. 
the influence of pop culture in certain radical milieus) shape this diversity of 
material. For researchers analysing social media data, these tendencies have 
consequences on two levels: firstly, raw data sources are diverse, ranging from 
text to memes to audio clips to video sequences, all of which may poten-
tially occur within a single communication context; secondly, the incentives, 
motives and behaviours of those posting the content need to also be reflected 
upon, as these might differ significantly from those of persons who participate 
in real-world conversations and/or produce more traditional printed texts.
The variety of forms of expression possible on social media complicate 
not only the collection of such data, but also its analysis. Firstly, decisions 
must be made –  and made transparent –  regarding how different types of 
textual and audiovisual data will be stored and processed. The deletion of 
accounts, no matter by whom, can lead to the rapid disappearance of data. 
Hence, data must be backed up quickly. Furthermore, as already mentioned, 
researchers are confronted with datasets that contain multiple formats, often 
within a single communication thread. Although text often predominates, 
images, memes, audio clips and videos are also included. While shifting from 
one platform to another may be a deliberate strategy by which users aim to 
avoid surveillance, the combination of various formats is unlikely to be done 
for such reasons, yet nonetheless has consequences for researchers. For these 
reasons, taking a mixed methods approach is proving very fruitful in this field 
of research. Secondly, combining various methods also demands transpar-
ency. It is clearly not enough to simply collect a multitude of data: researchers 
need to reflect on how to weigh up the reliability of different data sources and 
consider how best to combine them in order to address the research question 
(for different techniques for combining methods and weighing data points, 
see Junk 2011 and Leuffen et al. 2010).
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Plurality of platforms, profiles and threads
In addition to the wide range of types of communication data, we have 
observed platform shifts whereby one communication thread on one plat-
form/app is linked to another communication in another platform/app 
(Zuckerberg 2019). We have also observed that different participating pro-
files do not necessarily represent different individuals. Multiple Facebook 
accounts may be maintained, on the one hand, so that a kind of back-up 
profile is available should one account be deleted by the platform or security 
authorities. This means that in the event of a deletion, for example, identi-
cal/similar contacts and networks can continue to exist. The use of different 
platforms increases not only users’ access to information, but also their own 
visibility. The parallel use of different platforms is a strategy that expands 
one’s own field of observation and increases one’s own audience. Particularly 
among users associated with radicalisation towards Salafist jihadism, a con-
stant back and forth between different platforms is common. Individuals and 
groups who are aware that their content is likely to be scrutinised by security 
authorities take measures to render their communications more difficult to 
follow, or even completely inaccessible for unwanted audiences. This may not 
always be in response to the fear of legal consequences; very personal indi-
vidual motives can also motivate such precautions. For example, in our own 
research in the field of Salafism we found that (young) individuals who are 
moving towards radicalisation often want to withhold their newly developing 
ideas and attitudes from their former circles of friends or, even more impor-
tantly, from their families. Often, users block certain ‘friends’ on Facebook or 
‘followers’ on Telegram or Instagram, and they may subsequently switch to 
completely different social media or remain active on the same platform but 
under a different profile/channel name.
More effective than simply creating a new profile or changing platforms, 
the transition to using closed spaces also serves to avoid unwanted readers: 
Facebook in particular offers a number of different options for this, ranging 
from profiles to private hidden groups.2 Newman et al. (2019: 37) point out 
2 As of 7 August 2020. Facebook renamed in 2019 its public, closed and secret group settings 
to public and private settings. Private groups can be visible or hidden for non-members.
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that debates in social media are rarely conducted in public and the tendency 
to withdraw towards private spaces is increasing and a migration to private 
messenger applications can be observed. Furthermore, our own empirical 
findings reveal that ‘the more radical the content, the more encrypted and 
closed the communication’ (Abay Gaspar et al. 2018: 36, own translation). 
There is an observable change in the way social media are used in the course 
of radicalisation processes. While social media in general and Facebook in 
particular often mediate the first contact (see also Felden and von Hein 
2018), instant messengers such as WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, Viber, 
Telegram, Threema and Signal are subsequently used increasingly frequently 
to maintain and intensify contact as a radicalisation process develops. One of 
the reasons Facebook makes first contact possible is that it initially offers an 
anonymous and virtual platform for exchanges among like-minded people. 
Facebook also plays an important role in spreading low-threshold propa-
ganda (Frankenberger et al. 2018: 7), especially when it comes to attract 
particular types of young people. Our case studies of different degrees of 
radicality show that a person’s online behaviour changes as they become 
more radical. While, at the outset of radicalisation processes, individuals 
often use Facebook’s commentary function to express their own opinions, 
with increasing radicalisation users shift their communications to visible or 
private hidden groups that are only accessible to a selected group of people. 
This shift is nonetheless made visible by profiles’ explicit references to private 
groups. Often, for example, Facebook profiles refer to closed Telegram chan-
nels (Kimmel et al. 2018: 39).
The development of an individual’s way of using social media is also 
influenced by specific requests from group members. Terrorist organisations 
such as so-called Islamic State (IS) have called on their supporters and sym-
pathisers to behave well online in order to move ‘under the radar’.3 For exam-
ple, in the first issue of the so-called Kybernetiq magazine, published by IS, 
sympathisers and supporters were instructed to adopt the real names of unbe-
lievers because they would be less conspicuous than ‘any Arab battle names’. 
In fact, some violent Salafists seem to adhere to this and they go by allegedly 
clear names when engaging online. Whether these are their actual names 
3 See Kybernetiq, December 2015, Volume 1, p. 5.
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or fictitious names, however, is not ascertainable for researchers. Another 
striking feature to have emerged from our research is the sudden inactivity of 
some accounts. Many of the accounts that we observed, to which one or more 
posts were added almost daily, suddenly showed no further activity from one 
moment to the next. This could be another indication that in the course of 
their radicalisation those operating the accounts switched to other (social) 
media or followed the advice of Salafist jihadist groups and continued their 
communications in encrypted form via other channels.
These observations have consequences for researchers, for whom it 
becomes all the more difficult to track communication processes that with-
draw to private channels. These complications, which constitute our second 
observation, namely the growing ethical and legal challenges, will be dis-
cussed in the following section.
Some Ethical Challenges
While many aspects of researching social media dynamics relate to well-
understood challenges of research design and methodology in general, social 
media also bring specific characteristics and functions that are new territory for 
social science research. In particular, ethical challenges need to be addressed 
when designing research in the dynamic environment of social media. This 
pertains both to using social media as a research tool (e.g. for conducting 
surveys) (Monier 2018: 211) and to investigating it as a research object, 
studying the activities and content of individuals and groups. Although the 
former aspect raises important and partly new ethical questions (for a detailed 
discussion, see Gelinas et al. 2017), this contribution focuses on the latter, 
that is, researching social media content and practices.
Digitalisation and mediatisation have made research ‘more prone to 
invading the privacy of individuals who are the subject of research’ (Dobrick 
et al. 2018: 1). It is, therefore, not surprising that ethical and legal issues 
are increasingly being discussed in the context of digital research on social 
movements, radicalisation and terrorism. The key questions to be addressed 
are: what constitutes a challenge, what produces opportunities, and, if certain 
aspects are truly challenging, to what extent do they differ from the challenges 
of other research contexts?
The obligation of researchers to present their research interests 
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transparently, research procedures and the motivations behind their research 
is nothing new –  on the contrary, it is the essence of research in general. 
One reason why hitherto existing ethical and legal requirements need to be 
prioritised and re-evaluated when studying radicalisation in online envi-
ronments is that this is a sensitive research field that –  at least in Europe 
–  has become highly politicised and securitised. The situation is further 
complicated by the rapid development of the research object itself. While 
the diversity of data forms (text, image, audio and so on) represents a meth-
odological challenge, the withdrawal of users into private communication 
spaces intensifies many ethical and legal questions (Golla et al. 2018). With 
the virtual world constantly evolving, new framework conditions are cre-
ated, and therefore standardised ethical and legal research questions must 
be viewed in a new light.
Research ethics are discussed and addressed quite differently in different 
countries (Legewie and Nassauer 2018). Nevertheless, certain core principles 
transcend national contexts. Ethical issues that are emphasised in social sci-
ence research across the world include confidentiality, privacy (that of the 
research subject and their identity), transparency and trust, as well as the safety/
security of the researcher.
As Monier (2018: 211) puts it, ‘confidentiality is crucial in encouraging 
respondents, particularly when the topic is sensitive’. Especially when research 
participants cannot be asked for consent (because that would distort results or 
even make the research impossible), researchers should always manage data 
collected during and after the completion of the study confidentially. Even if 
participants have given their consent, data should always be anonymised or 
at least pseudonymised. There are grey zones, such as in the case of the death 
of a person, which results in the lapse of their right to their data –  as occurred 
during our research on jihadism. Nevertheless, even in such cases, researchers 
must ask themselves whether it is really necessary, for example, to disclose a 
person’s full name, or to continue to store data after a research project has 
been completed. Often, a name would not add any value to the findings, for 
example, in a description of the radicalisation process of a person who has 
demonstrably used violence and who perished in the Syrian War.
Confidentiality goes hand in hand with respect for privacy. Researchers 
should question their own moral principles and they should carefully 
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consider how to handle information gathered from social media (Turculet 
2014: 968). Questions that arise include where and how the data is stored, 
whether the software used is trustworthy and how comprehensive a software 
vendor’s privacy policy is. These issues are relevant to any research project. 
When working with social media, researchers should also take into account 
the privacy settings of the profiles and groups from which data is gathered. 
Whenever possible, consent should be sought from research participants. 
It is also very important that researchers take their own privacy into con-
sideration. In order to convince a participant that confidentiality will be 
upheld, for example, researchers may be obliged to reveal their own identity 
or the identity that was developed for the research project. Revealing one’s 
personal identity to strangers can infringe one’s own privacy (Monier 2018: 
215). Not only in such situations, researchers should reflect upon their 
moral motives and respect the privacy of others as they would expect their 
own to be respected.
Transparency is a related key consideration. Transparency refers both to 
explaining the research project to research participants and to being transpar-
ent about data collection and processing methods when publishing results. 
Studies conducted in online environments are particularly prone to leaving 
open questions about the data corpus and the handling of the data generated. 
Transparency should be upheld regarding the origin of data, the method of 
data generation, the method of analysis and the processes by which data has 
been accessed and cases selected. Doing so is not merely good social-scientific 
practice but enables readers to understand and interpret the results for them-
selves. A high degree of transparency –  despite strict anonymity –  of the data 
used should therefore always be a primary goal.
In social media research, the aspect of trust is particularly crucial because it 
is difficult to verify individual identities in online environments. Researchers 
not only need to bear in mind that the profiles they are observing may be 
‘fake’; they should also strive to act in a trustworthy manner and try to avoid 
conducting their research via fake profiles, whenever possible.
With regard to the safety/security of the researcher, an issue that is often 
taken too light-heartedly in the context of studies in potentially criminal 
contexts, preparation and communication are key: before embarking upon 
research, arrangements should be made so that it is clear who should be 
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notified if threats are received, and who should be informed of details such as 
the location and timing of interviews.
As already mentioned, the ethical challenges that arise when conducting 
research in the virtual world have already been widely discussed (Dobrick et 
al. 2018; Legewie and Nassauer 2018; Kern et al. 2016). These ethical ques-
tions go hand in hand with legal questions. When considering how best to 
handle data obtained without the permission/awareness of research subjects, 
especially data from closed/encrypted platforms, it becomes clear that ethical 
issues are inseparable from legal issues. Is it even possible to conduct research 
without research subjects’ permission, and if it is, under what conditions? 
Which data protection challenges arise as a consequence? And, finally, how 
does this limit and/or open new possibilities for research? Each platform (and 
its terms of use) and each privacy setting gives rise to a different legal context. 
In addition, most social scientists do not have the necessary legal expertise. 
In the next section, therefore, we will present the legal challenges and outline 
the possibilities for and limitations of research in social media from a data-
protection perspective (for the multi-dimensionality of the legal frameworks 
in researching these transnational phenomena of jihadi audiovisualities, see 
also Carvalho, Chapter 3). Laws are legally binding whereas ethics offer guid-
ing principles, yet both address quite similar challenges and provide ‘sets of 
rules that try to achieve an adequate balance between research and privacy 
interests’ (Lauber-Rönsberg 2018: 41). And there are, of course, overlaps: 
as we elaborate on below, to consider whether the research purpose is legiti-
mate is both an important requirement in complying with legal frameworks 
and a key ethical consideration. Since we are not legal experts ourselves, we 
conducted our research in collaboration with law scholars who advised us on 
legal matters.4 This exchange was key in enabling us to design our research in 
a field of uncharted waters in which data regulation was continually changing 
and its implications for researchers had yet to be thoroughly discussed by law 
scholars.
4 Special thanks to our colleagues Sebastian Golla, Henning Hofmann and Matthias Bäcker 
(see also Golla et al. 2018).
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Designing Research Opportunities within the Constraints of European 
Data Protection Regulation
As European Data Protection Supervisor Giovanni Buttarelli (2019: 3) states, 
‘[e]thical thinking and deliberation come before, during, and after the law. 
Ethics are the foundations of our legal systems and ensure that they are 
updated when necessary’. The processing of personal data obtained online 
and offline for research purposes is an essential prerequisite for scientific pro-
gress in many research programmes. The virtual world in general and social 
media in particular are becoming increasingly important data sources.
In social networks, people often reveal a great deal about themselves. 
They may provide personal information such as their ethnic origin, political 
opinions, religious and ideological convictions, sex habits, sexual orientation, 
health and affiliations, for example, trade union membership. Some of this 
personal information may be of interest to researchers conducting studies 
in various fields. In the European Union, the legal protection applicable to 
such personal information is set out in the first paragraph of article nine of 
the GDPR. The requirements for conducting research using personal data 
obtained online have changed in recent years. The GDPR provides a legal 
framework for the handling of such personal data. This not only imposes 
constraints upon but also creates opportunities for scientific research –  and 
for anyone designing research using such data.
A key distinction must be made between (1) research involving data from 
subjects who have consented to the use of their data and (2) research involv-
ing data that is collected and analysed without the consent of data subjects. 
The processing of personal data is generally prohibited under the GDPR 
unless it is expressly permitted by law (see the leeway and considerations for 
researchers, which we will elaborate on below) or the data subject has con-
sented to the processing. If consent is given, the data may be processed in the 
manner specified or stipulated in the consent agreement. However, for our 
project it was virtually impossible to obtain consent to conduct research on 
Salafist jihadism in social media. Hence, we focus in this contribution on the 
legal and ethical options for working without consent.
Scientific research interests may stand in contradiction to the ethical 
principle that processing a person’s data should only be done with the consent 
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of that person. In some situations, seeking to obtain the consent of data sub-
jects may jeopardise the research. If data subjects have been informed that 
their data will be processed –  even if many suspect that this may happen at 
any time –  the data obtained is likely to be different from if it were processed 
without the awareness or consent of the data subject. Knowing that their data 
will be analysed often leads people to modify their behaviour. For example, 
if individuals knew that they (or their threads, posts and comments on and 
transmitted via social media) were being observed, they would be likely to 
act differently, communicate through other channels, stop expressing their 
opinions (virtually) or adapt them.
In the following, we will elaborate on the legal aspects of working with 
sensitive data obtained from social media. Ultimately, researchers need to 
comprehensively weigh the right to personal privacy against the societal rel-
evance and the research interest. Legal requirements to pass the proportional-
ity test are the following considerations: legitimate purpose (is the purpose 
that requires the measure legitimate?); necessity (are there no other or less 
intrusive means available to achieve the purpose?); appropriateness (does the 
measure achieve (or encourage) the purpose?); and adequacy (what are the 
advantages of the measure in relation to its disadvantages?). We will elaborate 
on these elements in the following. On the basis of these considerations, 
researchers need to develop a data protection plan that should be discussed 
with and approved by a data protection officer at one’s own institution before 
the empirical work starts.
The principle of proportionality
In order to justify processing data for research purposes without the consent 
of data subjects, it is necessary to show why this serves the research purposes 
and why the research interest (significantly) outweighs the data subjects’ 
rights to the protection of their data. This weighing up constitutes the prin-
ciple of proportionality. Researchers must demonstrate an appropriate cor-
relation between the intended purpose and the measure taken to achieve it. 
The proposed data processing must serve the pursuit of a legitimate (research) 
purpose and be suitable, necessary and appropriate in order to achieve the 
research objective. In brief, the collection of data without the consent of the 
data subjects must fulfil a legitimate purpose. Scientific research in general is 
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a legitimate purpose (see also Golla et al. 2018: 90). Nevertheless, the pro-
cessing of personal data for a research project without the consent of the data 
subjects should only be considered if the research purpose cannot be achieved 
by other means. The observation of people on Facebook, for example, may be 
deemed necessary in order to learn more about how social media use influ-
ences radicalisation processes and how differently radicalised people behave 
in social media.
A measure such as using data obtained via social media is deemed suit-
able if it enables the research project’s aims to be achieved, or if it at least 
contributes to the achievement of those aims (suitability). In addition, it is 
assumed that the measure pursues a purpose and is not arbitrary. Conducting 
research with data obtained from social media, for example, can be justified 
in order to learn more about the behaviour of radicalised people in social 
networks.
If the collection of personal data is deemed needed, researchers must 
seek to analyse no more data than is necessary and to minimise the extent to 
which the privacy of the person concerned is intruded upon. Analysing data 
collected online may be required in order to follow extensive lines of commu-
nication including entries in the form of text, picture or video messages and 
chats (so-called threads). Tracing an individual user’s posts and their behav-
iour on social media can offer researchers insights that would not be obtain-
able via conventional field research methods or biographical self-testimonies. 
A further reason for observing individual actors and their online activity is 
that social networks store entire communication processes, which makes it 
possible to follow developments in online debates over extended periods, or, 
for example, to keep track of an individual’s potential radicalisation. This is 
possible because profile pages display the date, time and the user names of 
authors of posts, which are presented in chronological order. Furthermore, 
profile pages indicate the content that occurs repeatedly, enabling researchers 
to assess its significance. In the real world, past communications can only be 
traced if they have been recorded. Processes of knowledge production and 
knowledge acquisition of individuals or within groups can also be traced 
by analysing Facebook content. For example, the timeline makes it easy to 
track which friends joined when, which likes and posts were made when and 
how the type of content posted may have evolved –  for example, following 
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political events. This can be very important when studying radicalisation 
processes and the influence of political events on these.
The principle of adequateness and appropriateness
The processing of data obtained online from social media without consent 
must also be adequate and appropriate. In order to examine the appropriate-
ness of the intervention, the legal justification for carrying out the interven-
tion (often based on the perceived societal benefit of the research) must be 
weighed against the obligation to protect the individual whose privacy is 
violated by the intervention. For our work, this meant deciding whether the 
processing of personal data from individual profiles or groups on social media 
was an appropriate measure for the purpose of scientific research. From a 
legal perspective, the right to conduct scientific research must be weighed 
against the interests of those affected. The strictness of ethical guidelines or 
data protection regulations varies in accordance with the privacy settings of 
the individual profiles/groups studied. In the following, different settings for 
groups will be discussed.
Personal data shared within public groups is data that a research subject 
has made public –  unless it is information about third parties. For research-
ers to view such posts, it is not necessary for them to establish a ‘friendly 
relationship’ with a research participant. Open Facebook groups represent 
public communication spaces; they are not private, and anyone can view their 
pages even without being on Facebook. Data obtained from public groups is 
therefore the least problematic type of data to analyse in terms of legal and 
ethical obligations. Conducting research in private visible or private hidden 
groups is far more complex.
The first question to consider in relation to working with data obtained 
from private groups is whether this serves purposes that cannot be achieved 
by using data from publicly accessible groups. As mentioned above, indi-
viduals in the advanced stages of a radicalisation process often retreat from 
public forums to communicate in (visible or hidden) private groups. In order 
to investigate radicalisation processes, therefore, observing closed or private 
groups can be essential.
Visible private groups will appear with their names in the results list of 
a public search. However, visible private groups differ from public ones in 
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two ways: only current members can see the list of members in the group and 
the content of posts, comments and shares. Hence, a visible private group 
can be understood as a ‘semi-public communication space’. In order to gain 
access to a visible private group, it is not usually necessary to know other 
group members personally, to be their ‘friends’ or to know their real-world 
identities.
Our research team’s experience to date has been that access to visible 
private groups, even when requested by a blank profile that does not include 
statements of political opinions or other specific characteristics, is frequently 
granted (very) quickly. Group members can add any friend to a group, 
whether the group is public or private. However, a group administrator 
might have to approve the request before the person can join.
Nevertheless, administrators and members of visible private groups real-
ise that ‘informers’ could also be among the group’s members. We assume 
that awareness of this potential lack of privacy of communication makes 
extremist users tend to adopt false identities when using semi-public commu-
nication spaces in order to avoid disclosure of their actual identities. Visible 
private groups are, therefore, not private but political or religious communi-
cation spaces, in which personal information is only revealed in a limited and 
controlled manner. Although entering a ‘semi-public communication space’ 
represents a greater intrusion upon privacy from a legal perspective than 
that incurred when observing public groups, private groups are nonetheless 
viewed as communication spaces within which participants cannot assume 
that they are secure within a restricted, confidential circle of known users.
In general, it has become clear that online data, even that shared among 
Salafist communities, can never be shielded from the observation of security 
authorities or other unwanted readers. Warnings about the importance of 
online security are repeatedly issued within Salafist circles. As mentioned 
above, it is impossible to know who actually stands behind a profile. Hence, 
users are obliged to assume that their posts and comments may also be read 
by (unwanted) others.
In addition to public and visible private groups, Facebook also offers 
hidden private groups. Hidden private groups are the most private of the 
three available types. Membership is managed and granted by the group’s 
administrator. Most significantly, no features of hidden private groups 
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are publicly visible. Only current and former members can find the group 
and can see its name and description. Current members can also see posts 
and content shared by group members. Thus, members of hidden private 
groups consider themselves to be in a more secure communication space 
than those of public or visible private groups.
One important feature of hidden private groups that actually strengthens 
the ethical justification for doing research within them is that administrators 
can exclude users at any time. If they do not want to have ‘strangers’ in their 
group, they have the option of only inviting profiles belonging to people they 
know personally from the real world.
A further ethical justification for research is that some groups may require 
completion of an entrance test. If researchers respond to such questionnaires 
truthfully, expressing their genuine opinions, and are nonetheless accepted 
into a group, they can feel more justified in being present and observant in 
that group than if they had only been granted access on the basis of answers 
and the expression of opinions that did not reflect their own views but were 
submitted in the expectation that such responses would gain the approval of 
the group’s members or administrators.
The ethical and legal issues concerning the analysis of data collected from 
profiles are similar. Anyone who has a Facebook profile can choose privacy 
settings that determine who can see their contents. If settings are chosen that 
make content publicly viewable, a researcher’s analysis of such data is seen to 
constitute less of an invasion of the data subject’s privacy than if the data was 
only shared among ‘friends’ or an even smaller user-defined subset of selected 
persons.
Data economy
Researchers working with data obtained online must also observe the require-
ment for data economy. The collection of personal data must always be linked 
to a specific research project and/or pursue a specific research objective. Only 
data that is absolutely essential to achieving the research project may be col-
lected. Limiting the amount of data collected (data economy requirement) 
and the degree of its processing to the minimum necessary for the purpose, 
defining a (limited) storage period and regulating who has access to the data 
are the key principles of data economy.
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Anonymisation and pseudonymisation
The anonymisation and/or pseudonymisation of data are also crucial ethical 
requirements when working with sensitive personal data. If the purposes 
pursued can be achieved with anonymised or pseudonymised data, then 
data should be anonymised or pseudonymised. Anonymisation refers to the 
removal of personal or identifying information from research data. Data 
should be modified as soon as possible so that it can no longer be traced to 
a particular person. There may be situations when complete anonymisation 
would impede research, however. For example, when analysing commu-
nication processes, it is often necessary to identify different users’ com-
munications over extended periods. In such situations, pseudonymisation 
(e.g. ‘User 1’, ‘User 2’) should be carried out. Nonetheless, it should be 
remembered that absolute anonymity can never be guaranteed with social 
media data (Kern et al. 2016; Crawford et al. 2013; Crawford and Finn 
2014). Therefore, data must be gathered and maintained at all times with 
great diligence and with appropriate precautionary measures to restrict who 
has access to it.
These considerations extend well beyond the actual empirical data analy-
sis. Research findings are usually published in order to make them accessible 
to a wider public –  usually in written or oral form. This brings additional 
considerations regarding anonymisation and pseudonymisation. At the pub-
lication stage it may be necessary to take more comprehensive precautions 
than those taken for data storage and processing. In our own research, we 
often faced the challenge of how to present our findings in ways that avoided 
unnecessary stigmatisation and criminalisation of individuals and groups, 
while still offering meaningful presentations that did not become confusing 
as a result of measures taken to prevent any possible identification of indi-
viduals or groups.
Passive observation
Another aspect of conducting research with data collected in social networks 
that raises ethical and scientific issues is the role (active versus passive) taken 
by researchers during the data collection process (the positionality of research-
ers matters greatly in any case; for a detailed discussion, see de Koning et al., 
68 | part a
Chapter 1). If researchers assume a completely passive/observational role in 
the data collection process at all times, they will not influence the commu-
nication processes observed, which is a crucial requirement for research with 
data collected in social networks. Other users are then not encouraged by the 
researchers to make statements or to express themselves on certain topics. 
Neither the flow nor the dynamics of communication within a profile/group 
are influenced by the researchers, let alone manipulated. By contrast, if 
researchers themselves generate content –  openly or covertly –  they interfere 
with and may direct communication in particular ways. Researchers who 
actively participate in online communication risk distorting the data they 
collect, which would be unethical and dishonest if they were not transparent 
about their data collection methods. For both ethical and scientific reasons, 
researchers should strive to remain passive whenever possible when collect-
ing data. If they do –  anonymously or via a pseudonym –  make comments, 
they should not incite other users to make statements. If, for example, our 
objective is to observe the online activity of radical users, our aim should be 
to observe what kind of content is posted by differently radicalised people, 
not to influence radicalisation processes by commenting on their posts or 
encouraging them to make statements.
Usually, for their own safety, researchers do not use their real names 
when collecting data in social media without having asked for permission 
to do so from other users. Instead, blank or so-called ‘fake’ profiles are used. 
In the latter case, researchers construct an identity that they present to other 
users of the social network as if it were their own. This is a form of decep-
tion that should only be undertaken if absolutely necessary. When assessing 
the degree to which a research design takes appropriate ethical measures for 
working with data in social media, the roles adopted by researchers should be 
scrutinised in terms of how their online activity (if they take an active role) 
may influence the data collected. Researchers should aim not to affect the 
course of the events they observe and should be as honest as possible in their 
self-presentations, while taking precautions to ensure their own security.
Final Remarks
Since (moving) images touch people emotionally and increase their recep-
tibility to further (propagandistic) material, they are of great importance 
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for understanding and researching radicalisation processes. Many research 
questions, however, cannot be answered by simply analysing what is visible or 
audible in such audiovisual data. To identify the significance of audiovisual 
content it may often be necessary to relate it to streams of communication, 
other interactions involving the same profiles, or further contextualising data 
obtained from interviews, media reports, background discussions and the 
like.
In this contribution we have provided some insights from our own 
research on (jihadi) Salafists in Germany. We outlined how we designed our 
research in order to be able to work with sensitive data from social networks 
without compromising on ethical standards or breaching legal requirements. 
This is particularly challenging, if there is no explicit consent of the research 
participants. Privacy concerns are not only prioritised when we are planning 
how to process and store the data collected during the empirical research pro-
cess, but also when it comes to the publication of findings. Ethical and legal 
requirements are deeply intertwined, not least because ethical considerations 
underlie legal measures to safeguard personal privacy. While researchers have 
to make their own moral judgements as they balance issues of confidentiality, 
transparency, trust and their own security against the social value of research, 
they are also legally required to comply with the relevant data protection 
regulations.
The guidelines we offered in this contribution were based upon European 
data regulations and the experiences we gained conducting research in the 
German context. In the past, we had encountered colleagues who either 
simply avoided researching such contentious phenomena or embarked upon 
research projects without taking data protection issues into account. There 
needs to be a middle ground. This contribution has offered insights, not 
only into the challenges and limitations researchers face but also into the 
opportunities they have in working with data gathered online to investigate 
socially and politically relevant phenomena, and we hope that it will encour-
age further research in such fields.
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ETHICS IN GENDER ONLINE RESEARCH: 
A FACEBOOK CASE STUDY
Claudia Carvalho
Introduction
T errorism continues to evolve in its many layers of definitions, actors, typologies and motivations. It does so at a fast pace. However, there are 
still unanswered questions and a significant literature gap in specific areas such 
as online gender radicalisation, research ethics, or the utilisation of Facebook 
as a radical violent environment. This study presents the ethical challenges I 
came across while identifying the jihadist roles of Spanish-speaking women 
active on Facebook. I will dwell on pragmatic ethical aspects, offline field 
experiences and the methodological design driven by my research, hoping 
that the discussion will contribute to the further development of ethics 
applied to online research.
Data were systematically collected between 2012 and 2017. They deliver 
a unique insight into the underdeveloped topic of women as jihadist agents. 
Hence, and following the dynamic lines of grounded theory methods, a 
‘steady movement between concept and data’ (Lawrence and Tar 2013: 30) 
was performed, in both fields, offline and online, in order to code, compare, 
clarify and control the results.
First, we need to discuss the fact that the women who are part of this 
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study regard jihad as having a violent nature and a compulsory status. It is an 
emic perspective, reflecting how these women make sense of jihad. However, 
this perspective does not correspond with the Islamic theological one. In this 
research, jihad and violence are not considered interchangeable concepts. 
Nevertheless, it is important emphasise the fact that these women perceive 
‘jihad’ and ‘violence’ as synonyms.
As we will see in the following sections, they established their own digi-
tal method of luring, grooming and recruiting new elements for jihadist 
networks. This communicative practice is performed on Facebook, a social 
media echo chamber intensifying the jihadi belief and its religious legitimacy 
among this network.
A second introductory note has to be made regarding the public nature 
of the collected data. With public data, there is no need to employ consent 
forms; still, as with any other data set, the fulfilment of ethical obligations 
is required, namely anonymity, transparency and privacy, as I will develop 
further in this chapter.
With the exception of interviews, the data collected for the purpose of 
this study is open source. More concretely, all data were manually harvested 
from Facebook and manually treated without the help of any type of data 
software. I opted to collect the data from public contents and profiles, which 
led to an unexpected abundance of audiovisual data available in this format. 
Keeping their profiles and contents open (instead of private) is an intentional 
action by Jihadi-Salafi (al-salafīya al-jihādīya) individuals aimed at reaching a 
broader audience. This offers a unique opportunity to explore the concept of 
jihadi audiovisuality, as a way of observing, collecting and studying the online 
data produced and consumed by Jihadi-Salafis.
Focusing sharply on this specific notion, we can say that Jihadi-Salafis 
are those who pursue Salafism, an Islamic current of thought built upon the 
core centre theme of returning to the pious behaviour of the Companions 
of the Prophet, or ‘a philosophy that believes in progress through regres-
sion’ (Maher 2016: 7). Salafism is a generic denomination that conceals a 
wide subset of ideological categories that differ in terms of strategy, propa-
ganda (quietists or purists), political elections (politicos) and endogenous 
jihad (jihadis), but that subscribes to jihad as a permissible Islamic principle 
(Wagemakers 2012a: 9). In the strict vision of Jihadi-Salafis, ‘Jihad should 
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not just be waged against invading or aggressive non-Muslim enemies but 
should also be used in a revolutionary way against the “apostates”’ rulers in 
their own midst’ (Wagemakers 2012a: 9).
In terms of chronological and situational context, my research began in 
what we may consider the pre-caliphate period (2012), a time when jihadist 
women were openly engaged with online jihadist contents and were willing 
to discuss their ideology. In the summer of 2014, the caliphate was estab-
lished and declared active, which led to intensive online production of ISIS 
contents and a surge of female jihadist profiles on Facebook.
Nonetheless, with the growth of ISIS activity and the consequent ter-
rorist attacks in Europe, online police surveillance increased, and issues of 
liability and risk associated with research on jihadism were at the centre of 
the academic debate. Spanish-speaking jihadist women in the wake of this 
trend became more alert to the harm their jihadist activities could bring upon 
themselves, causing them to change their online participation. Indeed, some 
modified their public profiles into private ones, others dissimulated regarding 
their online jihadist profile, and others publicly exposed other jihadist profiles 
on Facebook. The situation instigated a lack of trust among jihadist women, 
forcing them to migrate to closed online communication platforms, such as 
WhatsApp or Telegram.
From the November attacks in Paris in 2015 onwards, and owing to 
these reasons of liability, risk and harm, my research was limited to ‘invis-
ible online observation’. The new and adapted ethical model categorised any 
direct engagement with jihadist individuals as unacceptable, and any type of 
online participation related to jihadist contents as well. Although it limited 
my online ethnographic research, this situation ended up opening up new 
methodological approaches, particularly social network analysis as a meth-
odological alternative.
By the end of my research time, the caliphate had entered its downward 
spiral with the loss of physical territories and foot militia. Yet, despite this 
significant defeat, ISIS activities continued online. Undoubtedly, the most 
expressive part of the caliphate derives from its ‘online territories of terror’ 
(Prucha 2011), its virtual form of existence (Winter 2015) and the per-
petuation of its violent propaganda ‘between the sword and the pen’ (Torres 
Soriano 2012: 782).
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Accordingly, jihadism gained an unlimited territory with continuous 
production and a global audience, both acting as pull factors to recruit more 
individuals. These individuals have a ‘loose affiliation as media mujahideen’ 
(Fisher 2015) and the distinction between ‘supporter and membership is 
blurred’ (Winter 2017: 9). Nevertheless, they are considered and rewarded as 
fully-fledged physical jihadist fighters (Winter 2017: 12–14).
In the fight against this scenario, 2017 was pivotal for online social media 
companies in terms of their introducing a ‘differential disruption’ in ISIS 
online propaganda (Conway et al. 2017: 20). Categorically, several compa-
nies co-ordinated their strategies via the Global Internet Forum to Counter 
Terrorism consortium to monitor, identify and ban violent content on their 
online platforms. The case in point of this research, Facebook, installed added 
and detailed measures in June 2017 to outline its counter-violent extremism 
fight (Conway 2017: 15). These measures have a distinct impact on the selec-
tion of online methods and on the selection of ethical protocols associated 
with online research on jihadism.
The chapter will be structured as follows. Having introduced the above 
section on the situational context of my research, I will plunge into the 
gendered dimension of my case study. Subsequently, I will present my meth-
odological strategy to make use of Facebook as a field of online research. 
After that, I will explore the legal framework bonding the different parts 
of my study, moving then to understand how jihadist women create their 
digital profiles and then, bridging their digital ability, to understand how 
they perform their jihadist task of digital grooming. Finally, I will share my 
offline investigation in Catalonia, and how positionality was key to accessing 
Salafist environments.
Online Gender Jihadism
Facebook, in the context of the Spanish-speaking jihadist women, is the cen-
tral stage for the violent and wrongful appropriation of the notion of jihad. 
Only if we figure out how processes of radicalisation and recruitment occur 
online can IRBs and security forces fully oversee the road ahead.
In this regard, I will adopt the definition of Jenkins (2007: 2–3), who 
distinguishes recruitment from radicalisation: ‘Radicalization comprises 
internalizing a set of beliefs, a militant mindset that embraces violent jihad 
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as the paramount test of one’s conviction. It is the mental prerequisite to 
recruitment.’ Applying this concept of radicalisation to online gender jihad-
ism study delivers the approximate definition: radicalisation involves recog-
nising Salafi-jihadism (set of beliefs), disseminating its principles in a constant 
manner (militant mindset), engaging with violent behaviours, belonging to 
jihadist networks, and directly contributing to its terrorist goals.
In a gendered perspective, studies guided by Pearson and Winterbotham 
(2017: 67) and Calvo (2017: 6–7) indicate that, in comparison with male 
jihadists, women’s preferred space in which to engage with radicalisation is 
the online space. In this regard, the results in Spain are clear. Among the 148 
jihadist individuals arrested between 2013 and 2016 (Calvo 2017: 3), 55.6 
per cent of the women were radicalised online, whereas only 30.8 per cent of 
the men (ibid. 7) were exposed to online violent radicalisation. So, we have 
clear figures on the actual relationship between online activity and engage-
ment with online violent extremism, but the data is confined to arrested 
individuals.
Hence the relevance of this case study, as it concentrates on jihadist 
women freely acting on Facebook, in the role of disseminators, brokers or 
recruiters to the jihadist movement. Facebook, with its opportunities for 
direct communication and exchanges, concurred with the normalisation of 
violent behaviour and the development of trusted, tight-knit relationships 
between online producers and consumers. Daily, embedded and embodied 
exposure to jihadist audiovisualities framed by religious justifications were 
central elements used by jihadist female leaders to arouse their audience. 
Furthermore, they also arouse researchers’ interest in exploring the field of 
jihadi audiovisuality. Nevertheless, privileged and direct access to the phe-
nomenon of online gender jihadism is limited to male researchers, owing to 
the prevailing rules of online gender engagement. In my particular case, as a 
female researcher I was allowed to be part of their audience. Besides gender, 
my knowledge of the local narratives and the ability to relate to them also 
facilitated the construct of trust and respect during my first encounters.
Following this line of thought, and deepening my argument on online 
gender jihadism, the conclusion is that most academic work focuses on the 
general perspective of positioning jihadist women in terrorist activities. But 
there are fewer studies bringing researcher positionality to the centre of the 
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academic discussion, and even fewer studies focusing on what kind of impact 
the researcher’s gender has on the study goals and analysis. By bringing all 
the areas together, this research paves the way to further innovation in social 
sciences in general, and in ethics applied to gender studies in particular.
Online Method Strategy
In order to better grasp the online roles of Spanish-speaking female jihadists 
on Facebook, I have combined techniques emanating from digital ethnogra-
phy with elements of grounded theory and digital grounded theory, explic-
itly participant observation, content analysis, field notes, coding and digital 
archiving. This multi-methodological approach corresponds to what Lorenzo 
Vidino and other authors conducting similar research suggest: ‘there is no 
grand theory of radicalization that can explain all processes. [. . .] the sound-
est approach in trying to understand radicalization is a multidisciplinary one’ 
(Vidino et al. 2017: 77).
The lack of a grand theory of radicalisation and the difficulties of a 
consensual definition of radicalisation have implications for theoretical and 
practical ethical research design. Hence, to pursue an online study on jihad-
ism in particular or on any other manifestation of online violent extremism 
in general, it is important to select methods and correspondent ethical codes 
that can quickly and fairly be adjusted to changes both in events and in rules 
of engagement.
For that matter, I have pursued the grounded theory principle that ‘all 
is data’ (Glaser 2001: 145), which involves immersing oneself in the data, 
knowing that ‘what is going on in the research scene is the data’ (Glaser 2001: 
145). To this I would add immersing oneself online to ‘read and watch on 
the screen [. . .] all the time, even on the go’ (Varis 2016: 63). These mobile 
and digital practices require being in the field in a disciplined, frequent and 
‘sensorily embodied’ (Postill 2012: 6) manner in order to capture the factor 
of immediacy inherent in jihadism.
The selected design of my methodological process (Figure 3.1) is now 
presented in a step-by-step characterisation covering the period from collect-
ing data to the final moment of archiving it. The first step implies that the 
researcher enters the field (step 1) without pre-defined ideas or assumptions. 
The second step (step 2) is the most challenging: this is to find Facebook 
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accounts that fit the criteria affiliated with jihadism that will allow the process 
of snowball sampling.
In the following step (step 3), the researcher’s default attitude will be to 
assume that ‘all is data’ (Glaser 2001: 145), because, from the visual aspects 
to the preferred forms of texts, all contents, all profiles and all online accounts 
comprise meaningful social and behavioural patterns. The result will be a 
large data set, which needs to be filtered and assessed (step 4) according to 
its relevance to the research scope. Another strategy for collecting data on 
Facebook is to trace and collect social metadata, tags, likes, sharing, and lists 
of friends (step 5). The patterns emerging from the collected data deliver 
critical codes (step 6) with which to analyse online female jihadist roles (step 
7) and to confirm the validity of these women’s Facebook accounts as jihadist 
online profiles in a conservative way (step 8). Once these processes of engag-
ing with violent extremism are determined and the profiles are validated, it is 
time to structure their jihadist network (step 9). The last step (step 10) is to 
conserve and keep data that will not be useful in the research context and that 
may be relevant to future studies.
Figure 3.1 Methodological Process; Spanish-speaking Facebook Jihadists (SSFJ) and Social 
Network Analysis (SNA) (© Claudia Carvalho).
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There are, of course, pitfalls in employing a multimodal approach: for 
example, the dispersal of techniques, the effort to exercise all methods per-
fectly and equally, and the necessity to prove the validity of new methodolog-
ical designs. The unfamiliar environments where this research takes form urge 
a cautious application of ethical procedures that will have more efficiency if 
applied case by case. What is more, new methodological designs are the fruit 
of the researcher’s own identity, including the capacity to seize the scientific 
opportunities, the courage to select different paths, and the creativity to gen-
erate new ways of collecting data in the least expected fields. This means that, 
in the absence of pre-defined ethical procedures, the researcher will have to 
respect more than morality, values or privacy, and will have to anticipate and 
consider how the disclosure of sensitive data may harm all of the subjects 
directly or indirectly involved with the research.
In conclusion, the motivations, the causes and the processes surrounding 
jihadism as a current violent phenomenon are neither entirely disclosed nor 
fully understood. For this reason, an empirically-based analysis is an appro-
priate, sensitive and comprehensive approach. Parallel with it should stand 
equally appropriate ethical pillars that are able to embrace legal frameworks, 
Institutional Review Board decisions and terms of service, all coherently in 
a general ethical protocol. In the following sections, I will address these ele-
ments in relation to my own case study.
Terms of Service
I will deal first with my own field of online research, Facebook. Facebook was 
the digital environment chosen for this investigation because of the incipient 
state of available studies and the correspondent literature gap focusing exclu-
sively on it. To this day, and because of that, the great majority of academic 
studies tend to be anchored in Telegram and/or Twitter. In terms of the 
literature produced about digital jihadism, in, for example, 2017, we can see 
that most of it is dedicated to Twitter as the online field.
An important aspect of, and a limitation inherent in, research conducted 
on Facebook is the fluctuation of the number of online active members. 
Owing to the sensitive and violent character of the contents produced, 
shared or commented on by Spanish-speaking jihadist women, two scenarios 
are possible on Facebook. First, their accounts are subjected to temporary 
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and/or permanent disruptions, and, second, the female users anticipating the 
first scenario open simultaneous accounts. The second scenario, of multiple 
accounts managed by one single user, is in general possible to be verified 
because the user explicitly identifies herself and announces the opening of 
new accounts in order to keep the same ‘friends’ and/or ‘followers’. These 
scenarios have been more recurrent since the application of the initiative 
by the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism referred to above. The 
variation in numbers of users represented in the research mirrors the evolu-
tion of Facebook as a social media platform, the constraints of surveillance 
and censorship, and a higher level of online control of the production and 
dissemination of violent contents.
I will now look at the legal frameworks restricting the research, and at 
the university ethical protocols on sensitive research topics. While conduct-
ing online research on Facebook, I always presented myself, my university 
affiliation and the objectives of my research to the jihadist women active 
on Facebook. Transparency and positioning were interconnected categories 
when I introduced myself in the first phase of my research. However, in order 
to respect the privacy of those being observed, we sacrifice our own privacy as 
researchers. In a more concrete way, through sharing my university weblink 
I have given an indication of my location. In the particular case of my study, 
a certain degree of risk and liability is implied that may affect colleagues who 
share the same space. I never questioned the ethical procedure nor saw the 
danger in it until the Paris attacks of 2015. I started to question it when some 
of the women with whom I had been in contact within the initial phase of my 
online research became connected with individuals involved in the terrorist 
attacks then unfolding in Europe in 2015 and 2016.
Jihadism aspires to execute violent actions. However, dealing with its 
operatives from the other side of the screen creates, at times, the illusion that 
these violent actions are contained beyond the digital divide. Nevertheless, 
personal safety and direct contact with these individuals ‘retains an element 
of danger’ (Schuurman and Eijkman 2013: 3) that has to be taken into 
consideration. In 2015, after I had met the Ethics Committee, then recently 
founded, of Tilburg University, several steps were taken to synchronise my 
work with the deliberations of the Code of Ethics. On the one hand, my 
previous work was unofficially reviewed, discussed and generally approved 
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in the following informal discussions. Although the Ethics Committee had 
decided not to concede any ethics clearance to research conducted before its 
constitution, this was still an important validation of my work.
The lack of direct interaction with these individuals constitutes a meth-
odological limitation. To overcome it, more time-consuming triangulation 
techniques are necessary to produce a conservative confirmation of data. As 
Geertz (1968: 151) so aptly put it, ‘This pressure springs from the inherent 
moral asymmetry of the fieldwork situation’. My conclusion was that the 
collection and subsequent analysis of the public posts while handled anony-
mously were too valuable to be ignored in a scientific approach. Hence social 
media enabled the research, with the unique opportunity to acquire critical 
primary data furthering terrorism studies but also, in the present case, fur-
thering religious studies.
Another important impact resulting from doing online research is the 
mandatory contemplation of all the distinct legal frameworks that interfere 
with the research. In my case, I needed to contemplate the terms of ser-
vice of Facebook (online place of research) and two different legal models, 
the Spanish (subjects of research) and the Dutch (offline place of research). 
The three legal dimensions equally played a complex role in my own ethical 
considerations as a researcher. Thus, while conducting digital ethnography 
in Spanish-speaking online and offline spaces, I needed to be aware of the 
Spanish law on what constitutes an act of jihadism in the online sphere. The 
Spanish law, Ley Orgánica 2/2015 (30 March 2015), defines this as ‘the act 
of accessing in a usual manner a website that has contents directed to pro-
mote recruitment to a terrorist organization’. On the other side of the screen, 
I was conducting research from a laptop with an IP address located in The 
Netherlands. The Dutch law on online criminal activities relates to computer 
criminality in III, a, Articles 137c–137e of the Dutch Criminal Code, which 
enunciates the following: ‘The Netherlands’ comprehensive action program 
to combat jihadism contains the following measures [. . .] c) Producers and 
distributors of online jihadist propaganda and the digital platforms that they 
abuse, are identified.’ At times, the complexity of the jihadist phenomenon, 
allied with this multi-dimensional legal framework, was too much of a limita-
tion, rather than a benefit. As specified previously, owing to jihadist attacks 
and consequent questions of liability, safety and security, my research avenues 
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were limited to ‘invisible observation’. Invisible observation applied to crimi-
nal subjects resembles police work in several respects. Though the process in 
the academic world and in the police has similar stages, the difference lies 
in the end results. While scholars aim at scientific output, police authorities 
define and arrest suspects. Translated to research practices, this may sound 
simple. However, the statement implies ethical dilemmas on both sides that 
demand urgent attention, namely if there are common goals to achieve, such 
as profiling jihadist individuals.
Digital Jihadist Profiles
In order to define ethical guidelines that can be applied to online research 
on sensitive subjects, we have to possess a deep understanding of the mean-
ing attributed to specific digital spaces by online users. It is important to 
understand the processes that make Facebook a ‘sacred space’ and the online 
mechanisms that lead to online jihadist recruitment. Several aspects frame the 
general setting that lead to jihadist recruitment, among them ‘social environ-
ment and widespread grievances’ (Newman 2006: 750) as seen in the section 
above, together with close-knit social networks, proximity to Salafi-jihadist 
ideology, online acquaintance, and regular contact with violent religious 
propositions (Alonso and Rey 2006: 179, 195).
In the section ‘Football and Foreign Fighters’ of this chapter, I will 
share a detailed account of my offline fieldwork in Catalonia to sustain the 
above argument about how social inequality and correspondent grievances 
promote Facebook as the ideal sanctuary in which women may engage with 
jihadist elements. In this section, I will advance some important categories 
that help to make sense of the holistic context surrounding Spanish-speaking 
jihadist women in the region of Catalonia. Actually, a more specific observa-
tion of the Muslim population in Catalonia reveals several categories that 
may enclose the capacity to explain, at least partially, the causality between 
offline lack of social integration and online sisterhood. Those categories are, 
for example, lack of equal social, educational and work opportunities, gen-
eral discrimination (more intense for Muslim women who wear traditional 
religious clothing), cultural differences, language barriers and, above all, the 
absence of official spaces in which to pray. In some cases, these mosques’ 
remote locations in industrial areas have created the phenomenon of ‘garage 
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Islam’, that is, the reliance on unofficial, inadequate places in which to gather 
Muslim believers to Friday’s services. These ‘garages’, because of their closed-
in structure, guarantee the privacy of individuals whose views on Islam are 
far from mainstream or moderate. Further, they lack space to incorporate the 
mandatory gender division by offering a separate space for women. In these 
cases, women are forced to perform their communal prayers in the seclu-
sion of their homes and need to renounce debating, questioning, or gaining 
religious knowledge via a public sphere. Owing to its digital affordances, 
Facebook becomes the preferred space for these women to pursue their reli-
gious learning processes and to perform online rituals.
However, the embedded and embodied online experience that jihadist 
users experience on Facebook took place, in the first instance, in the offline 
world. For this reason, the situational context involving the everyday life of 
Muslim women in Catalonia played a distinctive role in my analysis of the 
process of transforming Facebook into a sacred space, and of how jihadist 
profiles take form online.
First of all, the women have to overcome cultural and religious obstacles 
that sanction spaces where inter-gender relationships are possible. Second, 
they must be able to afford the costs of smart-technology devices and an 
internet connection. Third, they must obtain enough computer, media and 
digital literacy to navigate through the different online systems.
Being frequently online results in offline social isolation, a condition 
that ‘is critical for normalizing behaviors’ (Torok 2013: 6), namely behav-
iours that involve acceptance and justification of extreme violence. Stern and 
Berger (2015) understand this behavioural path as similar to ‘creat[ing] a new 
human being’ which perceives violence as a normalised behaviour.
Thus, I was aware of the effort the women had gone through to gain an 
active online jihadist profile when approaching them. I was also acutely aware 
of their intentions, their agency, and their digital ability to manage Facebook 
as a communication platform through which to pursue their terrorist goals.
While conducting digital ethnography, and selecting profiles that could 
be considered jihadi, I was confronted with the perennial question about the 
informants’ authenticity. ‘[D]eception and detection’ are even found in the 
natural sciences (Barnes 1994: 57), and they are for sure part of the social 
sciences (1994: 59). Of course, there is an element of ‘fiction’ (Geertz 1968: 
ethics  in gender online research | 85
154) in all performances, offline and online. But ‘it is this fiction-fiction, not 
falsehood, that lies at the heart of successful anthropological field research’. 
Moreover, I was interested in learning about the meaning of the Spanish-
speaking jihadist women’s online performance on Facebook, the authenticity 
of their online production. Authenticity is here understood in its emic sense, 
that is, how do the women perceive their online jihadist performance and the 
meaning they attribute to it?
Once the observed individuals matched the criteria for being considered 
jihadists (actively posting and interacting, in a coherent, cohesive and consist-
ent manner, with violent jihadist contents), their list of ‘friends’ was (where 
possible) analysed in depth. This is a time-consuming task, especially when 
carried out manually. Simultaneously, this task had to be completed within 
a short time considering that these types of accounts tend to be blocked/
deleted also within a short period of time. The selected profiles were sampled 
to see whether they matched the criteria, and if so they would be added to the 
network (the snowball sampling method).
The number of informants varied according to the situational context at 
the time of the research. After the Paris attacks of 13 November 2015, the 
number of open profiles, or of people willing to share their jihadist views, 
was much smaller than in the previous period. From then on, the only pos-
sible way to conduct my research was by monitoring public profile accounts 
on Facebook without disclosing my identity. At this point the dilemma 
was obvious, and left me stranded between the option of transparency as a 
researcher and the option of being ‘at risk’ and ‘a risk’.
In addition, there is the question of ‘pervasive data’, that is, data that is 
being collected without the knowledge of the participants. I would like to 
give this a twist and draw on Buchanan (2012) to address the point that, at 
times, researchers of sensitive data are in the position of being manipulated. 
In other words, pervasive data concerns information about behaviour occur-
ring in a context where an individual can reasonably expect observation and 
recordings. This would mean that the individual can assume that information 
provided for specific purposes will be made public. The Spanish-speaking 
jihadist women keeping their profiles public constantly produced violent 
content, aspiring to see these spread as widely as possible, and had no moral 
scruples in seeing their jihadist profiles as part of academic research.
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How can this scientific dissemination trap be solved? The overlap between 
online, research and dissemination venues blurs the lines of conduct further. 
Facing this perverse realisation, together with the methodological limitations 
of being confined to invisible observation, I thought it reasonable to try to 
get a glimpse of the Spanish-speaking jihadist network. On the one hand, this 
involved a smaller focus on contents and a wider focus on social meta-data. 
On the other, it meant including male Facebook users who were part of this 
network and who also kept a public profile. Social network analysis does not 
take shape without carrying its own dimension of ethical reflection, such as 
regarding the possible loss of data that was not collected on time, and may 
cause incomplete or incorrect data readings and arguments about privacy, 
and violate anonymity when revealing roles, hierarchies, and the positioning 
of elements within the network.
Out of the sum of profiles, a conservative universe of 360 active profiles 
was considered as the most suitable sample group according with the research 
scope. By conservative, I mean profiles sharing, producing and consuming 
jihadist ideology in a consistent, consequent and frequent manner, whose 
social meta-data clearly indicated their jihadist affiliation.
Alongside the ideological motivation, the data illustrates how kinship 
and social ties are further vital sources promoting jihadist networks. Indeed, 
family members and close friends create their own social structures upon 
belonging and emotional bonding. In the case of females, they forge their 
own online sisterhood. In the next section, it will be observed how grooming 
fosters recruiting into these female jihadist networks.
Digital Grooming
Grooming is a common strategy employed by jihadist recruiters, not only upon 
possible jihadist recruits, but also directed at researchers and analysts. Jihadist 
women gain their audience through the construction of online legitimacy, reli-
gious authority and their knowledge of Salafi-jihadist principles. Their initial 
network nodes are individuals from their close range of connections, family 
and friends. With the help of trust mechanisms, they move forward to more 
distant ties, such as researchers. In general, the grooming strategy is initiated 
with the call to Islam (da’wa) considered a duty for all Muslims and taken to a 
higher level of mandatory actions by Salafi-jihadist scholars (Carvalho 2014).
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I have witnessed this grooming strategy first-hand in both my online and 
offline contacts. I have always defined myself as a born and raised Catholic 
who was conducting research for the purpose of obtaining a PhD degree, not 
seeking a conversion. On frequent occasions, both online and offline, I would 
be asked to consider conversion to Islam. It was interesting that the online 
invitations to conversion used the ritualisation of the shahada, the Muslim 
profession of faith: write it down or video-tape it, post it on my Facebook 
wall and have people commenting or liking it was the necessary process to 
make the ritual valid. While I was trying to know more about the jihadist 
recruiters’ online activities, they were also trying to persuade me to convert: 
that is, to ‘move beyond “the da‘wa trap”’ (Gauvain 2018: 207) was an ‘ethi-
cally ambiguous situation’ for me (Geertz 1968: 151).
To clarify my point, I will share the concrete details of how a female 
jihadist recruiter made me the target of her digital grooming strategy. First, 
she guided the conversation to enquiring about my right intentions (nīya) 
towards Islam. My answer was ‘to gain more knowledge’, ‘to further my 
education’, which she considered a predisposition to accept the true religion, 
Islam. Therefore, she recommended important basic readings, of the Quran 
and hadiths. The second step was to question me about what I had learned 
so far from those readings, redirect the learning process to the ‘right, pure 
path of the Salafs’, and ask me about my personal life. The third step was to 
answer my questions on jihad (open questions about the theological Islamic 
definition of the term) by sending me PDF documents along with relevant 
literature (Join the Caravan being the most frequent, back in 2012). This 
is a clear indication of the fact that jihad and jihadism were intertwined in 
this woman’s mind-frame, and that they were equally part of the Islamic 
religious literature. The fourth step was to integrate closed discussion groups 
via Facebook messaging, Skype or WhatsApp. The condition for entering 
these debate groups was to be a Muslim or to become one directly (everyone 
needed to write the shahada, in their first intervention). I declined to do so, 
which meant the end of her attempt to lure me into her network, but it also 
meant the end of my attempt to develop my study. This mind-frame is what 
Gauvain (2018: 203) defined as ‘oppositionality’, that is, in the case of these 
recruiters, to refuse and stay far from individuals who do not accept their 
Salafi positioning.
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According to Wellman and Gulia (1997: 10), online communities have 
‘strong ties’ that promote ‘frequent, companionable and voluntary’ contact 
among participants in the same manner as offline communities. Against this 
background, I decided to complement my online study with offline ethno-
graphic incursions.
Football and Foreign Fighters
Therefore, in May 2014, I did fieldwork in Catalonia, visiting mosques and 
Islamic centres and interviewing Muslim and non-Muslim citizens. The aim 
of the research was to go beyond the Salafist presence in Catalonia and to 
reach a wider perspective on what it means to be a Muslim in Spanish society, 
hence obtaining a more defined picture of the real ‘root causes’ of extrem-
ism (Bjørgo 2005; Forest 2005; Newman 2006; Pedahzur 2006; Richardson 
2006; Pick et al. 2009; Veldhuis and Staun 2009; Asal et al. 2011; Schmid 
2013; Aziz 2016).
The online female community did not match the one I was observing 
offline, at least not in terms of their shared views on violence and the meaning 
of jihad. Keeney (2011: 544) describes a similar experience during his own 
ethnographic fieldwork in Ceuta. On the same line of argument as Keeney 
(2011), my research took a month, which Keeney (2011) describes as unique 
for terrorism studies, but as sufficient if the study’s scope is narrow and the 
core site of research is online. I can add that the contacts developed during 
this period were continued afterwards and followed up online, delivering 
more data and granting more research results. Indeed, the online communi-
cations follow-up resulted in another critical contact, a young Moroccan man 
living in Catalonia and working at a local Islamic institution, who agreed to 
have lengthy conversations on Skype. The detailed information he gave about 
the recruitment of young women in Morocco helped me to understand much 
of the online narrative and the formation mechanisms beyond the jihadist 
networks connecting Morocco and Spain.
Once I was in the region, gaining access to the local imams as a non-
Muslim woman was possible by using convenience sampling methods. 
My football network was the key to opening the doors of the mosques in 
Catalonia: ‘Player X from Morocco that plays in Barcelona now has been 
an acquaintance since he was 10 years old.’ This sentence, repeated at the 
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entrance of almost all mosques, was the ‘log-in’ password. Football is a shared 
cultural phenomenon familiar to Moroccan and Spanish jihadists because the 
ritualistic sacrifice (towards a common good and goal), ritualistic violence 
(pain, injuries, blood), discipline (control), delimitations (time and space) 
and group bonding are all part of both football and the jihadist environment.
Although Salafism in its strict interpretation condemns any activities 
related to football, the truth is that football is a recurrent topic of online 
content among self-professed Salafists, reaching from playing to support-
ing teams or watching games. Independently of the religious restrictions, 
football and foreign fighters are an overlapping cultural phenomenon that 
has a constant impact on the foreign fighters. This impact is visible in their 
Facebook accounts, from the images of professional football players or clubs 
used as profile pictures (the preferences are for Real Madrid, Barcelona and 
Manchester United), reaching to the organisation of football matches among 
themselves in the caliphate and to discussion of the latest results and perfor-
mances of their local home teams, or to larger-than-life debate as to who is 
the best player in the world.
Remarkably, access to Salafi preachers, small mosques or the entrance 
to the mosque of Reus (visited by M. Atta, leader of the 9/11 attacks) was 
possible, owing to the emotional attachment Moroccan communities have to 
football. However, there were occasions when doubts arose concerning the 
ethical correctness of this approach. Being in direct contact with the football 
world, I knew that this emotional attachment would facilitate my access to 
individuals and Salafi environments, which otherwise would be out of reach 
for a female, non-Muslim researcher. Nonetheless, I was equally aware of the 
preachers’ own desire to gain inside access to the football environment, and 
even more acutely aware of the naivety of ‘downplaying the impact of al-wala’ 
wa’l-bara’ and other forms of Salafi oppositionality’ (Gauvain 2018: 208). 
However, there were occasions of physical threat, and occasions when the 
imam would sit in a different room and answer my questions there because 
of strict Salafi gender engagement rules, and, most particularly, refusal to talk 
to me because I was wearing a black abbāya (‘If you are not a Muslim, it is a 
falsity to wear it’).
Actually, the individuals who reside in Spain and wish to encounter 
offline sources of jihadist narrative are obliged to follow other routes to find 
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a space of radicalisation or to attend the ‘garage mosque sermons’ that are 
not surveilled. The police-controlled Spanish mosques, imams and khutbas 
(sermons) issue politically correct and co-ordinated statements that openly 
condemn jihadist discourses and activities. Although it is a fact that there are 
a higher number of Salafi-jihadist proponents in the Catalan region (Moreras 
and Tarres 2014: 161) than in the rest of the Spanish territory, offline jihad-
ist mobilisation still follows the route of Morocco, owing to the rigorous 
monitoring of official mosques, sermons and imams in Spain already referred 
to. Neumann and Rogers (2007) already came to the same conclusion in 
their report on European mosques and hubs of radicalisation. However, this 
security strategy promotes the appearance of the previously mentioned phe-
nomenon of ‘garage mosques’ or ‘garage Islam’.
In conclusion, two different layers of positionality can be observed. On 
the one hand, online, I was a non-Muslim, female researcher contacting 
female participants affiliated to jihadism, whereas offline, I was a non-Muslim 
female researcher interviewing male Salafist imams. On the other hand, as a 
non-Muslim female researcher in the online realm, I felt the impact and the 
corresponding limitations of my positionality. Surprisingly, offline, the same 
positionality and my refusal to consider conversion produced few limitations 
and I kept the connection with key figures in the Spanish Islamic community.
Concluding Remarks
Spanish-speaking jihadist women were confident about the success of their 
roles in propagating jihadist audiovisual material among their friends and 
followers on Facebook, and, hence, recruiting other women to the jihadist 
cause. For this purpose, Facebook was the ideal digital space, allowing plenty 
of media contents, correspondent threads and social meta-data to give more 
relevance to their jihadist aim. As a researcher, I found it useful to observe 
these Facebook-generated contents, in order to infer vital aspects of social 
online dynamics and social online exchanges between individuals involved in 
jihadist networks. This gave me a unique opportunity to register their own 
specific digital method of alluring, grooming and recruiting new elements to 
jihadist networks.
Although the reality is now better documented, we are still far from 
having an efficient and adequate ethics protocol to conduct online research 
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on sensitive matters such as online jihadism. In other words, this study has 
exposed the interest of furthering the possibilities offered by digital contexts, 
namely Facebook, to gather primary data on individuals directly engaged 
with jihadism. Similarly, the study has broadened the perception of the 
work ahead to elaborate comprehensive ethic procedures to assist researchers 
devoted to online violent extremism.
Although the study reflects a particular sample with defined characteris-
tics, it has the potential to explain similar processes of violent extremism and 
to replicate its ethical considerations in similar research areas. The jihadist 
social networks share similar relationship patterns and construction dynam-
ics, categories that validate the importance of comparing and replicating 
coherent ethical plans. Furthermore, these common categories represent a 
possible advance towards ethical research models, that is, to determine how 
they can be evolved in a more pro-active way. Moreover, the input brought 
up by empirical data such as that presented in this study contributes to 
a comprehensive, deepened analysis of the ethical implications of studying 
jihadist social networks.
During the entire time of my research I have never lost sight of the fact 
that online jihadism plays a significant role in the lives of people everywhere 
in the world, and brings harm in between the blurred lines of the online or 
offline world. This chapter has explored specific ethical dilemmas associated 
with online research on highly sensitive and pressuring subjects, as well as 
having addressed my own position as a researcher.
My ethical decisions reflect the several overlapping contexts that have 
surrounded my research. I have exposed them here to discussion so that they 
can serve as stepping-stones with which build up new theoretical avenues or 
to reinforce the validity of existing theories. Moreover, these ethical deci-
sions are important for the purposes of shedding light on similar case studies 
observing common patterns and mechanisms that may be useful in generat-
ing overarching ethical theories and practices. Finally, the chapter has shown, 
the uniformity of audio, textual and visual jihadi contents on Facebook, and 
the ability to frame these into themes that have a distinct value for Spanish-
speaking jihadist women, is a key recruitment tool.
Hence, more analysis is necessary to explain the online radicalisation 
processes while they are still in motion. More work is necessary to harvest 
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data that position the individual’s stages of engagement with violent online 
contents. This also means that we have to develop ethical propositions that 
can be helpful specifically to deepening data on online gender jihadism.
It would be interesting, therefore, to test and measure whether the multi-
ple (albeit indirect) interrelations that evolve around people’s entanglements 
with jihadi media resist and subsist after the online links are broken. That 
is to say, it would be interesting to explore whether the impact of mediated 
jihadi thinking and action persists in its interlocutors after digital platforms 
disrupt their activity. In order to answer this question, we need to further 
conceptualise and develop jihadi audiovisuality as a field of research.
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APPROPRIATION IN ISLAMIC STATE 
PROPAGANDA: A THEORETICAL AND 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK OF TYPES 
AND DIMENSIONS
Bernd Zywietz and Yorck Beese
Introduction
The ‘Islamic State’s’ (or IS’s1) publicity and media work have attracted worldwide attention and shaped public debates about online propa-
ganda. One specific aspect of this outreach is the different practices of appro-
priation. IS supposedly used ‘Hollywood’ techniques to overwhelm viewers, 
adapted various social media services (Awan 2017; Farwell 2014) and appro-
priated ‘the crusades’ (Roche 2017) or even al-Qaeda’s ideology (Khatib 
2015: 14).
This brief overview already illustrates how the term appropriation (Latin 
appropriare, ‘to make one’s own’) bears an enormously ambiguous range of 
meanings while offering a valuable perspective in two ways. First, discerning 
acts and elements of IS propaganda as appropriative can be understood as 
 1 Adopting the Islamic State’s self-designation ‘the Islamic State’ is contested for good reason. 
Yet alternatives such as ‘Daesh’ come with their own terminological challenges. Bearing in 
mind the adoption of other militant or even terrorist groups’ self-designations (‘Red Army 
Faction’, ‘Irish Republican Army’) in academic literature, we will use ‘Islamic State’ or the 
abbreviation ‘IS’. We will not use the shorthand ‘ISIS’, since it stands for the Islamic State’s 
predecessor, ‘The Islamic State of Iraq and Shām’, which ceased existence in 2014.
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making strategic ascriptions to delegitimise the ‘Caliphate’s’ representational 
claims, but also as making projections in reaction to its cultural ‘strange-
ness’. Second, the perspective on appropriation introduces an insightful 
analytical approach to IS’s media work and texts as propaganda. By propa-
ganda we mean a kind of persuasive ideological communication (Jowett and 
O’Donnell 2012). For us, the term is value-free; it is not per se tied to sinister 
motives or unethical methods of influence. It sets the focus, however, on 
rhetorical functionality. Distinguishing and mapping different dimensions 
of appropriation in the area of strategic communication (as we do in section 
4) might not only provide a systematic framework for analysing IS’s and 
other actors’ propaganda, for co-ordinating current and future research, and 
for correlating respective results. It also could advance our understanding of 
cultural symbolic practices in the field of media socio-technology and media 
format phenomena.
Before we proceed to a general critical view of Islamic State as an ideo-
logically and epistemologically threatening ‘appropriator’ (section 2) and the 
questionable labelling of IS propaganda as ‘Hollywood’-like (section 3), we 
introduce three broad types of appropriation in order to clarify the term, 
which allows us to discern different dimensions of IS appropriative strategies 
(section 4). These categories and their naming are preliminary and are meant 
as a suggestion, which holds for our outline of IS’s adaptive dimensions as 
well. They result from our ongoing investigation of IS propaganda as part of 
the research project Jihadism on the Internet.2
Types of Appropriation
The term appropriation is applied to different objects of study and various 
degrees of generalisation between the individual (micro) and the broader 
cultural or social (macro) level. It is used across heterogeneous disciplines 
like paedagogy, social work, media studies, science and technology stud-
ies, human–computer interaction, cultural studies and social anthropology. 
Appropriation requires an individual or collective actor and a material or 
 2 The research group Jihadism on the Internet: Images and Videos, Their Appropriation and 
Dissemination is hosted by the Department of Anthropology and African Studies at Johannes 
Gutenberg University, Mainz. The group is funded by the German Federal Ministry of 
Education and Research. 
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mental object turned into something significantly new or different, essen-
tially or in relation to its original meaning or domain of use. This transfer or 
transformation may concern legal ownership (such as the appropriation of 
goods or land; Fairhead et al. 2012),3 but also, more abstractly, basic cogni-
tive processes of human orientation and learning such as ‘active analysis of 
the environment, especially objective and symbolic culture’ (Hüllemann et 
al. 2019).
Against this backdrop, we distinguish three types of appropriation central 
to the humanities and to cultural studies. Interpretive appropriation includes 
the aforementioned processes of hermeneutic understanding (Ricœur 1983: 
179), mental interpretation, sense-making or world exploration, generating 
relations ‘between what new knowledge is imparted on someone and what is 
already sedimented in the experience of the appropriating subject’ (Michel 
2007: 62). One possible sub-type, especially in the context of cultural stud-
ies, is the assignment and acting out of cultural-symbolic interpretations 
(Schweiger 2007: 319), for example counter-hegemonic or oppositional 
readings of films or TV shows. Although this kind of appropriation primarily 
relates to the ‘internal’ or implicit human activity, it may manifest itself in 
acts such as discussing those interpretations with peers (Ayaß 2012).
The second type, practical technological appropriation, relates to means of 
action and their techno-cultural and techno-social exploitation, but also their 
practical exploration (meaning the sovereign capacity of utilising). In this 
area, some resistant practices can be identified as well, for example if users 
invent or develop manners of use contrary to the intentions and guidelines 
of device manufacturers and application developers. Theories and studies 
on the diffusion and adoption of media and other technologies are closely 
connected to this type of appropriation (Tchounikine 2017). Here, a strong 
interpretive-cognitive component comes into play, too, especially regarding 
usability or user experience.
As a third type of appropriation we identify expressive appropriation, 
better-known and highly contested as cultural (mis-)appropriation, although 
this term is sometimes defined more broadly (and expanded into the field of 
 3 This material, legalistic and physical form of appropriation will not be further addressed in 
this chapter. 
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our first two domains) by authors such as Huck and Bauernschmidt (2012). 
While interpretative appropriation primarily relates to the generation of mean-
ing and practical appropriation to skills and tools, expressive appropriation – 
 as defined by us –  relates to the acquisition and, most of all, the application of 
pre-existing cultural and artistic forms, formats, patterns or motifs. This type 
and practical appropriation intersect because the use of ‘artistic’ or expressive 
tools (e.g. the body as medium of dance) cannot be clearly separated from 
its individual form or style. Nonetheless, this distinction seems useful even 
despite its semantic entanglement since the technical-instrumental aspect 
differs from creative practice through the adaption of, for example, literary 
subject matters and motifs (Sanders 2006) or the choice of formal devices.
Expressive as cultural appropriation is the most controversial kind of 
appropriation, as it is morally charged to a high degree in the postcolonial 
discourse, or in terms of cultural, social and political identity (Brunk and 
Young 2009). Debates revolve around the public display and, by extension, 
the ‘culture-industrial’ commodification of certain hairstyles, (body) decora-
tion, textile patterns, clothing and other cultural-artistic styles and motifs 
originating in marginalised groups or peoples. By contrast, similar practices 
are deemed less offensive and objectionable, even positive in the sense of 
cultural resistance, participation and creativity if enacted by subjects located 
in a rather inferior position within patriarchal, postcolonial, culture-capitalist 
or otherwise centralised power structures.
Since we are primarily concerned with the pragmatic differentiation of 
adapted or utilised objects or practices, we prefer the less evaluative phrase 
expressive appropriation, meaning, in a value-free manner, the adoption 
and application of media-textual structures and conventions, formal aes-
thetic elements of design or motifs, and specific sign repertories in media 
representations.
Still, many problems remain. Besides the question of cultural essential-
ism and fixed cultural identity and authority inherent in the term (mis-)
appropriation as a derogatory label, there is the problem of terminological 
distinction and demarcation. This applies especially to the ordinary ‘use’, 
‘borrowing’, ‘application’ and ‘implementation’. After all, instances of appro-
priation are ‘not just symbolic achievements or cognitive activities; they 
are concrete actions’ (Hahn 2012: 17). To what extent, then, is the term 
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appropriation of any use if virtually every action, whether mental or physical, 
entails an element of adopting something as one’s own?
Regarding such pitfalls, appropriation in general should not be consid-
ered a definite category of practice, but taken as an analytical perspective 
on cultural and social-procedural action (appropriating) and its outcomes. 
Besides the determination of source and target objects (appropriation of/into), 
it seems necessary to assess a minimum of transformation effort (appropria-
tion via). Criteria for measuring this effort could be derived or deduced on 
a case-by-case basis from the relation between the object status before and 
after appropriation. Points of reference are conventional and generic modes 
and situations of use with respect to socio-semiotic meaning (Derboven et al. 
2016; van Leeuwen 2005), inferable from ‘typical’ or ‘traditional’ pragmatic 
contexts.4
Subsequently, the type and extent of formal and material change or the 
modes of use are less important than the meaning connected to appropriation 
for the respective publics deemed relevant (appropriation for). The advantage 
of such a recursive understanding is that appropriation is nothing fixed, but 
construed in relation to a (e.g. cultural, disciplinary or ideological) locus. This 
place or position from which the term appropriation is deployed might be 
an individual standpoint or a metacommunicative position (observing the 
attribution of appropriation) and must be factored into the analysis.
Since our systematic overview of the manifold media-propagandistic 
appropriations by IS already has to be cursory owing to the breadth of the 
subject, we can offer only a limited reflection of this kind. Nevertheless, 
before turning towards distinct categories and fields of propagandistic adop-
tion, adaptation and imitation, we begin with a general view of the classifica-
tion of IS as an ‘illegitimate’ appropriator, with the attribution of illegitimacy 
being the principal constituent in ‘detecting’ or construing appropriation.
Discursive Delegitimisation and Projection: IS as Appropriating Other
According to the terminological scope outlined above, a plethora of IS appro-
priations can be identified beyond the group’s looting of private and public 
 4 On this basis, appropriation can be described as the interplay of various interdependent pro-
cesses or practices (see section ‘Dimensions and Modes of IS Propaganda Appropriation’). 
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property, public goods and resources (especially oil) as well as cultural arte-
facts in occupied territories. However, the discursive classification or percep-
tion might be dominated by the rendering of IS as illegitimate appropriator 
on a symbolic and communicative level and, as a consequence, as ‘epistemi-
cally defective’ (Ross 2002): as dishonest, illogical, misleading or erroneous.
IS claims validity, and it is in this way that its narratives (Heck 2017) 
are contested and countered just like the claims and narratives of other jihad-
ist actors. The Islamic State, according to this view, ‘wrongfully’ or ‘falsely’ 
adopts religious concepts and signs or interprets them in ‘extremist’ ways. As 
many civil actors, scholars, clerics and politicians like US president Barack 
Obama have stated, it does not represent Islam at all, or at least represents 
it in a distorted fashion (Dyer 2019; Wassenstein 2017). Further examples 
of dysfunctional appropriation concern symbols like the black banner, the 
concepts of caliphate (Al-Rasheed et al. 2013), jihad (Khdir 2018) and takfir 
(‘excommunication’; Badar et al. 2017), the history of the medieval crusades 
(Roche 2017) and, generally, the selective, decontextualising, instrumentalis-
ing and anti-clerical interpretation of the Quran to justify its actions and 
establish its world-view as authoritative (Jacoby 2019; Frissen et al. 2018).
This debate about the attributed status of IS’s members as non- or devi-
ant Muslims, in which the ideological power to define what ‘true’ Islam is (or 
should be), is negotiated, is as relevant as ‘orientalist’ (Said 1979) prejudices 
and stereotyping (Bassil 2019) and still awaits its critical investigation. It is, 
however, already apparent in the argument structures and the values mobi-
lised in order to delegitimise IS that conflate questions of ethics and religious 
interpretation with a strategic counter-communicative calculus and security 
policy agendas (that undermine the political and religious appeal for poten-
tial IS followers).
Here the differentiation between interpretive and expressive appropria-
tion proves to be useful, even if only heuristically. In the context of dis-
cursive or ideological warfare, it is important to distinguish between the 
(ascribed) strategic or rhetorical deployment of symbols (the black banner, 
the prophet’s seal, ritualised corporal punishments) and the public perfor-
mance of symbolic (cultural, religious) actions out of conviction and in good 
faith. The latter appears less malicious, more internal and ‘sincere’, as it may 
imply a naive misunderstanding of the Quran and Sunnah, for example a too 
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literal reading of them.5 Therefore, it is not surprising if the argumentative 
and linguistic framework of inadmissible cultural appropriation is used to 
denounce such practises as deliberate and instrumental enactments that mask 
reprehensible motives (such as greed for power, sadism, enrichment or sexual 
lust), but also political and social grievances.6
Since the focus of this chapter is on IS’s practical and strategic media 
work, we will not pursue this issue further. However, the outlined fram-
ing will remain crucial in attending to IS’s appropriative activities, whether 
the ‘Western’ image of Islamic State is an expression of racist-ideological 
orientalism or whether Islamic State presents itself as ‘anti-modernist’, 
purposely fuelling stereotypical images (like sword-wielding  executioners 
in its capital punishment videos) or cherishes and repurposes nostalgic 
 (counter-) imaginations.7 The perception of IS as fascinating as much as – 
 regarding its ‘savagery’ –  horrifying other not only influences, or even distorts, 
the view on actual or supposed appropriations by or in the ‘Caliphate’. It also 
makes IS and its media work lucrative subjects for academics and journalists 
alike. This is especially true since, owing to the lack of valid information or 
the abundance of bizarre details, IS offers an easy target on which to project 
rather abstract cultural criticism or a source for sensationalism.8 Observations 
about how, for example, ‘Hollywood-like’ IS videos in this sense rather illus-
trate the ambiguity of and fascination with Islamic State probably reveal 
more about the speakers, their position and the cultural and ideological envi-
ronment than they do about the discussed object. We address this example of 
a more general appropriation framing in the next section.
 5 Of course, in circles hostile towards Islam and religion in general it might be regarded as 
another ‘true’ radical version of belief.
 6 For examples of and reflections on this topic see Guidere (2015), Cottee (2017) and 
Gunning and Jackson (2011).
 7 Rogers (2018: 120) considers the ‘so-called “Islamic State”’ as ‘the War on Terror’s cor-
porate competitor for hegemonic control of conflict-capitalism’s global market. The group 
positions itself for American consumers as ultimate threat to our very civilizational soul, 
rendered legible in a localised brand identity that responds to audience expectation: Evil™.’
 8 See Kraidy’s application of the term spectacle to IS’s ‘projectilic’ or ‘operative images’ (Kraidy 
2017) or Botz-Bornstein’s (2017) comparison of IS aesthetics with Italian Futurism. With 
respect to journalism, we would like to call to mind the media buzz IS generated, especially 
in 2014 and 2015. Sensations were, for example, the five-part VICE news series The Islamic 
State (August 2018) by journalist Medyan Dairieh.
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The Islamic State’s ‘Hollywood’
Some metaphorical uses of the Los Angeles district’s famous name refer 
to actual film production sites (e.g. Mumbai’s ‘Bollywood’, Nigeria’s 
‘Nollywood’). In other contexts, ‘Hollywood’ stands for escapist, glamorous 
cinematic entertainment and technological finesse. Images of the 9/11 attacks, 
on the other hand, have been associated with ‘pictures like in Hollywood’ to 
express feelings of unreality and being overwhelmed (Rickli 2009).9
Journalists, especially, have described IS videos using the word 
‘Hollywood’ (Blender 2017: 59). However, only a few ways of applying this 
label seem sensible. We will address just two.
The first refers to the insertion of snippets from Hollywood movies into 
IS videos, for example from Ridley Scott’s period film Kingdom of Heaven 
(2005) (Fernandez 2015) or Peter Jackson’s The Lord of the Rings –  The 
Return of the King (2003) (Ma 2018). In both cases, scenes of war and mass 
combat were chosen for illustrative and affective purposes, to display historic 
confrontations between Muslim armies and their adversaries. By alluding to 
historic battles and paralleling them with current military confrontations, the 
jihadists express their proclaimed legitimacy, lend their own operations the 
aura of mythological prophecy and try to find support for their constituency. 
It is not so much the specific films and their specific meaning that are crucial 
but the audiovisual motifs, for instance scenes of ‘medieval’ and ‘archaic’ wars 
that are fought in head-to-head combat with sword, bow and arrow. The fact 
that Lord of the Rings depicts a fantasy world with non-human creatures is 
readily ignored. Kingdom of Heaven, on the other hand, fictionally re-enacts 
historical clashes between crusaders and Muslims. Read as a commentary on 
the international war on terror at the time of its release (Sarris 2005), it seems 
to be an interesting, yet presumably uncalculated choice as an image source. 
Contrary to most Hollywood movies shaping negative stereotypical images 
of the Arab world (Shaheen 2015; Semmerling 2006), Kingdom of Heaven’s 
Muslim characters, and especially Sultan Saladin, are depicted as far more 
civilised and tolerant than the European Christians. Still, it is remarkable that 
 9 An example concerning the Hollywood metaphor in relation to the Islamic State’s images 
of destruction is offered by Munk (2018). 
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Islamic State repurposes Hollywood’s historic and fictional visions for use in 
a similar manner, albeit an illustrative fashion, stressing the visual appeal of 
the imagery while reversing the interpretation of identities.10
The second way in which IS propaganda resembles Hollywood media is 
by quality and style. This notion of appropriation is less distinct and manifest, 
since it either concerns forms of imitation or a certain formal production and 
design effort or the affective experience associated with this (which may be 
understood by analogy with the aforementioned ‘hollywoodesque feeling of 
9/11 imagery’).
For example, Dauber and Robinson (2015) note: ‘[IS] videos mimic 
what could be called a “Hollywood visual style”. And this is being done 
so systematically and carefully that, while its [sic] entirely possible that it’s 
accidental, we find that very unlikely.’ They point out that the description 
as ‘being like “Hollywood action films”’ (ibid.) is not to be taken literally 
because, among other reasons, IS videos are not really big-budget produc-
tions. Instead, ‘Hollywood’ stands for an internationally pace-setting com-
mercial standard and strong efforts concerning, among other things, the 
clarity and colour intensity of images, professional lighting or visual effects. 
This is a necessary relativisation because IS makes use not only of Hollywood 
films but also of TV footage or computer games, while Hollywood, in turn, 
is influenced in style and content by, for example, Asian cinema or documen-
tary films. Furthermore, the ‘Hollywood’ label only applies when the history 
of New Hollywood Cinema and other historic developments or products of 
the ‘dream factory’ are ignored.
The same holds true for IS videos, of which only a small segment display 
the infamously high level of quality. Classifying Islamic State as a clever and 
effective yet unauthentic appropriator stealing from Hollywood only matches 
hyperbolic and simplifying public discourses on the subject. In fact, IS media 
offices ‘only’ seem to follow established aesthetic standards as these are not 
only part of IS propagandists’ media socialisation but are also pursued by 
producers worldwide –  from Egyptian TV stations to Brazilian telenovelas.
10 The fact that IS uses excerpts from fictional films in quasi-documentary contexts for pur-
poses of illustration is, however, less remarkable. This ‘makeshift’ procedure is common in 
documentary television and film.
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The fact that the notion of such a ‘Hollywood’ quality is implicitly or 
explicitly attributed to IS –  or even secretly admired as subversive –  can be 
explained in three different ways. First, it results from IS’s extraordinary 
status as an extremist and terrorist organisation. Second, it stems from the 
high degree of success in artisanal imitation or adaption (especially if com-
pared to other jihadist groups and the attention it generates internationally). 
Third, and finally, it is based on the popularised self-representation of Islamic 
State as uncannily anachronistic. The modern audiovisual professionality 
seems to contradict IS’s orientation towards the way of life of the founding 
generations of Islam.
Dimensions and Modes of IS Propaganda Appropriation
We now proceed to take a closer look at several domains of IS media appro-
priation in terms of practical technological and expressive appropriation. Beyond 
this, appropriation entails, as mentioned above, one or more ‘re’-processes, as 
we like to call these actions or steps of transformation and conversion:
recasting or redesigning; remediating (as formal, technical or material 
change)
resituating, re-enacting or recontextualizing (using in or transferring into 
a different context, e.g. historical or generic)
refunctioning or repurposing (introducing a new way of or a novel 
purpose for use; transfer into a different functional state)
This list is of course not exhaustive and we cannot go into more detail here. 
It is, however, important to note that these and other basic appropriative 
‘operations’ underlie or model, on an abstract level, resemiotization (Iedema 
2003) and resemanticization (Joyeux-Prunel 2017), which again include or 
provoke higher-order processes like reinterpretation and re-evaluation. Such 
a pragmatic-functional reconstruction allows us to be more precise and sys-
tematic in investigating appropriation as meaning-making, for example by 
differentiating whether a formal element is deployed in a new way or whether 
a functional element is given a novel gestalt.
We identify five interdependent core dimensions of practice: media mate-
rials (media texts), formal aesthetic and structural elements as well as styles 
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(design conventions, patterns, genres), technological tools (hardware and soft-
ware) and technical formats. These are explored in the next four sections. A 
further dimension not addressed in this chapter concerns social and technical 
infrastructures.11 By this we do not only mean the internet, the dark net or 
the social web, but also local structures within IS territory: media kiosks, TV 
satellite dishes or social networks of personal relations and word-of-mouth 
communication among relatives, neighbours and acquaintances.
Across these categories, two further, likewise interlinked functional or 
objective dimensions can be discriminated: (1) the ideational-ideological con-
veyance of world-view and overarching historical and political goals and 
objects; and (2) the self-marketing as an individual brand that competes with 
other (jihadist) actors (Simons 2018; Rogers 2018). We will not discuss these 
functional dimensions separately or explicitly. Nevertheless, they are relevant 
in exploring and interpreting adaptive actions, processes and their results.
‘Found Footage’: The Utilisation of Existing Media Texts
Like political activists, IS makes use of pre-existing media materials of any 
modality to repurpose them and incorporate them into videos, photographic 
reports and magazines. Most of these media materials are taken from press 
kits, stock photo archives or other journalistic recordings available on the 
internet. They are used like any other news item, for example in the Dabiq 
magazine, in order to illustrate reports, but also to supply evidence, as well 
as to cite, reply or contribute to certain discourses. An example of this is an 
excerpt from a TV speech by the then US president Barack Obama or opera-
tive footage of air-strikes in the execution video of James Foley.12 The execu-
tion of the American journalist and the accompanying speech by the hooded 
executioner ‘Jihadi John’ were organised dramaturgically as a reaction (or 
dialogical answer) to the images which often serve as proof of the enemy’s 
aggression or, in some cases, of its double standards.
Besides such a reflexive thematisation of visual materials and statements 
(the title of the Dabiq column, ‘In the Words of the Enemy’, sums it up well), 
there is no explicit re-interpretation. However, while the basic journalistic or 
11 For notes on this subject see Zywietz (2020).
12 A Message to America (al-Furqan Media Foundation, 19 August 2014).
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otherwise original functions do not change, a re-evaluation takes place via 
the new contextual embedding. Prime examples of this are the triumphant 
display of terror attack images –  a reframing and re-evaluation as positive and 
glorious events. Appropriation, in other words, is linked to the pragmatic 
role or functional communicative mode of the media artefact. In No Respite,13 
images such as photo portraits of US presidents are refunctioned as associa-
tive elements of an ornamental and aesthetic visual stream of consciousness 
without any indication of their representational origins or formal external 
discursive status. And while the former is indicated as ‘citation’, thus drawing 
legitimacy from the source’s reputation, the latter are stylistically fitted into 
the visuality of the Islamic State media world.
Formal Aesthetic and Structural Dimensions: Designs, Styles and Genres
Political activists commonly attempt to establish and maintain their own 
‘corporate’ or ‘brand identity’ by employing symbols, image worlds, colour 
combinations, logotypes and other visual and auditive elements (such as 
hymns) (Beifuss et al. 2013). They serve as implicit or explicit statements 
about aims and the status as political and historical actor(s). In the case of IS, 
utilising symbols like the black banner or the prophet’s seal as a central brand 
logo is accompanied by public ‘enactments’ like carrying the banner or hoist-
ing up the flag over the city. This historicising appropriation is embedded 
in further performative practises that oscillate between presentative staging 
for the camera, empathetic nostalgic re-enactment, political demonstration 
and public religious rituality (e.g. riding on horses, following scripture with 
respect to clothing style or beard, and so on; see Salzmann 2016).14
Media logos and designs of the ‘Caliphate’, its central and regional 
media offices and their single ‘product brands’ (like the Inside the Khilafah 
video series and the Dabiq magazine) function similarly. Like the traditional 
symbols of Neo-Salafism, they are structural culture-text elements, derived 
from, referring to and thus drawing on a certain pre-given area of cultural 
13 No Respite (al-Hayat Media Center, 24 November 2015).
14 This resonates with ‘heroic’ motifs in anāshīd lyrics. Regarding words as derived from poetry 
and its musical (vocal) composition and performance, these hymns are a substantial jihadi 
cultural genre, yet with its own history of traditions, adaptations and mixtures well before 
and beyond Islamist contexts (Weinrich, Chapter 10).
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expression and legitimacy. Here the specific style and its associative meaning 
are relevant, too. Points of reference are modern media outlets and products, 
television stations, news programmes and print magazines, their designs and 
aesthetic qualities –  and how they are strategically organised.15 Along with 
their adaptation of traditional and regional culture genres like anāshīd, IS and 
its media outlets imitate, cite or emulate also general styles, formats and codes 
common to global media culture. This includes elements of video games, 
which, in turn, draw on ‘cold’ techno-military operational images (Eder 
2017). The video Kill Them Wherever You Find Them,16 for example, com-
bines a collage of news footage generated during the Paris attacks (13 and 14 
November 2015), surveillance camera with animated aerial shots and visual 
effect filters simulating superimposed grids, computer-generated reticles and 
other artificial optical markers. It references the augmented reality visuality of 
head-up displays or guided missile control images common in video games, 
particularly mission briefing sequences in games like Call of Duty: Modern 
Warfare 2 (2009). Such instances of computer game aestheticisation, along 
with a television commercial or music video stylisation, pursue a strategy 
to affect and attract. On the other hand, many of IS’s formal or structural 
elements derived from TV and web journalism are rhetorical in shaping the 
corporative rhetor’s consistent and ‘valuable’ image for the audience (Ulrich 
2012: 222–4), thus enhancing its credibility and soundness.
There is, however, more to these dimensions of expressive appropriation 
than simply reasons of imitation and effectiveness, as the case of the British 
journalist and IS hostage John Cantlie illustrates. For the caliphate’s propa-
ganda, Cantlie performs as a reporter17 or, in the Lend Me Your Ears series,18 
as a commentator, seated at a wooden desk in front of a black cloth. In his 
role as pundit, Cantlie wears a bright orange jump suit alluding to the images 
15 It is relevant that, for example, the different wilāyat videos not only opened with a ‘profes-
sional’ visually attractive, animated identifier (a slow metallic materiality of the logo against 
a black background) but that they all showed this very same unified design: an integrated 
brand (family).
16 Released by al-Hayat Media Center, 24 January 2016.
17 E.g. Inside Mosul (al-Hayat Media Center, 2015).
18 Lend Me Your Ears –  Messages from The British Detainee John Cantlie, a seven-part series of 
videos released in 2014.
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of prisoners at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay –  a cynical parody of TV 
expert statements and, at the same time, an appropriation of clothing norms 
for the purpose of re-enactment and subversion.19 Cantlie even had his own 
column in the Dabiq magazine where other typical magazine elements and 
genres could be found like a table of contents, a foreword and ‘ads’ for the 
latest IS video productions, but also for hostages advertised as a ‘limited time 
offer’ for an unspecified ransom.20 These and other paratextual genre appro-
priations like film teasers and trailers announcing the more elaborate IS video 
productions21 show the traits of a somewhat ironising, perhaps even play-
ful mimicry. However, their appropriative status is dynamic and oscillates 
between closeness and distance, appreciation of form, and contempt for the 
ideological origins and style of the templates used. Those paratexts and genre 
texts revere the referenced material and, at the same time, refuse it because of 
its cultural and ideological origins.
Alternatively, these formats, styles and genres can be considered as appro-
priated formal means of expression and structural elements with which to 
articulate IS’s own ideational contents. From this perspective, appropria-
tion is less mocking and appreciative, but a functional communicative merg-
ing of presentational means and visual jihad culture: images of paradise-like 
places –  or, in some historic jihadi videos, even paradise itself –  and the 
heroic pathos of mujāhidīn (Ostovar 2017; Holtman 2013). Those visual 
patterns and motifs, codes and metaphors are, however, not the ‘real’ or main 
essence of the message. They become fully meaningful and rhetorically effec-
tive only in dialectical contrast with the design vehicles or packaging. Such 
a view is compatible with the concept of recontextualisation as introduced by 
Chouliaraki and Kissas (2017: 28–9) in the context of IS’s explicit death/
body imagery: a way of competing meaning-making, a form of intervening 
by engaging, mirroring back and exposing. Either way, any kind of reference 
and quality (‘high-end’, semi-professional or ‘amateurish’) in IS’s media work 
19 Other authors (e.g. Gruber 2020) have noted the appropriation of orange prison clothing 
by IS as well.
20 Dabiq, 11, 64–5.
21 Some of the main productions this applies to are Flames of War (al-Hayat Media Center 
2014), Flames of War II (29 November 2017) and The Rise of the Khilafah and the Return of 
the Gold Dinar (al-Hayat Media Center 2015). 
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is to be considered not only a sign of (in-)ability and (failed) aspiration, but 
also a potential marker of a kind of procedural authenticity, distinction and 
signification.
Technical Tools
Genres or communicative formats, whether viewed as established formulaic 
solutions for recurring communicative tasks or as continued and rigidified 
creative contracts or proposals, are substantially dependent on techniques and 
technology, their development and, of course, practical utilisation. Point-of-
view shots of fighting IS mujāhidīn were made possible only by action cam-
eras like those developed by GoPro, Inc. IS soldiers attach cameras to their 
heads or to their rifles, preferably in videos of the combat genre, in order to 
produce an immersive ego perspective of battlefield action. Unlike bodycam 
footage of soldiers or police officers, which primarily serves to gather further 
intel, evaluate a mission or become legal evidence, IS uses these images mainly 
to cultivate a spectacular high-definition experience, document the exploits 
of its mujāhidīn and, maybe unconsciously, reproduce the vista popular in 
first-person shooter gaming.22
Other means of visual design like the animation of title lettering (most 
notably in the form of kinetic typology), infographics or FX filters, for exam-
ple glitched data effects, evidence an appropriation of pre-existing design 
templates and the use of corresponding hardware and software. The history 
of Islamic State’s and other jihadist groups’ media technology is part of the 
ongoing adaptive history of terrorist and activist media, which, in turn, is a 
history of media democratisation and decentralisation, especially with regard 
to electronic and digital means of production and distribution. Video cameras 
became smaller, more affordable and easier to use. Editing is no longer tied to 
high-end professional work stations, but, instead, is turned into or available 
via media software (Manovich 2013) for home computers, notebooks and 
mobile phones. Just like artists or home users do for their respective purposes, 
extremists use those means for their propaganda.
22 The Islamic State video Determination of the Brave 2 (Wilāyat al-Anbar 2015) not only 
features GoPro cameras footage, but even reflects on it by demonstratively comparing, i.e. 
cross-cutting, third- and first-person perspectives. 
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Besides this mainstream technology, the Islamic State uses equipment 
more typical for (semi-)professional media actors, such as clip-on micro-
phones (e.g. on the clothing of victims in capital punishment videos) and 
advanced lighting kits. Major IS productions in particular are shot with at 
least two cameras, allowing for scenes to be resolved from different angles. 
Film-making conventions like these were adopted rather quickly by Islamic 
State, beginning in 2014, and indicate another non-central dimension of 
appropriation: the capturing of media equipment or its acquisition through 
illegal or at least unofficial channels that are closely connected to shadow 
economies and underground financial transactions. Across several groups 
on Telegram, calls for donations to acquire equipment were made; one 
website on the dark net even explicitly asked for money to be donated 
for cameras in the $400–800 range (the said model of camera, the Nikon 
Coolpix p900, would later be seen in Islamic State videos).23 A similar grey 
market has evolved for internet access via European satellite networks or the 
distributors of devices and service access (Kwasniewski 2015). In order to 
maintain its grip on TV and internet reception, Islamic State banned satel-
lite dishes in its regions, celebrating their destruction in propaganda videos 
(Naylor and Salim 2016). According to an IS statement, the materials from 
the destroyed antennas were re-used as part of explosive devices (Dearden 
2015).
However, such aspects of the availability and distribution of equipment 
already lead into the subject area of propaganda infrastructures addressed 
elsewhere (Zywietz 2020). Therefore, we wish to close with some remarks on 
media-technological formats –  a subject recently discovered by media and 
culture studies.24
Technical Formats
By format we do not mean the generic structure of media texts like the 
licensable concept of a television show (‘TV format’, Chalaby 2015), but 
23 However, it has so far been impossible to clarify to what degree such donations using 
Bitcoin or PayPal are ‘legitimate’ or whether they are scams or even traps set by security 
services.
24 A seminal work has been presented by Jonathan Sterne (2012), who suggested and outlined 
a format theory.
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the basic physical norms or technical standards of information encoding, its 
syntax and its semantics: paper-page size and printing norms, cassette tapes 
and DVD standards, file formats and codecs for data compression, transmis-
sion, storage, playback or editing like MP4, MP3, HTML, DOC, JPEG, 
GIF or PDF. Formats are not epistemically neutral, if only because the ideas 
of conformity and exchange are essential to the very concept of formatting 
(McGill 2018: 671). They influence the media-textual work, its performance 
spectrum, its results and its perception. ‘The format is what specifies the 
protocols by which a medium will operate’ (Sterne 2012: 8); it ‘denotes a 
whole range of decisions that affect the look, feel, experience and workings of 
a medium’ (ibid. 7).
Unsurprisingly, IS delivers its media in the established formats that the 
technology apparatus and online platforms demand or facilitate, because it 
wants to be ‘understood’ by a target audience and its devices. However, within 
those regulations, and together with religious keywords, established wordings 
and references, the spoken and written Arabic of IS publications marks a 
distinct cultural identity –  or technicality –  and serves the processes of inclu-
sion, exclusion, conformity or standardisation. Besides jihadi iconography 
(Brachmann and Kennedy-Boudali 2006), graphical patterns (ornamenta-
tion, calligraphy) and auditive structures (recitations, vocalises in anāshīd; 
Pieslak 2017; Weinrich, Chapter 10), they are forms of self-enactment or 
adaptations of formal guidelines in media design, too, even if not directly 
regulated by technical standardisation. Yet they might be considered ‘soft’ 
formats, a kind of counter-coding, and important in this context, as they are 
not immediately intelligible for human ‘outsiders’ and, in addition, not for 
non-human agents like algorithms or upload filters.25 However, even when 
personal apps for android phones and browsers were developed to facilitate 
the dissemination of propaganda and possibly even allow for encrypted mes-
saging (Dillow 2016), as far as technical media formats are concerned IS and 
other political and cultural actors remain ‘silent’ or can only articulate them-
selves in technological ‘languages’ supplied by standard-setting bodies and 
25 The Arabic script –  as writing system, Unicode and ISO standards, and digital fonts – 
 exemplifies how tight and complex technical and cultural formats interrelate in this context.
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their working groups,26 Far East and US tech companies which won so-called 
‘standard battles’ or ‘format wars’ (van de Kaa and Vries 2015).
Conclusion
In order to outline the heterogeneous field of Islamic State’s appropriation, 
we described three basic types of appropriation which again can be applied 
to several dimensions of IS propaganda texts and practices. Together with 
analytical terms like ‘style’ or ‘formats’, ‘appropriation’ proves an instructive 
concept with which to generate insights into what IS is doing with its media, 
but is also useful, if critically deployed, in working out of how the idea of 
appropriation is in itself functional in culturally and ideologically othering IS 
and denouncing its position in a global (anti-)‘jihadist’ discourse. Although 
we could only briefly or implicitly touch on this issue, it is remarkable how IS 
does not use interpretative, technical or expressive contents, styles, symbols 
and devices of communication and (re-)presentation essentially different from 
those used by other political, religious or militant activists. Computer game 
visuality, GoPro points-of-view, Adobe Premiere templates or codes of TV 
journalism are remarkable or even unusual for us. The reason is not that they 
are new, but that they are transferred from one ‘appropriate’ (and at the same 
time inappropriate) domain of use (and locus of encountering) to another 
‘inappropriate’ (and appropriated) one. Therefore, as a meta-communicative 
concept, appropriation is an ascribed practice and –  most of all –  an analytical 
perspective of great value in (en-)countering Islamic State and its ‘Caliphate’ 
by reflecting our own ideological and cultural stance.
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VISUAL PERFORMATIVITY OF VIOLENCE: 
POWER AND RETALIATORY HUMILIATION 
IN ISLAMIC STATE (IS) BEHEADING VIDEOS 
BETWEEN 2014 AND 20171
Michael Krona
The significance of visual propaganda and imagery in war and conflict, currently carried by terrorist organisations on popular social media plat-
forms, has never been debated so much as it has been since Islamic State 
(IS) started gaining global attention for its sophisticated Jihadi-Salafi media 
campaigns in 2014. Although IS visual propaganda contains a wide tapestry 
of narratives, the images and videos of gruesome beheadings have for years 
been the centre of attention for scholars,2 and for supporters of IS ideological 
doctrines as well.3 This graphic violence involves deliberate choices in terms 
of image composition, lighting, camera angles, and overall editing techniques 
deployed to produce the maximum effect in terms of viewing experience and 
ideological interpretation among its targeted audiences. These videos pro-
duced and disseminated by IS, especially since the declaration of its caliphate 
in June 2014, are not only evidence of tactical choices and strategic products 
and tools in warfare: they are also communicative artefacts.
 1 First presented at Jihadi Audiovisualities, 4–5 October 2018, University of Mainz.
 2 For more on the visualisation of torture in IS media campaigns, see Molin-Friis (2015) and 
Euben (2017).
 3 For more extensive discussions of the role of online supporters for the dissemination of 
propaganda, see Krona (2020).
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This chapter aims to dissect a particular mediation of performative vio-
lence: the visualisation, through moving images, of beheadings as multi-
layered and multimodal media artefacts, produced with the dual objective of 
inciting fear among adversaries and, in addition, strengthening the in-group 
identity of the organisation for its supporters. How videos of IS beheadings 
of foreigners, alleged apostates or spies are designed is crucial for our under-
standing of the role of visual propaganda in IS contemporary warfare. It also 
contributes to a larger discussion of the significance of graphic representa-
tions of power and retaliatory humiliation in radicalisation processes. This 
chapter is based on the qualitative visual analysis of beheading videos pro-
duced and disseminated by IS’s official media wings between 2014 and 2017, 
with a particular focus on image composition and sequencing, contextualised 
through a theoretical discussion about how power and retaliatory humiliation 
are constructed through the visual performativity of violence.4
Militant Jihadist Beheadings and IS
Despite the fact that IS had emerged, developed and extended its territorial 
reach in both Iraq and Syria long before the appointed caliph Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi stepped up for his first address to the ummah in the Grand Mosque 
of Mosul in June 2014, it was mainly during the weeks following that speech 
that wider international attention to the proto-state project that is Islamic 
State was generated. A significant reason for this global outreach was the 
al-Hayat video entitled A Message to America,5 in which the US photojour-
nalist James Foley was beheaded by the UK citizen Mohammed Emwazi.6 
However, the use of decapitation videos broadcast on contemporary media 
platforms is by no means the invention of IS. Leaving aside this established 
execution method as a tool for intimidating adversaries used by, for instance, 
Mexican drug cartels (see Koch 2018), the significance of beheading videos 
within the twenty-first-century militant jihadist milieu can only be described 
as essential in its modus operandi (see, inter alia, Jones 2005).
 4 Screenshots have been selected taking into account ethical restraints and considerations, 
though they may seem provocative and graphic in nature.
 5 Produced and released by IS’s main media wing for international audiences, al-Hayat Media 
Foundation, in August 2014. 
 6 Emwazi became known as ‘Jihadi John’ in major Western media outlets.
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But before entering the role of strategic and propagandistic mediations 
of IS beheadings, one must consider a contextual framework to understand 
the contemporary use of beheadings in IS warfare, namely the historical prec-
edent and sectarian dimensions behind the divide between Shia and Sunni 
within Islamic scripture and history. Even though there are several dimensions 
involved in this split, a historical important factor is the beheading of Husayn 
ibn Ali, the grandson of the prophet Muhammad. He was killed in the 
battle of Karbala in 680 after having confronted Caliph Yazid ibn Muawiya 
(appointed by his own father in the first Sunni Arab dynasty). Husayn ibn 
Ali, as a Shia imam, was considered the spiritual leader of Muslims and Yazid 
ibn Muawiya had only temporal power, a fact he was aware of. After Husayn 
ibn Ali had claimed his position to preserve the pure and true foundations 
and values of Islam, an army of men sent by Yazid ibn Muawiya caught and 
beheaded Husayn ibn Ali and his group of seventy-two followers, which 
ended with their heads being put on spears7 and presented to the Caliph in 
Damascus (Campbell 2006: 585).
This and several other historical events and developments within Islamic 
scripture are often used by Salafi-jihadist organisations like IS as a means of 
justifying the use of beheadings as a method of execution (see Furnish 2005). 
There are several reasons, aside from the symbolic ones, for IS performing this 
violent act instrumentally and doing so in front of cameras for the world to 
see. From a military strategic point of view, IS militants have employed this 
method as a catalyst for deterrence in anticipation that enemies and adversar-
ies would surrender in order to avoid further victimisation. In several videos, 
there are also demands for or mentions of halting air-strikes, even though it 
is more relevant to consider that this is not a desired or achievable end-goal. 
It is, rather, a means of provoking reactions from the international coalition 
fighting IS since late 2014. In either case, the beheading videos are not merely 
propaganda but, in addition, evidence of IS’s saliency and its reliance on ‘its 
messaging value and recognition of Internet media’s wide reach’ (Zech and 
Kelly 2015: 85).
From the perspective of media and communication studies, the very 
practice of mediating beheadings becomes even more interesting around the 
 7 In several IS videos of beheadings, the victims’ heads are also placed on spearheads.
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millennium shift when the practice was starting to be broadcast and/or dis-
seminated online –  thereby changing the nature of hybrid warfare and the 
digital circulation of videos among supporters of, for instance, AQI8 or other 
contemporary militant jihadist organisations. Since then, a number of inter-
nationally recognised beheadings have been videotaped and gained attraction 
around the world. When the Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl was 
beheaded in 2002 and the video of his death was found on media platforms 
to be viewed around the world, it helped spark a modern-day resurgence of 
this Salafi-jihadist ritual rooted in Islamic scripture, even though Chechen 
rebels, for instance, had also rather substantially evoked this method of execu-
tion in the battlefield already in the late 1990s (see Furnish 2005).
In IS videos, the victims and opponents are portrayed as criminals deserv-
ing to be punished, and, according to IS, the sought-for audience for these 
videos is meant to observe fair executions rather than illegitimate murders. 
Unlike during the French Revolution, when France promoted the guillotine 
to standardise capital punishment in a manner symbolic for modernity and 
equality, IS utilises an extra-judicial and more religiously crude interpreta-
tion and implementation of beheadings as execution method, for instance 
by using knives and hence showing determination and force of manual and 
prolonged decapitation (Zech and Kelly 2015: 87). This and several other 
symbolic actions are explicitly exhibited in the visual representation of IS 
beheadings analysed later in this chapter.
Methodology
The videos selected for analysis have all been collected through covert observa-
tion9 on Telegram. From a methodological point of view, the advantages of 
using covert observation monitoring IS Telegram channels are: the immediacy 
in attaining raw data, authenticity, because IS carefully chooses the channels on 
which it releases official propaganda, and archival purposes regarding Telegram’s 
architectural design allowing the easy and fast downloading of material for 
 8 An infamous example of a jihadist beheading video from 2004 of a Western citizen shows 
AQI (Al-Qaeda in Iraq) leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, wearing a headscarf and standing in 
the middle of four other disguised militants, with the US-company-contracted Nick Berg 
kneeling in front of them, beheading Berg after reading a statement about his ‘crimes’.
 9 See Given (2008) for a comprehensive discussion of covert observations. 
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analysis.10 Furthermore, from an ethical perspective, it is vital to recognise the 
challenges of representing graphic empirical material along with the necessary 
considerations around integrity and respect for victims. The choices made in 
this chapter regarding how to represent and discuss videos containing behead-
ings have all been made in the strong conviction that in order to pursue a sig-
nificant argument and enhance the understanding of a potential appeal for IS 
supporters in these videos, some visual representations are important in terms of 
their being highlighted. But in this process, an awareness and careful considera-
tion have been secured so as to show respect for the victims.
The videos selected for analysis have been extracted in accordance with 
a purposeful sample strategy –  choosing videos, from the years 2014 to 
2017,11 with attributes that can best provide answers to the following research 
questions:
RQ1: What characterises the visual imagery and construction of power and 
humiliation in the selected IS beheading videos between 2014 and 2017, 
and which, if any, changes can be traced over time?
RQ2: How can IS beheading videos be understood as visual representations of 
both instrumental and expressive forms of performative violence?
The selection of videos has subsequently been made with the purpose of 
including videos, first, which derive from each year in the time frame and, 
second, which contain a variety of qualitative attributes. In this case, these 
attributes are visual techniques and strategies for mediating the performative 
violence and constructing positions of power and humiliation. With the aim 
of discussing the plethora of visual strategies concerning editing, after-effects, 
camera angles, image composition and symbolism as well as environments, a 
total of thirteen videos were selected for qualitative visual analysis. Another 
distinction was the focus on the scenes and sequences revolving around the 
executions themselves. With the overall narratives in the video of which 
they were a part, this excludes much of the political and religious narratives 
10 Telegram has levels of encryption and offers possibilities for remaining relatively anony-
mous when monitoring channels.
11 Additional searches have been made on databases such as jihadology.net in order to verify 
titles and translations. 
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surrounding the beheadings. Instead, the spotlight is directed on the violence 
itself and the visual choices made during these acts.
The visual analysis performed in this chapter relies on Gillian Rose’s argu-
ment that visual artefacts and communication can be analysed through the 
joint understanding of three so-called ‘sites’: (1) site of production, (2) site of 
the image and (3) site of audiencing (Rose 2001: 14–16). Depending on the 
research questions and focus of the inquiry, one could choose to perform a 
combined analysis of the three sites or an in-depth close reading of visual mate-
rial highlighting certain aspects of production, image or audiencing. For this 
chapter, a special interest is primarily devoted to the site of the image, which, 
according to Rose and under the conceptual framework of ‘compositional 
interpretation’ (ibid. 52), entails analytical dimensions of image composition, 
lighting, and editing techniques. Even though this framework was intended 
for analysing still images, it is applicable also to moving images, not least when 
adding the concept of multi-modality and understanding it as a form of ‘frame 
sequencing (how visual frames are edited in cohesive sequences)’.12 This allows 
for an analytical reading of the empirical material combining in-depth visual 
analysis of screenshots/still images and their function in a sequence in relation 
to other frames.13 We can gain further knowledge of the symbolic and expres-
sive function of IS videos as communicative acts and aesthetic practices by 
analysing not only what the videos say (or show) through the means of visual 
imagery, but also how they work –  in this case, as visual representations of per-
formative violence through the construction of power, and as humiliation.14
Theoretical Framework
Without a doubt, brutal IS videos have been a significant part of its propa-
ganda strategy and branding efforts, not least for Western audiences (see 
12 Chouliaraki, Lilie And Angelos Kissas (2018), ‘The Communication of Horrorism: a 
Typology of ISIS Online Death Videos’, Critical Studies in Media Communication, 35: 1, 
p. 28, which in turn utilises an approach borrowed from Jewitt, Carey (ed.) (2019), The 
Routledge Handbook of Multimodal Research, London: Routledge.
13 Rose (2001) presents this as inspired by Monaco, James (2000), How to Read a Film, New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press.
14 Ethical considerations are essential, above all for showing respect for the victims. Therefore, 
I have selected images with as much ethical restraint as possible.
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Zelin 2014). One way of arguing for aims involved in producing and dis-
seminating these videos is touched upon by Simone Molin-Friis (2015: 
729), who states that the acts are carried out ‘not for the sake of murder in 
itself, but with the purpose of being reproduced and watched by an audi-
ence far larger than the one directly experiencing it’. Considering the layers 
included in the videos of beheadings throughout IS media campaign since 
the declaration of the caliphate in 2014, a striking impression is the level of 
ideological, symbolic and visual dimensions and, in particular, the contrasts 
between them. Relationships between them are extensions of the core instru-
mental part of the violence and encourage perspectives and meaning-making 
beyond the brutal act itself. Therefore, this chapter focuses on these intersec-
tions within the visual construction of violence, performativity, power and 
humiliation.
As a first level of distinction, IS videos of beheadings are considered aes-
thetic practices within the social realm of ‘horrorism’, rather than a means of 
conducting ‘terrorism’. By considering horrorism as connected to the medi-
ated witnessing of violence for a distant audience, whereas terrorism involves 
proximity, more physical experience and the witnessing of violent acts, it is 
possible to contextualise IS videos as horror ‘in the realm of the eye’ and not 
as lived experience of panic and fear (Caverero 2009). Within this mediated 
representation of violence, it is necessary to analyse how it visually performs 
violent death and, in addition, how the audience is invited to relate to and 
understand it (see Chouliaraki and Kissas 2018; Zelizer 2010).
Performativity of Violence and Retaliatory Humiliation
For the purpose of understanding the role, attributes and significance of 
visual performativity of violence in IS beheading videos, Jeffrey Juris pro-
vides a useful definition of performative violence as ‘a form of meaningful 
interaction through which actors construct social reality based on available 
cultural templates’ (Juris 2005: 415). Here, violent acts are considered to 
have more than practical-instrumental dimensions, namely also symbolic-
expressive characteristics (see Riches 1986). With regard to the application 
of the concept of the visual performativity of violence in this chapter, the 
implementation of the definition above would then be leaning more towards 
the symbolic-expressive aspect of violent acts: a representational context for 
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the symbolic interaction of violence in which the performative violent act in 
itself is re-mediated and re-contextualised through visual means.
In line with acknowledging the symbolic-expressive function, Tripp 
(2018: 168) argues that in political struggles violence exhibits an exercise of 
power in which acts bring about a social reality. In this view, the violence can 
both protect an established order and create a new configuration of power. 
Violence then becomes a projection of statehood, and performances, in addi-
tion, convey a message to those threatening to overthrow the new order.
The concept of humiliation, and, above all, the mediated enactment and 
construction of humiliation, stand in direct, mutual and necessary opposi-
tion to the position of power in which IS executioners find themselves. In 
line with Roxanne L. Euben’s (2017: 1010) definition, humiliation is ‘the 
imposition of impotence on Islam and Muslims by those with greater and 
undeserved power, while retaliatory humiliation both performs and produces 
an inversion of this relation’. If the concept of retaliation in relation to humil-
iation is incorporated, one must consider the theoretical context in which 
retaliation is expressed and justified. Bertram Turner argues that retaliation 
occurs discursively under four main framework conditions: scientification, 
securitization, religiosification and juridification (see Turner and Schlee 2017: 
5). With regard to IS videos in this chapter, the framework of religiosification 
holds the highest merit. As Turner and Schlee go on to maintain, ‘Religion 
may stipulate forbearance towards those who have wronged someone or, on 
the contrary, emphasise the exercise of retaliation as a religious duty, thereby 
fostering an intertwining of the religious and the secular in various domains. 
Tenets of faith may thus appear inextricably linked with notions of retaliation 
and reflect religious ideas about justice, repentance and remorse, punishment 
and salvation.’ Moreover, the way IS claims legality through divinity by refer-
ring to scripture and divine law as justification for both method and punish-
ment further supports the notion of seeking to embed retaliation in religious 
discourses in order to strengthen the impact of its messages to supporters and 
adversaries as well. Exercised humiliation does not come out of a vacuum, but 
from a religious and ideological context of justified retaliation.
The aspect of how retaliatory humiliation generates an inversion of power 
structures encompasses two main levels. First, the applied visual imagery in 
IS videos converts the physical punishment of the victims into a symbolic 
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punishment of the nation or the community they belong to. As in the case of 
James Foley, retaliatory humiliation is symbolically imposed on the American 
nation,15 and it simultaneously exhibits a form of dominance of IS over the 
USA. Furthermore, this is where sovereignty comes into play, as the sover-
eign power16 connected to the formation and implementation of nation states 
includes the right to judge and punish, and thereby exercises power over life 
and death. By legitimising this right, not least through its proto-state and its 
political project attempting to back up claims of Western understandings of 
sovereignty, IS additionally reverses the relationship between the ‘state’ and 
outlaws, or terrorists for that matter.
Through rhetorical constructions, the USA is positioned as the murderer, 
aggressor and terrorist state, and therefore, IS argues, it deserves punishment 
in a way similar to the humiliation of Islam and Muslims around the world 
(see Euben 2017: 1012). Conclusively, the concept of power should be under-
stood as associated not only with sovereignty here, but also with dominance 
in different forms. In some of the early videos chosen as empirical material 
in this chapter, dominance over the victims is practised and performed in the 
videos by an IS executioner in the sense of visual composition, often stand-
ing tall over a kneeling prisoner. Besides, from a Foucauldian perspective, IS 
presents regular use of strapping the body of the victim preventing the free-
dom to move, usually with tied hands behind the back or by keeping victims 
in cages before executed. This can be contextualised as a transformation, as 
Michel Foucault explains in his work Discipline and Punish, from the aim of 
execution as punishment being to inflict pain on the body itself, into a focus 
on the disciplining character of contemporary punishment, leaving the body 
in an intermediary fashion and changing focus from the body itself to the 
actual act of depriving the prisoner of free movement as the main characteris-
tics of public and non-public state executions (Foucault 1977).
15 In the video of James Foley’s execution (A message to America, released August 2014), the 
ascription of guilt is conducted orally and visually and argued by both Foley reading from 
a prepared script blaming the US administration and their foreign policy, and hence the 
American nation, and by his executioner through a separate monologue aimed directly at an 
international audience.
16 ‘Sovereign power’ is here equal to definitions proposed by theorists such as Michel Foucault 
and Thomas Hobbes.
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By invoking the excessive use of retaliatory humiliation, IS symbolically 
and ideologically challenges a status quo and provides a competitive system 
of meaning, a framework enhanced not least through the videos of behead-
ings (see Ingram 2015). The characteristics of these beheading videos have 
been identified and analysed in several academic contributions in recent years 
(see Impara 2018; Euben 2017; Friis 2015; Koch 2018; Chouliaraki and 
Kissas 2018). By focusing on the symbolic power of the violence performed 
and communicated, this analysis aims to provide insights into the way these 
videos of performative violence are constructed, and, furthermore, into the 
visual presentation of power and humiliation and how these constructions 
work. The purpose of the analysis is also to track potential changes over time 
to highlight the variety of visual techniques and their relation to the audience.
Analysis
One of the Quranic verses justifying beheadings most commonly used by 
IS is Surah Mohammad 47:4: ‘So when you meet those who disbelieve [in 
battle], strike [their] necks until, when you have inflicted slaughter upon 
them [. . .]’.17 In the context of war and of defending Islam from outside 
interference and attack, which is the core foundation of doctrines conveying 
the ideological and religious framework of IS, beheadings are interpreted as 
a justified means. Reminding ourselves about the definition of retaliatory 
humiliation presented earlier in the theoretical framework of this chapter, the 
significance and application of Islamic scripture and actions, or interpreta-
tions in contrast to the IS Salafi-jihadist reading, is essential in any attempt 
to critically approach the IS retributive violence performed in these videos. 
For instance, the use of knives as weapons and tools for beheadings contains 
a layer of relevant ideological points. From perspectives of Islamic scripture, 
the knife, as a more convenient, intimate and individually-connected weapon 
than the sword, can be considered an extension of the hand. The connection 
to and similarity with the sword is obvious, which in turn constitutes ‘a 
17 The full Surah (47:4) continues with ‘then secure their bonds, and either [confer] favor 
afterwards or ransom [them] until the war lays down its burdens. That [is the command]. 
And if Allah had willed, He could have taken vengeance upon them [Himself], but [He 
ordered armed struggle] to test some of you by means of others. And those who are killed in 
the cause of Allah –  never will He waste their deeds.’ 
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pre-modern weapon which is considered noble and is associated with early 
Islamic heroes and their jihads’ (Campbell 2006: 604).
Fiction, Documentary –  or Real Horrorism
One of the most significant and frequently used strategies in IS beheading 
videos is the deliberate blurring of the boundaries between fiction and reality. 
The concept of authenticity is relevant, as it ‘rests on the visual’s privileged 
epistemic status: it verifies and it brings the audience closer to the event’ 
(Hansen 2011: 56). When authenticity is drawn upon it has a certain con-
nection to the audience, as the genre of documentary film or observations is 
an invisible contract of anticipation between the filmmaker and the audience 
(see Nichols 1981). But IS videos of violence have a complex, or uneasy, 
relationship with reality and documentation only. The use of fiction in terms 
of staging scenes, after-effects and creative editing holds similar uncertainties 
for the audience.
A commonly used reference is the notion of IS as constantly using tech-
niques and visual imagery deriving from, or mimicking, Hollywood movies 
and familiar Western modes of cultural expression. However, although this 
might be true in many cases depending on how analytically we approach 
them, there is a vastly more elaborate and rich use of techniques applied for 
other purposes of making violence exciting and appealing for its supporters, 
including the direction of scenes. As Gruber (2019: 139) notices, the ‘deadly 
scenes are carefully staged –  the scenography and body movements practiced 
multiple times –  before an actual killing takes place’. I argue that an empha-
sis of fictionalisation, here determined through the elaborate use of editing 
techniques and after-effects, has not only increased with time, but, in addi-
tion, has been designed to appeal to supporters rather than being utilised as 
a means of inciting fear with these videos. A comparison between two initial 
videos in the selected time-frame, A Message to America and A Second Message 
to America, released in fall 2014, with Wa-in ʿuddtum ʿudanā #2 released 
in October 2015 shows how editing strategies aiming to blur boundaries 
between reality and fiction also have different levels of performativity. The 
first two videos depict the execution of James Foley and Steven Sotloff, while 
the third was released one year later. The prisoners’ interaction and participa-
tion change. In the first videos, Foley and Sotloff are forced to speak and read 
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from a prepared script; hence, a portrayal of them as persons, individuals, is 
created, and they represent their nation symbolically. In the third and later 
video, the prisoners are visually represented first of all as a group rather than 
as individuals, consistently through acting in terms of being forced to walk in 
line and being held by their executioners, who lead them to a designated spot. 
The camera makes cinematic movements in order to capture the environment 
and relationship between executioners and prisoners.
There are different types of performances in play in the full empiri-
cal material. Dimensions such as participant movement and body language, 
poses and interaction between executioner and prisoner are all constructed 
through the interplay with decisions on how to enhance the symbolic and 
emotional effect with visual means (see Pfeifer et al., Chapter 7). The videos 
of Foley and Sotloff were aimed at a specific audience and had a clear political 
statement, while the third and later video in Arabic was designed for a dif-
ferent audience and could therefore have a more elaborate narrative. In this 
particular video (Figure 5.1, right), the actual beheading is later filmed with 
three camera angles, one from the side and two cameras from the front, film-
ing from the ground with low-angle and both medium and close-up shots, 
switching between slow motion and normal speed, with some repetition of 
the decapitation sequences. In comparison to the 2014 videos mentioned 
above, the beheadings are now explicit and visible, accelerating the gore effect 
and impression of fiction. There is also an interesting de-humanisation of the 
prisoners in this video, as few individual faces are shown in close-up or even 
medium-shot. Instead, all prisoners are presented in one frame, as a collective 
Figure 5.1 (Left) Screenshot from A Message to America, Al-Hayat Media Center 2014, 
showing James Foley’s execution. (Right) Screenshot from Wa-in ʿuddtum ʿudanā #2, 
Wilāyat Nīnawā, September 2015, showing five IS prisoners being led to their execution.
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rather than as individuals, thereby strengthening the symbolic representation 
and decreasing the personal unique qualities of each individual.
In another infamous video, A Message Signed with Blood –  To the Nation 
of the Cross released in February 2015, several aspects concerning both per-
formativity and the use of fictionalising techniques in the editing process 
are similar. As the screenshots represented in Figure 5.2 show, there is a 
symmetrical visual imagery, carefully considered in terms of the line-up of 
executioners and prisoners, body positions of the black-covered men stand-
ing, clothing, and so forth. The symmetrical imagery also resonates with the 
performative violence to the right and the co-ordinated effort of pushing 
prisoners to the ground, one by one, and filming them from the side, which 
makes the action appear as a wave-movement.
In combination, this imagery generates strength, command and 
motion. When it comes to the beheadings later on, there is frequent cross-
cutting between slow motion close-ups of beheadings and fast forward 
images, creating a visual performativity of violence characterised by a mix 
of sophisticated film techniques with theatrical performance, placing the 
audience in an uncertain position regarding expectations, performance and 
genre-mixing.
The productions mentioned should also be seen as contrasting with 
other types of visual style in beheading videos being produced and dissemi-
nated by IS, which are characterised by more shaky and hand-held camer-
awork and a more documentary style of capturing events. For instance, in 
Shifāʾ al-nufūs bi-dhabª al-jāsūs #1, released in June 2015 (Figure 5.3), a 
hand-held camera in front of the victim is used, resulting in low-resolution 
Figure 5.2 Screenshots from A Message Signed with Blood – To the Nation of the Cross, 
al-Hayat Media, February 2015.
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images with medium-shot of the kneeling prisoner, whose hands are tied 
behind his back. A single camera is employed only following the movement 
without edited cuts. The executioner stands on top, forcing the victim to lie 
down on the ground before lifting his head and moving the knife towards 
the neck.
Instantly, the images fade to black, which questions the authenticity and 
leaves the intrusive documentation of the violence just before its climax. The 
next visible image shows the decapitated head placed on top of the body. 
Bridging between frames of documentary film aesthetics and an elaborate 
fictional style with special effects is a technique repeatedly used in IS behead-
ing videos from 2014 and 2015 –  a time when the IS global media campaign 
in general and the production and design of beheading videos in particular 
was in a phase of transition as the brand of IS received increased international 
attention. Hence one would also assume increased expectations among sup-
porters concerning the elaboration and development of visual propaganda 
strategies. The overall visual imagery of the videos is characterised by flex-
ibility and an adaptive mode concerning the fictionalisation of true violence, 
yet with the reservation of never fully convincing the audience of its fictional 
character but leaving room for truth-claiming elements. Similar imagery is 
Figure 5.3 Screenshot from Shifāʾ al-nufūs bi-dhabª al-jāsūs, Wilāyat Khurasān, June 2015.
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used in a later video in the same series, Shifāʾ al-nufūs bi-dhabª al-jāsūs #3, 
released in October 2015, with a mix of staged execution and a prisoner 
being paraded along a country road, only to meet his death after being forced 
to the ground.
Performative Violence and Constructing Power and Humiliation
Videos are manifestations of power as dominance over others. Exercising 
power is realised (a) through the instrumental aspect of the violence, where 
IS executioners practise power over body and life, and (b) over the audience 
in the videos, in terms both of addressing us directly or indirectly and of 
the visual means by which this addressing is constructed. In contrast to how 
positions of power are constructed in the videos, the binary opposition of 
humiliation is included in the interpretative frames. Figure 5.5 is an illustra-
tive example of a visual representation capturing both power and humilia-
tion. The rite of placing the decapitated head back on top of the dead body 
is a recurrent theme of IS videos and also has long-standing historical and 
theological connotations (Campbell 2006).
In the video ʿĀqibat al-mundharīn, released in July 2017, a scene of mul-
tiple beheadings ends with a close-up shot on an executioner’s foot placed on 
top of the head of one of the prisoners, leaving an everlasting symbolic and 
physical impression of superiority. As the head also is a symbol of reason and 
thought, this impression becomes even more accentuated.
Aspects of retaliatory humiliation and, at the same time, an exercise of 
power and dominance can also be visually expressed through other means. 
In the video Jazāʾ al-khāʾinīn #2, released in May 2017 (Figure 5.6, left), 
Figure 5.4 Screenshots from Shifāʾ al-nufūs bi-dhabª al-jāsūs #3, Wilāyat Khurasān, 
October 2015.
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the prisoners selected for execution by beheading are visually represented 
through a collage of superimposed images and multi-screens, as in a video 
game, when they are forced to admit their alleged crimes.
The use either of prisoners’ interrogations with confessions, more or 
less forced, or of forced readings of scripts (like the examples of James Foley 
and Steven Sotloff) has remained over the years. This aspect, the fact that 
prisoners are forced to speak the words of their murderers during their last 
breath, captures an essence of the duality in the mediated construction of and 
between power and humiliation. It is not only an exhibition of dominance 
over another person, but also a confessional dimension attempting ‘to control 
the narrative and legitimise the murders in the eyes of viewers’ (Zech and 
Kelly 2015: 87).
It appears essential for IS to portray the prisoners through recurring 
elements emphasising the retaliatory humiliation, for instance as shown in 
Figure 5.6 (left), where the consequences of the alleged crimes of which the 
prisoner standing is accused are being presented underneath him on the 
screen. In Figure 5.6 (right), another prisoner awaits his death and the person 
behind the camera first zooms in on the prisoner’s face and then slowly leads 
the audience’s attention to the knife held by his executioner. The anticipatory 
Figure 5.5 Screenshot from ending scene of ʿĀqibat al-mundharīn, Wilāyat al-Furāt, July 
2017 (note: image edited by author for ethical reasons).
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character of composition and editing prolongs suspense for the audience, and 
yet another concept comes into play: fear. The faces of the prisoners fulfil 
an important narrative function as fear itself is also related to threat here. In 
Figure 5.6 (right), the defined threat is usually placed behind the prisoner, as 
is the case with several other similar videos like the one cited in Figure 5.7.
Threat is being constructed on two levels: one for the prisoner and one 
for the audience. These are usually contradictory, in the sense that the audi-
ence is not being kept in the dark regarding what will unfold, but the pris-
oner is almost exclusively so. The performativity of the violence represented 
in IS beheading videos requires some restraints concerning the purposeful 
Figure 5.6 Screenshots from Jazāʾ al-khāʾinīn #2, Wilāyat Karkūk, May 2017.
Figure 5.7 Screenshot from Shifāʾ al-nufūs bi-dhabª al-jāsūs #2, Wilāyat Khurasān, July 
2015.
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incitement of fear in the prisoners themselves. They are to remain as calm 
as possible in front of the camera in order to fit the storyline of retaliation, 
which includes confessing their alleged crimes and, besides, quietly accepting 
their punishment –  aspects used to further legitimise the executions and to 
provide IS with forms of power drawing on its sovereignty. This dimension of 
visually-controlled fear reaches a theatrical climax in the video Qi‚‚at al-nah
˙
r, 
released in June 2016, in which the five prisoners are placed according to a 
clear pattern (Figure 5.8, right) where one of them is forced to watch the 
other four being executed first. Hence, this is a double form of punishment. 
However, his reactions towards what he witnesses are, although they are 
edited out, again controlling the fear in the representation of humiliation and 
power, and then finally he is beheaded as well.
Direct attacks against the enemy do not necessarily induce fear, and 
instead we can observe this staging through the lens of propaganda’s and 
horrorism’s role, concluding that ‘beyond actually attacking your adversary, 
the best way to frighten him is to commit an atrocity that he observes’ (Vinci 
2005: 370). This relationship or interaction between the executioner and the 
prisoner highlights, on the one hand, a gruesome form of instrumental vio-
lence and, on the other hand, a strong visual and expressive act of performa-
tive violence seeking to enhance the dichotomy between divine power and 
retaliatory humiliation.
In Figure 5.8 (left) from the same video, yet another highlighting of this 
relationship is evident, as the five executioners look straight into the camera 
in front of them, when the narrator in the middle suddenly turns to address 
the kneeling prisoners and, with the help of another camera placed behind 
them, at the same time directly addresses the audience. This composition 
and performance places the audience in the prisoners’ position. When the 
Figure 5.8 Screenshots from QiÍÍat al-naªr, Wilāyat al-Furāt, June 2016.
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audience is directly addressed, this breaks the illusion of theatrical staging 
and brings the audience closer to the event, thereby also increasing the effect 
of power over life and death to power over mediation and the audience as 
well. The same holds for a scene from the video Na‚r min Allāh wa-fatª 
qarīb #4, released in March 2016, when the actual beheading is filmed from 
underneath and the executioner looks directly into the camera, which creates 
a bridge between the audience, the executioner and his actions.
Finally, I want to reconnect to Foucault and his notion of the transfor-
mation of capital punishment’s focus from causing extensive pain to the body 
itself into the symbolic power of depriving the prisoner of free movement. 
Without these two aspects being mutually exclusive, we can observe that IS 
beheading videos almost all contain strapped prisoners, and this relates not 
only to the aspect of power and punishment, but also to the aforementioned 
control of fear and undesired reactions from the individuals facing execu-
tion. One video in which this is overtly emphasised and visually represented, 
both instrumentally and expressively, is Shifāʾ al-nufūs bi-dhabª al-jāsūs #4, 
released in November 2017. With a painting-like image composition, the 
method of execution involves more than a beheading as it is preceded by 
the prisoner being strapped around his wrists and arms and stretched as in a 
Figure 5.9 Screenshot from NaÍr min Allāh wa-fatª qarīb #4, Wilāyat al-Khayr, March 
2016 (note: image edited by author for ethical reasons).
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crucifixion position. Two men with swords stand behind him and start the 
torturous process with a simultaneous movement of cutting each arm with a 
forceful stroke.
The combination of strapping and the upcoming force of removing 
the prisoner’s arms conveys a double manifestation of depriving individual 
agency, both literally and symbolically.
Although this graphic document of the atrocities performed and imple-
mented by IS would easily remain an iconic image in public consciousness, 
it is important to nuance the symbology and visual imagery. As this analysis 
has revealed, one of the main purposes of the performative violence is to con-
struct and accentuate the forms of power held by executioners and the retali-
atory humiliation suffered by the victims. These constructions and the visual 
imagery of violent acts enable IS to portray itself as a powerful legitimate 
organisation with a preserved (and divine) right to implement punishment 
that is, in the cases analysed, carried out through beheadings. Victims are 
framed accordingly as representatives of nations, ‘apostates’ or ‘spies’, hence 
as criminals who, with forced confessions, are represented as deserving the 
humiliating positions they find themselves in.
In sum, much of IS’s efforts to construct and design videos of beheadings 
Figure 5.10 Screenshot from Shifāʾ al-nufūs bi-dhabª al-jāsūs #4, Wilāyat Khurasān, 
November 2017.
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comes down to putting the audience in a specific relation to the victim. 
Moreover, to some extent, a common denominator across the empirical mate-
rial presented in this chapter is the effort to reduce our sympathy for the vic-
tims, as if they deserved the punishment and humiliation performed. As Judith 
Butler writes about the precarity of life and our perception of other people and 
their lives: ‘specific lives cannot be apprehended as injured or lost if they are 
not first apprehended as living. If certain lives do not qualify as lives or are, 
from the start, not conceivable as lives within certain epistemological frames, 
then these lives are never lived nor lost in the full sense’ (Butler 2009: 1).
Conclusion
Drawing on theories of performativity, power and retaliatory humiliation, 
the analysis illustrates that there is no evident or causal chain of events 
leading to the conclusion of a stable line of innovative development and 
elaboration of visual strategies. Rather, it is clear that techniques and visual 
constructions are used depending on contemporary events and targeted 
audiences. Aside from the aim of using the beheading videos of westerners 
in 2014 to convey a political message and provoke responses, the videos of 
beheadings over the following three years have shifted substantially in visual 
imagery. The videos from 2015 and early 2016 exhibit an experimental 
and elaborate use of visual techniques, coinciding with transitional phases 
for IS in general certainly affecting production possibilities, for instance 
the increase of hostile air-strikes and dismantling of territorial land. Yet 
another way of interpreting the variety of techniques in terms of construct-
ing power and humiliation in the interaction between executioners and 
victims is paved by the apparent efforts to appeal more to the regional 
population and sympathisers, rather than developing a trajectory of linear 
productions concerning visualisation of beheadings. The symbolic expres-
sive mode of the performative violence visually constructed emerges as more 
carefully considered than the instrumental aspect of the acts. Nevertheless, 
it is possible that, at least, these are never separated from each other. The 
construction and legitimisation of sovereign power over life and death are 
magnified by the use of strategic relations between executioner and victim in 
terms of performance and interaction, by visual imagery enhancing effects 
of larger-than-life characters, and, above all, by exercising power over the 
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mediation itself and its audience through various techniques in body lan-
guage, addressing and editing. The position of humiliation for the prisoner 
is constructed as a necessary opposition to the position of power, visually 
represented through the symbolic and instrumental act of removing the 
individual’s choice of free movement, of the consistent forceful performance 
of them being pushed to the ground to meet their death, of their duty to be 
active participants in re-enactments, and of the use of forced confessions to 
their alleged crimes as well.
Framing these mediations as horrorism above terrorism allows a deeper 
understanding of the communicative and aesthetic aspects of the behead-
ings, something that is far more applicable in any attempt to design counter- 
narratives to IS’s competitive system of meaning. Therefore, meaning-making 
process taking place in the relationship between the sequences themselves, 
and their audience is considered absolutely essential in understanding the 
significance of performative violence in IS branding. For instance, when the 
videos turn from sophistication in terms of staging, editing techniques and 
image composition in general to a grainier image quality, hand-held camera-
work and improvised performances, this signifies a change in the relation 
with audiences. The camera techniques commonly used in contemporary 
visual culture production have connotations familiar to, not least, a Western 
audience and consumers of visual popular culture. By deploying similar 
techniques and style in the representation and performances, but narrating 
content drawing upon ancient scripture placed in a modern context, IS 
manages to stand out from previous terrorist organisations applying media 
strategies for branding purposes. The videos analysed in this chapter hence 
work and function in several capacities, because they are designed simulta-
neously to incite fear, encourage supporters, relate to Islamic and political 
history, and magnify and alter definitions of justice, power and humiliation, 
to name only a few. They move between political, ideological, religious and 
cultural discourses on society. Regardless of who interprets the content in 
general, and visual constructions of power and humiliation surrounding IS 
beheadings in particular, the conclusion is that their multimodal character 
and carefully considered visual imagery have contributed to strengthening 
the global brand of IS, as this imagery has become among the most iconic 
and recognised in the jihadosphere of propaganda. This is worth considering 
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when, at present, IS still produces and spreads these types of videos, work-
ing to further establish its own definition of good and evil and, above all, to 
maintain its position as a leading force in the mediated visual propaganda of 
performative violence.
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FROM THE DARKNESS INTO THE LIGHT: 




Instructing people as to who they are, how they are related to others, and  how they should act in certain situations is a central function of Jihadi-
Salafi media activities. Jihadi-Salafi actors assess and classify individual and 
collective action as well as social and political processes and events along 
clear-cut, often binary lines. They have, just as any other social collective, a 
keen interest in establishing and substantiating collective identities that help 
them to create senses of belonging and construct boundaries with ‘the Other’. 
At the same time, such collective identities offer an epistemic and ontological 
framework, helping people to set their individual biography in relation to one 
or more social collective.
In this chapter, I will examine a specific format used by Jihadi-Salafi 
groups to make such an offer. I trace the (re-)creation of two autobiographical 
* I thank Tom Kaden, Simone Pfeifer, the members of the junior research group Jihadism on 
the Internet: Images and Videos, their Appropriation and Dissemination at the University of 
Mainz, and the many participants at workshops at the Universities of Bielefeld and Bochum 
for their thoughtful comments and suggestions on earlier iterations of this chapter. All 
remaining errors are, of course, my own.
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narratives of religious conversion as they are presented in two videos authored 
and issued by the Jihadi-Salafi groups al-Muhajirūn and the Islamic State 
(al-dawlat al-islāmīya) between 2016 and 2017. Testimonies of the mission-
ary activities (daʿwa) of Jihadi-Salafi actors, these videos render the stories of 
their protagonists remarkable and meaningful examples of religious conver-
sion to Islam. The authors do not only present individual narratives, that is 
autobiographical recollections of a series of events and personal experiences 
of two young men, but also interweave them with allusions to Islamic his-
tory and the ideological framework of the Jihadi-Salafi current. They create 
needs among (potential) followers, show them what conversion to ‘pristine’ 
Islam according to the Jihadi-Salafi interpretation is, help people to convert, 
and demonstrate the consequences of such an individual transformation. As 
such, the recollections articulated in these videos are instrumental in religious 
appeals of Jihadi-Salafis to (potential) followers, help to construct faith-based 
social identities, and offer a religious justification for thinking and action.
The epistemological interest of this chapter is to reconstruct the appro-
priation of key concepts from Islamic intellectual history and the teleological 
strategies employed in the audiovisual processing of these personal narrations. 
I will show the ways in which the videos’ authors use audiovisual means to 
construct and enhance the authenticity and plausibility of these individuals’ 
personal stories and their spiritual experiences. I assume that they are well 
aware of the inherent logic of conversion processes in general, as well as the 
ensuing narratives that often (but not always) evolve around experiences of 
crisis and the functionalisation of the ‘new’ belief system in order to stigma-
tise one’s past vis-à-vis a glorified present and future. On the basis of this 
premise, I argue that the videos’ authors offer specific configurations of roles 
and social identities that draw on shared systems of knowledge about patterns 
of narratives of conversion to Islam in general. They also connect these offers 
with the self-conceptualisation of Jihadi-Salafi actors so as to provide an intel-
lectual framework for a broad range of (potential) followers.
To scrutinise how such knowledge figures in the composition of these 
videos, I structure my endeavour along four thematic lines. First, I examine 
the conceptualisation of religious conversion to Islam as a consequence of a 
natural inclination of mankind. Second, I draw attention to the crisis-induced 
nature of religious conversion, be it an existential crisis of the protagonist or a 
150 | part b
moral crisis of his social framework. Third, I show how the videos and the pro-
tagonists’ narratives address the tension between individual agency and divine 
predetermination. Fourth, I look at the ways in which the videos’ authors seek 
to establish social and symbolic boundaries through conversion to Islam.
Data and Methodology
The leaderships of major Jihadi-Salafi groups and movements have always 
used their media apparatus to appeal to (potential) followers and call them 
to join. Although it is imperative for them to incite commitment in order 
to ‘recruit’ others to their ranks, it proved difficult to provide an intellec-
tual framework with which as many people as possible could identify and 
which could also be suitable for non-Muslims. Despite the fact that former 
‘outsiders’ confessing their belief in Islam are part of many textual and audio-
visual publications belonging to the Jihadi-Salafi current, accounts that offer 
a detailed biographical perspective on the individual are rare across all media 
formats. In creating such accounts, Jihadi-Salafis arguably took inspiration 
from a number of Sunni Muslim daʿwa groups whose media regularly give 
prominence to individual stories around conversions to Islam.
I have selected two examples from this this scarce category of Jihadi-
Salafi videos1 which had been issued by al-Muhājirūn2 and the Islamic State 
(al-dawlat al-islāmīya). The first is a nine-minute video published by Islamic 
State’s al-Furāt province media centre3 on 2 September 2016 under the title of 
Min al-Õulamāt ilā-l-nūr (Aus der Finsternis ins Licht). Second, I have selected 
Fi†ra –  The West behind the Mask (fi†ra –  al-gharb min khalaf al-qināʿ), a 
35-minute video released by al-Muhājirūn in June 2017. Both videos are 
 1 Among the videos compiled by our research group, I have found four in which the process 
of individual transformation to ‘genuine’ Muslimness is a major element of the story. Two 
of them, however, centre primarily on other aspects of the individual’s biography, which is 
why I have not considered them for examination here. 
 2 Al-Muhājirūn was a Jihadi-Salafi group that mainly operated in the Syrian civil war between 
2015 and 2017, and is not to be confused with groups with the same name, one of which 
has been active in the UK. The group produced audiovisual material in several languages, 
including videos of Jaysh al-Fatª in Syria (see Joscelyn 2015).
 3 The Islamic State established several local and regional branches of its media apparatus. 
Among them, the maktab al-iʿlāmī li-wilāyat al-Furāt had been active between February 
2015 and April 2018.
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notable examples of Jihadi-Salafi video production in several respects. First, 
an autobiographical perspective on religious conversion is of primary impor-
tance to the authors, who put the protagonists in an interview situation with 
more than one camera on set. Their narrations are juxtaposed with moving 
images (at times in picture-in-picture scenery: Figure 6.1), which undergird, 
reinforce or simply illustrate the verbal narrative. Second, and related to the 
former, they feature a German male who converted to Islam and joined one 
of the groups some time prior to the publication of the videos. However, 
only ‘Christian’, the protagonist of Min al-Êulamāt, speaks German with 
Arabic subtitles, while Fitrah’s central character ‘Andreas Müller’ (alias ʿAbd 
al-Salām al-Muhājir) chooses Arabic with English subtitles. Nevertheless, 
both videos were widely disseminated on various (German-language) social 
media channels and were even received in mainstream media as examples for 
the persuasive power of Jihadi-Salafi videos (see, inter alia, Reuter 2017).
Both videos present the post-hoc recollections of these young men about 
their experiences of life, being and spirituality as an autobiographical narra-
tive in which their conversion to Islam and the ensuing consequences play 
a central role. This is not least because ‘the narrative itself [is] the constitu-
tive process of how converts are “made”’ (Rambo and Farhadian 2014: 8). 
Primarily, however, both videos are embedded in a communication strategy 
that functionalises these narratives in order to further the Jihadi-Salafi cause. 
This means that the people appearing as first-person orators are chiefly per-
sonages whose narratives are subject to and shaped by the values, norms, 
beliefs and practices advocated by al-Muhājirūn and the Islamic State. Being 
the videos’ authors, these groups skilfully create an audiovisuality of ‘pristine’ 
religious conversion so as to refashion the biographies of the protagonists in 
Figure 6.1 Video stills from Fitrah – The West behind the Mask (2017) (left) and Min 
al-Êulamāt ilā-l-Nūr (2016) (right).
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conformity with their ideological meta-narrative and specific regimes of truth 
to show others how they could fit into the same story. Thus, we have to be 
aware that the affective potential of the narratives unfolding in these videos is 
built upon a strong blend of ‘real’ persons and the partly fictionalised person-
ages of ‘Christian’ and ‘Andreas’ who appear as protagonists. This synthesis 
is first and foremost commissioned by the authors who script and realise the 
cinematographic processing. For this reason, the narratives presented here 
are an artefact of Jihadi-Salafi ideology that figures in the ways in which the 
protagonists apprehend and describe their experience of a radical change in 
the significance of their lives.
To address this inextricable audiovisual interdigitation of ‘the pious con-
struction of self’ (van Nieuwkerk 2014: 680) and the group narrative, I use a 
hermeneutic approach to reconstruct the appropriation of key concepts from 
Islamic intellectual history as well as the teleological strategies employed in 
the audiovisual processing of these personal narrations. Because these are 
all used by the videos’ authors to offer specific collective identities and link 
them to the life-world of (potential) followers in ‘Western’ countries, I also 
set them in relation to research on religious conversions to Islam, particularly 
in Europe and the USA. This allows me to link the narrative structures of 
my case studies to patterns of the inherent logic of conversion narratives in 
specific socio-cultural contexts.
‘The Natural Constitution’: Conceptualising Conversion to Islam from 
a Jihadi-Salafi Perspective
But in the end, I realised that only Islam with the miracle of the unaltered 
and uncorrupted Quran is God’s true religion.
This statement by Christian, the protagonist of Min al-Êulamāt, points to one 
of the key frames of the videos examined in this chapter. An individual’s pur-
suit of ‘the truth’ and a genuine system of meaning is completed by turning to 
the One God and his ordinances as given in the Quran. His call for a purified 
Islam not only echoes the central tenets of the Jihadi-Salafi agenda, but also 
addresses sentiments shared by some young Muslims –  second-generation 
and converts –  in Western Europe (van Nieuwkerk 2016: 344). In the same 
vein, the voice-over in Fitrah presents the film as a bibliographical showcase in 
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accordance with Quranic verse 17:81: {And say, ‘Truth has come, and false-
hood has departed. Indeed, is falsehood ever bound to depart.’ } The motif of 
truthfulness figures strongly in the autobiographical narratives in the videos. 
Moreover, it helps the authors to inextricably link this symbolic system of a 
purified Islam with the protagonists’ configuration of their individual change 
as a radical, incisive and meaningful break with their past that bears severe 
consequences for their lives. As with many processes of religious conversion, 
their change is charged by an individual pursuit of truth that affects concepts 
of the self and one’s biography. It also entails universalistic claims that set the 
individual in relation to symbolic systems of meaning and several wider dis-
courses. Arguably, the videos’ authors are well-aware of both the inherent logic 
of narratives of religious conversion and corresponding systems of knowledge.
The authors use these patterns to structure both the visual narration 
accordingly, and the language used by the protagonists to describe the trans-
formation they have experienced. Neither ‘Christian’ nor ‘Andreas’ refer to 
these changes using the term ‘conversion’. Instead, they say they have ‘become 
Muslim’, or that God had ‘guided me to the true religion’. Their terminol-
ogy demonstrates a field of tension between individual activeness and divine 
predetermination, which I will further elaborate on below. But at first it is 
noticeable that, on a semantic level, the protagonists connect to terminologies 
that we find in long-term empirical studies of conversions to Islam in different 
parts of the globe, where people use similar concepts to articulate and affirm 
belonging to a social collective in the process of their religious conversion, 
highlight group boundaries and symbolise their distance from other social 
groups (see inter alia van Nieuwkerk 2014: 668–9; Scharrer 2014: 129–30).
The protagonists’ nomenclature furthermore connects to an ontological 
dimension of religious conversion that figures in the way in which many 
people, particularly in Western Europe, conceptualise their transformation as 
well as the language they use to speak about it. Hermansen (2014: 633) pro-
poses that ‘many English-speaking converts to Islam prefer the term “revert”, 
since Islamic theology features the idea that all souls have recognised God 
in pre-eternity in an episode known as the Primordial Covenant’.4 This idea 
 4 This refers to Quran 7:172–3: {And [mention] when your Lord took from the children of 
Adam –  from their loins –  their descendants and made them testify of themselves, [saying 
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might be related to the way in which some converts conceive of their conver-
sion, that is as a process of gradual realisation expressing that ‘they already 
feel Muslim but did not know that their ideas were Islamic’ (van Nieuwkerk 
2014: 669).
Other perspectives support this notion but prioritise a different epis-
temological angle. In her study of online and offline conversion narratives, 
van Nieuwkerk (2014: 669; 2006b: 109) found that people extrapolate from 
an individual-centric notion to a generic perspective, where the idea ‘I was 
Muslim but just wasn’t aware of it’ slides into the ideology of ‘all people 
are born Muslim’, that is, in a ‘state of Islam’. This aspect cannot be under-
estimated in light of an Islamic missiology in particular that sets the stage for 
a common Muslim appeal positing that ‘in choosing to follow Islam one is 
not “converting”, but rather “reverting” to the world-view and state of being 
that is innate in every person’ (Poston 1992: 135). People, particularly in 
Europe and the USA, are not simply invited to any other religion on the 
‘market’, but rather ‘to the oldest religion, indeed to their “own” religion, the 
religion of living in total surrender to their Creator, in accordance with the 
guidance brought by all His Messengers’ (Murad 1986: 18).
Conceiving of individual transformation under religious premises as a 
return to humankind’s natural state links the conversion process presented in 
both videos to the idea of fi†ra. This concept, which signifies the innate nature 
of mankind created by God as Muslims, is a key code in the framework of the 
protagonists’ self-representation. Consequently, it is in the film Fitrah that 
we find the concept most explicitly linked to the biographical story of its pro-
tagonist, ‘Andreas Müller’. His personal development towards Islam is identi-
fied as a step towards the authentic state to which man is destined. Again, the 
videos’ authors connect the protagonist’s change to the narratives of many 
converts to Islam, who do not understand their conversion as a transforma-
tion to something new, but as a return to a natural, God-given and pristine 
disposition (see inter alia Scharrer 2014: 129–30). The Quranic idea that 
to them], ‘Am I not your Lord?’ They said, ‘Yes, we have testified.’ [This] –  lest you should 
say on the day of Resurrection, ‘Indeed, we were of this unaware.’ | Or [lest] you say, ‘It 
was only that our fathers associated [others in worship] with Allah before, and we were but 
descendants after them. Then would You destroy us for what the falsifiers have done?’.} See 
also Al-Qadi (2003).
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God had, in order for humans to recognise Him by themselves, created all 
people with a natural inclination towards a primordial form of monotheism 
(ªanīfīya) that is equivalent to Islam is related to this (van Ess 1975: 103–7).5 
The notion that Islam and fi†ra are identical has further been reinforced by 
the principal ªadīth on fi†ra, implying that Islam is the universal religion of 
every newborn child (Hoover 2016: 104).6
It hardly comes as a surprise that the epistemology supporting the identi-
fication of fi†ra and Islam also figured in the theology of the Óanbalī reformer 
Ibn Taymīya (d. 728/1328), who is held in high regard among Jihadi-Salafi 
theorists and who developed an understanding of fi†ra as a ‘positive and 
instinctual disposition towards Islam [which] is widespread in modern activ-
ist circles’ (Hoover 2016: 106). Adding to this notion, some modern Sunni 
reformers sought to render ‘pristine’ Islam –  devoid of all customs and blame-
worthy innovations –  discernible to the people, making them able to discover 
and follow the ‘right’ path. In this regard, Abū ’l-ʿAlāʾ al-Mawdūdī, for 
instance, emphasised the importance of ‘a moral vanguard, so important 
to reviving Islam and raising its head against foreign and un-Islamic tute-
lage’, whereas Sayyid Qu†b gave priority to the idea that ‘the true human 
nature, had to be reacquired through an austere path and a complete method 
(manhaj) including belief, conduct, and morals of the righteous predecessors, 
not to be deviated from’ (Malik 2018: 231). The concept of fi†ra has since 
been used by Muslim scholars of various backgrounds ‘to mount an apolo-
getic for Islam as the most suitable and naturally fitting religious system for 
humankind’ (Hoover 2016).
Equally, Jihadi-Salafi scholars have appropriated the concept, which 
becomes particularly apparent in the way the idea defines the ontologi-
cal framework for the autobiographical narrative presented in Fitrah. The 
 5 Quran 30:30: {So set your face toward the religion, being upright, the natural constitution 
(fitra) of God, according to which He constituted (fatara) humanity. No change should 
there be in the creation of God. That is the correct religion, but most of the people do not 
know.}
 6 ‘Every newborn is born with the natural constitution (fitra). Then, his parents make him 
a Jew, Christian, or Zoroastrian. This is like an animal that bears another that is perfect of 
limb. Do you sense any mutilation in it?’ (Muslim, Kitāb al-qadar, 4803). On the hadith, 
its variations and interpretations, see Hoover (2016).
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authors develop the protagonist’s story as an example of how an individual 
recognises and enacts his fi†ra. He does not only discover his natural inclina-
tion to ‘genuine’ Islam, but also sets his self in relation to the binary opposi-
tion between the good forces of monotheism and its evil antagonists. In the 
introduction, they parallel his biography with that of Moses,7 stating that 
the protagonist ‘was born in the house of Pharaoh and lived among them for 
many years. However, God fortified his fi†ra’ so that he was able to debunk 
the deceiving nature of Western societies and report about it. Hence, the 
authors suggest temporal continuity and present Andreas as a role model for 
the enactment of the primordial covenant, and, besides, also render his story 
an authoritative account of the ‘true’ nature of Western societies. This scheme 
ultimately sets the tone for the boundaries in which the protagonist’s story is 
arranged and presented.
This Manichean scheme is over-articulated in both videos. As the protag-
onist debunks ‘the West’ by listing the many ways in which people in Western 
societies voluntarily or involuntarily distance themselves from their natural 
disposition, we see grey and greenish pictures desaturated from the colour red 
(Figure 6.2). These images do not only contrast the brightly shining impres-
sion of sites of European cities presented in the beginning to demonstrate 
 7 Adducing the biblical prophet, they emphasise that he had liberated the Israelites from 
captivity in Egypt and the deceiving magic of Pharaoh by ‘the light of Islam [that] came in 
Moses’ right hand’ (jāʾa nūr al-Islām bi-yamīn Mūsā). With this, the authors refer to Quran 
20:11–23, which reports on the signs of prophecy with which God has equipped Moses, 
among them a stick in his right hand.
Figure 6.2 Video stills from Fitrah – The West behind the Mask (2017).
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‘the mask’ of Western societies. They are also set in opposition to the bright 
and colourful pictures of Muslim communities, places of Muslim religious 
practices and Muslim majority societies in the moment when the protagonist 
thanks God for ‘preserving my fi†ra’.
Beyond the visual juxtaposition of Western societies and the Muslim 
community, visualisations and the protagonist’s narrative alike introduce the 
moral and ethical constitution of these social collectives as a framework for the 
interpretation of the protagonist’s personal development. They demonstrate a 
severe moral degeneration in European societies, which, as an epistemological 
background, helps the viewer to understand the external factors that render 
the protagonist’s orientation towards Islam inevitable. The authors offer the 
audience a blueprint for interpreting the protagonist’s individual transforma-
tion and for understanding who he is and how he is related to Western socie-
ties and the larger Muslim community. In doing so, they effectively offer a 
blueprint that potentially helps viewers to put themselves in the place of the 
protagonist and relate to his ‘awakening’.
Conversion to Islam as a Crisis-induced Process
The protagonist’s realisation of living in a faulty environment does not only 
promise positive prospects for his future. It also entails the recognition of 
states of crisis affecting the larger society, certain social collectives and the 
individual. In fact, such states of crisis play an important role in both videos. 
Moreover, critical moments and the recognition of states of crisis constitute 
important watersheds that shape the protagonists’ transformation and help 
them adopting a different social identity. As will be detailed below, they also 
help the authors to portray the transformation as a ‘rebirth’, which not only 
reinforces expressions of dissociation from former patterns of identification. 
Incorporating such an idea, in their self-representation also enables them to 
gain feelings of strength, firmness, conviction, consciousness and ontological 
security throughout their very process of conversion and joining a specific 
community.
Research focusing on psychosocial dynamics in conversion processes 
shows no clear picture of whether the correlation between an experience of 
crisis or conflict and conversion to specific religious groups is empirically 
relevant (cf. Murken and Namini 2004: 147–53; Pargament et al. 2005; 
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Gooren 2007). Reviewing previous research on conversions in general, 
Pollack (2009: 309) concludes that, although states of crisis and deprivation 
affect conversion processes, it is unclear to what extent these factors have an 
influence. Based on her research on conversions to Islam in Germany and the 
USA, Wohlrab-Sahr (1999, 2006) argues that individual processes of reli-
gious transformation are often recollected as coping strategies for problems of 
affiliation, distinction, recognition and discrediting. By contrast, Köse (1994) 
critically assesses crises theories and the role the experience of a moral crisis 
plays with regard to the pre-conversion life histories of converts to Islam in 
Great Britain. He strongly argues against an understanding of conversion as 
a coping strategy for specific realms of problems, be they religious crises of 
adolescence, failed socialisation, sexuality and gender relations, social mobil-
ity, or problems related to nationality and ethnicity.
As outlined above, we find that, in the audiovisual narratives  scrutinised 
in this chapter, experiences of crisis are part of the protagonist’s reasoning 
about their conversion or reversion to Islam. Most explicitly, Min al-Êulamāt 
presents its protagonist’s decision to accept Islam as being shaped by both a 
prolonged experience of moral uncertainty and an urgent existential threat. 
He introduces his religious background as having grown up with religious 
education in Christianity. He states that, although ‘I learned much about this 
religion and its history [. . .] [I was confronted with] many absurd things that 
I could not comprehend’. To underline the insinuated incomprehensibility 
of the Christian dogma and practice and present it as incompatible with the 
needs of an ordinary person, the video shows a male person flipping through 
a medieval Latin manuscript. The authors thus link his individual ontological 
crisis to the perceived failure of Christian theology, institutions and practices 
in providing a framework for his ‘thoughts about God and the afterlife’, 
which speaks to widely known effects of  de-traditionalisation and liberalisa-
tion in Western societies. The video presents these sequences (Figure 6.3) in 
greyish, dimmed images that give the impression of a confused and depressed 
state of mind, a subject helplessly admitting ‘I had lost myself and saw no 
alternative. I did not know what to believe.’
The authors then insert a text slide framing the following sequence as a 
tribulation wrought on the protagonist by God. Using Quranic vocabulary 
that indicates the protagonist’s weak-minded nature in relation to the divine, 
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the text has it that God tries (ibtilāhu) Christian with a disease, so that 
‘this disease and the tribulation be a reason for his guidance’.8 The protago-
nist describes how, in this existentially threatening situation, he begged his 
Creator: ‘Save me! And if there is true religion, guide me rightly and I will 
serve you as best I can.’ Christian’s narrative manifests the logic of his conver-
sion experience, connecting it to established patterns of autobiographical nar-
rations wherein individual transformation is identified as a coping strategy. 
The biographical development over a longer period of time is characterised 
as a state of limbo and the moment of acute existential insecurity presents 
itself as catharsis, providing the impulse for reorientation. However, the pro-
tagonist connects this reorientation to specific expectations so as to (re-)gain 
certainty and clarity vis-à-vis the previous state of ontological and existential 
insecurity, hence to find a religious system that offers truth and meaning. As 
will be detailed below, the video creates a tension between divine forces of 
predetermination and the agency of the protagonist, who places his destiny 
in the hands of God, but, at the same time, presents himself as an active 
individual who determines his further path.
In Fitrah, Andreas recollects that during his adolescence he had developed 
an inner sense of imbalance of the society he lived in, which rendered his per-
sonal state uneasy in terms of his social environment. He recalls that ‘at first 
it was simply feelings [. . .] that soon turned into realisation and conviction’. 
Although it does not figure explicitly in his narration, the conceptualisation 
of a recognition process as involving an inner voice and inward perception is 
 8 Ibtilāª references Quran 89:15–16, hence some people’s weak-minded understanding of 
(and trust in) God’s power addressed in this early Meccan sura. Congruent with the pres-
entation in the video, in an interview with Deutsche Welle Christian’s mother accounted 
for the emergency surgery, and that her son had afterwards been diagnosed with Crohn’s 
disease (Felden 2018). 
Figure 6.3 Video stills from Min al-Êulamāt ilā-l-Nūr (2016).
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closely linked to the concept of a natural predisposition of humanity towards 
monotheism that is fi†ra. He denounces the moral and ethical degeneration of 
Western societies, which he attributes to the remoteness of people from God, 
that is, from their natural predisposition to monotheism. On a visual rather 
than on the textual level, the authors identify institutionalised Christianity 
and the European Enlightenment in particular as a root cause of this develop-
ment (Figure 6.4). Fitrah thus wittingly posits the Enlightenment discourse 
–  often advanced to highlight alleged cultural clashes between European and 
predominantly Muslim societies –  as one of the main sources of people’s 
remoteness from God. The proposition of the video’s authors is that the ideas 
advanced by prominent figures in the German tradition of Aufklärung such as 
Lessing and Kant only purportedly contributed to liberating people from the 
compulsion of ecclesiastical offers of meaning. Rather, their ideas had paved 
the way for the work of new idols and increased a lack of orientation on part 
of the people.
Contrary to other converts who consciously inscribe their interpreta-
tion of Islam in the discourse of enlightenment and modernity (Özyürek 
2015), the film portrays this very discourse as a symptom of those evil forces 
that further people’s separation from the One God. Being per se antipodal 
to a ‘genuine’ Muslim identity, the ideas of modernity and enlightenment 
are tangible in many spheres of society, and hence affect people’s lives in a 
negative way. In particular, the realms of media and education, the misuse of 
alcohol and drugs and consumerism are interpreted as instruments of Satan 
to ‘turn people into his slaves instead of slaves of Allah’. Debunking the West 
is therefore not only a paradigmatic way to investigate the failures of Western 
societies, but rather helps recognising the forces of evil against which the 
protagonist stands as one of few who enact ‘pristine’ monotheism.
Figure 6.4 Video stills from Fitrah – The West behind the Mask (2017).
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The film thus creates a biographical narrative that contrasts the sheltered, 
well-educated protagonist with the moral degeneration of his environment. 
These authors thus not only render the story appealing and potentially com-
patible with all who perceive these or similar problems in Western societies. 
They also establish a background for rendering the protagonist’s experience, 
decision and firmness an extraordinary example, because his biography would 
hardly have given him any reason to change his life so drastically, thus putting 
him in opposition to mainstream society.
Although allusions to the protagonists’ strength and firmness dominate 
their narratives, we also find glimpses of yet another, post-conversion crisis. 
In addition to coping with individual states of crisis through conversion, the 
process as such, and in particular the habitual changes it entails, which are 
clearly articulated vis-à-vis one’s social environment, also involve potentially 
crisis-like moments. Karin van Nieuwkerk (2014: 672–3) emphasises this 
in her study of female converts where she finds that conversion to Islam as 
such might trigger feelings of crisis among such a person ‘not knowing how 
to give this new conviction a practical place in her life: in her work, in her 
family, and in her choice of clothing’. Wohlrab-Sahr (2006: 74) adds that, 
in contradistinction to assumptions made by the human-capital approach, 
conversion to Islam in Europe and the USA in particular ‘produces enormous 
conflicts and costs. The life that they have been living, the social relation-
ships that have been relevant, the places that they have been going, cannot 
be referred to easily after conversion.’ Both videos point to such potential 
moments of crisis. Most notably, the protagonists distinctly highlight their 
post- conversional vulnerability in relation to their social environment, that 
treats them with suspicion or is generally perceived as discriminating against 
Muslims.9 Connecting to generalisable patterns experienced by religious 
converts, the authors then reframe these parts of the narration. They link it 
with their meta-narrative that portrays Muslims as victims of ‘Western’ socio-
politics to emphasise the protagonists’ inner stability in light of such stressors, 
as well as to highlight the even greater need among Muslim communities to 
close ranks against their adversaries and put their trust in God.
9 In Fitrah, around twelve minutes (i.e. one third of the whole video) are used to document 
systematic discrimination against Muslims in European societies.
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Agency and Predetermination
The conversion processes portrayed in these videos are characterised by an 
individual’s search for a change in the significance of his life. These individu-
als and their views of the self, others and their environment at large form 
the centre of their journey. Both videos relate the protagonists’ thoughts 
and actions to specific collective identities that include a strong reference to 
numinous powers. However, in doing so, they create a tension between pre-
determination and individual agency. This is particularly discernible in the 
ways in which they portray the protagonists’ biography as being determined 
by transcendent forces that may ‘make’ them Muslims, and in the way they 
frame their change as a spiritual journey.
Most explicitly, Fitrah presents its protagonist as the subject of divine 
guidance and predetermination. At several points in the video, Andreas 
affirms that he thanks God who has ‘preserved my fi†ra [. . .] and guided me 
to the true religion and favoured me greatly over much of his creation’. His 
trajectory towards embracing Islam is not rendered as a deliberate, rational 
choice but rather as a consequence of the work of transcendental forces. The 
environment he experiences as chaotic and traumatic is neither portrayed as 
‘the subtle handiwork of a benevolent God’ (Buckser and Glazier 2003: xii) 
nor as the work of human agents. Rather, it is ‘Satan [who] has deviated these 
societies away from Allah’. Since God had allowed the protagonist to realise 
the faults of his own society, there is no option available other than to begin 
‘living for what I was created for’. Consequently, he reconstructs his conver-
sion as the experience of a cathartic moment verbalised with such terms as 
guidance, being chosen, being born anew, liberty, and awaking from a night-
mare. As discussed above, the verbal articulation of this experience is impres-
sively underlined with images and sounds. The portrayal of the fault-lines of 
Western societies through highly desaturated, greyish and greenish pictures is 
contrasted with pictures of Muslims and places of Muslim religious practices 
presented in bright, rich and highly saturated colours. In addition, a prayer 
call creates an aural atmosphere that strongly contrasts with the scenes before.
Particularly remarkable is the way visualisations are used to fill in for expe-
riences that cannot be expressed verbally. Both Fitrah and Min al-Êulamāt 
use exactly the same imagery, which was probably taken from stock footage. It 
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conveys the obviously unspeakable multi-sensual experience of being touched 
and spiritually connecting to the divine (Figure 6.5).
The visual metaphor is abundantly clear. The viewer beholds a warm 
room, with, lying at its centre on a reading desk, an open book, probably the 
Quran, which is illuminated by sun rays. Looking through the slots of the 
banister, the viewer’s gaze is distant and very closely involved in this intimate 
scenery at the same time. Concurrently, the light refracted by the grids of the 
mashrabīya window, illuminating the book and symbolically enlightening the 
reader, points to the presence of the unrepresentable God and elucidates the 
protagonists’ guidance from the darkness into light.
In Fitrah in particular, the terminology used and the way in which the 
conversion process is visualised demonstrate a high degree of predetermina-
tion and divine guidance of the protagonist, who marks Western modernity 
and individualisation as hideous consequences of people’s separation from 
God. The narrative in Fitrah thus rejects, albeit implicitly, the idea that 
the protagonist as an individual agent is the centre of his biography –  a 
notion that is key to the discourse of modernisation and individualisation, 
and hence significant for processes of conversion (Hofmann 1997). Karin van 
Nieuwkerk (2006a: 3) further argues that ‘[t]he changed place of religion and 
the process of individualization transformed religion and religious goods into 
matters of individual choice. Actors choose among several religious options 
the worldview that suits them best.’
As Allievi (1998) and Wohlrab-Sahr (2006) have shown, the ideas of 
individuals who pick and choose rationally among religious systems of mean-
ing on the religious market also apply to conversions to Islam in Europe 
and the USA to a certain extent, where religious behaviour more often than 
Figure 6.5 Video stills from Fitrah – The West behind the Mask (2017) and Min al-Êulamāt 
ilā-l-Nūr (2016).
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not is ‘influenced by individual choice rather than by tradition and social 
constraint’ (Wohlrab-Sahr 2006: 72). This idea significantly lingers in the 
protagonist’s narrative in Min al-Êulamāt. The video frames his decision 
to embrace Islam as not driven primarily by supernatural forces or beliefs 
regarded as ‘irrational’ in the discourse of modernity. Rather, the authors of 
the video strongly accentuate the idea of the protagonist’s individual agency, 
rendering his conversion freely chosen and ‘rational’, yet authentic, and 
stressing the autonomy of the person to whom Islam’s message is meaning-
ful. Here, Christian asserts agency by going against the grain of his social 
background and culture in selecting something new and strange.
Although his decision to embrace Islam is shaped by an intervention of 
the divine during life-threatening surgery, the video’s authors do not allow 
the viewers to grasp the protagonist’s spiritual journey. After he has promised 
God to search for the truth we see him searching the internet, looking for 
information about the creeds of Judaism, Christianity and Islam (Figure 
6.6) before he acknowledges that the decisive criterion for the truthfulness 
of religious messages is the extent to which they are devoid of customs and 
human interest.
Following this logic, he highlights the pristine and unchanged charac-
ter of the Quranic text and recognises Islam as ‘God’s true religion’. He is 
portrayed as choosing Islam as if it were one commodity among others on 
the market of religious goods. This market is –  of course –  a priori limited to 
‘those who claim being monotheist like Judaism and Christianity’,10 and like 
Islam, whose religious traditions and dogmas the individual agent rationally 
10 The Arabic subtitles (02:34) give the spoken text as al-baªth bayna al-diyānāt ka-l-yahūd 
wa-l-na‚rānīya, which does not reflect the insinuation articulated in the German voiceover.
Figure 6.6 Video stills from Min al-Êulamāt ilā-l-Nūr (2016).
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comprehends and selects accordingly. Embracing Islam here is not ‘a recogni-
tion of the heart (the seat of the “intellect” [ʿaql] in Quranic terminology)’ 
(Dutton 1999: 163), but rather becomes a matter of choice, though presented 
as the ‘natural way’. The protagonist’s decision for Islam thus seems inevita-
ble, because it is the logical consequence of both the way predetermined by 
God and his self-determined search.
In both videos, the factor of self-determination becomes even more 
important, because the influence of religious authorities and the receiving 
religious community before and during the conversion process are hardly 
noticeable as a social and ideational framework for the protagonists’ personal 
and spiritual development. The authors of Min al-Êulamāt and Fitrah use 
visual means to make clear that the protagonists do not first seek the advice 
of local religious authorities and do not even consult peers. Rather, they 
are portrayed as seekers who have pursued an individualist’s path under 
the guidance of God. This undoubtedly represents a moment of empower-
ment and elevation of the self of converts over both traditional Muslims 
and non-Muslims alike –  a recurrent theme in studies of conversions to 
Islam in Europe (Özyürek 2015). At the same time, this approach, which 
emphasises the individual and its agency in actively choosing his/her path 
through life, is symptomatic of the ways in which Salafi and jihadi teach-
ings further far-reaching transformations of structures of religious authority 
that have ‘fragmented’ Sunni Islam on a global level for more than thirty 
years (Robinson 2009; Eickelman and Piscatori 2004). Bypassing traditional 
religious hierarchies and institutes of learning, the protagonists’ conversion 
biographies become role models for the renunciation of long-established 
schemes of interpretation of the Quran and Sunna. Furthermore, the auto-
biographical narratives showcase another dimension of the Jihadi-Salafi ‘lib-
eration theology’, because they offer a ‘way out’ of a society that is, on the 
one hand, morally degenerate and hostile to Muslims. On the other hand, 
many Sunni Muslim scholars have come to terms with this and  advocate an 
integration of Muslim life in Western societies.
Establishing Boundaries and Symbolising Distance
The videos make it abundantly clear that the protagonists’ lives in Germany 
had been characterised, among other things, by problems of belonging. These 
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were caused by the perceived irreconcilability of their natural inclination to a 
specific set of norms, values and beliefs based, on the one hand, on the Jihadi-
Salafi interpretation of Islam and, on the other hand, on a social environment 
that is morally corrupt and distant from God. This set of norms, values and 
beliefs helps to structure the post-hoc recollections and to image the Muslim 
umma in general and specific Jihadi groups in particular as communities 
meeting the protagonists’ needs for belonging, safety and ontological secu-
rity. They yearn for a social and religious affiliation that is both a matter of 
individual choice and an expression of divine guidance. They enter into the 
Muslim umma as a community that transcends geopolitical, ethnic, racial 
and class boundaries and into the framework of Jihadi-Salafi ideas that offers 
belonging to a vanguard of believers in ‘pristine’ Islam. What is more, this set 
of principles also helps to establish ‘a contrasting principle and ideology ena-
bling the person to leave the conflicting symbolic frame [so that] the problem 
of precarious belonging is turned against the system that makes belonging 
problematic’ (Wohlrab-Sahr 2006: 87).
The videos depict how the protagonists find and form new social identi-
ties, which provide shortcuts to potentially complex systems of beliefs, norma-
tive appeals and orientations, and help them to gain a different understanding 
of who they are, how they are related to others, and how they should behave 
in certain situations. This dimension of the conversion process is developed 
on two distinguishable yet interrelated levels. First, a transformation in their 
own conception of the self and their relation to their social environment is 
effectively narrowed down to a mental process on part of the protagonists, 
who contemplate, search, choose and decide on their own.
The change of roles, which is mainly mentally processed, however, 
requires a second level of identity formation. It means external recognition or 
misrecognition through the reactions and responses of the receiving commu-
nity and society at large towards the protagonists. In this regard, the authors 
of the videos put a premium on conceptualising conversion as a transforma-
tion of the protagonists’ relationship with their socio-political environment. 
Conversion is accompanied by specific religious beliefs, that is, the belief 
in one God, the recognition of his power, and the acknowledgement of his 
antagonists. Once these specific religious beliefs have become part of the 
protagonists’ self-concept, they form the framework in relation to which they 
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mainly assess social and political facts and events. By way of their narrations, 
the protagonists do not only fit a certain framework; they also carefully inter-
weave social and political facts and events into their conversion narratives, 
thus potentially enhancing the plausibility and authenticity of their experi-
ences, the radical change to their selves, and the ideological meta-narrative 
of the videos’ producers. Moral, ethical and socio-political elements form 
the narrative and ontological structure against which the appropriateness of 
the protagonists’ decision for Islam is presented.
Moreover, in the light of this prioritisation, it is conspicuous that neither 
the implications of the social act that is conversion nor the ways in which 
the protagonists enact these transformations prominently figure in the visual 
narration. The videos recognise the protagonists’ embeddedness in social rela-
tionships, but focus mainly on an individual transition rather than conceiving 
conversion as a complex social phenomenon with various implications and 
consequences for an individual, the concerned religious communities and the 
larger society. Also, despite indexical images showing ablution and prayer and 
mentioning the protagonists’ changed names,11 the videos hardly reflect the 
ways in which (or the practices with which) these people created, embodied 
and transmitted their new identity while they were still in Germany.
The videos clearly highlight, however, the ways in which the protagonists 
establish spatial boundaries as a compelling consequence of the change of 
social identities and the switch from one social collective to another. For 
them, becoming Muslim is incommensurate with living in their home coun-
tries. Contrary to the findings of research on European converts to Islam,12 
it is not an option for them to stay and enhance their status of being a good 
citizen by becoming Muslim. They reach far beyond pure ideas and habitual 
elements and identify the establishment of boundaries with an escape from 
the hostile environment.
11 The change of name is a practice that serves the anonymisation of followers of jihadi groups. 
More importantly, this practice dates back to the time of the prophet Muhammad, who 
would change people’s names if they overtly signified unacceptable pre-Islamic beliefs or 
practices. Thus it is a meaningful element to reflect a religious conversion to the outside 
world.
12 On the discourse on conversion to Islam as a way of establishing feelings of being a good 
citizen of European societies, see Özyürek (2015) and van Nieuwkerk (2006c, 2016).
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Their departure, declared hijra, becomes the ultimate consequence of 
their conversion to Islam and symbolises their distancing from their former 
environment. The audiovisual arrangement of this issue provides manifold 
allusions to the prophet Muhammad’s role model, as it references the first 
hijra in Islamic history with connotations of emotional and spatial separa-
tion and the subsequent endurance of psycho-social hardships. By making 
such a fateful decision, it is implied, the protagonists will neither follow 
the ‘simple’ path of alternation (Travisano 1986) nor pursue a conversion 
career (Richardson 1980) in the sense that they might switch back and forth 
between different religious and non-religious systems of interpretation of 
meaning.13 In fact, they are very clear about the consequences of the drastic 
change in their life under religious premises.
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ARTIVISM, POLITICS AND ISLAM –  AN 
EMPIRICAL-THEORETICAL APPROACH TO 
ARTISTIC STRATEGIES AND AESTHETIC 
COUNTER-NARRATIVES THAT DEFY 
COLLECTIVE STIGMATISATION
Monika Salzbrunn
Introduction: Performances as Aesthetic Practices in a Political Context 
of Stigmatisation
In a world characterised by the globalised circulation of references, choreo-  graphies and images, various social, political and religious actors are increas-
ingly appropriating specific aesthetics and means of expression to create visual 
and audio products that are intended for widespread circulation via social 
networks.
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and ever increasingly since the 
9/11 attacks in New York, new antagonisms have emerged that are contributing 
to changes in the ways Muslims are perceived in certain countries, particularly 
France and the USA. The experience of collective stigmatisation and the confla-
tion of Islam with terrorism have fuelled the development of aesthetic counter-
narratives and artistic forms of self-representation; in particular, performances 
by means of which those performing distance themselves from jihadi ideologies. 
In the present chapter, we explore the interrelations between art and activism, 
activism in art and the use of art in activism in the current context in which 
Muslims are experiencing growing stigmatisation. To what extent have the arts 
been political to date, and how does political activism make use of art (poetry, 
174 | part c
performance, painting, photography, music, video, and so on)? Starting from 
the Situationists’ movement and following Rancière’s ‘Distribution of the 
Sensible’, I will reflect on links between the aesthetic and the political. After 
a conceptual overview of artivism and political engagement as a research field 
and a consideration of its methodological challenges, I will provide concrete 
examples of artistic strategies that demonstrate how Muslims engage with vari-
ous media in order to counter collective stigmatisation and (mis-)representa-
tion. I will share insights from three ongoing research projects, ‘Undocumented 
Mobility (Tunisia-Switzerland) and Digital-Cultural Resources after the ‘Arab 
Spring’’, ‘(In)visible Islam in the City –  Material and Immaterial Expressions of 
Muslim Practices in Urban Spaces’ (both funded by the Swiss National Science 
Foundation) and the project ‘ARTIVISM. Art and Activism. Creativity and 
Performance as Subversive Forms of Political Expression in Super-Diverse 
Cities’ funded by the European Research Council (ERC). Each case shows 
how Muslims (predominantly from North Africa and from Senegal) have been 
developing artivistic strategies based on music in order to counter collective 
stigmatisation and the conflation of Islam with terrorism.
Artivism: Concepts and Methods
Artivism1 is a neologism combining the words art and activism. It refers to 
both the social and political engagement of militant artists (Lemoine and 
Ouardi 2010) and to the use of art by citizens as a way of expressing politi-
cal positions (Salzbrunn 2014, 2015; 2019b; Malzacher 2014: 14; Mouffe 
2014). The term gained notoriety through its use by Latin-American activ-
ists and artists working in California: the group Mujeres de Maiz, founded 
in 1997 in East Los Angeles, has included ‘women of colour artivists’ in 
their recent oral history project.2 Referring to the Chicana artist Judy Baca, 
 1 The ERC ARTIVISM project has received funding from the European Research Council 
(ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme 
(ARTIVISM –  grant agreement No. 681880), Available at <www.erc-artivism.ch> (last 
accessed 17 October 2019). I would like to thank my assistants Serjara Aleman and Lisa 
Zanetti for their help in translating parts of the text from French to English, and Lorena 
Ehrbar for technical assistance. 
 2 Available at <https:// www.mujeresdemaiz.com/ 20th-anniversary> (last accessed 26 
September 2019).
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founder of the SPARC laboratory in 1996 in Los Angeles, Chela Sandoval 
and Guisela Latorre use the term ‘digital artivism’, observing that the com-
bination of ‘activism’ and digital ‘artistic’ production’ is ‘symptomatic of a 
Chicana/o twenty-first-century digital arts movement’ (Sandoval and Latorre 
2008: 81). The increasing interest in mural art has led to a professionalisation 
of mural artists who started as political activists and now travel globally and 
participate in mural art festivals or tours organised by the local governments 
of cities like Porto3 or Cologne,4 which have been marketing mural art as a 
tourist attraction.
On a conceptual level, researchers studying artivism have questioned the 
distinction often drawn between art considered as work and art for art’s sake, 
as discussed, for example, by Jacques Rancière in The Politics of Aesthetics: The 
Distribution of the Sensible:
Producing unites the act of manufacturing with the act of bringing to 
light, the act of defining a new relationship between making and seeing. Art 
anticipates work because it carries out its principle: the transformation of 
sensible matter into the community’s self-presentation. (Rancière 2004: 44)
It goes without saying that the simple fact of sharing a common religion 
does not automatically lead to any kind of homogeneity or community. 
Nevertheless, sharing a common political goal or being subject to similar 
prejudices or stereotypes can lead to a shared position or situatedness, which 
may result in a sense of belonging to a larger group (see also Ali et al., Chapter 
9).
Artivistic expression can take innumerable forms: from mural art, graffiti, 
comic strips, music, flash mobs, or theatre, to the invention of new forms of 
expression (Concept Store #3 2010). Recent forms of artivism that use perfor-
mance art find their roots in other experimental artistic movements developed 
in the 1960s, notably Agosto Boal’s Theatre of the Oppressed, Situationism 
(Debord 1967) and Fluxus. Just as the Situationist International (1958–69) 
 3 See the current research project dedicated to street art in Porto. Available at <https:// www.
streetartcei.com/ > (last accessed 26 September 2019).
 4 Available at <http://cityleaks-festival.de/> and at <https:// blog.koelntourismus.de/en/ arts-
culture-en/the-best-quarters-and-spots-for-discovering-street-art-in-cologne/> (last acc es-
sed 26 September 2019).
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movement tried to create situations (1967) with which to destabilise the 
audience (Lemoine and Ouardi 2010), and the Theatre of the Oppressed 
(Boal 1996) used theatre as a form of therapy, contemporary artivism aims 
to awaken the public from its ‘supposed inertia’, inciting people to posi-
tion themselves in relation to social issues (Lemoine and Ouardi 2010; on 
the transformation in and of urban spaces see Schmitz 2015 and Salzbrunn 
2011). The artist, curator (at ZKM Karlsruhe) and university professor 
Peter Weibel (2013), referring to the global aCtIVISm exhibition, wrote: 
‘Audience participation in art as a consequence of the performative turn has 
probably created the historical prerequisites for the new civic participation in 
democracy.’5 Furthermore, he considers artivism to be ‘the first new art form 
of the twenty-first century’ (ibid.). In the empirical examples that follow, I 
focus on the way activists and/or engaged citizens have used art –  mainly 
music and performance –  for political purposes, rather than examining how 
contemporary artists perpetuate the long tradition of socially and politically 
engaged art. Focusing on specific performances allows us to better follow the 
involvement of the performative audience, and to observe the direct effects 
of artivist action. Just as certain actors define themselves as artivists, some 
performances are defined as artivistic by their authors. In other cases, these 
terms are not used as emic categories but are imposed as etic categories (in the 
anthropological sense of the term) by researchers. In this chapter, I focus on 
the way activists have used artistic means, including performance, to express 
narratives that counter the stigmatisation of Muslims.
Finally, current activist movements make wide use of the latest informa-
tion and broadcasting technologies, both during the process of creation and 
in circulating their works, images and testimonies (Salzbrunn et al. 2015). 
More radically, hacktivists intervene by diverting links and transforming 
websites. The Internet has facilitated the development of new ways of medi-
alisation, for example, the transformation of images or messages from one 
medium to another, or the creation of new forms of expression, namely digi-
tal assemblages, by which I mean the combination of still and moving images 
with music. What have been referred to as ‘new’ media, which are no longer a 
 5 Available at <https://zkm.de/en/blog/2013/12/ peter-weibel-global-activism> (last accessed 
26 September 2019).
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novelty, and their style figures have been widely used by various actors. Since 
the beginning of their activities, members of Islamic State (IS) have used social 
networks to promote their ideologies as well as to exhibit their treatment of 
prisoners, most notoriously disseminating aesthetically elaborate audiovisual 
documentations of executions. As other contributions in the present volume 
show, the use of memes (Dawkins 1976) and détournement is central to 
IS’s creation and circulation of audiovisual narratives. Certain images evoke 
analogies between the conditions of detention in Guantanamo and the treat-
ment of kidnapped journalists in IS-controlled territories –  images that have 
become widely circulating Internet memes (including those used against IS: 
see Pfeifer, Fuhrmann and Wevers, Chapter 8). Conversely, Muslims who 
have wanted to distinguish themselves from IS have used public performance 
in order to stage different ways of being Muslim and/or of practising Islam, 
as I will show below.
Finally, anthropologists who work on artivism are exploring not only 
new methods of investigation, but also new ways of communicating their 
results, in particular with the aim of decentring the status of text (Schneider 
and Wright 2006) by shooting documentary films, creating comic strips, 
holding discussions with artivists via blogs,6 or interacting through perfor-
mances such as Rawson’s Boat, led by the Nigerian Jelili Akiku in May 2018 
at the Museum of Acquitaine in Bordeaux.
One aspect commonly raised in relation to the analysis of performances 
is the performativity of such acts and their transformative potential. In their 
constructive dialogue, Judith Butler and Ana Athanasiou propose that the 
performative is a specific power of the precarious (Butler and Athanasiou 
2013: 121). They identify the ‘promise of performing disruptively –  that is, 
the open-ended possibility of performing within, beyond, and against retro-
active recitation, and expropriating limitations and injuries prescribed by it. 
This understood, performative politics, in its conjunction with the politics 
of precarity, remains open and unprefigurable, persistently and intermin-
ably susceptible to the precarious forces of eventness’ (Butler and Athanasiou 
2013: 131).
In an age in which individuality is often erased, especially in media 
 6 Available at <www.erc-artivism.ch> (last accessed 19 October 2019).
178 | part c
representations of refugees, the portrayal of Muslims or any other (post-)
migration phenomenon as a collective, apparently homogeneous group 
reflects a process related to a certain form of biopolitics. At such times it 
is all the more imperative that research should, as Jean-Luc Nancy (2000) 
suggests, capture the singularity (which is always plural) ‘of those politically 
reduced to insignificant human matter’ (Butler and Athanasiou 2013: 133). 
Following Athanasiou and Butler (2013: 140–1), who conceptualise eventness 
as the ‘performative exercise of social antagonism within norms that act on us 
in ways that exceed our full awareness and control; a social antagonism that 
produces disruptive and subversive effects in the normalised matrices of intel-
ligibility’, I will now analyse the (co-production) of representations through 
aesthetic audiovisual counter-narratives intended to oppose stigmatisation 
(see also Dick and Fuhrmann, Chapter 12). Do the frames of disposses-
sion ‘become a performative occasion for various contingencies of individual 
or concerted actions’ (Butler and Athanasiou 2013: 143) –  rewriting his-
tory, repainting representations through performances? Can actors, as Butler 
argues in Bodies That Matter, create a desired world by performing bodies? 
The empirical studies presented below show, at least to a certain degree, pro-
cesses of boundary-making undertaken by certain individuals and/or groups 
who do not want to be assimilated into a supposedly homogeneous category 
of persons with ‘Arab’ roots who are conflated with terrorists by wider popu-
lations. In this context, ‘Arab’ is an emic category used by Muslims of West 
African origin. Analysing their performances, we observe ‘“aesthetics” at the 
core of politics’ in the sense highlighted by Rancière (2004: 13): ‘Aesthetic 
practices are “ways of doing and making” that intervene in the general distri-
bution of ways of doing and making as well as in the relationship they main-
tain to modes of being and forms of visibility’ (ibid.). The three empirical 
examples show different ways of transforming perceptions of Muslims’ being 
and doing, instigated by aesthetic practices performed by Muslims within 
public, semi-public and/or virtual spaces: musical performances, religious 
gatherings and the aesthetic staging of (diverse, including Muslim) bodies in 
a fashion show. By performing their commonality (as Harraga) or their sense 
of belonging to a Sufi brotherhood (Murids) or a place of residence (district 
of Maddalena), the actors concerned express themselves by means of artis-
tic practices. Through the analysis of these artivist actions, I will also show 
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how Muslims take measures to avoid religious ascriptions in order to not be 
perceived first and foremost as Muslims, or, as Muslims, not to be conflated 
with terrorists. Indeed, since 9/11, as a reaction to stigmatisation processes, 
Muslims have been increasingly doing boundary work in order to distinguish 
themselves from terrorists. Following Lamont and Molnar (2002: 168):
Symbolic boundaries are conceptual distinctions made by social actors to 
categorise objects, people, practices, and even time and space. They are tools 
by which individuals and groups struggle over and come to agree upon 
definitions of reality. Examining them allows us to capture the dynamic 
dimensions of social relations, as groups compete in the production, dif-
fusion, and institutionalization of alternative systems and principles of 
classifications. [. . .] Social boundaries are objectified forms of social differ-
ences manifested in unequal access to and unequal distribution of resources 
(material and nonmaterial) and social opportunities.
Music and Images about Harraga
My first example demonstrates how music and musical performances about 
Harraga are presented in (semi-)public and virtual spaces. During my project 
‘Departures. Undocumented Mobility (Tunisia-Switzerland) and Digital-
Cultural Resources after the Arab Spring’, we7 undertook a long-term ethno-
graphic study in Tunisia, Italy and Switzerland, working with undocumented 
migrants (Harraga8) and focusing in particular on their representations of 
Europe. The on-site ethnography was conducted parallel with a netnography 
–  an analysis of sounds, images and texts circulating via social networks, in 
particular on Facebook. The transnational imaginary that shines through the 
videos and self-created digital assemblages of photos, original images and 
 7 Project No. 146041 funded by the Swiss National Research Foundation (SNF), led by 
Prof. Dr Monika Salzbrunn and conducted with senior researcher Dr Farida Souiah and 
PhD student Simon Mastrangelo between 1 October 2013 and 30 September 2017. See 
Souiah et al. (2018) on representations in Tunisian and Algerian cultural productions about 
undocumented migration.
 8 Harraga is of Arabic origin and literally means ‘to burn’. It can also mean ‘to free-ride’, ‘to 
jump a queue’ or to ‘run a light’ (Souiah et al. 2018: 155). In the context discussed here, it 
refers to young men who wish to travel to Europe by boat and burn their papers in order to 
avoid deportation to their countries of origin. 
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music, as well as staged self-representations such as selfies or videos from the 
journey to Europe by boat, reveals the central preoccupations and interests of 
young men who want to migrate to Europe. These comprise the following:
1. As a destination, Italy appears very frequently, evoked by national flags, 
logos of its leading soccer clubs, or Italian women.
2. As symbols of success, cars are very often displayed, sometimes with 
women (e.g. images similar to car advertisements).
3. Young men are frequently shown with symbols of physical strength, of 
their power (of seduction) and of risk behaviour (alcohol, sometimes 
weapons), thereby positioning themselves in relation to certain social 
and/or religious norms.
4. Apart from images of desirable European-looking women, the only 
female figures featured tend to be mothers weeping and suffering from 
the absence or death of a loved son.
The inner conflict of desiring freedom of movement yet feeling loyalty 
towards a suffering mother is clearly expressed. Interestingly, the extreme 
risks of the journey and the disillusionment experienced in everyday life 
in Europe are also emphasised (see Salzbrunn et al. 2015, 2018). Religious 
practices or values are less prominent in such material, with the exception 
of prayers for a safe journey, for the mother left behind and for the (future) 
safety of the family that will be supported by the migrant if he is successful. 
These findings have been presented more extensively in other publications, so 
here I will present just a short lyric excerpt from Cheb Rached’s ‘Ya Roma’, 
which has been performed in various different ways on Facebook as well as 
on TV shows, and associated with images of Harraga (a large corpus of lyrics9 
has been analysed in Salzbrunn et al. (2015)):
Excerpt, Cheb Rached, ‘Ya Roma’/Oh Rome, Mezoued
A winter’s night, we went to the sea
Without a word of goodbye, without a travel bag
 9 Farida Souiah translated the lyrics from Arabic to French and Lisa Zanetti from French to 
English. I express my gratitude to both of them.
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We indulged in the waves, we were not afraid of the danger
If we have to die, we would rather die valiantly.
O waves of the sea, calm down
Let the boat pass through
We arrived safely
We arrived in Italy
The little mom is happy. She is appeased.
O Rome, I am coming
O waves of the sea, do not rise [. . .]
Do not let the boat go backwards
Your prayer, O mom, when you pray
I would rather die than come back
O lights of Rome, appear
O Rome, we are coming.
O waves of the sea, be gentle
In the middle of the depths, protect us
As mentioned above, the lyrics express a deep desire to travel to Rome – 
 the protagonist would rather die than return home. Nevertheless, his first 
thoughts are dedicated to his mother and her protective prayers. When Nabil 
Louhichi sung Cheb Rached’s song ‘Ya Roma’ on a Tunisian TV show in 
2012, he had attached several portraits of Harraga to his clothes. During this 
broadcast performance, he publicly expressed the suffering of all the fami-
lies who had lost their sons. Indirectly, he also criticised the difficult living 
conditions that motivate young men to take such risks to leave their home 
country. Although neither Louhichi nor Rached are Harraga themselves, the 
contents of their performances are similar to Harraga’s cultural productions 
themselves.
In sum, in the fifty-four Mezoued lyrics examined, religion featured as 
a form of moral support for the migrant’s journey and for the family left 
behind, in particular the mother, the most venerated person. The Harraga’s 
artivist practices range from circulating stagings and representations of their 
own multiple belongings via social networks, transgressing social and reli-
gious codes and defying expectations to the creation of digital assemblages 
and the public performance of songs. While Tunisia is known to have a 
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certain number of IS activists, in our ethnographic and netnographic findings 
we did not come across cultural productions that justify this evolution.
Drawing Boundaries to Reject External Jihad in Transnational Murid 
Events and in Local Muslim Festivals
The second example deals with semi-public performances of religious belong-
ing (to a Sufi brotherhood) expressed through musical performances, prayer 
and discourses. As part of the project ‘(In)visible Islam in the city: mate-
rial and immaterial expressions of Muslim practices within urban spaces in 
Switzerland’,10 we researched various ways in which a specific form of belong-
ing to Islam is performed. At a time in which terrorist attacks were on the 
rise, Sufi brotherhoods, common in Senegal and popular among Senegalese 
abroad, represented an interesting case for studying boundary-making pro-
cesses. Since the referendum in which the majority voted to ban the construc-
tion of minarets in Switzerland in 2009, Muslims have been subjected to a 
particularly negative populist image campaign. Moreover, regional referen-
dums against face-veiling in 2013 (Ticino) and 2018 (St Gallen) have stoked 
anti-Muslim sentiment in general, although the majority of Muslim residents 
in those regions are of Balkan origin, and do not even wear the veil. The 
following example shows how Muslims from sub-Saharan African countries 
have responded to these growing anti-Muslim discourses in Switzerland by 
defining boundaries between themselves and ‘Arab’ Muslims (as an emic 
category) through discourses and performances.
The Murid Brotherhood in Switzerland and its Kourel Kat (Singing Circle): 
A ‘Bird Who Flies’
From the very beginning of the development of the Murid brotherhood, the 
companions of the founder, Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba (1853–1927), met 
regularly to form a circle to recite and to share the poems he had written. 
Cheikh Amadou Bamba’s ideas were disseminated through religious songs. 
To this day, young practitioners form circles called kourels kat in order to 
10 The project No. 143203, ‘(In)visible Islam in the city: material and immaterial expressions 
of Muslim practices within urban spaces in Switzerland’, was led by Prof. Dr Monika 
Salzbrunn and conducted with senior researcher Dr Talia Bachir-Loopuyt and PhD student 
Barbara Dellwo between 1 April 2013 and 30 September 2017. 
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sing the founder’s praises, with each such circle developing its own sonority. 
Usually, the practitioners come from the same daara (praying circle in a rural 
environment, from the Arabic word dār: home, farmhouse), or dahira (pray-
ing circle in an urban environment and/or in a diaspora, from the Arabic 
word dā’ira: circle, field, area, zone) or are made up of members who share 
the same marabout (spiritual authority). According to Cheikh Ahmadou 
Bamba’s last son, the General Khalife Serigne Saliou Mbacké (1915–2007), 
‘The kourel is like a bird who flies, the providers are its wings and those who 
listen are its feathers’.11 Hence, the listening audience is integral to the per-
formativity of this musical prayer ritual.
A Message of Peace Shared in a Tense Political Context: The Khassida Jazbul 
Performed in front of the University of Geneva
During the visit to Geneva of Serigne Mame Mor Mbacké, a grandson of 
Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba, on a Saturday evening in 2015, a reception was 
held in an auditorium in a central building of the University of Geneva. 
Before the opening, a kourel took place in the square in front of the building; 
young men formed a rotating circle and sang. The kourel continued to sing 
for half an hour as the audience of followers arrived. When the doors opened, 
a hundred people entered the atrium of the building, still surrounded by the 
sound of the khassaïdes. About ten people hurriedly started to film the scene 
from the sides of the atrium. When the members of the kourel entered the 
auditorium, they placed carpets on the floor, to the right of the podium, 
and continued singing. All night long, many people came and went, talking 
to each other, sharing news or congratulating each other on their resplend-
ent outfits. Many Murids filmed or took pictures of the scene, including a 
reporter from the Murid TV channel Bichri-TV. These images continue to 
circulate via social networks, Whatsapp, Youtube channels and/or as digital 
assemblages that are screened during other visits of Murid spiritual lead-
ers. On the evening Serigne Mame Mor Mbacké was in Geneva, videos 
from his previous visit to New York and images from Murid gatherings all 
11 A sentence repeated many times in oral Sufi culture, and often cited, e.g. in Anonyme, 
‘Le Koureul’, Hizbut Tarquiyyah Darou Khoudoss [online], HTDKH, 2008, Available at 
<http:// www.hizboudaroukhoudoss.org/ ?Le-Koureul> (last accessed 15 December 2016).
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over the world were screened in order to reinforce a feeling of transnational 
community.
In the following section, I provide an analysis of some sections of verse 
from the khassida Jazbul Qulūb ilā ʿAlāmil Ghuyūb’– known as [Jazbu] (The 
Attraction of the Hearts towards God12). This khassida includes 185 verses, 
of which more than a third (56) refer to peace. The following verse does so in 
relation to the prophet Muhammad and emphasises the peace granted to his 
followers and his companions:
8- O LORD! Grant Peace and Honors to the Prophet who, as soon as 
he arrived, was promoted to the Pole of the Universe, as well as to his 
Favorable Family and his Companions.
Other verses praise the prophet’s beauty and describe his character. In the 
following verses, a moral imperative is implied in the request for peace to be 
granted to those who demonstrate exemplary behaviour, to the prophet and 
his companions, and to all Muslim women and men:
15- O LORD! Grant Peace to the Doorway of Righteousness, to the 
Prophet whose ascendancy is broad and who has filled us with gifts, this 
brave Lion among the enemies who has dissipated the danger, the Doorway 
leading to Eminence and Honorability [. . .]
22- O YOU in whom my hope lies! Grant, on my part, Peace to the Draped 
Messenger, to His Companions endowed with Perfection as well as to the 
entire Muslim community [. . .]
Despite the explicit mention of enemies and danger, in the speeches that fol-
lowed the kourel performance it was the peaceful nature of the fight against 
the enemy that was emphasised. In the speeches –  as in other stories –  parallels 
were drawn between significant events in the prophet’s life and milestones in 
12 I refer here to the translation in French published on a Murid website: Mouride Blogger, 
Khassidablog [online], 22 November 2013. Available at <http:// khassidarek.blogspot.ch/ 
2013/ 11/ jazbul-qulub-ila-alamil-ghuyub-jazbu.html> (last accessed 11 May 2017). I thank 
my assistant student N’Deye Maty Kane for having collected many sources after the field-
work we did together in Geneva, and for translating the speech of H. E. Bassirou Sene, the 
ambassador of Senegal, cited in the text, from Wolof to French. Thanks also to Lisa Zanetti 
for the translation of this section of this chapter from French to English.
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Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba’s biography, in particular his peaceful fight against 
the enemy (the French colonisers) when the latter sent him into exile.
During the evening, the theme of violence was taken up by the lecturer 
Mouhamet Galaye Ndiaye, director of the European Islamic Institute in 
Brussels, as well as by the guest of honour, H. E. Bassirou Sene, Ambassador 
of Senegal in Geneva. In his speech, the ambassador observed that the current 
situation was marked by terrorist attacks committed in the name of Islam, 
and took the opportunity to distance himself and the audience from such 
actions, by stressing the peaceful history of Muridism. Speaking directly to 
the guest of honour, Serigne Mame Mor Mbacké, grandson of the founder of 
the Murid brotherhood, he said:
Dear Serigne Mbacké, know that we, here in Geneva, you have seen how 
we are, you have seen which pastor leads us, the Murids, the Tidjanes 
and many others gather and go together, we ask you to pray that this will 
continue in this way, that we will continue to listen to your speeches and 
instructions. The so-called jihadists, who go to the mosques to kill people, 
to take women in their homes and rape them, to take ignorant young 
people to give them guns and tell them to kill their closest acquaintances 
first, yes, because among jihadists, they are told to kill their family first, this 
is the test to become a real jihadist. Whoever does this is not a Murid. What 
Serigne Galaye said is true, and powerful. We believe that, as long as we 
stay behind you and Serigne Touba, as long as we learn the khassaïdes, the 
Koran, we know that jihadists will never come from the Muridism, Allah 
kuli al.13 I think that we will never find a jihadist among the Murids.14
This speech echoes the sentiments of the lyrics sung by the kourel to the 
extent that both call for peace. The narrative of Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba’s 
peaceful resistance of the colonisers is well-known among Murids, so the 
audience would easily recognise the allusion. On some occasions, the his-
tory of Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba’s life is explicitly remembered and cited to 
call upon followers to be inspired by it and reject the outer armed jihad.15 
13 May God forbid.
14 H. E. Bassirou Sene, Ambassador of Senegal to Switzerland, University of Geneva, 30 May 
2015.
15 E.g. Cheikh Anta Mbacke Babou recalls Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba’s concept of ‘Jihad for 
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In recent years, warnings have been issued against ways of thinking that 
come from the Arabian Peninsula. The Murids insist that they are peaceful 
Muslims, unlike other branches that propagate violence in the name of Islam. 
In the same way, in his responding speech, Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba’s grand-
son emphasised the distinction between Muridism and the Islamic teaching 
that is imparted in Arabic countries (e.g. Egypt, Saudi Arabia), and explicitly 
advised listeners not to send their children to such countries, where they 
would be encouraged to stray from the right path, that is, a moderate one:
If I return on the learning process, in fact, at one point we started to notice 
that as soon as the children have a bachelor’s degree, they would leave. By 
the time they came back, they brought us problems, they changed the way 
they dressed, they grew their beards, they wore so-called ‘Islamic’ clothes, 
and made strong progress on subjects they didn’t master.16 We know very 
well that the bachelor’s degree has a lot of positives effects on children, but, 
when you get to leave the country, some people will try to bring you on 
paths that are not yours, and you will end up saying to yourself that every-
thing you believed in before was wrong.
 Professor Galaye has already said that this was not really plausible 
in Senegal.17 It is for this reason that when we created the University of 
Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba, at the beginning they wanted to call it Al-Azhar 
but I didn’t agree, because Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba is more important, for 
us, than Al-Azhar. Everything was reformed. For example, every child who 
lives there must speak French and English. [. . .] Serigne Touba, if he made 
it through all this, it is thanks to of his beliefs and because he met good 
people. He has been Tidjane, Khadr and he went to Mauritania, he took 
everything that was good but he didn’t look any further.18
In the speech above, Serigne Mame Mor Mbacké recalled the broad cultural 
education of his grandfather Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba, who had been taught 
the soul’ mentioned in Cheikh Anta Babou (2007), Fighting the Greater Jihad. Amadu 
Bamba and the Founding of the Muridiyya of Senegal, 1853–1913, Athens: Ohio University 
Press.
16 He refers to young Murid graduates known to have changed the way they dress and their 
ideas about Islam after continuing their studies in so-called ‘Arabic-Muslim’ countries. 
17 Reference to armed jihadism, terrorism. 
18 Serigne Mame Mor Mbacké, University of Geneva, 30 May 2015.
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by intellectuals from two brotherhoods, the Tijâniyya and the Quadiriyya, 
without ever needing to go to the Arabian Peninsula. Emphasising the need 
to distance oneself from the kind of instruction imparted in Arabic countries, 
specifically the University Al-Azhar in Cairo, Serigne Mame Mor Mbacké 
mentioned that the Murid University in Senegal was named after Cheikh 
Ahmadou Bamba rather than Al-Azhar. Nevertheless, two references come 
together in the name of the Al-Azhar Touba Institute, which has educational 
campuses and Murid associations in Senegal and worldwide: the reference to 
the Egyptian University of Al-Azhar and to the Senegalese city of Touba. The 
Institute is mainly funded by remittances sent by Murid migrants. Touba is 
the capital city of Muridism, funded in 1988 by Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba, 
and became the second-largest city in Senegal thanks to important remit-
tances sent by Murids from all over the world.
Murid women are not generally very visible during the most important 
moments of religious events, yet they do take important roles in organ-
ising religious and/or political meetings. Several women with positions of 
responsibility in associations have a strong convening power. In Switzerland, 
many international Murid organisations are led by women. Their strong 
financial standing and their societal status are clearly expressed by their smart 
fashionable clothes, precious jewellery and expensive handbags. This festive, 
opulent way of performing gendered and religious belonging is also part 
of a  boundary-making process whereby they distinguish themselves from 
other Muslim groups, which they view as excessively conservative and out of 
‘Senegalese tradition’, which is considered as being more liberal.19
The collective effort to make Sufi Islam audible and visible is part of 
a performative strategy that should be analysed with reference to intersec-
tionality. This concept, initially developed in order to facilitate analysis of 
the intersection of gender, race (in the sense in which the term is used in 
North American literature) and class can be extended to include religion, 
nationality or geopolitical location (e.g. boundary-making vis-à-vis another 
group defined on the basis of continent of origin, even if expressed in terms 
of language or race) (see Crenshaw 1991: 1,241–99). Following Crenshaw, I 
19 Observation of verbal and non-verbal reactions, made during another Murid assembly, 
when converts wearing the hijab had arrived. 
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believe that to understand the boundary-making that took place at the event 
in Geneva, it is necessary to take into account the articulation of race, class 
and gender in the given historical and social situation –  particularly since the 
majority of Murids in Switzerland are highly qualified immigrants who pos-
sess greater social, cultural and relational capital than the country’s average 
resident. Religion and gender, as well as other categories of multiple belong-
ing, are performed individually and collectively in a boundary-making con-
text in which such performance often expresses reactions to experiences of 
exclusion from certain public and/or mediatised spaces. Thus, Murids in 
the Lake Geneva area perform (semi-)publicly their belonging to the Swiss 
public sphere, while distinguishing themselves from other Muslim groups 
by condemning them as violent and deviant, and most importantly, incom-
patible with the peaceful form of Islam propagated by the Murid brother-
hood since its inception. As I have written elsewhere (Salzbrunn 2019a), we 
observe here an ‘ethnicisation of religion’ insofar as sub-Saharan Africans are 
distancing themselves from ‘Arabs’ (in the emic sense) and from extremely 
conservative Muslims by asserting the uniqueness of the way they practise 
their religion, claiming that the Sufi practice developed by a ‘black’ African 
is more peaceful than the school of Islam practised and taught in training 
centres on the Arabian Peninsula. Although Sufism has historically been 
characterised by rather discreet and private ritual practices, the anti-Islam 
political context has encouraged Murids in Switzerland to perform their 
belonging publicly, emphasising their specific poetical, mystical and musical 
heritage. To this end, religious activists create soft power through artistic 
practices (music, poetry, recitation, performance) –  a strategy that has led 
them to participate in exhibitions in Lausanne and Geneva and to give a 
performance in the MEG (Musée d’Ethnographie de Genève). Following 
the dictates of situational analysis, any observations should always be con-
sidered in their specific context. Speeches made on other occasions, such 
as in the wake of the attacks against the Charlie Hebdo cartoonists, have 
focused on reminding listeners that Senegalese Muslims belong to umma, 
for example. While the attacks were condemned by most speakers, includ-
ing the Senegalese President Macky Sall, cartoons have also received much 
criticism in Senegal in the name of Islam.
Whereas many Senegalese residents in Switzerland enjoy a good social 
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standing, the same is not true in Genoa, in Italy, as the following example 
shows.
Fashion Show in the Maddalena District of Genoa, Italy: Defying 
Stigmatisation
The third example deals with a public performance: a fashion show, organised 
by residents, tailors and vintage-shop owners in order to counter prejudiced 
ideas about their locality. When I arrived in Genoa in the autumn of 2017 to 
conduct a long-term study on art and activism, I was struck by very negative 
headlines in the local press, which portrayed the Senegalese population as a 
‘mafia’ that was flooding the streets of the old town with crack.
Having worked for twenty years on the political and religious networks 
of Senegalese and their translocal social networks in Senegal, Europe and the 
USA, I found the negative media coverage in Genoa, associating Senegalese 
with mafia and drugs, a surprise. It contrasted starkly with the positive media 
representations enjoyed by Senegalese in New York (Salzbrunn 2004) or 
the images they themselves cultivate publicly in Geneva (Salzbrunn 2016). 
From the beginning of my stay there, I was compelled to reconsider my 
understanding of the local, regional and national logics of Senegalese people’s 
self-representations. Given that I had chosen the city of Genoa because of its 
vibrant and large artivist actions as one of the fields to be covered as part of 
my project ERC ARTIVISM,20 discovering the variability of representations 
in circulation relating to the Maddalena –  one of Genoa’s most demographi-
cally diverse districts –  thus created a bridge between two projects, with the 
performative, artivistic representation of self and others as a common issue.
As we will see later, religion, or, more precisely, Islam, hardly seemed 
to be an issue during the preparation and organisation of the fashion show 
organised in the Via Maddalena. The only time religious practices were men-
tioned was in setting the date for the show, in order to avoid the event coin-
ciding with Ramadan, as had once mistakenly happened in the past.
The district of La Maddalena, near Genova’s port, is characterised by 
20 ‘ARTIVISM. Art and activism. Creativity and performance as subversive forms of politi-
cal expression in super-diverse cities’. Available at <www.erc-artivism.ch> (last accessed 19 
October 2019).
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the diversity of its population. Linked to historical immigration that centred 
around transport nodes, like many port localities, the Maddalena saw workers 
from formal industries and the informal economy arrive at the port from both 
overseas and inland. Today, La Maddalena, part of Genova’s centro storico – 
 the largest old town in Europe, as the tourist office proudly informs visitors 
–  also has the highest percentage of residents with an academic degree. This 
indicates that the area is already showing signs of gentrification processes, of 
which artists and intellectuals are ambivalent precursors.
As already mentioned, Maddalena’s media image is tainted by local press 
reports that hold the ‘Senegalese Mafia’ responsible for flooding the district 
with drugs. At the entrance to one of the streets leading to the old town, 
there are still traces of a message from the Second World War that warns 
soldiers about sexual diseases (transmitted by prostitutes) and against vio-
lence. Some contemporary tourist guides also advise readers that it can be 
risky to walk the streets, some of which are almost too narrow for more than 
two people to pass. Nonetheless, more and more groups of cruise ship tour-
ists now pass through the historical centre because Via Garibaldi, listed as a 
UNESCO World Heritage Site with its many museums and palaces from the 
Renaissance period, is just a stone’s throw from Via Maddalena. The base-
ments of the buildings in Via Maddalena house numerous artisan workshops, 
including many tailors and fashion designers of West African (mainly from 
Senegal, but also from Ivory Coast) and Ligurian origin. In the same street 
and those nearby there are also many vintage stores, which are run either by 
charitable organisations or by individuals and address a range of clientele 
in terms of purchasing power. In 2017, dressmakers and shop managers 
came up with the idea of coming together to organise a fashion show on 
Via Maddalena. One of the motivations was the desire to counter perceived 
associations of the neighbourhood with crime and danger, and to value and 
celebrate the diversity of its residents, in terms of their origins, status, social 
class, and so on. I followed the preparations for the second show in autumn 
2017, together with members of the ERC ARTIVISM team (Raphaela von 
Weichs and Pascal Bernhardt), with whom we filmed the activities.
From the outset, the fashion show seemed to me to be a form of political 
performance, a staging of self and otherness, a way of staging diversity and 
commonality –  the sharing of a common neighbourhood. The shots filmed of 
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the preparation work revealed ‘what [was] at stake’ (Lallier 2018) in the per-
formance exercise, particularly at the moment when bodies and new clothing 
came together.
As we filmed the preparations, we asked the (non-professional) models 
how it felt to wear the clothes. A young man of North African descent, 
who had experienced some setbacks in his teens, commented that when he 
donned a silk suit from the 1960s it made him ‘feel important’. The whole 
experience of rejection, of being looked down upon as he had been at times 
during his youth, seemed to be forgotten the moment he stepped into a suit 
representing a different status. Another participant in the event, a former 
political refugee from Morocco known locally as the ‘white wolf’ for his 
generosity, also radiated joy and pride, announcing to camera that he loved 
the neighbourhood ‘more than anything’. Later, Cheikh, the Senegalese boss 
of a sewing workshop, proudly traced the migratory route of his family of 
dressmakers: from Senegal via Ivory Coast to Italy. For him, the event was 
above all an opportunity to show his creations to a wider public. We filmed 
Cheikh in his studio, while he worked diligently on a suit:
It’s a job I grew up with. It’s now 28 years of work. I started in our country, 
Senegal, and I did it in many African countries before coming here. We 
did it in Mali, we even had a sewing workshop there. We did it in Togo, 
Nigeria, Cameroon, we did a lot of countries. In Africa, everyone sees that 
it is a job of Senegalese.
Since one of the aims of the fashion show’s organisers was to value the skills 
and work of tailoring, the common profession emerged as a rallying point 
that seemed more important than the origins or religious affiliation of the 
people involved. Nevertheless, religious practices did become relevant when, 
as in the spring of 2019, the event took place during Ramadan. The common 
desire to publicly showcase the fashion creations ultimately prevailed over 
criticism of the scheduling. In addition, a critical attitude towards the glo-
balised fashion industry and in favour of championing local creations and 
second-hand circuits brought the protagonists together.
Just as individual shots triggered statements about how the body and 
mind dwell in clothing, the shooting of the event itself reinforced the stag-
ing of oneself. Dances, acrobatics, exotic make-up with white lines on the 
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cheeks, all kinds of gestures such as those expressing joy or greetings were 
performed in a theatrical fashion by everyone living in the neighbourhood 
who was transformed into a model for a day. The representation of the self, 
of one’s attachment to the neighbourhood, to the locality, appeared to be 
paramount –  far more important than the performance of one’s origins. To 
live and to perform the joy and pride of being the protagonist of the day 
in the Maddalena district was an opportunity to assert one’s place in this 
place, a particularly important experience for people affected by the grow-
ing racism in Italy, especially (first- and second-generation) refugees. The 
activists, engaged in representing their neighbourhood and fighting against 
racism, used performance art –  a fashion show with masquerade, dance and 
music performances –  to counter the stereotypes disseminated by local media 
in relation to the whole district as well as to specific groups (‘Senegalese’, 
‘refugees’, ‘immigrants’), by appropriating public and media space.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have discussed three different creative strategies of 
 boundary-making established by Muslims with different origins who reside in 
different places. I was able to offer a nuanced analysis of the situated politics 
of belonging (Yuval-Davis et al. 2006) because I did not pre-define any sup-
posedly homogeneous group as the subject of my research, nor did absolutist 
conceptions of religion or migration narrow the field of my interest. Instead, 
I explored the interrelations between art and activism, focusing in particular 
on the use of art in activism in the context of the growing stigmatisation of 
Muslims by certain media.
Frequently, the process of creating academic representations about migra-
tion and religion begins with the definition of research subject/ questions, 
approach and methods. This procedure is problematic in a number of ways. 
Firstly, there is the risk that researchers’ preconceptions will shape the subject 
they want to investigate. Secondly, in the process of translating the project to 
make it easier for participants to understand, a hegemonic form of othering 
–  by which migrants are reified as a distinct, supposedly homogeneous group 
–  informs how migration is represented in the course of interaction with the 
subjects, if migration or a specific form of religion is emphasised as the key 
issue. Thirdly, when the results are disseminated, if migration or religion are 
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over-emphasised as cause and/or effect, the self-fulfilling prophecy of reifica-
tion is completed with the reception process.
In the Harraga example, music, video performances and digital assem-
blages circulated via social networks represent the values, desires, and trans-
gressions of social norms of those who create them. The staging of risky 
behaviour (alcohol, physical force and so on) does not stand in contradiction 
to prayers for a safe journey to Europe. Producing or referring to musical pro-
ductions in which Harraga feature as adventurous and courageous protago-
nists is a way of countering preconceptions and gaining recognition through 
the arts. Whereas moral and/or religious values like respecting one’s parents, 
in particular the mother, are implicitly or explicitly part of the Harraga’s 
references, engaging in an outer jihad was not a relevant theme for the popu-
lation we worked with during our ethnographic research.
The two subsequent empirical examples focused on specific events within 
urban spaces. Attending events allows us to observe what is important for 
a particular population residing in a specific place. Whether organised as a 
disruptive form of performance within public space or an event that refers 
to issues already supposedly overcome –  such occasions have the potential 
to incite the creation or foster the maintenance of groups around a common 
political goal. Experiencing racism in a local, regional and national context of 
growing xenophobia in Genoa has, for instance, led to local resistance move-
ments in which the religion or origin of the participants are not central to their 
politics of belonging (Yural-Davis et al. 2006). The protagonists’ representa-
tion of local life through the fashion show has contributed to changing the 
way knowledge production is situated, challenging the hegemony of printed 
media and establishing counter-images within public space, disseminated via 
social media and films. Following Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2018), this 
way of pushing further the actor-centred approach might contribute to foster-
ing the ‘end of the cognitive empire’, making way for alternative epistemolo-
gies. Hence, the rather hegemonic nature of the concept of ‘participation’ 
(by whom to what, from which perspective?) can be constructively overcome 
by researching the performative (Butler and Athanasiou 2013) impact of a 
disruptive and/or unpredictable event (Amiotte-Suchet and Salzbrunn 2019) 
in public space.
From a methodological point of view, our work with the camera also 
194 | part c
highlighted how bodily postures were transformed by wearing particular 
clothes for the fashion show in Genoa. The recovery of dignity that took 
place when the clothing and the models became one was clearly visible in our 
footage. Here, in the words of Rancière (2004), politics (of recognition) are 
obviously aesthetic.
In the case of the Murids’ festive event in the Lake of Geneva region of 
Switzerland, Murids’ own self-representations have already been circulating in 
social networks and media for some time. The event, particularly the moment 
of Cheikh Amadou Bamba’s grandson’s arrival, was documented by a dozen 
cameras operated by Murid professional filmmakers as well as amateurs. Just 
as images from his previous visits all over the world were screened during the 
event, the images from Geneva will be projected at future events worldwide, 
demonstrating that Muridism is a global phenomenon. Emphasising that the 
Sufi Islam practised by Murids is peaceful and condemns armed outer jihad 
and disseminating that (audiovisual) image is a key objective for Murids, 
especially since 9/11, as we have shown in different ethnographic studies 
(Salzbrunn 2004, 2016).
In a context of stigmatisation and exclusion by certain media, espe-
cially since the strong increase in the popular and political influence of the 
far right in Italy since 2018, as well as, to a certain extent, in France, the 
desire to counter preconceptions by celebrating the value of ‘urban diversity’ 
(Reuschke, Salzbrunn and Schönhärl 2013) is stronger than ever. Talking 
about professional trajectories, as the Senegalese tailor does in a locality that 
others portray as a drug dealers’ milieu, is a way of counter-performing oth-
ering images of oneself not only individually but also collectively. Both the 
Senegalese tailors in Genoa and the Murids in Geneva are keenly aware of 
the importance of publicly staging alternative expressions of belonging. These 
artivistic performances and their mediatisations are part of a media battle 
within which we, as researchers, also participate. Hence, to answer the ques-
tion raised in the introduction to the present chapter, actors have used the 
‘frames of dispossession’ as a ‘performative occasion’ (Butler and Athanasiou 
2013: 143) to rewrite history and to create their own image, visible within 
public space.
Finally, creating disruptive artistic performances like fashion shows in 
a stigmatised urban space or religious musical recitations in a very secular 
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urban environment are ways of using art as a political tool. These forms of 
artivism are spectacular and disruptive in their local contexts and beyond, 
producing counter-narratives and countering stereotypes related to ethnic, 
national or religious belonging.
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RE-ENACTING VIOLENCE: CONTESTING 
PUBLIC SPHERES WITH APPROPRIATIONS 
OF IS EXECUTION VIDEOS
Simone Pfeifer, Larissa-Diana Fuhrmann and Patricia Wevers
Introduction
T  wo women dressed in black hoodies, with their faces hidden behind black veils, stand behind a kneeling woman with a veiled face, who wears 
an orange jumper. The hand-held camera and clumsy frontal framing offer 
glimpses of a living room with long curtains, sofas, cushions and a flat-screen 
TV. The two standing women rhythmically shake long knifes in their hands 
to the intradiegetic remixed version of the well-known Islamic State (IS)1 
nasheed Íalīl al-‚awārim. As the song comes to the call ‘Allahu Akbar’ and 
the remix’s trap rhythms come to the fore, one woman pretends to cut off the 
kneeling woman’s head, then all three start to dance with their hands. At the 
end, the two women dressed in black dance closer to the camera and point 
their knives directly into the lens. As the music fades out, only the women’s 
giggling laughter can be heard.2
 1 Other terms, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or Islamic State of Iraq 
and Syria (ISIS), refer to earlier self-designations and their translation from Arabic. 
 2 We thank all members of the research project Jihadism on the Internet, especially Christoph 
Günther, for their insightful comments on the videos as well as on this chapter, and Pip 
Hare for her sensible language editing.
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In the course of 2015, a large number of Arabic-speaking YouTubers 
responded to and reproduced staged beheading memes3 like the one described 
above. These popular amateur videos are set in intimate living rooms. The 
soundtrack of these videos is generally a version of the popular IS nasheed 
Íalīl al-‚awārim (The Clanging of the Swords) (see Fuhrmann and Dick, 
Chapter 12). As the scene and the nasheed progress, anticipation of a vio-
lent culmination intensifies –  then viewers’ expectations are confounded. 
The soundtrack marks a turning point in the narrative. Instead of an actual 
beheading scene, after gestures of cutting off the head with the knife, the 
standing and kneeling performers suddenly start to move their bodies, danc-
ing humorously and suggestively to the ‘song’. The phenomenon, originally 
mainly produced by Egyptian YouTubers, went viral on YouTube and was 
imitated in many Arabic-speaking countries and received media attention 
across the globe.4
The colour-coding of the black and orange costumes,5 the choreogra-
phy and the gestures clearly reference IS-authored decapitation videos, for 
example, the ones of the journalists supposedly murdered on camera by 
Mohammed Emwazi,6 which became infamous in the course of 2014 and 
2015. Yet by choosing domestic indoor settings, amateur hand-held camer-
awork and covering the victims’ heads, the makers of these YouTube videos 
do not strive to replicate IS’s professionally-produced staged beheadings with 
their multiple camera angles and close-up shots. Furthermore, the female per-
formers and their giggling stand in stark contrast to IS productions that rarely 
depict women as actors with agency. The clear reference to the mediated 
 3 We follow Limor Shifman’s (2014: 41) definition of internet memes ‘as (a) a group of digi-
tal items sharing common characteristics of content, form, and/ or stance, which (b) were 
created with awareness of each other, and (c) were circulated, imitated, and/ or transformed 
via the Internet by many users’.
 4 Available at <https:// www.youtube.com/ watch?v=zFR1AUA_ RPo> (last accessed 16 
September 2019); see also Jones 2015; Saul 2015; Arabisches Internetphänomen veralbert 
Hymne der IS-Miliz (2015).
 5 Clothing their victims in orange jumpsuits became one of the most powerful symbols of IS’s 
attempt to reverse relationships of power. On aspects of rhetorical resistance in this practice, 
see Richey and Edwards (2019). 
 6 Mohammed Emwazi, known as the faceless executioner Jihadi John, appeared in several IS 
videos (Mekhennet 2017: 261–2; see also Chandrasejaran and Prephan 2019 on the ‘iconic 
character’). 
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IS beheadings evoked by the IS nasheed Íalīl al-‚awārim is subverted by 
the use of the exegesis forbidden remixed version that includes trap music 
elements.
These YouTube videos have been interpreted as part of anti-IS humour 
and digital cultural resistance (Al-Rawi 2016), as a movement to counter IS’s 
spreading of fear by disseminating via Internet ever more graphically violent 
and horrifying portrayals of beheadings. While this observation seems to hold 
on a general level, in our contribution we want to explore the techniques that 
are at work in these forms of engagements that we term re-enactments of 
violence. With re-enactments of violence, we describe the embodied (video-)
performance of executions that relate to decapitation videos mainly pro-
duced and distributed online by IS media outlets. Beyond recognising the 
re-enactments as humorous and/or defiant attempts to counter IS’s iconic 
and (operative) images, we want to go further, to explore how they transform 
and redirect forms of violence within and between very different digital and 
political realms.
In this contribution, we begin by defining how we conceptualise resist-
ance and re-enactment, and how this relates to discussions on (digital) public 
spheres. Secondly, we examine the iconic features of IS beheadings, and 
the creative techniques and practices that different actors use in their re-
enactments and reinterpretations of that violence. We point to similarities 
used in different re-enactments while showing how re-enactments of violence 
may differ according to the contexts in which they are set. Thirdly, we relate 
our examples to discussions on cultural resistance, power and hierarchy, and 
argue that re-enacting images of violence can not only be used as a memetic 
form of cultural resistance to counter IS iconography, but can also be used 
to transform those ‘projectilic’ (Kraidy 2017) or ‘operative’ images (Klonk 
and Eder 2018) into different forms of resistance and hatred.7 We therefore 
recognise that re-enactments and their mediations can become actors with an 
existence in their own right (Mitchell 2011: xix).
 7 We distinguish re-enactments of violence from ‘mere’ imitations of the violent acts on 
the basis that imitations do not relate aesthetically to iconic forms or practices. Hence, we 
do not see the decapitation of two Scandinavian tourists in Morocco by IS supporters in 
December 2018 as a re-enactment of violence. 
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The Constitution of Re-enactments of Violence, Resistance and 
(Digital) Public Spheres
While we acknowledge that beheadings in IS videos might themselves be re-
enactments, appropriated and performed for the camera (see Zywietz and 
Beese, Chapter 4), we point to the iconic status of these videos, which is testi-
fied to by the diverse ways in which the iconic images are taken up by different 
(digital) contexts and publics. We apply W. J. T. Mitchell’s (2011: xix) method 
of ‘Iconology’ and bring it together with ethnographically-informed investiga-
tions of audiovisual encounters in social media. Mitchell (2011: xix) points out:
Images, from an ‘iconological’ standpoint, are both verbal and visual entities, 
both metaphors and graphic symbols. They are, at one and the same time, 
concepts, objects, pictures, and symbolic forms. Some of them become oper-
ative forces in sociopolitical reality, attaining what is commonly known as 
‘iconic’ status –  widely recognizable, and provocative of powerful emotions.
He thus brings together the interpretative inquiry into the meanings of images 
in their historical contexts and their power to influence human behaviour 
with the ‘agency’ of images –  ‘how they live and move, how they evolve 
and mutate, what sorts of needs, desires and demands they embody’ (2011: 
xix). This is very close to our ethnographically-informed approach whereby 
we follow images and their entanglements in different digital environments, 
taking account of how they are socio-culturally situated. Following Pollock’s 
(2012) assertion that images become iconic when they come to represent the 
entire complexity of an event in its exceptional singularity, we examine how 
such an iconic status may be defied by (re-)appropriation and reinterpretation.
In our analysis of the videos, we draw on the term ‘cultural resistance’ fol-
lowing Duncombe (2002: 5), who describes it as the use of culture consciously 
or unconsciously, effectively or not, to resist or change a dominant structure. 
Here, the dominant structure provided by the IS decapitation videos is defied 
in the re-enactments.8 Our goal is to offer a deeper understanding of ‘the 
 8 IS videos themselves could be seen as a form of cultural resistance against Western domi-
nance or certain internal Islamic debates, yet such considerations go beyond the scope of 
this chapter. 
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people’s’ capacity to resist narratives circulated by IS by re-appropriating its 
audiovisual material as a resistive practice. Through our examples, we reveal 
how cultural resistance ‘works to foster or retard radical political activity’ 
(Duncombe 2002: 5) and how it may be interpreted as anything from rebel-
lious deviance or emancipatory struggle, according to a viewer’s ideological 
perspective. This raises the questions of which contexts publicly acknowledge 
and understand such acts of cultural resistance as worthy of ‘serious’ attention 
and of what the common creative techniques of re-mediations of iconic IS 
beheadings are. We therefore also examine what happens to re-enactments of 
violence in the digital public sphere where re-enactments by actors in Arabic-
speaking countries as well as in different European contexts intersect.
In recent years, the concept of re-enactment has not only been widely 
used in artistic performance practices but has also been discussed in historical 
sciences, history of art, anthropology and cultural and media studies. When 
it was initially used in historiography, the term primarily referred to the per-
formance of past events in order to generate new forms of knowledge or to 
develop methods for re-living and re-thinking the lives of past actors (Agnew 
2004). In our contribution, we follow Dreschke et al. (2016a, b), who con-
sider re-enactments from a media-practice-based perspective. Dreschke et al. 
(2016a, 10–11) define re-enactments as media practices that are situated in 
time (historical), space (geographical-topological) and within a (re)mediated 
conveyor of traces (Spurenträger). They are creative (media) appropriations 
that produce new material-aesthetic forms. In this sense, re-enactments are 
performative practices that always relate to another time and another space, 
and, most importantly, reference other forms of mediations like films and 
videos. In our examples, they are not necessarily about the actual re-living of 
a certain event, but they are nonetheless always a re-interpretation of a point 
of reference. In contrast to enactment, a re-enactment always relates to the 
mediation of an event (with a specific time and space), a film or icon; while 
the physical practices comprise one medium within a chain of remediations.
In this contribution, we focus on the mediated forms (embodied, audio-
visualised or digitised) and examine how the temporal and spatial dimensions 
of re-enactments are interconnected and mediated in particular ways as socio-
culturally-specific public activities. It is especially this group-related activity 
that becomes relevant when looking at re-enactments as part of public spheres, 
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especially digital public spheres, which Martin Zillinger (2017) has referred 
to as graduated publics. By focusing on ‘making things public’, the concept 
of graduated publics challenges the binary opposition of public versus private 
realms and the concept of a unified public or counter-public sphere.
When writing about re-enactments of IS decapitation videos, we acknowl-
edge what Friis (2018), with reference to staged executions, has called the 
‘public display of violence’ (see also Krona, Chapter 5). She argues that it 
is not the arbitrary ‘brutality’ of IS executions, but the public visibility of 
the acts that are facilitated through the professional use of media technology, 
the transgression of sensibilities and as part of an alternative political order. 
In this sense, it is not only the killing of foreigners that successfully attracted 
global attention (Koch 2018: 25) but what Azoulay (2012) identifies as the 
three defining characteristics of the execution portrait: the transgression that 
is seen in the image, the manner in which the image is made public and the 
horror an image generates. Applying Azoulays’ (2008) theoretical considera-
tions of the ‘photographic situation’ and the ‘civil contract of photography’ 
to the decapitation videos that we are concerned with, it becomes clear that 
the imbalance of power that is inscribed in the roles of perpetrator, victim 
and audience is crucial. The ‘individual victim is forced to actively participate 
in the performance’ (Friis 2018: 249, italics in the original), but the imbal-
ance of power and the violence are inscribed not only upon the body of the 
victim but also upon the body of the spectator.
Defying Violent Visuals: Two Ends of a Spectrum?
The Levant Front’s counter-Islamic State video (henceforth Levant Front)9 was 
uploaded in 2015 to a YouTube channel with content focusing on Middle 
Eastern, British and US American politics and has attained nearly a million 
 9 Available at <https:// www.youtube.com/ watch?v=7OEvK9nO94Y> (last accessed 16 
September 2019). The ‘Levant Front’ (al-jabha al-shāmīya) is an umbrella for several rebel 
groups in Northern Syria, founded in late 2014. They have been coined a major ‘anti-
ISIS opposition group’ and have received support from the US government (Cafarella 
and Casagrande 2016: 6). They are known for conducting arrests and executions in their 
province, and their status is highly controversial. Hence, their production and release of the 
video described sparked a great deal of critical debate in social media.
204 | part c
views to date. On the YouTube channel, a short contextualising paragraph 
summarises the video in English:
On December 7, 2015, al-Jabhat al-Shamiya (The Levant Front), a Syrian 
rebel group in Aleppo, released a video that imitated the Islamic State’s 
produce up to the moment that it seemed they were going to execute the 
Islamic State prisoners, at which point the Front brought in a cleric to 
instruct on justice.
Five minutes into the professionally filmed and edited video ten captives in 
orange jumpsuits are standing in a row with naked feet, their heads bowed 
down. Behind them, ten heavily armed men in camouflage suits and bala-
clavas are shown with multi-camera angles and close-up shots. The shackled 
men in the front are pushed to the ground, kneeling in the dirt when pistols 
are being pointed at their heads. The iconic choreography and landscape are 
reminiscent of IS audiovisual productions, for example, the video released by 
Al-Furqan Media Foundation Although the Disbelievers Don’t Like It (2014), 
which features ‘Jihadi John’ among a group of executioners preparing for 
acts of violence. Hence, the description in English not only serves to prepare 
viewers for the content, but also potentially to prevent the video from being 
deleted immediately by the website’s administration.
Figure 8.1 Still from The Levant Front’s Counter-Islamic State Video (2015). © Levant Front 
(note: persons anonymised by authors for ethical reasons).
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The turning point stated in the description occurs at minute 5:26 into 
the video and comprises three elements that interrupt the expected course 
of events. The first element is the fading in of a text proclaiming ‘Muslims 
are not criminals’ in English and Arabic. This is the first time that English-
speaking viewers are directly addressed. Up until that moment, non-Arabic 
speakers might have been misled by the resemblance of the video to IS 
propaganda material, especially if they were unaware of the political stance 
of its producer. The subsequent textual content addresses Arabic-speaking 
Muslims, providing contextual and linguistic elaboration to make a religious 
and political statement regarding Islamic State’s executions. The second ele-
ment is the unmasking of the men behind the captives. This destroys the 
anonymity of the executioners that is obligatory in IS executions. They 
walk away and leave their captives behind. The significance of executioners’ 
anonymity also becomes clear in journalist Souad Mekhennet’s (2017) writ-
ings on the ‘unmasking’ of Jihadi John’s identity. The third element is the 
sudden appearance of the imam who gives a speech addressing the captives 
and the camera, denouncing past IS executions on the basis of religious 
arguments. As the imam starts to make a speech condemning IS executions, 
photos of them are blended in; the captives look at each other with bewilder-
ment but relief.
Non-Arabic-speaking viewers would notice this element but would not 
understand the reasoning put forward by the religious authority, since no 
translation is provided of the imam’s speech.10 What adds to the potential 
confusion and discomfort of viewers, regardless of their language competen-
cies, is that it remains unclear whether the captives knew that they were par-
ticipating in a re-enactment rather than an actual execution. From an ethical 
perspective, this raises the question of whether the imam’s condemnation of 
IS violence is not counterbalanced by the trauma and torture experienced 
by the captives in the same video, if they did not know what was about to 
happen to them.
The video is an act of cultural resistance that draws upon the visual 
10 It is beyond the scope of this contribution to elaborate on changing forms of Muslim reli-
gious authority in relation to militant digital environments (see Bunt 2018; Eickelman and 
Anderson 2003).
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memory of the viewer, works as an educational piece for an ‘exclusive in-
group’, and leaves less informed viewers with more questions than answers. 
While the use of iconic, easily recognisable elements, such as the captives’ 
orange jumpsuits and the executioners’ military outfits and balaclavas, makes 
the re-enactment video’s reference point clearly identifiable, care is also taken 
to reproduce more subtle details. The cinematography, camera angles, visual 
effects and branding of the opening titles are clearly part of the re-enactment. 
In terms of the soundtrack, not only the nasheed but also other audio effects 
directly reference IS propaganda videos.
Unlike the aforementioned example, ISIS Bloopers11 is a humorous re-
enactment of the infamous execution of the American journalist James Foley. 
The video was uploaded in February 2015 on a YouTube channel called 
 which mainly features comedy content from Israel. The video consists ,בערך
of the imagined ‘outtakes’ from an execution video, and features a camera-
man, an executioner and a captive, who interact with each other in English. 
The visuals, which evoke the imagery of iconic IS executions, produce a sense 
of dissonance in combination with the jokes made by the protagonists. The 
video is directed at an English-speaking audience familiar with visual parody 
and with allusions to different frames of reference. From the very first frame, 
it is obvious that this is a comedy video and not IS propaganda. It opens with 
a clapperboard and a voice saying in exaggeratedly broken English ‘Kill all the 
infidels, take wahad ’.12 The executioner re-enacts the start of a speech from the 
James Foley video but fails to remember his lines. Unlike the aforementioned 
video by the Levant Front, this video shows a lively interaction between cap-
tive and executioner, ascribing agency to the captive, which in itself already 
testifies to the video’s defiant stance. Despite kneeling in a subordinate posi-
tion, he acts as an intellectually superior subject, correcting the executioner’s 
English while laughing with/at the latter’s mispronunciation. He even tries to 
take advantage of the executioner’s momentary distraction to flee the scene, 
but he is recaptured. The captive expresses concern for the executioner when 
he cuts himself with the knife and advises him to hold his hand up to reduce 
11 Available at <https:// www.youtube.com/ watch?v=Qz3oWmDUW1Q> (last accessed 16 
September 2019).
12 One, in Arabic.
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the bleeding. In the next scene, the captive is already dead, and his body can 
be seen lying on the ground. When the executioner, cameraman and sound 
recordist realise that they had forgotten to press the record button, the sound-
man replaces the captive to become the next execution victim for the camera 
to record. This narrative twist emphasises the interchangeability of IS victims, 
making it clear that their identities are subordinate to the primary objective 
of filming a performance that can be shared widely to incite fear. And herein 
lies the potential for a humorous re-enactment to become a force of resist-
ance against IS, as Al-Rawi (2016) has observed. By drawing on a variety of 
frames of reference, producers of such videos destabilise the aesthetic styles 
and structures that characterise IS’s execution videos in order to subvert their 
monolithic narrative.
The above-mentioned examples show two ends of a broad spectrum 
of videos that re-enact IS executions. The re-enactments evoke the ico-
nography of IS execution videos by replicating camera angles, audio and 
visual effects, postures and clothing. While both videos share the same 
goal, to defy the narrative of the IS, the Levant Front’s serious commentary 
addresses a very specific Arabic-speaking group, whom it seeks to convince 
by means of authoritative religious-political argument, whereas the comedy 
ISIS Bloopers uses humour to ridicule IS, appealing to a wider English-
speaking audience. Acting in or watching either video is nonetheless a 
visceral embodied experience. Affecting the viewer and evoking emotions 
and bodily reactions is the key strategy by which the videos’ producers aim 
to reach wide audiences and thereby undermine the potency of the ‘source’ 
material. Both videos achieve this objective, but they do so in contrasting 
ways.
Circulating through (Digital) Public Spheres: From Videos to the 
Streets to (Social) Media and Back Again
Many researchers who study IS decapitation videos have pointed out the 
importance of the visibility and the public display of violence (Friis 2018; 
Krona, Chapter 5), not only for an immediate audience but also for one 
reached by global digital distribution via social media platforms (Winter 
2015) or journalistic outlets (e.g. Zelizer 2016). In our consideration of 
re-enactments of violence produced by different activists in Europe, the 
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public display of violence and the interrelations between different offline 
and digital public spheres also come to the fore. The activist collective ‘12th 
Memo Rise’ came to prominence with the re-enactment of an IS execu-
tion in the pedestrian zone of the German city of Essen in October 2014. 
Hassan, one of the founding members of ‘12th Memo Rise’, recounts the 
group’s first theatrical staging, as he called it, in a longer interview with 
the authors:
We stood at the Limbecker Square. The silent scene started. Actually, we 
only wanted to perform there, two of us kneeling, one standing with a 
knife, one with a pistol, just standing there and nothing more. After five 
minutes the police came and told us: ‘you have to explain immediately 
because we’ve had more than 200 callers.’ I think the number is exagger-
ated, but he said a high number of callers had told the police: ‘there is an 
attack happening in Essen’. People had already gathered, a huge crowd, 
[police] calling ‘who is responsible for this chaos?’ So I stepped forward and 
showed my ID. (Hassan, 12 June 2019)
Hassan’s description highlights the confusion that the group’s performance 
created among those who saw it. Because the activists did not provide any 
explanation or contextualisation, the embodied re-enactment of the IS 
beheadings was seen as a ‘real’ terrorist threat by many of the people who 
came across the scene in Essen. Only when requested to do so by police 
did members of the collective improvise speeches and write contextualising 
explanations on the concrete with chalk to explain their actions. As in the 
videos discussed before, it was the iconic orange prison suits, the perpetrators 
veiled in black with guns and knives, and the kneeling and standing poses 
that clearly referenced IS executions. Furthermore, the appropriation of the 
black flag made the allusion to IS execution videos unmissable. The emblem-
atic symbol on the black-and-white banner referenced the IS flag, while the 
additional text ‘Ausgebildet in Bonn Braunschw. Wuppertal’ (educated in 
Bonn, Braunschweig, Wuppertal) referred to Jihadi actors’ connections with 
major German cities, highlighting Germany’s transnational entanglements 
with the war in Syria and Iraq.
Mediated executions by different IS media outlets were the main point of 
reference for the collective ‘12th Memo Rise’:
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At that time, YouTube and Facebook weren’t blocked. You only had to do 
a search in Arabic on YouTube, and you’d find something. So we watched 
a few videos. That wasn’t easy, some videos were just too extreme. We 
watched out for the cinematic techniques, why this kind of music at this 
moment, why Hollywood-style scenes, why this kind of drama. There were 
so many details, scenes, close-ups, the weapons. And the emotions of the 
victims. It was all in there [in the video] and we tried to write it down 
and said we want to do something similar but with a different message. 
There’s that saying: fight the enemy with their own weapons, then we said 
let’s do that. [. . .] I still have the videos in my head because I personally 
found them really hardcore. One time, we watched three Arabic videos. My 
Figure 8.2 Stills from IS Hinrichtung in Essen / Deutschland (2014). © 12thMemoRise.
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friend Ali, he has a smart TV and he could play them on the TV from his 
iPhone. So we watched them on the TV. One of the videos was the one 
with the Jordanian pilot who was burnt alive.13 That was really a high-end 
video, it could have been a Hollywood production, the way it was filmed 
and portrayed. Then we watched one video that showed a whole group of 
people drowning in a cage14 and one was the beheading of an Iraqi man, not 
a migrant. I still have the scene from that video in my head. But the thing 
is, we were watching something totally different, not just the cinematic ele-
ments, we studied what they were wearing, how is this guy standing, what 
is he doing, how does he move. That was what we were interested in for our 
scene. (Hassan, 12 June 2019)
It was not only the costumes, other props, posture and gestures that they 
were careful to emulate in their re-enactment. As in the videos discussed in 
the previous section, the camera shots, editing techniques and narrative con-
struction through montage of IS productions were taken into account when 
planning the re-enactment in the pedestrian area and producing the video of 
the performance.15
The re-enactment was undertaken with the clear objective of ‘counter-
ing the message’ of IS videos by using the enemy’s own ‘weapons’. That also 
meant using the same aesthetic styles as those of IS videos, which apparently 
made the re-enactment barely distinguishable from the ‘original’ for the audi-
ence in Essen. In other words, before the resistant ‘countering’ could take 
place, the nearly perfect imitation had to successfully evoke the original. 
The countering was then achieved by relating the imagery to new narrative 
frames, and by providing commentary in the public space and within the 
video, which included text inserts and quotations from media reports.
13 The video shifāʾ al-‚udūr (Healing of the believers’ chest) with the Jordanian pilot Moaz 
al-Kasasbeh was distributed online by the IS media outlet al Furqan media on 3 February 
2015, months after the release of IS Hinrichtung in Essen. 
14 Presumably, this was a similar video to the infamous wa-in ʿuddtum ʿudanā (If you return 
[to sin], we shall return [to punishment], Quran 17:8) distributed by IS’s Nineveh Province 
Media Office on 23 June 2015, in which alleged ‘spies’ are drowned in a swimming pool.
15 IS Hinrichtung in Essen / Deutschland. 12th Memo Rise (published 3 December 2014). 
Available at <https:// www.youtube.com/ watch?v=AxDq96g1tUg> (last accessed 16 
September 2019).
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Additionally, some of the filmic elements self-reflexively drew view-
ers’ attention to the fact that they were watching a recording (figure 8.3). 
While the recording information imprinted on the video image indicates a 
certain time and date, its primary function is to mark the scene as a video 
recording and to disrupt the immersive narrative. The split screen with 
four images showing the same scene from different angles serves a similar 
reflexive aim, not only highlighting the simultaneity of the actions taking 
place but also using aesthetic techniques to draw attention to the act of 
montage and framing, while referencing similar reflexivity found in some 
IS videos. Expanding on Dreschke et al.’s (2016a) notion of re-enactment 
as creative (media) appropriation, the video that was produced as a new 
Figure 8.3 Stills from IS Hinrichtung in Essen / Deutschland (2014). © 12thMemoRise.
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material-aesthetic form became a re-enactment to mediate between differ-
ent contexts.
Hassan’s statement also points to the emotionally and affectively inten-
sive experience of viewing the extreme violence of the IS execution videos, 
for him personally and for the group as a whole. Furthermore, and this also 
relates to our findings above, his comments remind us that the accessibility of 
such videos is not only governed by platform politics and restrictions but also 
effected by language proficiency and other barriers that have to be considered 
in our discussions about digital public spheres.
Even though the staging in the street was done in order to produce the 
video, the physical and affective performance had a cathartic effect for those 
who participated:
In the end we celebrated our achievement, as if we had liberated territories. 
But that wasn’t acting, it was a real sense of relief. We had done it because 
of the rage we had been feeling, about always having to justify or, I don’t 
know, I’m associated with these people, I think differently, but somehow 
I’m associated, because of religion, origins, language, appearance, all identi-
cal, even though my mindset is different; you have this certain kind of 
rage, having to justify to yourself. To outsiders you react, sometimes you 
overreact, if someone asks what you think of it; because I criticise myself 
for that, I even hate myself, but when we did it, it was such a liberation. In 
the video you see that we hugged each other, we celebrated and that was 
enough for us. We had done it and we had done something, our conscience 
was calmed, we only wanted to go home. We weren’t thinking about the 
video, what would become of it and what impact it would have. (Hassan, 
12 June 2019)
Hassan’s narrative refers to what other authors have termed knowledge 
through experience (Agnew 2004: 331). He initially likens his sense of joy 
and relief to supposedly militaristic feelings of freeing territories from IS, 
before going on to describe the frustration and pressure he feels in everyday 
life in Germany, where he is constantly obliged to position himself in relation 
to what is going on in Syria and Iraq and feels the need to distance himself 
from it. Even though these ‘re-lived’ feelings are a personal experience and 
knowledge, in the context of the execution re-enactment the reactions of the 
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audience on the street are an integral part of the performers’ affective experi-
ence: without witnesses, the exhilarating cathartic and motivational effect of 
the activism would not have been so profound. Additionally, Hassan draws 
a clear distinction between the meaning of the performance constructed by 
those who saw it live, and the video and messages that his group disseminates 
more widely via social media.
‘12th Memo Rise’ released the video on its YouTube channel in December 
2014 with the title ISIS Attack in Essen/Germany, shortly before the attack 
on the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo and a kosher grocery store in Paris 
on 7–8 January 2015. The title ISIS Attack in Essen/Germany was intended 
to attract attention, including from audiences that Hassan termed ‘radical’ 
or ‘Salafists’. With the promotion and sharing of the video on the Facebook 
profile page of Essen-born German rapper Sinan-G, in January 2015, the 
video came to be seen and commented on by more than 1,500 people within 
a matter of hours, and was also mentioned in various German TV, radio 
and press statements. Given Sinan-G’s many followers on Facebook and 
his status as an ‘influencer’, his promotion extended the  video’s reach far 
beyond the group’s own following on Facebook and YouTube. As a result 
of the media attention, filmmaker Till Schauder accompanied the group for 
a year, producing the documentary Glaubenskrieger (Warriors of Faith) that 
was broadcast several times on different German TV channels from 2017 
onwards.
The video’s diverse audiences reacted to it in very different ways. While 
Hassan describes feeling rather uplifted and motivated by the immediate 
reactions of audiences on the streets and online, wider dissemination led to 
more complicated reactions from the different kinds of nonetheless over-
lapping publics. Two developments are notable here: initial critical voices 
and threats came from different online contexts, including the group’s own 
Muslim community, disapproving of the statements that they as young people 
were making about Islam, not only by criticising leading figures of the Salafi 
movement in Germany but also by contesting conservative religious authori-
ties.16 Secondly, and even more pertinent for our argument here regarding 
16 Some of their statements also fuelled conflicts between Shiite and Sunni communities in 
Germany, but this goes beyond the scope of this chapter. 
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digital public spheres, a consequence of the online criticism expressed by 
some Muslim communities was the expression, on social media, of positive 
responses to the video by supporters of far-right movements that were flour-
ishing at the time, including Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of 
the Occident (PEGIDA) in Germany and the ‘Identitarian Movement’ in 
Austria.
Inspired by the re-enactments of the activist collective ‘12th Memo 
Rise’, the Viennese branch of the ‘Identitarian Movement’ re-enacted the 
Essen re-enaction on one of Vienna’s main shopping streets on 21 December 
2015. The same day, the YouTube channel ‘Esterreicherr’, administered by 
an anonymous person who regularly published videos of police and firefighter 
operations, such as (violent) demonstrations and football games, uploaded a 
video of the event.17 For the video’s entire 2:48 minutes, the copyright stamp 
and written watermark of the YouTube channel ‘Esterreicherr’ are displayed 
in the lower-right corner.
After fading in from black, the video opens with footage recorded by a 
walking camera-person who passes among pedestrians and police to reveal the 
scene of the re-enactment. A loud voice screams ‘Lass los!’ (Let go!), then the 
English-language nasheed For the Sake of Allah starts to play. The shaky hand-
held camera moves in and out of the scene as people try to physically disrupt 
the re-enactment but are held back by supporters of the performers. Three 
males wearing military outfits and olive balaclavas stand next to a person 
dressed in a black burka holding a black banner bearing the Muslim creed in 
white Arabic letters. In front of this ensemble of four, a woman and a man are 
kneeling, dressed in everyday clothes with their faces clearly visible, holding 
‘Refugees Welcome’ signs. The camera zooms in on one of the camouflaged 
men, who is holding a knife, pretending to cut the throat of the kneeling man 
before throwing him to the ground. He gives his knife to the person standing 
next to him, who performs the same movements with the women kneeling in 
front of him. For most of the video, these two people lie on the ground, still 
holding the ‘Refugees Welcome’ signs so that they can be clearly seen. After 
17 IS-Enthauptung mitten in Wien | Mariahilfer Straße 21.12.2015. Esterreicherr. Available 
at <https:// www.youtube.com/ watch?v=WwRV2bYGa5E> (last accessed 16 September 
2019).
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a cross fade at minute 1:28, the nasheed stops playing and the well-known 
leader of the ‘Identitarian Movement’ in Austria, Martin Sellner, explains 
his views on immigration to Austria. He indirectly takes the re-enactment 
of the IS execution as a starting point, going on to blame refugees for the 
‘Islamisation’ of Austria and to identify his own movement as the solution 
to all of Austria’s problems. Without ever directly referring to IS, Martin 
Sellner’s choice of wording clearly associates the execution re-enactment with 
‘terrorism’ and the ‘Islamisation of Europe’.
As in the examples discussed previously, the careful staging of distinctive 
postures and gestures, accessories like the knife and, in part, the perpetra-
tors’ camouflaged outfits and the flag clearly mimic IS execution videos. 
Furthermore, as in the living room re-enactments described in our introduc-
tion, using the English nasheed as a soundtrack references IS videos, despite 
differing in terms of the use of intra-diegetic ‘original’ sound in the street 
performance. The victims holding the ‘Refugees Welcome’ signs are equated 
with the protesters who try to prevent the re-enactment from taking place 
and who are shouting. However, unlike in the case of the victims in the ISIS 
Bloopers video, no agency is attributed to their role. The different narratives 
of refugees, activists who welcome refugees and politicians who call for the 
defence of ‘Fortress Europe’ are set in complex relationships with one another 
by their staging within the re-enactment in the pedestrian zone of Vienna and 
the distribution of its mediated form via social media, mainly on Facebook 
and YouTube.
These re-enactments of executions by ‘12th Memo Rise’ and the 
‘Identitarian Movement’ share similarities in the ways in which they perform 
and speak to different publics offline and online, even though the video of 
the Vienna example was later distributed by different actors and its narratives 
and messages interpreted in divergent ways. It is precisely the flexible scaling 
of publicness that, as Martin Zillinger (2017: 43) has pointed out in relation 
to Moroccan trance rituals, enables the re-enactments to unfold their agency 
and transcend their original ambits, becoming imbricated with new (and not 
necessarily intended) meanings in the process.
In both cases, re-enactments of IS execution videos were staged in 
public spaces in Europe in order to draw attention to the transnational 
links between the wars in Syria and Iraq and the countries in which the 
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re-enactments were performed. The re-enactment by ‘12th Memo Rise’ 
pointed to German involvement in the violence in Syria and Iraq, for exam-
ple, by naming German cities where IS fighters had been born and educated, 
and warning that hatred could take hold in Germany. The re-enactment 
by the ‘Identitarian Movement’, by contrast, located the source of violence 
outside Austria, in order to argue that it must be prevented from entering 
the country. But at the same time, the ‘Refugees Welcome’ signs and Martin 
Sellner’s speech served to direct staged violence and hatred towards ‘leftist 
liberal activists’ and refugees supposedly attempting to come to Austria.
Significantly, as Hassan mentioned in one of our conversations, the 
‘Identitarian Movement’ had observed his group’s activities and the Vienna 
re-enaction was clearly inspired by the Essen performance, aspects of which 
it imitated, such as the location. The ‘Identitarian Movement’ later even 
approached ‘12th Memo Rise’ and suggested collaboration for a joint event. 
Hassan’s group declined the invitation, but the interaction points to the 
entanglements of the different publics. The two re-enactments and videos 
discussed were staged at different locations on different occasions and 
were made public in distinct digital contexts with different, even contrary 
dynamics and discourses, yet these apparently separate online and offline 
spheres transcended their original fields to converge, not only as a source of 
inspiration. Re-enactment thus mediates between different actors in offline 
and online spheres and lends itself to very different forms of cultural resist-
ance. A re-enactment develops further, becoming an independent reference 
in itself. The re-enactment travels through watching IS videos, to staging 
a re-enactment of them in a pedestrian zone in Germany, to distributing 
the re-enactment among a particular social media audience with the aim 
of countering a particular image of Islam in Germany. The reference then 
travels further, inspiring a re-enactment by the ‘Identitarian Movement’ that 
is distributed online to express very different narratives relating to immigra-
tion and Islamisation. The re-enactment as a mediating device is clearly more 
complex than something that simply circulates –  the interlinkages of the dif-
ferent images, narratives and discourses it brings forth become entangled in a 
‘messy web’ (Postill and Pink 2012).
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Conclusion: Contesting and Redefining Violence
In this contribution, we have introduced the reader to re-enactments of vio-
lence that reference IS execution videos. Drawing upon selected examples, 
ranging from ones that work with comedy to others that are presented as 
serious (religious-)political re-enactments, we have shown how the videos’ 
producers use this media form to resist and defy the narrative and undermine 
the iconic status of IS imagery, despite having different motivations for doing 
so. The diverse contexts we have discussed were made comparable by showing 
how re-enactments mediate content from one context to another and how 
they are imbued with new meanings from specific (cultural) settings in the 
process. The shifts in the ways in which the videos are interpreted are made 
possible by actors’ re-contextualisation of the recognisable and iconic ele-
ments that they appropriate. Firstly, we identified as a practice common to all 
the re-enactments the precise replication of details from IS execution videos, 
such as the clothing worn by captives and perpetrators, the protagonists’ 
demeanour, gestures and movements, the choreography of the bodies within 
the setting as a whole, and the use of direct speech to address the audience. 
Secondly, we showed how cinematographic and video techniques such as the 
use of special effects, close-ups and multiple camera angles, certain editing 
styles and audio techniques such as the incorporation of a nasheed make 
re-enactments appear all the more similar to IS propaganda and therefore 
intensify the ambiguity in order to confuse viewers and make them unsure 
whether they are watching something ‘original’ or not. This ambiguity is 
key to the embodied and affective impact of the re-enactment. Thirdly, we 
argued that the re-enactments cannot be discussed without considering the 
different kinds of publics (online and offline) that are addressed, intention-
ally or otherwise, which become an integral part of the performance of the 
re-enactment.
As we pointed out in the introduction, the notoriety that IS videos have 
achieved cannot be explained simply by the horrific nature of the acts of 
violence that they show; the ways in which the images are produced and cir-
culated must be taken into account. The success of the perpetrators in dissem-
inating a message is dependent on the distribution of the image (Klonk 2017: 
1; Friis 2018). The re-enactments we have discussed re-work IS’s depiction of 
218 | part c
violence in different ways, leaving out the violence (as in the Levant Front), 
undermining it with humour and mockery of the perpetrators (ISIS Bloopers), 
or transferring it to different geographical contexts (‘12th Memo Rise’) or 
to different kinds of narratives and victims (‘Identitarian Movement’). In 
each case, the re-enactments serve to defiantly resist IS’s implied claim to a 
monopoly on a specific genre of violent images by reinterpreting the execu-
tion videos to convey different political messages.
Our examples have shown how the embodied and performative practices 
of re-enactment are always inspired by and relate to other mediated forms. 
Hassan’s statement testifies to this when he talks about how his group studied 
IS execution videos in order to work out the aesthetics for its performance 
and prepare for staging it. Not only physical performance but even embod-
ied spectatorship is an affective experience; bodies are thus one link in a 
media chain that also includes objects, audio, video, social media and media 
infrastructures. Infrastructures enable re-enactments to be made public to 
different kinds of audiences and (digital) publics and thus to travel across 
social and political spheres. It is precisely this scaling of publics that allows 
re-enactments to interconnect seemingly discrete online and offline public 
spheres and different (cultural) contexts. While the content and styles of the 
re-enactments themselves already bear traces of these interconnections, by 
following the relations between the activist collective ‘12th Memo Rise’ in 
Germany and the ‘Identitarian Movement’ in Austria, we have shed further 
light on the process. The re-enactments mediate between different contexts, 
yet the divergent narratives imposed upon two similar stagings of violence 
show how that violence and hatred can be redirected and transformed for 
different purposes. The ‘Identitarian Movement’ transforms the violence 
inflicted upon ‘infidel’ victims in IS executions videos and redirects it towards 
‘liberal leftists’ and refugees.
This brings us to the important role of the captives in these videos and to 
related ethical discussions. Simone Molin Friis (2018: 249–50) has pointed 
to the active and participatory role of victims in IS execution videos, noting 
how the victim ‘becomes complicit in the killers’ narrative [. . .] [while 
becoming] silenced through the pain’. This relates to the (re-)enacted agency 
of the victim that we drew attention to in our examples. By moving their 
bodies or expressing themselves verbally, victims exert their agency, as when 
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they start to dance in the introductory scene in the living room, or when the 
victim in ISIS Bloopers not only attempts to escape but also shows himself to 
be superior to the executioner by correcting his pronunciations. By contrast, 
the agency of the captives in the Levant Front video is questionable. As in 
the IS videos they are performing under duress within the Levant Front’s 
narrative, and it is not clear for viewers whether they knew in advance 
that the video was a re-enactment with a narrative twist that they would live 
to survive.
By discussing the creative techniques used in decapitation re-enactments 
and the mimetic performances of violence in online and offline engagements 
and (semi-)public spheres, we have shown the diversity of ways in which 
people from various backgrounds and professions have employed perfor-
mance and used audiovisual distribution infrastructures in order to resist 
and defy the narrative of power disseminated by IS’s media outlets and to 
undermine the iconic status of its imagery.
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‘YOU’RE AGAINST DAWLA, BUT YOU’RE 
LISTENING TO THEIR NASHEEDS?’ 
APPROPRIATING JIHADI AUDIOVISUALITIES 
IN THE ONLINE STREETWORK PROJECT 
JAMAL AL-KHATIB –  MY PATH!
Rami Ali, Džemal Šibljaković, Felix Lippe, Ulrich Neuburg and 
Florian Neuburg
The Issue: Contesting Jihadi (Online) Recruitment
‘I want to write a book, in order to prevent other young people from repeat-ing the same mistakes I made.’ These were the words of a young man in 
prison who is mentored by a social worker from our project team. Once part 
of the jihadi subculture in Vienna, Austria, he had since cut all ties to the 
group he was once part of and distanced himself from the worldview he had 
shared. He had turned his back on a scene that had been the starting point 
for the more than 320 Austrians who travelled or attempted to travel to Syria 
and Iraq to join the so-called Islamic State (IS) or other groups in the ongo-
ing conflict (Bundesministerium für Inneres 2019). He had reflected his 
own fanaticisation process and had reached a point where he wanted to share 
his experiences with young people like himself, who for various reasons are 
susceptible targets for the recruitment efforts that had once convinced him. 
An initial project team, consisting of social workers and experts in Islamic 
sciences formed around his idea to disseminate his conclusions in order to 
prevent other young people following a similar path. The question facing our 
newly-formed project team was how such young people could be reached. 
Against this background, three main guiding principles were formulated in 
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the conceptualisation of the project: to use social media as means to com-
municate our message (1), to deconstruct the us vs them narratives, prevalent 
both in jihadi propaganda but also in mainstream discourse, in our message 
(2) and to use videos in which we appropriate audiovisual aesthetics of jihadi 
propaganda, as vehicle for our message. These principles were informed by 
the experiences made by the young man within the jihadi scene, the insights 
our social workers had gained in their day-to-day work, and the expertise of 
Islamic scholars, who were consulted from the very beginning of the project.1
It quite quickly became clear that the best way to reach our target audi-
ence, namely adolescents who are at risk of coming into contact with extrem-
ist content, as well as adolescents who already sympathise with jihadi groups 
and their narratives, would be to use social media as means of communication 
instead of a book. Accordingly, the first guiding principle was formulated: In 
order to prevent young people being convinced by jihadi recruitment efforts, 
we decided to employ the same means of communication as that used by 
extremists. Groups such as the so-called IS make extensive use of social media 
platforms in order to spread their propaganda, knowing that such media have 
the capacity to shape perceptions, manipulate cognition and divert behaviour 
to achieve a response that furthers their desired intent (Jowett and O’Donnel 
2012: 7). Long before the so-called IS, Al-Qaeda was already using online 
forums to spread its ideology and most importantly to recruit sympathisers. 
Such actors are well aware of the impact of their online propaganda, in fact 
they consider it to be crucial to the whole movement, as Osama Bin Laden, 
founder of Al-Qaeda, and his successor Az-Zawahiri, have stressed (as cited 
in Al-Rawi 2018: 6). The American jihadi Omar Hammami who led the al-
Shabab terrorist group once declared: ‘The war of narratives has become even 
more important than the war of navies, napalm and knives’ (Cottee 2015). 
Abu Bakr Naji, author of the book Idārat at-Tawaªªush (The Administration 
of Savagery) published in 2004, which aims to provide a solid strategy for 
establishing the caliphate, stresses the importance of media, describing jihad-
ist struggles as ‘media battles’ (Najii 2006: 73). He identifies several crucial 
functions of media. Firstly, media can convince potential recruits to ‘[offer] 
 1 Parts of this chapter have previously been published in e-beratungsjournal.net – 
 Fachzeitschrift für Online Beratung und computervermittelte Kommunikation 15(1).
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positive support and [adopt] a negative attitude toward those who do not join 
the ranks’ (ibid. 55). Secondly, media should call upon people living outside 
the groups’ territories ‘to fly to the regions which we manage, particularly the 
youth after news of our transparency and truthfulness reached them’ (ibid. 
51). As part of the strategy, jihadis and their sympathisers exploit every media 
outlet possible, creating a complex network of content that is spread across 
platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and Telegram (Conway 
2017: 77–98), employing a wide variety of multimedia including videos, 
memes, comics, video games, magazines, literature and a cappella-style songs 
with religious themes called anāshīd (plural of nashīd) (Piper 2008: 28–38). 
The decentralised nature of jihadi online content and its interlinked distribu-
tion across different platforms are considered key to maximising the number 
of people reached. However, it is neo-Salafist content that appears to come 
closest to dominating the search results on topics like Islam as such, or inter-
national conflicts involving the oppression of Muslims. Neo-Salafists mostly 
operate within the limits of the law and try to attract the attention of ado-
lescents by addressing issues relevant to them and tapping into mainstream 
discourses. Not only in legitimising violence do their narratives overlap to a 
large extent with those of actors from the jihadi end of the spectrum, however 
(Said 2015). The experience of some of the young people who later became 
part of our project team confirms that these jihadi and neo-Salafist online 
recruitment efforts can be effective. In a conversation with his social worker, 
the young man who sparked the idea of the project recalled: ‘The first time I 
heard about Takfir [the concept jihadi and neo-Salafist actors mainly refer to 
when distinguishing between “true Muslims” and “non-believers”] was in a 
propaganda video. When I heard it more often in videos featuring imams, I 
wanted to know more.’ These kinds of remarks inspired our decision to use 
the same kinds of media to promote a very different message and to distrib-
ute our content across several social media platforms, mainly in the form of 
videos.
A second guiding principle that was formulated at the start of the project 
was to focus on particular aspects of the political socialisation of the young 
man, whose biography we wanted to share with our target audience. More 
precisely, we wanted to concentrate on the jihadi narratives that had been 
central in his fanaticisation processes. This principle was created in response 
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to the observation that groups such as the so-called IS produce content rang-
ing ‘from gruesome images of beheadings and calls of violence against kafir 
(infidels) to Instagram posts depicting jihadists who are cuddling with cats 
or are gleeful about access to Snickers and Funyuns’ (Farag 2017: 848). 
Presenting such a diverse range of material is a strategy intended to speak to 
the needs and interests of different target groups, to appeal to anyone, from a 
young Muslim student to a thirty-year-old who feels alienated by the state or 
discriminated against. The success of the so-called IS derives to a large extent 
from its ability to address the grievances of different people at different stages 
of their lives (Farag 2017: 848). In 2010, Al Qaeda published the first issue 
of Inspire in English, one of many jihadi online magazines that are freely 
available on the internet (Ghambir 2014). Political myths play an important 
role in Inspire, especially when it constructs in-group and out-group identi-
ties (Kirke 2015: 284). One of Al-Qaeda’s main narratives is the foretelling 
of an epic clash between the Umma and the evil Western ‘Crusader’ who is 
supported by treacherous ‘puppet’ regimes in the Middle East. The intention 
behind these kinds of narratives is clear: you either support your oppressed 
brothers and sisters by joining the fight (in self-defence) against the Umma 
or you become a traitor without morality who passively accepts the systemic 
persecution of Muslims. So-called IS’s Dabiq magazine, first published in 
English in 2014, uses similar ‘us versus them’ argumentative structures to 
construct the good ‘we’ and bad ‘they’ (Berger 2017).
Othering, identity politics, polarising in- and out-group constructions 
are thus crucial to jihadi online propaganda and have been seen as key to 
the fanaticisation processes of adolescents in the West who decided to follow 
the call to jihad. That is because the ‘us versus them’ constructed in jihadi 
online propaganda is especially effective when it resonates with the everyday 
experiences of the receiver. ‘Discrimination and abuse can give rise to anger 
that could be transformed into rage, hatred and a desire to take revenge’ 
(Karagiannis 2012: 106), and so ‘feelings of Islamic repression and massacre 
affect radicalization’ (Githens-Mazer 2008: 550). The adolescents who joined 
our project later confirmed this interrelation when they talked to the social 
workers in our team. These observations made it clear that for the Jamal 
al-Khatib –  My Path! project it would not suffice to try to counter the nar-
ratives of jihadis by simply spreading opposing content, but that it was also 
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necessary to fight or at least publicly denounce the roots of Muslim suffering 
as well as discrimination and racism in all its forms –  especially in the wake of 
rising Islamophobia and right-wing nationalism in Europe. This ‘unexpected 
solidarity’ proved crucial in tackling the ‘us versus them’ narrative of jihadis 
that aims to convince vulnerable individuals that they are isolated in a hostile 
society and can count on no one except themselves or their ‘Muslim brothers 
and sisters’ (i.e. the construed in-group) in the fight against discrimination 
(by the out-group).
The third principle that guided our approach in reaching out to the 
target group was appropriation of the audiovisual aesthetics of the online 
propaganda of groups such as the so-called IS. Content created in order to 
offer alternatives to jihadi narratives and to reach out to their target audience 
needs to be as aesthetically appealing as the propaganda itself, while chal-
lenging the simplified world-view that the latter propagates. Appropriation 
must therefore be undertaken in terms of both content and (audiovisual) 
form. Propaganda videos produced by the so-called IS, for example, often 
draw on Western pop culture by incorporating certain stylistic features of 
Western movies, video games and so on, combined with quintessentially 
Islamic elements, such as anāshīd in the soundtrack. The videos showcase 
high-quality graphically violent footage, fast cuts between scenes and a gener-
ally ‘dark’ atmosphere. Even just the way the pick-up trucks were presented 
was enough to spark interest in these videos, according to the adolescents 
who later became part of the project team themselves. This made it clear that 
in order to contest these kinds of videos, high production standards would 
have to be achieved to produce videos with similar kinds of footage, general 
atmosphere and sounds to those disseminated by extremists, but with a com-
pletely different message. It was thus clear from the outset that a professional 
filmmaker would have to be consulted for the project.
Building on these three principles, Jamal al-Khatib –  My Path!2 has 
been developed: a project in which the internet is understood as an informal 
learning environment within which political education can be offered in 
 2 The second season of Jamal al-Khatib –  My Path!, which was launched in the course of 
an online campaign between May and July 2019, was funded by the Bundeszentrale für 
politische Bildung and the Erasmus+ Role Model Initiative.
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a manner that is geared towards young people’s circumstances and experi-
ences. The project is conceptualised as media-mediated youth work, whereby 
our specific approach to online preventative work combines aspects of both 
information dissemination (political education online) and online interac-
tion (communication and discussion online).3 The young man quoted at the 
beginning of this contribution, who initiated the project, was joined by other 
young participants including both young people who had dropped out of 
the jihadi scene and young people who, during the heyday of the so-called 
IS, had resisted jihadi narratives. In accordance with the project’s peer-to-
peer approach, the experiences of these young people have come to form 
the basis for the content of the campaigns. Based upon narrative biography 
work, videos featuring alternatives to jihadist and neo-Salafist propaganda are 
produced. The videos are posted on different social media platforms, com-
municated to the target audience via the fictional character Jamal al-Khatib, 
and discussed in the course of online streetwork.4 The adolescent members 
of the project team are involved in every step, from text production to online 
streetwork. This participatory approach is central to our work. It guarantees 
a level of authenticity without which it would not be possible to reach the 
target group. Most importantly, however, working in the project offers par-
ticipants the opportunity to reflect upon their own biographies, compare 
their experiences to those of other adolescents, and share their reflections 
with their peers and participate in a public discourse that is relevant to them. 
Reflecting on their political socialisation strengthens their sense of autonomy; 
combined with being afforded a chance to become self-efficient in a support-
ive social environment, those who are in the process of distancing themselves 
from the jihadi scene are supported sustainably (see also al-Mafaalani 2017; 
Deci and Ryan 1993). The adolescents were joined by professionals including 
 3 Digital youth work can be subdivided into media-related and media-mediated youth work 
(Mayrhofer and Neuburg 2019: 8). Media-related youth work in turn can be subdivided 
into media pedagogical work, which aims to teach young people specific skills in the use of 
digital media, and creative-transformative media work, which seeks to develop competen-
cies that enable young people to actively design digital spaces.
 4 Streetwork is a method in the field of social work, which is designed to establish contact 
with hard-to-reach target groups in public space. Online streetwork describes the transfer of 
this approach to the online sphere. 
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experts from fields such as Islamic studies, political science, sociology, psy-
chology, psychotherapy, social work, educational science, filmmaking, digital 
content management and more, to create a richly diverse team. This multi-
disciplinary approach is essential to realising the goals that the project Jamal 
al-Khatib –  My Path! sets out to reach: to deliver alternative narratives to 
those propagated by extremist groups to adolescents who are vulnerable to, 
or have already been influenced by, extremist propaganda; to initiate discus-
sions and processes of self-reflection; and ultimately, to increase young adults’ 
resources to cope with conflict, compromise and contradictions, and to foster 
their tolerance towards ambiguity.
The Project: Jamal al-Khatib –  My Path!
Narrative Biography Work
The fundamental core of the project lies in the experiences and thoughts of 
the participating young adults. Throughout the text production phase, the 
young men are supported by social workers and experts in Islamic studies 
and other fields, who first conduct narrative biographical interviews and then 
moderate group discussions. In order to get to know the stories of these 
young people, narrative biography work has proved to be a very productive 
method. Generally speaking, it is a way of dealing with topics separately 
from the individual. Working with narratives serves to distance the person 
concerned from the events that they have lived through, helping them to take 
a more objective view. Thus, the sense of personal involvement is reduced to a 
certain degree, relieving the narrating person and facilitating a better environ-
ment for discussions. The method is empowering for narrators because it puts 
them, and especially their stories, at the centre of the discussion. Narrative 
biography work can be used to address different processes in life. In our case, 
the focus was on the political socialisation, the access to and exit from jihadi 
groups and, in particular, key moments in participants’ pathways within 
these groups.5
 5 It is crucial to recognise the processual character of fanaticisation and the multiplicity of its 
causes. Neither a single event nor a single isolated aspect of life can be identified as exclu-
sively responsible. Experiencing discrimination, although in itself very harsh, is much more 
likely to lead to the adoption of extremist views if it is linked to feelings of powerlessness. If 
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The first step is to offer narrators a safe space in which to share the nar-
ratives that have shaped their beliefs and their personal development. This 
gathering of experiences is undertaken with the accompaniment of other 
team members –  social workers, experts on Islamic studies, psychologists or 
psychotherapists. At this stage, the team provide general psychological sup-
port to help narrators to discuss difficult circumstances, while also helping 
them to express themselves and to re-view and reframe certain aspects of the 
narratives they encountered in the course of their involvement in the jihadi 
scene. This involves the deconstruction of jihadi narratives and the effort to 
abstract specific needs that had motivated their interest in extremist narra-
tives and the joining of groups. The next step is to work together to come 
up with alternative perspectives and different ways of framing certain aspects 
that were talked about.
As mentioned in the introduction, one factor in fanaticisation processes 
is the experience of recurrent discrimination and exclusion. Continually 
being subjected to racism in different contexts, such as in school or in police 
controls based upon racial profiling, can result in an overwhelming sense 
of powerlessness and humiliation: feelings that can lead an individual to 
experience disaffection from society (El-Mafaalani 2017: 91). In the course 
of narrative biography work, the young adults of the project team reported 
such incidents all too often in connection with police and teaching staff. 
They had almost always been singled out for such harassment on the basis 
of their cultural and religious identity, which led to feelings of frustration 
and anger towards the perpetrators, relative to whom they were in a socially 
subordinate position. They had rarely had opportunities to reflect on such 
incidents afterwards, and even when they had, the outcomes were often frus-
trating, with the victim all too often being blamed for the racism and actions 
of people in power. Institutionalised racism in Austria receives a great deal 
less critical attention from the country’s popular media, however, than do 
narratives claiming Islam is a violent, misogynistic or anti-democratic reli-
gion. These narratives contradict the experiences of young people for whom 
young people discover ways of expressing their frustration about racist narratives and other 
negative experiences productively, the likelihood of their being convinced by extremist 
rhetoric is diminished.
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faith is an important part of their identity, and something they perceive as 
positive –  seeing it constantly coming under attack from representatives 
of the Dominanzgesellschaft (dominant society) intensifies a sense of being 
excluded and isolated by the society they live in. A widespread response to 
these racist experiences is anger and disappointment, which makes the ‘us 
versus them’ narratives of extremist groups make sense. But even this anger 
can be channelled in ways that benefit not only the persons experiencing it, 
but society as a whole, by holding it accountable for negative developments 
within it. Anger is a powerful force that can open up a great window of 
opportunity if young adults are included in public debates that all too often 
take place without their being offered a chance to take part. Being left out 
creates a sense of powerlessness that is a further factor in increasing the pro-
pensity to fanaticisation. By embracing young people’s strong feelings about 
society and their position within it, a great many different opportunities and 
ideas can be created. Jihadi groups recognise this potential and harness it, 
calling upon young people, who are already motivated to do so, to oppose 
the injustices they have experienced (Reicher and Lippe 2019: 60). The 
sense of powerlessness felt by such youth can also be countered by offering 
them opportunities to create narratives of their own and by involving them 
in wider discussions, which increases their perceived self-efficacy (Freires 
1973). Hence, it is not enough to simply criticise the ‘us versus them’ narra-
tives spread by extremist groups; those of the so-called Dominanzgesellschaft 
need to be subjected to similar scrutiny. This approach is central to our 
method, and is most visible in the narrative of the video Takfir from the 
second season of Jamal al-Khatib –  My Path!.
The diversity of the team is key to the way our project works. All team 
members recognise and highly value the multiplicity of skills and expertise 
contributed by other members. Input from different professional experts is a 
prerequisite for high-quality, nuanced and differentiated results. The method 
necessarily involves instigating situations in which young people may experi-
ence flashbacks or other psychological stress as they recall highly charged 
emotional moments from their own lives. These difficult situations demand 
a highly sensitive approach and support from very considerate, dedicated, 
experienced and well-qualified personnel. Talking about turbulent experi-
ences can (re-)trigger feelings like fear, isolation or anger. Irrespective of 
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the objectives of the process in relation to the project, there must always be 
time and willingness to respond to the narrators’ needs and, if necessary, 
immediately take a pause to guide the narrator to a position in which they 
can somewhat distance themselves from their story, in order to prevent re-
traumatisation. The social workers in our team are indispensable. They see it 
as their role to work towards the empowerment and inclusion of excluded 
groups within society and to fulfil the duty of political education. One key 
objective to this end is to debunk extremist narratives and to show young 
people that serious issues and societal problems can be addressed in ways that 
do not have to be based on violence and discrimination.
Appropriating Jihadi Aesthetics –  A Means to an End
In order to adapt the texts created in the course of narrative biography work 
into videos, the team’s filmmaker guides the adolescents to develop a shoot-
ing script together. A lot of thought is put into this process in order to 
guarantee the right look and feel of the videos. This is essential if our videos 
are to compete with the highly professional material produced by terrorist 
groups such as the so-called IS. The group uses film language to develop the 
arguments they want to convey, discovering audiovisual techniques that can 
add meaning and enable them to deliver their message to the target audience. 
Since this target audience includes young people who have already come into 
contact with jihadi propaganda, we have made it our mission to appropri-
ate some of the audiovisual codes and strategies used in such videos. These 









‘Kuffar’ (disbelievers) vs 
‘Muslims’ as a central concept
‘Kuffar’ oppose you because 
of your Muslim identity
Divisive theology
Undifferentiated judgement 
of people based upon identity
‘Kuffar’ is a derogatory term 
used to refer to non-Muslims
‘Takfir’ is a (political) method 
to separate people
Undifferentiated judgement 
of people based upon identity
Muslims oppose non-
Muslims because of their 
beliefs
Only God can know whether 
someone is a believer or not
My opinion towards people 
is based on the way they treat 
others, not their religion or 
identity
God does not want the 
division of humankind
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include the use of exaggerated aesthetics, graphical elements, sound design, 
anāshīd,6 character building, episodic structure, presentation of religious con-
tent in sound and graphics, and varying cinematographic styles from hand-
held documentary-style camera to complex effect shots to first-person shooter 
sequences like those in video games (Figure 9.1).
We wanted to appropriate such codes in order to attract the attention of 
the kinds of young people who find jihadi content appealing and are likely 
to spend hours watching it. To that end, the filmmaker reviewed selected 
 6 For a detailed examination of other appropriations of IS anāshīd by different actors see Dick 
and Fuhrmann (Chapter 12). 
Figure 9.1 Point-of-view in IS-produced video (first image) and over-shoulder shot in 
Jamal al-Khatib; both are commonly seen in computer games. Note the different focus:  
IS – the fight lies ahead; Jamal – confusion in the middle of a fight. © IS Propaganda; 
© turn.
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propaganda material in order to identify the audiovisual devices employed 
and was advised further in terms of content by academics and social work-
ers. The audiovisual codes presented in the first season were largely religious, 
and featured elements commonly found in productions by the so-called IS 
(e.g. quotations from the Quran, anāshīd). In the case of the Quran quota-
tions, the young participants proposed certain rules of presentation that 
we adhered to strictly, such as no accompanying music, intricate graphic 
borders and an impressive visual design (Figure 9.2). The key shot that we 
developed for presenting the protagonist Jamal, in which he approaches 
the camera head on, is the same as that used in many recruitment videos 
produced by the so-called IS as well as numerous other military recruit-
ment videos (Figure 9.3). We decided that Jamal should walk steadily and 
consistently maintain a camera height of almost eye level to match that of 
the viewer. This shot is used recurrently in every episode. The audiovisual 
atmosphere that accompanies Jamal is created by techniques including fast-
paced editing, hard and stylised contrasts and associative sequences that sup-
port the voiceover on an emotional level. In the second season, we adapted 
a few of these approaches and added others that are frequently used in the 
audiovisual material consumed by young people (e.g. first- and third-person 
camera angles). We hoped that these techniques would enable us to present 
young people with alternative ways of dealing with the problems in their 
lives to those put forward by extremist groups.
Yet the most important aspect of the filmmaker’s work was not address-
ing style, dramatic structure, series branding or audiovisual codes. One of 
our priorities was to effectively establish the central character and the world 
he inhabits, to define his goals and his needs. The thematic content of Jamal 
al-Khatib –  My Path!, as well as the stagings, were proposed by those directly 
affected by the themes addressed. In order to catch the initial attention 
of the target audience, the videos’ aesthetic elements had to be appealing, 
but if the videos had then failed to address relevant issues, to speak with 
an authentic voice, with character development and the establishment of 
a plausible world in which it all plays out, they would have only catered 
to the eye and probably failed to hold viewers’ interest, let alone stimulate 
conversation. After various texts had been created by the young people, 
they were developed collaboratively into screenplays. The process involved 
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Figure 9.2 Quran quotations included in IS propaganda (images 1 and 3) and Quran 
quotations featured in Jamal al-Khatib – My Path! videos (images 2 and 4). Images 1 and 3: 
© IS Propaganda; images 2 and 4 © turn.
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Figure 9.3 Protagonists approach the camera in IS propaganda videos (images 1 and 3) and 
in Jamal al-Khatib – My Path! videos (images 2 and 4). Images 1 and 3: © IS Propaganda; 
images 2 and 4 © Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung.
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singling out a specific theme for each video, combining different storylines 
and reducing redundancies. In a series of meetings, the screenplays were 
reviewed together with the young participants. Then each scene was broken 
down to identify requirements in terms of location, props and costumes, 
and content. The young participants discussed what they would consider 
authentic locations, appropriate attire and further accessories. During the 
shoot, the participants who were not acting in a particular scene were given 
a monitor so that they could give feedback on what was being filmed. Their 
insights, based upon their own viewing habits and preferences, as well as the 
social workers’ knowledge, helped those filming to produce videos which are 
authentic down to the tiniest detail.
The result of this process is Jamal al-Khatib, who appears visually as a 
black shadow; a silhouette without a face. There is no way of knowing who 
he is, but viewers recognise the world he moves through, the way he talks, the 
problems he faces, the desires he has and what drives him to walk confronta-
tionally towards the camera. Since the project is driven by the thoughts and 
experiences of young people, issues were addressed from their perspective, 
which allowed us to reach other young people with a similar background 
and prevented us from replicating the discourse from the perspective of the 
Dominanzgesellschaft. The production process includes, among other tasks: 
defining a negotiation level (personal/with society/religious and secular); the 
creation of a visual world in look and feel, with an identifiable location and 
social context; building a sustainable episodic structure with recurrent key 
visuals (live action, graphics and sound); incorporating audiovisual codes 
familiar to the target audience (e.g. anāshīd, certain graphic arrangements, 
spoken voice, authentic costumes) to establish an emotional landscape; and 
including dramatic structure and character development underscored by 
visual features. All these elements, and the choices made in order to achieve 
them, transform the themes, messages and content into a story.
The everyday experiences of discrimination described by adolescents in 
the course of narrative biography work are taken up visually in the video 
Takfir from the second season of Jamal al-Khatib –  My Path! (Figure 9.4), 
for example. The ‘us versus them’ mindset that is established by propaganda 
produced by so-called IS is cinematically expressed by staging Jamal in sharp 
focus with a narrow depth-of-field so that his surroundings dissolve into 
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blurriness. His in-group, by contrast, appears homogeneous, bound by a 
common cause (Figure 9.5).
It is necessary to use cinematic techniques in order to produce videos 
that tell stories that people will want to watch, to package the content in 
ways that will engage those receiving it, but the main and most important 
part of the project is working together with young people. Letting them find 
their own themes and motives and keeping the process within a framework 
that enables them to express their thoughts in a way that is participatory and 
results in a product they can be proud of –  dark and hopeful, threatening and 
compromising, angry and forgiving, always conflicting and never simple –  is 
the essence of Jamal al-Khatib –  My Path!.
Online streetwork
The text and script production, as well as the shooting of the videos, is fol-
lowed by an online campaign, in the course of which the videos are released. 
However, in contrast to other, alternative-narrative or counter-narrative cam-
paigns, our online campaign does not end with the release of the videos. Our 
aim is not simply to deliver content that the target audience accepts and 
adopts. We want the adolescents to whom we reach out to critically challenge 
the themes and ideas addressed in our material, so that they form their own 
opinions rather than just unquestioningly taking on ours. To achieve this, 
Figure 9.4 Visual representation of the everyday discrimination experienced by young 
Muslims in Austria shown as fictional (but plausible) election campaign posters. In English, 
the slogans would read: ‘Closed Border = Safe Home’; ‘Islam does not belong to us/There’s 
no place for Islam here’; ‘Josef not Yusuf –We speak German here!’. The fictional party 
slogan means ‘My homeland, my values’. © Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung.
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we strive to initiate discussion and debate in the comment sections under 
our videos. This is where our online streetwork method comes into play. 
Just as some social workers take to the streets, and spend time in parks and 
public places in order to reach their target groups, online streetworkers dive 
into digital spaces to get in contact with young people. Instead of shop-
ping precincts, social media platforms are visited; instead of hanging around 
offline meeting points, they are present in groups in messenger services. In 
contrast to approaches in which youth workers use their own profiles to 
enter different online groups and forums in order to communicate with their 
target groups, the project Jamal al-Khatib –  My Path! does content-based 
online streetwork. Like an offline youth club, the Jamal al-Khatib –  My Path! 
campaign platforms, with their own commenting and messenger functions, 
serve as a primary meeting and communication space for the targeted young 
Figure 9.5 The visual rendition of the ‘us versus them’ narrative. © Bundeszentrale für 
politsche Bildung.
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audiences. The outreach aspect of this approach is realised firstly by working 
in the digital realm, which transcends geographical borders,7 and secondly by 
the target-oriented distribution of our contents on the internet, whereby we 
take measures to get in contact with hard-to-reach dialogue groups by reach-
ing out to their online bubbles and echo chambers.
The Jamal al-Khatib –  My Path! videos address young people in general, 
but in particular, young people who already have an affinity for extremist 
or fanatical groups and who are highly likely to reject projects sponsored by 
the state out of principle. For this reason, we refrain from clearly marking 
the videos as the work of a preventative project when we present them on 
distribution channels (Facebook, Instagram, YouTube). At a second glance, 
however, the project can be recognised as such, and online streetworkers 
respond transparently and openly when questions are raised.
During the online phase of the project, our team of online streetworkers 
seeks to instigate discussion of the videos’ content in a one-to-many, many-
to-many approach. They also create opportunities for individuals to move 
into a safer discussion space, that is, to communicate via private message (one 
to one), which enables direct relationships to be established and personalised 
counselling to be offered. The goal is to establish a common ground and 
a respectful trustworthy relationship, which are prerequisites for changing 
behaviour patterns in the young adults from our target group (Weilnböck 
and Uhlmann 2018). In our project, interventions are undertaken not only 
by social workers but also by scholars of Islamic studies, religious educators, 
sociologists, political scientists, social educators and peers. In peer-to-peer 
interventions, young project team members take part in some of the online 
discussions on the various channels. Which particular mode of discursive 
intervention is chosen, and which member of the team takes on the main 
responsibility for communicating with a particular individual or group, varies 
according to the person or group addressed and the kinds of questions or 
issues discussed.
Our work is project-based and temporary, which means that we are only 
able to maintain contacts established with young social media users during 
 7 Geography does not become irrelevant, however, as some national legislations limit access to 
certain digital spaces and the exchange of certain information and opinions via the internet.
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the so-called online phase, which runs for a limited period. Therefore, one 
regrettable characteristic of our work is that we are unable to offer permanent 
supportive relationships via the net. Nonetheless, a large number of young 
people have used our channels to contact us expressing their need for advice 
and support. This shows that it is possible to reach young members of our 
target audience via content-based online streetwork, and that youth workers 
can successfully establish online relations that are trusted by the respective 
young people. We have set up a network of offline and online institutions 
that enable us, if necessary, to mediate contacts with specialised counselling 
services.
The Campaign: Can Target Groups be Reached by Appropriating  
Jihadi Audiovisualities?
Having described the project, its background, methods and implementa-
tion, we will now evaluate whether appropriating jihadi audiovisualities in 
our videos resulted in a successful online campaign and, most importantly, 
whether we successfully reached the desired target groups.8 The four videos 
of the first season received 200,000 views during the online phase. During 
the campaign for the second season, we reached around 450,000 views. It has 
to be noted, however, that we encountered certain obstacles: during the first 
campaign, our Facebook account was blocked for a week, and in both sea-
sons, the option to advertise our videos was restricted on all platforms. This 
might suggest that we did so well in appropriating jihadi audiovisualities that 
platform staff felt it prudent to impose restrictions. All in all, we achieved a 
satisfying number of views and interactions. However, while great awareness 
indicates a certain degree of success, the principal question for us was whether 
we could win the sustained attention and critical engagement of our specific 
target groups.
In order to obtain more in-depth information on that question, we ana-
lysed the ‘likes’ of Facebook accounts that had ‘liked’ the Jamal al-Khatib 
 8 Since this contribution focuses on the appropriation of jihadi audiovisualities in an online 
campaign, it will assess the degree to which we achieved our aims in terms of reaching the 
specific online target group. The results of the evaluation of the offline phase were published 
in April 2020. The report can be downloaded on www.turnprevention.com.
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Facebook account.9 The analysis of a sample of 500 such accounts revealed 
that about one fifth also had ‘Pierre Vogel.de’ and ‘Ansaar International 
e.V.’ among their ‘likes’.10 These are the Facebook accounts of a German-
speaking preacher and an organisation, both of which can be related to the 
neo-Salafist spectrum.11 Other popular Facebook accounts were ‘Generation 
Islam’ (approximately 15%) and ‘Realität Islam’ (Islam Reality) (approxi-
mately 8%). Together with demographic data about our viewers provided by 
the social media platforms, these numbers indicated that we had reached at 
least one part of the online target group, namely adolescents who are at risk 
of getting into contact with extremist content via search requests concerning 
topics that are relevant to them because they relate to their circumstances and 
experiences. That is to say, Facebook accounts such as ‘Generation Islam’ and 
‘Realität Islam’ are quite successful online initiatives that have been classified 
as Islamist and are associated with Hizb ut-Tahir, which has been declared 
illegal by the German government and several others (Schölermann 2018). 
The group uses the internet intensively for its activism. Part of its online strat-
egy is the organisation of online campaigns such as #NichtohnemeinKopftuch 
(notwithoutmyheadscarf) in order to bring its narratives to the attention of 
young Muslims. It takes up issues that are relevant to its target audience, typi-
cally incidents of anti-Muslim racism, to initiate discussion. The next stage, 
however, reveals its true agenda: part of the messages it typically puts for-
ward are ‘us versus them’ narratives, referred to throughout this contribution, 
which it harnesses to exacerbate the polarisation of society. Its target group 
are young Muslims who are interested in questions concerning their faith, for 
which they seek answers online, and who may be susceptible to manipulation 
(Institute for Strategic Dialogue 2018).
 9 This relates to the first season of Jamal al-Khatib –  My Path!. We have been undertaking a 
similar analysis for the second season, the results of which were made available in April 2020 
and can be downloaded on www.turnprevention.com
10 A ‘like’ does not indicate that the user who ‘likes’ has been fully convinced by the narratives 
we present. However, it is an indication that our contents were well-received, or at least that 
the respective user wished to receive updates relating to our online campaign.
11 Interestingly, we mainly found that accounts from the neo-Salafist spectrum were ‘liked’, 
and not ones that were associated with the jihadi subculture. This is probably because the 
latter mainly operate on more clandestine social network platforms such as Telegram, while 
the former tend to prioritise public visibility in order to reach a wider audience.
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In order to find out more about the extent to which we had been able 
to reach our target group, we also conducted an exploratory social network 
analysis of the ‘likes’ displayed on the public profiles of the followers of 
the Jamal al-Khatib –  My Path! campaign account (de Nooy et al. 2018). 
The results suggest that we had successfully reached an important part of 
our online target group –  that which was already frequenting online spaces 
associated with the jihadi or neo-Salafist subculture and thus was familiar 
with online settings characterised by extremist content. This was indicated 
by clusters of ‘likes’ identified by the social network analysis of the sample. 
One cluster comprised Facebook accounts associated with neo-Salafist cir-
cles, such as that of the Salafist preacher mentioned above. More precisely, 
the analysis revealed that half of the 20 per cent of the Jamal al-Khatib 
followers who had also ‘liked’ ‘Pierre Vogel.de’ had also ‘liked’ the ‘Ansaar 
International e.V.’ Facebook page. Also, ‘Generation Islam’ (31) was among 
the 25 most popular Facebook pages of the Jamal al-Khatib followers who 
had ‘liked’ ‘Pierre Vogel.de’. When the most popular Facebook pages of 
Jamal al-Khatib followers who had ‘liked’ the account ‘Realität Islam’ are 
examined, this trend becomes even more evident. Of those 40 followers, 27 
had also ‘liked’ ‘Ansaar International eV.’ and 24 ‘Pierre Vogel.de’, which 
represent the two most popular Facebook pages of those accounts. Assuming 
what cannot be taken for granted, that there were actual persons behind these 
accounts, this finding means that while scrolling through their news feeds, 
these people would have been regularly confronted with content posted to a 
large extent by accounts that disseminate Islamist and neo-Salafist material. 
From the moment that they clicked ‘like’ on the Jamal al-Khatib campaign 
account, our content, including the alternative narratives produced by the 
project team, also became part of their Facebook timelines.12
Taken together, the three guiding principles that we formulated at the 
beginning of our project have proved vital to the success of our online alterna-
tive narrative campaigns. Harnessing social media in order to communicate 
12 When drawing conclusions on the basis of the exploratory social network analysis, it must 
be remembered that a ‘like’ on Facebook does not necessarily mean that the ‘liker’ is actually 
a sympathiser with the respective preacher or organisation. However, at the very least, the 
accounts mentioned above are ones that people interested in, if not convinced by, jihadi or 
neo-Salafist narratives could be expected to ‘like’.
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alternative narratives to those disseminated by extremist groups has not only 
allowed us to reach our target audience (defined above), but has also ena-
bled us to establish contact and initiate discussions of the issues raised in the 
videos. The decentralised online setting and the limited time period available 
for building relationships imposed upon us by the campaign structure make 
it hard to be certain how many viewers and commentators were inspired to 
engage in processes of self-reflection as a result of our work. Nonetheless, 
it can be assumed that many more people than the number who actively 
responded by commenting or contacting us were reached in some way and fol-
lowed the discussions without getting directly involved in them. Furthermore, 
basing the content of our videos on material developed in narrative biography 
work proved a highly effective strategy. In order for the narrative of our main 
character to engage adolescents from our target groups, they needed to iden-
tify with him; the issues and experiences addressed in the videos had to be 
similar to the issues and experiences of the viewers. Key to achieving this in 
the course of our project was our collaboration with young people who had 
themselves made such experiences: young people who had encountered propa-
ganda material disseminated by so-called IS but resisted it, as well as some 
who had formerly been active in the jihadi scene. These young participants 
themselves expressed their strong motivation to take action against extremist 
online propaganda and to participate in public debates about it, while also 
expressing their frustration that they rarely found opportunities to do so. Two 
shitstorms during the second season, that is, co-ordinated efforts to spam 
our channels with propaganda disguised as harmless arguments, suggest that 
addressing the narratives the young adults had come across on the jihadi scene 
and combining them with the right keywords and hashtags was an important 
factor in reaching the target audience. These shitstorms were the answers of 
extremist actors to our reframing of certain aspects of their ideology. Our 
appropriation of audiovisual codes employed in material produced by extrem-
ist organisations such as so-called IS was also a significant factor in ensuring 
that our material caught and sustained the attention of our target audience. 
Examples of similar campaigns in this field suggest that regardless of how well-
researched the content of an alternative narrative or political education online 
campaign is, or how convincing the arguments it formulates, if the material 
is not presented in a way that (audiovisually) appeals to the target group, the 
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campaign is unlikely to be effective. For our videos to engage adolescents 
who are at risk of being influenced by the narratives of extremists, the right 
images had to be selected, the right music had to play in the background and 
the narrator had to speak the right kind of language. Many of the comments 
posted in response referred to the look and feel conveyed by the videos. One 
viewer was particularly confused by the combination of extremist audiovisual 
codes and unexpected narratives. He asked: ‘You’re against Dawla, but you’re 
listening to their nasheeds?’ His question indicates that our strategy achieved 
what we had set out to do: to instil a sense of ambiguity by combining familiar 
elements with new ideas, an ambiguity that opens space for self-reflection and 
the critical reconsideration of concepts and beliefs.
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P A R T  D
A N Ā S H Ī D :  S O U N D S C A P E S 
O F  R E L I G I O - P O L I T I C A L 




‘NASHĪD’ BETWEEN ISLAMIC CHANTING 




Music is one of the most powerful means of stirring up emotions and changing or deepening the mood of listeners. Throughout history, 
societies have used, but have also feared, the affective power of music, and 
have developed systems to channel and control it.1 Jihadi groups are no 
exception regarding their use of music, be it for recreation, for mobilisation, 
to strengthen the spirit, to fight fear or to recruit new members.2 They use 
the community-building effect of music and, last but not least, they use it as 
 1 This pertains to the definitions of what is music and what it is not, to attitudes towards 
music’s effect and usage, or to the ban of particular instruments or musical techniques. Only 
a few examples from the Muslim context will be mentioned: on the overlapping of Quran 
recitation and the Arab secular music system and the demarcation of both domains, see 
Nelson (2001); on the appropriation of Greek musical philosophy on the effect of music on 
the human soul and the body, see Blum (2013), Weinrich (2020b) and Wright (2008). For 
a general introduction to Arab music, evaluating a wide range of treatises on both musical 
theory and Muslim theology, see Poché et al. (2001). A rich overview of diverse styles, func-
tions and practices of Middle Eastern music is offered by Danielson et al. (2002).
 2 Bailey (2009): 151–2, 157; Lahoud and Pieslak (2018); Said (2016): 140–59; Seidensticker 
(2006).
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a means of distinction, to keep ‘right’ from ‘wrong’: they define what people 
should listen to and what they should not listen to.
It is almost commonplace knowledge that jihadi groups do not term the 
vocal genres they use as music or song but as nashīd. From an ethnomusicolo-
gist perspective, the question of what people define as ‘music’ is part of the 
research design. On a meta-level, however, all organised vocal and instru-
mental sound can be analysed as ‘music’, that is, according to pitch and time 
organisation. Hence, when I use the terms ‘music’ and ‘singing’ throughout 
this chapter –  meaning deliberately created sound –  it is part of the meta-
language and does not reflect the attitude of most performers. Nashīd (pl. 
anāshīd) is a term that is commonly used today to keep the religious reper-
tory separate from secular music and singing as a profane act without any 
further spiritual or ethical impetus. On a musico-technical level, however, 
nashīd shares the rhythmic and tonal structures and performance techniques 
of music, and much of the musical material builds on the Arab musical cul-
ture. In this chapter, I will map the field of the different musical domains that 
use the term nashīd and that chiefly form the musical sources of jihadi hymns.
By ‘jihadi hymns’, I simply mean those hymns that are used by jihadi 
groups, since there is no other distinct demarcation line where ‘jihadi’ as an 
attribute starts. First, not all munshids belong to a jihadi organisation; second, 
not all songs by a munshid or all hymns used in jihadi culture address military 
jihad or its related political aims; and finally, there is no fixed musical scheme 
for jihadi hymns.
Hitherto, research on jihadi hymns has ascertained a preference for 
traditional poetic forms, whereas the musical forms are more heterogene-
ous.3 Studies have identified forerunners of contemporary singers and have 
included a historical overview of politically motivated Islamic hymns (Lahoud 
2017; Lahoud and Pieslak 2018; Pieslak 2015; Said 2016). What is missing, 
however, is an evaluation of contemporary anāshīd ’s musical sources and 
their collation with other domains of Islamic religious music. Pieslak (2015, 
2017) mainly places the hymns within the ‘Islam-and-Music’ paradigm and 
 3 Seidensticker (2006); Said (2012, 2016); Gråtrud (2016); Creswell and Haykel (2017), on 
poetry by jihadi leaders that was not set to music. On music, see especially Pieslak (2015, 
2017) and Lahoud and Pieslak (2018; a shorter version of their paper appeared as ‘Music of 
the Islamic State’, Survival 60: 1 (2018), 153–68). 
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only occasionally hints at musical forms employed in general piety. Lahoud 
and Pieslak (2018: 16, 18) contrast the IS anāshīd with ‘traditional Arabic 
music‘, which is perceived as a rather static concept. Both categories, ‘allowed 
forms of music’ and ‘traditional Arab’ as a tertium comparationis, are too 
broad for specific sonic markers to be identified. The aim of this chapter is 
to identify confluences and distinctions of jihadi hymns within the field of 
song that is labelled with the Arabic term ‘nashīd’. Moreover, it aims to show 
that music is not only a vehicle for an ideological content wrapped in a poetic 
form but itself constitutes a message. The sensual perception is not a merely 
physiological process. How sounds or images are interpreted is shaped by pre-
experiences and learned behaviour (Howes 2015). Meaning emerges through 
an interplay of poetry, religious propositions and well-selected sonic markers.
Terminological Clarifications
The term nashīd is today widely used, yet it may denote quite different sonic 
manifestations. Historically, the root n-sh-d was not linked to an exclusively 
religious repertory. Rather, it denoted any activity of text articulation by a 
performer vis-à-vis a listener, most commonly poetry. This included a raised 
voice, clear articulation, and possibly a slower tempo than normal speech.4 
N-sh-d most probably described a rendition of poetry that was on a musico-
technical level simpler than ghināʾ (singing) as an art form, which is described 
quite expansively in Arabic sources for the seventh to tenth century, such as 
in the ‘Great Book of Songs’ (Kitāb al-aghānī al-kabīr).5 It was only in the 
late twentieth century that the verb anshada (‘to raise the voice’, ‘to recite’, 
‘to chant’) and the noun nashīd (hymn) became the marker of an almost 
exclusively religious repertory. The dualistic distinction reflects the aspiration 
to create a clear-cut line between ‘Islamic’ and ‘non-Islamic’, owing to the 
politics of alterity.
Anwar Al Awlaki, the US-Yemeni preacher of jihad who was killed in 
Yemen in 2011, refers to this early usage of n-sh-d in his call to produce 
anāshīd as an important tool for mobilisation:
 4 This is how the verb anshada is used in chronicles, biographical lexica and anthologies, and 
how the Arab lexicographers explain it. See also van Gelder (2012): 159–62. 
 5 al-I‚fahānī (1955–7). 
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Muslims need to be inspired to practice Jihad. In the time of Rasulullah 
(saaws) he had poets who would use their poetry to inspire the Muslims 
and demoralise the disbelievers. Today nasheed can play that role. A good 
nasheed can spread so widely it can reach to an audience that you could not 
reach through a lecture or a book. (Al Awlaki n.d.: no. 40, n.p.)
Al Awlaki refers to the pre-Islamic Arab warfare custom of chanting verses in 
the rajaz metre that extol the strength of the in-group and ridicule the enemy, 
a practice that was perpetuated in the Islamic era. The emboldening effect 
of specific rhythms and melodies was later discussed by Muslims within the 
appropriation of Greek musical philosophy; for Al Awlaki, however, the key 
issue is to create a link to the Prophetic practice. Having established this link 
as a legitimising basis, he moves on to recognise the general affective potential 
of musical sound which amplifies the merely spoken or silently read word. 
Hence, he affirms the need to use music as an affective tool within the jihadi 
movements.
In the following, I will briefly present the musical domains in which 
nashīd (pl. anāshīd) is the dominant term. These are, first, the field of tradi-
tional religious chanting, or inshād; second, the patriotic and political hymns, 
termed anāshīd wa†anīya; third, a body of religious songs subsumed under 
the English spelling of the term, ‘nasheed’; and fourth, the jihadi hymns. 
Jihadi hymns, I will show, draw musically from the three other domains and 
use specific sonic strategies which signify their general message.
Mapping the Field: The Musical Domains of n-sh-d
Traditional Inshād (Chanting)
In this domain, inshād is the generic term for a repertory that consists of 
praise poetry for the prophet, supplications, benedictions, rogation and dox-
ology.6 It is performed by a small ensemble (firqa) formed by a lead vocalist 
(munshid) and a chorus of four to eight persons. The ensembles are either 
all-male or all-female. Mostly, one or two frame drums of different sizes are 
added. In some regions, such as Egypt or Morocco, melody instruments are 
 6 The following remarks are based on fieldwork on contemporary religious chanting in Syria 
and Lebanon, conducted in 2007 and 2009–13. On inshād culture, see also Maktabī (2000).
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added (Frishkopf 2000; ter Laan 2016). Inshād comprises solo and group 
singing and rhythmic songs as well as the metrically free solo performance of 
poetry (qa‚īda).
Inshād happens mainly offline. It takes place as a live event and features 
a high degree of interaction between performers and listeners. The audience 
engages in singing along or clapping their hands during selected parts. Often, 
they perform alternately with the ensemble in the form of refrains or call–
response sequences (Abdel-Malek 1995; Frishkopf 2000; Weinrich 2016). 
During the soloist recitations, the audience participates through verbal and 
non-verbal responses such as exclamations, shouted comments or sighing. 
These are articulated between the single musical phrases and may inspire 
the performer to intensify emotions by repeating the phrase with subtle 
modifications –  a technique of mutual engagement termed tafāʿul (Racy 
2003; Weinrich 2018).
Performers and participants view inshād as a supererogatory act of devo-
tion, and its performance is often linked to other supererogatory acts, such 
as the commemoration of the Prophet’s birthday (mawlid) or meetings to 
invoke blessings for the Prophet (majlis a‚-‚alāt ʿalā n-nabī). Although inshād 
gets broadcast in radio and television and audio files are exchanged, its milieu 
is chiefly non-commercial. Munshids may get payed, but festivities and meet-
ings are sponsored with free access for everybody. Audio and video footage 
of such events are given away as a gift, sold informally, or uploaded on the 
internet.
To be clear, the characterisation ‘traditional’ relates to the performance 
context and performance practices and not necessarily to the musical mate-
rial, which can be quite volatile. It builds on an older repertory that is sty-
listically rooted in Arab art music (qa‚īda, muwashshaª), Quran cantillation, 
and local folk music and incorporates contemporary stylistic currents. A lead 
vocalist compiles his or her repertory from what he or she has learned, heard 
and liked. Besides, the composition of the audience, that is, what styles lis-
teners respond to, affects the selection. Inshād is a flexible and fluid system 
which is rooted in tradition and responds to individual preferences and shift-
ing tastes. The performance practice, however, builds on participation and 
interaction, independently of the concrete musical material. Although per-
formances often blur socialising, entertainment and religious devotion, one 
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main function of inshād is to praise God and the Prophet, express gratitude, 
ask for forgiveness and thereby provide for the Hereafter.
Whereas many genres and practices within this type of inshād –  though 
not the exact musical sound –  can be traced well back in history, the second 
category of songs termed anāshīd is a rather recent phenomenon. These are 
the patriotic and political hymns, called anāshīd wa†anīya.
Patriotic and political hymns (anāshīd wa†anīya)
Political hymns such as national anthems or the hymns of single organisations 
and parties form the few non-religious hymns that are termed nashīd. This 
type of composition started at the beginning of the twentieth century in the 
wake of Arab nationalism. Its musical features had, however, been prepared 
well before that time. In the 1820s, the first military music schools were 
founded in Egypt to educate musicians for the military bands (El Shawan 
1985). Students learned the basic rules of European music theory and a 
European and adopted Arab repertory. Alongside other European experts, 
music experts were recruited who worked in schools, as private tutors, in 
music institutions, and later in the radio stations. The ‘modernisation pro-
gramme’ of rulers such as Khedive Ismāʿīl (r.1867–79) promoted European-
style concerts, concert venues and performing troupes. With the inauguration 
of the Cairene Opera House in 1869, staging Giuseppe Verdi’s Rigoletto, 
an annual opera season started. Economic and social changes resulted in a 
re-organisation of music education: it shifted from guilds to private clubs 
and institutes, and from there to formal school education. European music 
pedagogy including staff notation and solmisation was introduced into the 
Egyptian school curriculum as early as the 1930s. Similar developments fol-
lowed in other Arab countries.
Patriotic hymns, anti-colonial hymns and hymns promoting different 
types of nationalism were present in early twentieth-century official festivi-
ties, demonstrations, paramilitary youth organisations of political parties, 
and schools. Many of these shared the characteristics of military music such 
as a straight beat and a marching tempo, frequent upbeats, dotted notes, fan-
fares, and, often, a melodic line that was suited for multi-part arrangement. 
Allusion to harmonic schemes –  singing/playing in fifths, thirds, or sixths – 
 and the oscillation between the Arab modal system of maqām and European 
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functional harmony can be traced back to this period.7 Since the late 1930s, 
the newly-founded radio stations in the Middle East, often owned by the 
colonial powers, contributed considerably to the dissemination of European 
music, and henceforth tonality. This never replaced Arab music’s tonal 
system, but was nonetheless continuously present and, in many cases, con-
stituted a model that shaped developments in Arab music, especially those in 
orchestrated music of the 1950s and 1960s (El Shawan 1985; Poché, Shiloah, 
and Wright 2001; Weinrich 2006). This brief overview shows that composi-
tion techniques based on European tonality are not a recent phenomenon 
but date back well into the nineteenth century; the issue of the asymmetrical 
power relations that shaped that appropriation cannot adequately be dis-
cussed here.
International nasheed
Nashīd ’s English spelling, ‘nasheed’, became an international term, used also 
by non-Arabic speakers and Arab Muslims writing in English. It denotes 
religious songs in Arabic and many other languages. It could also be termed 
‘pop nasheed ’, although most of its protagonists would dislike the term. One 
successful player in this domain, Sami Yusuf (b. 1980), remarks in an inter-
view: ‘They’ve called it Nasheed [. . .], rock and even Islamic pop, which I 
absolutely hate’ (quoted in Tusing 2010). But, in fact, many productions 
share the characteristics of a pop song: they are up to five minutes long, and 
have a clear, often strophic structure and a duple metre. Many songs come 
with a music video. The songs feature syllabic singing and only occasional 
melisma. The vocal line forms the centre of the musical texture, and the 
musical accompaniment ranges from only a background chorus to percussion 
or drum machine (or both) and more instruments. The electronic sound pro-
duction, both of vocals and of musical instruments, has become an important 
trait in this field. We find allusions to European-style harmony, but rarely 
fully-fledged harmonic chords throughout the complete song. For instance, 
the dominant in the minor or the parallel key is used instead of the dominant 
in the major.
 7 Cf. the samples included in ʿAytānī and Fākhūrī (1995): 184–97 and Qur†ās (1983); for a 
brief analysis of some hymns that circulated in the 1940s, see Weinrich (2006): 75–80.
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Initially denoting a single vocally-performed piece, ‘nasheed ’ became a 
generic term, illustrated by statements like ‘It’s not music, it’s nasheed ’ and 
titles for song compilations online. In this context, ‘nasheed ’ stands for a 
‘religiously licit repertory’, and performers often also call themselves mun-
shid. Nevertheless, a great part of the music production is market-driven 
and commercial: singers sell their records and tickets and make a living by 
singing, although they are often engaged in charity projects as well. Catering 
to the different demands of their audience, many offer different versions of 
a song: ‘with/without music’, or, more elegantly put, ‘acoustic/instrumental’ 
(Otterbeck and Skjelbo 2019; Weinrich 2020a).
Texts and music videos focus on personal piety, ethics, praise of the 
prophet Muªammad, images of contemporary Muslim lifestyle, and Muslim 
solidarity. The sonic and visual language of videos stresses images of a middle-
class lifestyle, which was formerly occupied by pop music videos and is now 
claimed as Islamic sphere (Barendregt 2012; Weinrich 2020a). Besides, videos 
use graphic patterns or natural landscapes as backgrounds. Many performers 
see their songs as a means of developing one’s own spirituality, and the field 
developed its own global market structures (Barendregt 2012; Karahasanoğlu 
2016; Morris 2017; Otterbeck and Skjelbo 2019; Weinrich 2020a).
Despite the above-mentioned commonalities, ‘nasheed ’ is a heterogene-
ous field with different local foci. It is part of a broader consumer culture of 
religiously conscious and faith-inspired products, such as in Western Europe 
(Herding 2013; Morris 2017), South Asia (Barendregt 2012), Lebanon 
(Deeb and Harb 2013) or Egypt, from where the impetus of the much older 
concept of ‘art with a mission (al-fann al-hadīf)’ began in the 1990s (van 
Nieuwkerk 2013). ‘Nasheed ’ is international in the sense that some actors, 
especially those performing in English and Arabic, have a global audience, 
and it is international in the sense that it simultaneously developed different 
local aesthetics.
Overlapping spheres of politically and religiously motivated anāshīd
Pieslak and Lahoud set the 1960s as the starting-point for songs that address 
military fight (Pieslak 2015: 23–4; Pieslak 2017: 67; Lahoud and Pieslak 
2018: 1–2). It is true that the fidāʾī, the Palestinian fighter who started mili-
tary operations, became the superhero of Palestinian resistance poetry and 
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popular culture from the early 1960s onwards. One should add, however, 
that the fidāʾī culture of the 1960s was a secular culture. In fact, politically 
and religiously motivated anāshīd emerged in several political contexts and 
followed different, though partly overlapping, paths, both politically and 
aesthetically. The following remarks can offer only a glimpse of these different 
paths.
Alongside political hymns, hymns with Islamic themes were launched by 
the Egyptian Muslim Brothers in the 1930s (Tammam and Haenni 2004: 
93). Secular political hymns formed an important part of the musical produc-
tion in Nasserist Egypt. The political hymns disseminated by the PLO in the 
1960s added to the already existing repertory of resistance songs that were 
inspired by Palestinian folk genres (McDonald 2013: 78–103). During the 
1970s, university students in Egypt and Morocco started to perform and con-
sume religious hymns as a protest attitude towards state politics (Haenni and 
Tammam 2004; ter Laan 2016: 88). The popularity of such hymns increased 
rapidly, resulting in the demand for performing ensembles for the so-called 
‘Islamic weddings’, a new form of wedding celebration that emerged around 
1990. These developments constitute the roots of what is today known as 
‘nasheed’ or Islamic pop (Tammam and Haenni 2004). The 1970s were 
likewise the time when the first jihadi hymns within the Islamic opposition 
in Syria and Egypt started to be written (Said 2016: 45–63; Pieslak 2015). 
The 1980s witnessed the further regional diversification of such hymns in 
Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia, followed by Palestine (Said 2016: 63–84). 
Finally, many influential leftist political singers and bands made their debut 
in the 1970s in several Arab countries. These were musically inspired by 
folk songs and the international civic protest movements (Weinrich 2006: 
412–13; not all songs in the latter category were termed nashīd).
The first Palestinian Intifada, starting in 1987, worked as a catalyst for 
Palestinian productions as well as for Islamic hymns in other countries. The 
Palestinian repertory was threefold: next to the politically leftist mass hymns, 
Palestinian artists inside the Occupied Territories further developed the folk-
based repertory, and Hamas entered the scene with a religious musical reper-
tory (McDonald 2013: 116–43). In Turkey, genres like jihad song (cihad 
ezgi) and march (marş) emerged in the late 1980s, in the beginning often 
modelled on the leftist marches of a decade earlier (Karahasanoğlu 2016).
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In the 1990s, the popularisation of Islamic hymns started, in the sense 
both of becoming a broad movement and of borrowing musical styles from 
popular music, from both ‘shaʿbī and shabābī (folk and pop)’, as Tammam 
and Haenni (2004: 96) put it. In South Asia, male performing groups 
modernised, popularised and recorded Islamic chants, such as nasyed in 
Malaysia (Arps 1996; Barendregt 2012), singir in Java (Wieringa 2006) 
or the qasida modéren in Indonesia (Arps 1996). Much of this repertory 
had been performed formerly by women. ‘Art with a mission’ revived as 
an alternative entertainment form and a means of propagating Islamic 
values. With the rise of private TV and radio stations, the aesthetic forms 
of religion became further mediatised, using music videos, TV shows or 
podcasts. In short, contemporary nasheed and jihadi hymns are strongly 
mediatised forms of what had started in the 1970s as ‘cassette cultures’ 
(Peter Manuel).
Jihadi hymns
Jihadi hymns that have become highly visible and audible on the internet in 
the twenty-first century include forerunners from the 1970s and 1980s that 
are re-used by contemporary performers. Many of these performers are from 
Saudi Arabia, Yemen or Egypt and were born in the 1970s and 1980s (Said 
2016: 123–39). The early repertory used musical material from the patriotic 
and political hymns (anāshīd wa†anīya), from traditional inshād, folk genres, 
and then popular styles. Whereas the early repertory was distributed through 
music cassettes with sporadic live performances, jihadi groups nowadays use 
specialised media companies, websites, and technically well-equipped –  but 
not overly expensive –  studios (Lahoud and Pieslak 2018: 19), and distribu-
tion mainly takes place via the internet. In many cases, the visual element is 
added to the auditive consumption, since hymns are available as stand-alone 
audio and as video soundtracks.
Lahoud and Pieslak (2018) have shown that a substantial change took 
place in 2012/2013, when IS, through hymns, prepared for a situation which 
was achieved in early summer 2014, namely the seizure of a territory that was 
to become the caliphate. The shift from an abstract idea to concrete territo-
rial manifestation of that idea is addressed in a number of anāshīd produced 
and disseminated by IS’s media wings. At the same time, these media wings 
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refrained from using songs from munshids that did not belong to IS. Hymns 
developed into a site of competition between militarist groups and thus had 
to contribute to shape an IS-specific identity. In the following, I will present 
a sample of individual single pieces and demonstrate different musical sources 
and styles.
Battle Songs and Military Music Features
Songs which describe or call to fighting commonly feature a marching tempo, 
syllabic singing, duple metre and a strong, palpable beat. Often, the melodic 
line is marked by upbeat, dotted notes, stylised fanfares and sequences, that 
is, the restatement of a motif or melodic passage in a higher or lower pitch. 
Many of these musical characteristics have been established by the earlier 
anāshīd wa†anīya. One prominent example is Bi-jihādinā (Through Our 
Jihad).
Bi-jihādinā exists in numerous versions online. The singer of the analysed 
recording is Mūsā ibn ʿAlī al-ʿUmayra aka Abū ʿAlī (b. 1978), a well-known 
figure in the jihadi milieu. The song itself is much older; its text is included 
in the poetry collection belonging to the music cassettes by the Syrian mun-
shid Abū Māzin, published in 1984.8 Next to rhyme and metre, the poem 
employs the rhythmic device of syntactic parallelism, which I have also tried 
to render in my translation:
(1) Through our jihad we let rocks crumble
and tear up the oppressor and unbelief.
(2) Through powerful and great determination
and a willingness that does not accept any compulsion.
(3) We mobilise emotions and intellect,
with our blood, we will colour the dawn.
(4) We arrive there [at the dawn] with victory, oh my Ummah,
with our fight, we will change fate.
(5) Through our jihad, through the blazing torch,
the night of polytheism and heresy will vanish.
 8 Nashīd al-katāʾib (1986), 3rd edn: 181. On Abū ʿ Alī, see Said (2016): 123–5; on the poem/ 
song, see Said (2016): 81, 164, 166–8 and Lahoud and Pieslak (2018): 4. Note that the 
stanza’s melodic line in Abū ʿAlī’s version differs slightly from Abū Māzin.
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(6) We embark with determination and endurance
and break the oppression of chains and bonds.9
In the musical composition, each half-line forms a musical phrase, and the 
melodic development of a line is chiefly shaped by sequences. This technique 
gives the song a clear structure and a distinct rhythm which reflects the rhyme 
and partly also the parallelism. In addition, the poem has been turned into a 
strophic song, with the first two verses taken as a refrain. The articulation is 
syllabic; only on the last syllable of each hemistich does the performer execute 
a short melisma or vocal turn, which almost forms a triad. The melody moves 
in small steps, with tone repetitions and occasional leaps.
In its musical structure, Bi-jihādinā is similar to Maw†inī (My Homeland), 
a well-known patriotic and non-religious hymn. Maw†inī is based on a poem 
by the Palestinian poet Ibrāhīm ˝ūqān (d. 1941) and was set to music by 
the Lebanese Fulayfil Brothers, Aªmad and Muªammad Fulayfil, who con-
ducted the first Lebanese national military band founded in 1942.10 Maw†inī 
is considered the unofficial Palestinian anthem and is often sung during 
protests. Since 2004, it has been the national anthem of post-war Iraq:
My homeland,
Glory and beauty, sublimity and splendour are in your hills.
Life and deliverance, bliss and hope are in your air.
Will I see you
Safe and blessed with prosperity, successful and revered?
Will I see you in your grandeur
Reaching to the stars?
As becomes clear from the visual form of the text, the poem is in free verse, 
like most of the secular nationalist and resistance poetry of the twentieth 
century.
Both compositions feature duple metre, upbeat, dotted notes, and 
sequences as a melodic figure. They furthermore exhibit a regular struc-
ture, based on four-bar blocks, fill-ins as a ‘fanfare’ and hints of functional 
 9 Since the last two verses of the poem are not sung, they are not included into the translation. 
All translations from Arabic are mine.
10 ˝ūqān (1988): 511–13; Aytānī and Fākhūrī (1995): 184–6.
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harmony. It might not even be by chance that both pieces are in the same 
maqām, that is maqām kurd.11 In music arranged for a military band or a 
larger orchestra, there is a preference for maqāmāt that do not involve micro-
tonal steps and thus are easier to combine with harmonic chords. Selective 
harmonisation, while at the same time retaining melodic movements char-
acteristic of maqām-related music, is the main marker of oscillation between 
both tonal systems, maqām and European tonality.
Patriotic hymns are commonly performed with the accompaniment of 
brass and percussion. This version of Bi-jihādinā is a purely vocal studio 
recording. Occasionally, a counter-voice to the main melody, humming, and 
vocal fill-ins are added.12 Throughout the song, reverberation is used. The 
reverberation effect has been immensely popular for a couple of decades. It 
is also used in live performances of inshād, regardless of the size of the room 
or the size of the audience. I experienced it during fieldwork on various occa-
sions, including performances in a small living room where the performer 
brought in a huge box with an amplifying system and reverb technique. 
Michael Frishkopf (2009) ascribes this aesthetic feature to the rising aes-
thetics of the Saudi style of Quran recitation, where it is often added in the 
11 Maqām (pl. maqāmāt) designates the modes in Arab and neighbouring music cultures. A 
maqām is defined by a specific succession of intervals, characteristic melodic movements and 
its relation to other maqāmāt.
12 In traditional Arab music, instrumental fill-ins between two musical phrases take up the last 
tones of a phrase, often by imitating the rhythmic or melodic structure.
Figure 10.1 Musical transcription of 
Bi-jihādinā (© Ines Weinrich 2020).
Figure 10.2 Page from a school hymn book 
edited by Wadād al-Maqdisī Qur†ās, principal 
of a Beiruti girl’s school in the 1940s.
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studio. He reads the reverb as a strategy for imitating the soundspheres of 
the huge mosques in Mecca and Medina: ‘Reverberating in their cavern-
ous spaces, the reciter’s voice becomes an index of the mosques themselves, 
sounding sacred space’ (Frishkopf 2009: 101). Reverb and delay seem to have 
transgressed styles and musical domains rapidly. John Baily observed these 
features in Taliban tarana recordings from Afghanistan and describes them 
as techniques that are very popular in the secular music of the region (Baily 
2009: 157). Whether the reverb technique originated in the Saudi-style 
recitation or not, it is certainly no longer a distinct feature of Saudi-shaped 
religious ideology, nor of jihadi hymns, since it is common in many inshād 
performances and in nasheed.
Similar musical structures and more sound effects are employed in a song 
which likewise encourages fighting, Usūdu l-ªarb (Lions of War). Usūdu 
l-ªarb is available in different versions on the internet, too. It is used in sev-
eral videos produced by jihadi groups, for instance a production by al-Qāʿida 
in the Maghrib in 2011, and is classed as one of the ‘Top 5 Jihadi Songs’ of 
2014, referring to a version by the munshid and Afghanistan veteran Abū 
Usayd.13 The song has been uploaded onto many websites either as an audio 
file or as a video, independent of official media productions. Many of the 
videos show only one photograph or a designed image as a still throughout 
the song. One video illustrates the poetic text by photographs. Against a 
green background, the song’s text and various pictures are shown: men riding 
on horses, men with a flag, a fighter with a machine pistol, the corpse of a 
martyr, a photo of Usama bin Laden:14
(1) In war, we are lions; we are never afraid
and [we are] falcons, ascended into the sky.
(2) The backs of our horses were our cradle
on them, we inherited our pride.
(3) We are knights, horses are our cradles
when we are called, we answer the call.
13 Mohammad D., ‘Top 5 Jihadi Songs of 2014’, posted 18 November 2014. <https:// syri 
anewsupdate.wordpress.com/ 2014/ 11/ 18/ top-5-jihadi-songs/ > (last accessed 24 October 
2018). On the poem/ song, see Said (2016): 172–86; on Abū Usayd, Said (2016): 128–30.
14 Available at <https:// www.youtube.com/ watch?v=3WN2vkane0E> (last accessed 24 
October 2018).
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(4) In the path of God we live and die
a life of glory or a death of sacrifice.
(5) If somebody calls us to
support Islam, we follow the call.
The next verses describe battle scenes, promise the immortal life for martyrs, 
and address a fighter’s mother and sister. The final verse reads:
(15) If he [the son/brother] dies as a martyr, be proud of him
if he returns, it will be with a clear victory (an-na‚r al-mubīn).
The poem’s rhythm, enacted through rhyme and parallelism, finds its match 
in the short musical phrases, which cover a half-line each, and the repetitive 
melodic schema that features narrow steps and pitch repetition. The syllabic 
singing alternates between a solo voice and a chorus. To enhance the sonic 
structure, various sounds effects are added, such as the hooves of horses, the 
roaring of lions, and a hissing sound that could be interpreted as either bul-
lets or arrows. Arrows would go with the poetic imagery, which evokes battle 
scenes as described in early Arabic poetry. Military sound effects are already 
reported by Baily (2009: 152) for hymns used in the 1980s. Furthermore, 
vocal fill-ins, counter-voices, and the singing of the same melodic line in a 
different register are occasionally added.
Both Bi-jihādinā and Usūdu l-ªarb share similar musical features com-
bined with the ethos of early Arabic poetry: the ethos of the knight, the brave 
and noble fighter, the well-versed rider and warrior. ‘We arrive there [at the 
dawn] with victory, oh my Ummah’ evokes the image of an early morning 
raid (ghazwa), which was a typical Bedouin warfare technique and is also used 
as a poetic simile in the Quran (100: 1–5). Guns and canons are repeatedly 
juxtaposed with swords and arrows. Horses figure prominently in the poetic, 
visual and sonic language: they are directly named or metonymically referred 
to in poetry; they feature in numerous pictures, as well as in the sounds of 
hooves and neighing.15 Given the fact that early Arabic poetry constitutes a 
large part of the school curriculum in many Arab states, there is reason to 
15 Cf., furthermore, poems and recordings such as Yā ʿābida l-ªaramayni, Risālatunā 
katabnāhā bi-damʿin, Sa-nanzaʿu qalba, or Íawt azīzi l-midfaʿ, and visual illustrations of 
various anāshīd compilations.
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think that not only sound and image but also the poetry resonates with native 
Arabic speakers.
With Al Awlaki’s reference to poetry chanting as an ancient tradition 
in mind, the musical features of battle songs and the poetic imagery form a 
strategy to appeal by evoking the heroic ethos of the early Islamic era, when 
Islam was still young, strong and uncorrupted. Further illustrated by visual 
images of horses, swords, and men in long garments riding on horses, the 
heroic ethos becomes poetically, sonically and visually present.
‘Be Steadfast, O My Soul’ (Íabran yā nafsī)
Another group of songs can be subsumed under the term ‘contemplative 
songs’. They feature also a regular beat, but exhibit occasional rhythmic liber-
ties and a slower pace. A soft, often breathy voice is preferred, and a higher 
vocal register. The melodic idiom is calmer, though elements like vocal fill-ins 
and selective multi-part singing remain in many studio versions. Such songs 
do not directly incite to fighting. They serve to release emotional tension 
and often address visions of paradise and female family members. The hymn 
Íabran yā nafsī (Be Steadfast, O My Soul) is a prominent example.
Judging by its numerous different versions, Íabran yā nafsī turns out 
to be an exceptionally popular song. It is included in the joint album Lan 
nansākum (‘We Will Never Forget You’, released in 2008) by Abū Fāris 
and Ghālib Aªmad Bāquʿī†ī aka Abū Hājir (b. 1986), where the lyrics are 
ascribed to Abū Hājir.16 A simple search on YouTube showed approximately 
a hundred different videos of this song, ranging from professionally produced 
ones to home-made mash-up videos.17 Unfortunately, the singer is not always 
mentioned by name. It seems, however, that the performances by Abū Fāris 
and Abū Hājir and by Nāyif Sharhān are the most popular, since their voices 
feature in most videos. Besides, videos show lay performers, such as armed 
fighters in the field or a man in a mosque, who sing live. The poem/song is 
16 <https:// archive.org/ details/ AbuHajaralHadramiAbuFarisLanNansakum/ 10+-+Sabrn.
mp3> (last accessed 23 October 2018). On Abū Fāris, see Said (2016): 127–8, on Abū 
Hājir, Said (2016): 130–3; on the poem/ song, Said (2016): 234–7.
17 Available at <https:// www.youtube.com/ results?search_ query=sabran+ya+nafsi> (last 
accessed 23 October 2018).
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used by different, also opposing groups, featuring different cities, war situa-
tions and armies in text and image.18
In the poem, a fighter addresses his soul and reflects on his situation. 
The intimate dialogue with the soul is a common trope in Arabic poetry. 
What makes the poem interesting is the description of struggling emotions, 
or mixed feelings, namely the conflict that arises through the memory of the 
fighter’s mother (verse 5) and his subsequent reassurance that he took the 
right decision, ending with visions of paradise:
(1) Be steadfast, o my soul, be steadfast, o my soul
be steadfast, oh my soul, God is with us.
(2) Jerusalem calls, Jerusalem calls
Jerusalem calls and cries out: ah!
(3) Be steadfast, because my path, be steadfast, because my path
be steadfast, because my path is [made of] fire.
(4) The Huris call, the Huris call
the Huris call to delight.
(5) I remember, when I said farewell to you [f.] that day
you cried for me out of compassion.
(6) You said: O son, don’t break my heart!
The memory and yearning kills me.
(7) And I went, because I realise that in my time
unbelief dominates everywhere.
(8) I took my weapon and lifted my banner
and went to kill the enemies
(9) In Paradise, I sing and trill and chant
and recite verses of the Quran
(10) There, I will meet my wife and children
and embrace my family and brothers
The version from the 2008 album is slow, featuring long notes and solo singing, 
enhanced by pad sounds. The text repetitions correspond to melodic repeti-
tions; only occasionally does the singer slightly modify the melody. The version 
18 In recent versions, Jerusalem is often replaced by Damascus.
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by Nāyif Sharhān skips one repetition, sacrificing the poetic form for easier 
listening. His version is further emotionalised through a humming chorus, gun-
fire that starts as early as verse 2, and heavy explosions illustrating the ‘fire’ men-
tioned in verse 3. Additionally, a ‘mother’s voice’ is cut into the song: after verse 
6, we hear a woman saying ‘allāh yir∂ā ʿalayk (may God be pleased with you)’, 
a common phrase in daily parlance, especially between a mother and her child. 
Verses 5–8, depicting the inner struggle of the fighter, are distinct from the rest 
of the song through a different textual and melodic structure and a higher voice 
register. When these verses are repeated by the chorus, the soloist increases the 
musical texture by adding fill-ins. When the ‘inner fight’ is over and the lyri-
cal subject convinced about his actions (again), having persuaded himself, the 
song gradually returns to its musical regularity. Composition and arrangement 
(tawzīʿ) of this song show strong affiliation with contemporary nasheed.
Though contemplative, elegies seem to form a separate musical cate-
gory within jihadi hymns. Most of them are solo performances and feature 
improvisatorial passages without an underlying metrical beat. Elegies seem 
to be inspired by musical forms that are traditionally performed in the con-
text of funerals, such as rithāʾ, the solo performance of a poem eulogising 
the deceased, nadb (lament), short verses sung alternatingly between soloist 
and chorus, or more general forms of lamenting and contemplating that use 
melismatic singing (nawªa, mawwāl).
It should be mentioned in this context that jihadi hymns have appropri-
ated not only musical aesthetics but, especially within the field of elegy, the 
fidāʾī culture of the 1960s, when the figure of the fidāʾī who devotes his life 
to the cause became almost omnipresent in poetry, song and cinema. Most 
striking is the parallel between the fidāʾī and jihadi culture in funeral songs 
that are at the same time wedding songs. The wedding has become both 
a site of and a topos in Palestinian resistance songs (McDonald 2013: 4, 
109–11, 177–88). But whereas the religious martyr is wedded to the houris 
in Paradise, in the resistance poetry the homeland is turned into the bride and 
the wedding into revolution.19 In addition, there is a considerable difference 
19 On ‘the wedding of the martyr’ in Palestinian resistance poetry, see Embaló et al. (2001): 
14–122; on the ‘revolutionary wedding’ in song, theatre, and film, see Weinrich (2006): 
241–3, 256–65.
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in the poetic form: whereas a great part of the jihadi poetry is composed in 
forms of the early poetic heritage, the nationalist fidāʾī poetry is predomi-
nantly in free verse (ash-shiʿr al-ªurr), a poetic style that most poets in the 
jihadi milieu seem to avoid.
Conclusion: Appropriations and Strategies of Authentification
This chapter has introduced the musical domains that are governed by the 
term nashīd: traditional inshād, patriotic political hymns (anāshīd wa†anīya), 
international nasheed, and jihadi hymns. Musically, jihadi hymns draw from 
the three other domains. The greatest communality with inshād is the miss-
ing of musical instruments, which are often employed in nasheed and in the 
patriotic hymns. Otherwise, there are significant differences between both 
domains. Inshād comprises different genres, including the melismatic, metri-
cally free qa‚īda, and different themes, such as human insufficiencies, the plea 
for forgiveness, and God’s mercy. Most importantly, in traditional inshād, 
the munshid interacts with his listeners in a live performance, whereas jihadi 
munshids often lack live listeners.20 Inshād builds on a participatory culture, 
where the roles of performer and listener merge. The processes of perfor-
mance and composition often overlap, especially in the qa‚īda style, which is 
significantly missing in jihadi hymns. Like nasheed and most of the political 
hymns, the jihadi hymn is a pre-composed fixed product. Jihadi hymns are 
marked –  and recently also marketed –  by a top-down process; only after the 
fixed product is offered to the public, individual choices of listening and re-
appropriation can start.21
Hymns exhibit sonic strategies which are based on listening as a learned 
practice. The effect thus may vary individually, but there are several strands 
which are designed to impact listeners on a more general level. I term these 
strategies to attract people as ‘strategies of authentification’, that is, present-
ing the own cause as genuinely ‘Islamic’. Many hymns, especially from the 
later period of jihadi hymns, employ sonic reminiscences to the kernel of 
religion and its sonic atmosphere. The primacy of the voice is indexical of 
20 For occasional live performances, see Said (2016): 125, 135–6.
21 On anāshīd as a fixed and controlled product, see Berg, Chapter 11; Dick and Fuhrmann, 
Chapter 12, analyse appropriations of jihadi hymns.
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Quran cantillation and related musical techniques. These comprise also the 
call to prayer and prayers pf supplication (duʿāʾ), which have several musico- 
technical restrictions in contrast to the singing of poetry. The a cappella 
singing has an ideological background –  music instruments are to be avoided 
–  but at the same time it links songs to the ‘most pure’ religious musi-
cal genres. Certain voice techniques add to the atmosphere of genuineness: 
performers are knowledgeable in Quran recitation and apply rules of tajwīd 
(orthoepy), such as the technique of qalqala, that is, producing an echoing 
sound if a syllable ends with the letters q, †, b, j, or d of the Arabic alphabet. 
Executed at the end of a word, it leads to a palpable echo which gives Quran 
recitation its distinct flavour.
In Ummatī qad lāªat fajrun (My Ummah, Dawn Has Appeared),22 the 
expression rabb al-ʿālamīn resonates numerous prayers (duʿāʾ) and of course 
the Quran, where it features most prominently in the fātiªa (first Surah) 
which is recited in every prostration sequence of the ritual prayer (‚alāt) 
and is therefore familiar also to Muslims whose native tongue is not Arabic. 
Together with ‚ādiqīn and other rhyme words, the song text is in its sound 
reminiscent of duʿāʾ and thus gives the content an aura of not only authen-
ticity but rightness, truth, and legitimation. Importantly, this effect is not 
created by the content alone (‘God wants it like this’), but by the sound that 
is itself a reference to professed sacred sources.
Sound comprises more than the musical composition; rather, the delib-
erate choice of vocabulary re-sounds religious propositions and the Quran. 
For instance, references to immortal life and the garden of eternity in Usūdu 
l-ªarb are evoked through Quranic vocabulary (Q 3:169, 25:15). For listen-
ers familiar with the Quran, the phrase an-na‚r al-mubīn (the clear victory) 
in Usūdu l-ªarb and Ummatī qad lāªat fajrun works as a sonic trigger. an-
Na‚r features prominently in the Quran (Q 3:126, 8:10), and the almost 
synonymous al-fatª al-mubīn (Q 48:1) comes into the mind. Moreover, the 
adjective mubīn semantically feeds into the Quranic link, since it is part of 
the self-referential al-kitāb al-mubīn (the clear book). Hence, mubīn stresses 
the reference to the Quran, without direct citation. Finally, keywords of 
poetic imagery constitute sonic markers of authenticity that build on learned 
22 On this song, see Lahoud and Pieslak (2018): 12–13.
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forms of meaning ascription. The recurrence of early poetic forms and 
imagery blends well with the re-actualisation of heroism and the greatness of 
a glorious past.
It might not be by chance that, in the IS repertory analysed by Lahoud 
and Pieslak (2018), the forms which are based on soloistic, melismatic per-
formance are largely absent. Elegies are built on this form, and might be 
avoided in favour of an optimistic self-referential repertory. The individualis-
tic impulse of improvised forms is generally decreasing in the repertoire. This 
includes the subtleties of the voice that show in microtonal nuances (ʿurab), 
which become eliminated in favour of a strong, compact sound. Finally, folk 
styles, too, build on individual creativity and exhibit subtle markers such 
as timbre, tessitura, or wordplay based on ambiguity (homonyms, puns). 
Moreover, folk styles index local cultures, whereas the ideology aims at merg-
ing with a universal Muslim culture. Thus, we can discern a focus on military 
and group-specific themes that demand sounds of rhythm, beat and chorus-
singing to signify power and communality. Markers of ambiguity and indi-
viduality are effaced in favour of uniformity.
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ANĀSHĪD AT THE CROSSROAD BETWEEN 
THE ORGANISATIONAL AND THE PRIVATE
Carin Berg
Introduction
Music is a contested issue in many Muslim contexts. Hence, in order to not contradict religious ideas, Islamist organisations like Hamas and 
Hizbullah use anāshīd (nashīd in the singular), a form of poetic chants, to 
mobilise their supporters. This chapter will show how anāshīd traverse the 
borders between the public domain of the organisations into the private lives 
of their supporters. This chapter aims at showing that the anāshīd’s capacity 
to move back and forth between public and private, hence fusing political 
and religious messages with emotions and organisational events, provides 
Hamas and Hizbullah with an exceptional tool to convey political agendas.
In order to grasp how the public (organisational) and the private domain 
interact, anāshīd will be analysed through Ray Pratt´s (1994) definition of 
the purposive and effective dimensions of how music can be used in political 
contexts and for political use. The purposive dimension implies that music is 
used in an intentional strategic manner to reach certain political goals and/or 
effects. The effective dimension, on the other hand, illustrates how music can 
be used for political purposes by evoking specific connotations, implying that 
any music can potentially be employed for political aims.
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Hamas and Hizbullah apply anāshīd as a tool and strategy to fulfil the 
role that other types of music play in many other organisations. Anāshīd are 
strictly controlled and managed to fit the religious ideology and political 
aims of the organisations. Music as instrument of political communication 
in general, including anāshīd, has the capability to strengthen the collective, 
to spread, highlight, and support core ideas as well as to stimulate emotions 
and trigger feelings, which is useful to maintain and reinforce political values 
(Pieslak 2015: 18–21; Pratt 1994). In Hamas and Hizbullah, this is especially 
true when anāshīd are used during political events to create specific atmos-
pheres and a common identity, to spread political messages, and to remind 
people of the struggle and enemies of the organisations. Their lyrics are widely 
popular, and supporters listen to the same types of anāshīd in private. This 
study will show that anāshīd are part of the organisational identification, 
although the organisations’ supporters have their own interpretation and 
experience of anāshīd and their own perception of their role, which stretches 
beyond the control and reason of Hamas and Hizbullah. The incorporation 
of anāshīd into the private sphere actually optimises their political quali-
ties, but also creates tensions as the distinctions between the private and the 
organisational are blurred.
In the private context, anāshīd are listened to, for example, at home 
and in the car, which are places where, potentially, any type of music could 
be played. Nevertheless, anāshīd are the preferred, or at least the selected, 
genre. One reason is that anāshīd are one of a few permitted musical genres 
according to a common interpretation of Islam. Another reason relates to 
the fact that, on an individual level, anāshīd can support the mobilisation of 
strength during harsh times, remind of and help maintain political and reli-
gious values, speak about morals, and entertain, which is not only of concern 
in regard to organisations (Berg, forthcoming).
Anāshīd will be explored through empirical data gathered during field-
work in the milieus of Hamas and Hizbullah. The material consists of partici-
pant observations, mainly during political events and rehersals, and interviews 
with officials, musicians, and supporters of the two organisations. The data 
were collected during nine months of fieldwork between 2012 and 2013 in 
Lebanon, as well as during additional follow-up interviews/conversations in 
2014 and 2015.
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Hamas, Hizbullah and Anāshīd
Palestinian Hamas (the Islamic Resistance Movement) was founded in 1987 
as an outgrowth of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers and as a result of the first 
Palestinian uprising against the Israeli occupation. In 2006, Hamas won the 
Palestinian parliamentary elections but was denied victory by Fatah, which 
did not accept the election results. As a consequence of major clashes and 
disagreements, the political system of the Palestinian territories was divided. 
Up until today, Fatah has ruled the West Bank and Hamas the Gaza Strip 
(Caridi 2012: 306–13). Lebanese Hizbullah (the Party of God) is one of the 
most powerful forces in the Middle East. It was founded in 1982, initially 
as an Islamic militia group. Hizbullah was created partly to strengthen the 
deprived Shia population of the Middle East and partly as a resistance wing 
against the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon. The organisation takes its 
inspiration from the teachings of Ayatollah Khomeini and the Iranian revolu-
tion of 1979. Today, Hizbullah is a party in the Lebanese government and 
is one of the most influential political forces in the country, with a strong 
military wing (Alagha 2015: 43–78).
Art and culture are part of both Hamas’s and Hizbullah’s structure and 
tools, among which anāshīd, meaning hymns or poetic chants (Weinrich, 
this volume), serve as a core element. Anāshīd have a long tradition of 
use in the Middle East. Originally, they lacked instrumental accompani-
ment, whereas today many anāshīd include multiple instruments. Anāshīd 
should not refer to subjects, or be used in contexts, that are incorrect or 
forbidden according to Islam, which is a matter of interpretation, with 
large variation (Teer Laan 2016: 79). The anāshīd applied and produced 
in Hamas and Hizbullah often contain political statements intertwined 
with Islamic messages. The organisations, particularly Hizbullah, also use 
military marches, French marches, for example, and political and nation-
alistic songs by composers such as Fairouz, Wadih Safi, Ghassan Saliba 
and Julia Boutros. These songs are not classified as anāshīd since they lack 
the religious dimension (Samir 2013). When referring to music that is not 
anāshīd but is still used in Hamas and Hizbullah, the chapter will speak 
about songs or other music. The anāshīd that Hizbullah uses and produces 
are mainly monotonous, with a low pitch, sung by men with powerful 
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voices (very rarely by women, and if so, in female contexts only). The 
songs usually include instruments, sometimes few and sometimes many. 
The common denominator is the Islamic message permeating the anāshīd 
(Teer Laan 2016: 79).
The anāshīd and songs analysed in this chapter mainly speak about resist-
ance, nationalism, heroism, morale, unfairness and revenge. Since their foun-
dation, Hamas and Hizbullah have used and produced anāshīd and other 
music; however, over time their function has become more formal, with a 
stricter management. In Hizbullah, nowadays art has its own branch called 
Risalat, whereas Hamas handles art in an ad hoc manner through the politi-
cal bureau in consolidation with religious leaders (Said 2016: 863–76). The 
fact that anāshīd are frequently used in Islamist organisations of today and, 
at the same time, are strictly regulated makes them particularly interesting 
and important to study. Not least, this study is important as the cases of 
Hamas and Hizbullah indicate that the strict management has limitations 
or is stretched, since the same anāshīd also play a role in the private sphere 
beyond these organisations.
Music in Political Organisations and Beyond
Music is a tool used by political organisations, with supporters, potential 
recruits and enemies as the main targets. Pratt (1994) argues that music has 
the ability ‘to give shape and voice to emotions that ordinary people have but 
find difficult to express with coherence and without embarrassment’ (Pratt 
1994: 4–5). Hence, when music is used by political organisations, the differ-
ent domains, such as events, serve as ideologically-controlled free zones for 
expressing political ideas where emotions can be played out and intertwined 
with the organisation’s goals. Pratt further distinguishes between two specific 
ways of using music politically as the purposive and effective dimension 
(Pratt 1994: 4–5). These two dimensions illustrate how music can be cre-
ated explicitly for political purposes, or alternatively, how any music can 
be made political, and how any situation (even a private one) can be made 
political through the use of music. Pratt (1994) emphasises that it is often the 
interaction between the song and the practice that makes the music political. 
However, this does not mean that the song cannot have a political agenda in 
itself. Rather, it shows that all songs are potentially free for any form of use 
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as soon as they are produced, a notion that will be developed further when 
discussing the effective dimension.
The purposive way of understanding how music functions politically 
concerns individuals or groups proposing to ‘influence the ideas or behav-
iors of others’ (Pratt 1994: 4–5), where music is used as a means. These 
individuals or groups are political representatives in some sort of position of 
power. John Street (2012) argues likewise, stating that political communica-
tion through music is closely linked to political representation where one has 
to be able to speak for people or a certain cause (Street 2012). In addition 
to representation, music is used as an organising force in political contexts 
such as in organisations. The music employed to organise people in a specific 
manner for certain political purposes has to be selected and controlled by 
an authority. To ‘organise’, in this context, is used along the lines of Arnold 
Perris’s (1985) meaning that it should ‘instruct and direct, as well as delimit, 
composers, performers, and audiences’ (Perris 1985: 68). Even if Perris par-
ticularly speaks about the function of music for political purposes in totalitar-
ian regimes, his remarks could be applied to any authority controlling music 
for certain aims, such as Hamas and Hizbullah.
Pratt (1994) reveals that using music in a purposive way has historically 
proven to be an effective political tool. One reason for this is that if music is 
produced for and used among a political collective, it is likely that this group 
will interpret and use the songs in a similar way. If music is used as a medium 
in a purposive way, specific songs are produced by the individuals or group 
aiming for certain political goals. The songs often have explicit messages and 
intentions and it is difficult to read more into them than what is stated in the 
text, because they do not leave much room for interpretation. According to 
Pratt (1994: 4), the most obvious kind of ‘purposive music’ is protest songs. 
They are usually explicit in their intentions, and therefore easy to apply and 
use in specific political situations. When the text is direct, its effect on people 
is more predictable than if the song could be interpreted as having multiple 
messages.
The effective dimension of how music is used politically refers to exercis-
ing an influence that can be intentional but is usually not. It implies that no 
one can control the use of a song once it is produced. For example, one could 
‘take a song from the Beatles and perversely twist it in his cultish murder 
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of several people’ (Pratt 1994: 4). Specifically, it is common, in relation to 
politics, for music not explicitly intended for political purposes to be used by 
a specific group or organisation. The reason for using music in this way is the 
same as in the purposive dimension: marking identity and creating bounda-
ries for certain groups. It is the interpretation that differs (Pratt 1994). In 
certain contexts, such as in organisations, this dimension should be under-
stood in terms of an authority that directs the targeted individuals towards 
a ‘correct’ interpretation of the songs in order to fit the agenda. If this is the 
case, the songs that function effectively are only partly unrestrained. Street 
(2012) writes about this issue in terms of how music becomes political. He 
points out that ‘the “right” to be political can be granted and taken away by 
the institutions which produce and regulate [. . .] music’ (Street 2012: 55). 
Hence, there is power and control involved in the effective dimension as well, 
which is played out by particular authorities possessing the power to approve 
songs as political as well as censoring and prohibiting them.
With regard to Hamas and Hizbullah, the purposive and effective dimen-
sions will be applied in order to show how anāshīd are used. The deliberate 
application of anāshīd in Hamas and Hizbullah corresponds to a large extent 
with Pratt’s (1994) definition of the purposive explanation. The produc-
tion and usage of anāshīd are intentional, with strict control for the sake of 
impacting people in accordance with the ideas of the organisation. Regarding 
how anāshīd are used in the effective dimension, the empirical results are 
somewhat different from, or go beyond, Pratt’s 1994 definition. Hamas and 
Hizbullah use songs by external composers for their own purposes. In addi-
tion, the empirical material reveals that the effective dimension also concerns 
a constant negotiation taking place around religion and politics. Hence, it 
also describes the usage and function of anāshīd in the uncontrolled space 
outside of, but not separate from, the organisations.
Anāshīd in Hamas and Hizbullah
Along the analytical themes of how music is used politically, this section will 
describe how anāshīd are used in the settings of Hamas and Hizbullah and 
beyond. The text will be divided into empirical findings in the purposive 
and effective dimensions. Moreover, each of the two sections will be further 
divided according to empirical sub-themes.
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Deliberate Function of Anāshīd
The intentional use of anāshīd in Hamas and Hizbullah serves the aim of 
guiding the organisations’ positions and influencing people’s ideas, emotions 
and behaviour. In order to describe how anāshīd are used in such a manner, 
the empirical material is divided into the following themes: general manage-
ment and control; anāshīd as an organising tool during events; and anāshīd as 
political communication. The themes reveal that the management of Hamas 
and Hizbullah has a clear vision and steers the function of anāshīd in order to 
achieve certain goals. They have to do with appropriate messages being sent 
and the right mood being stimulated, particularly during collective gatherings.
General Management and Control
Hamas and Hizbullah have a strict view as to what kinds of anāshīd should 
be used and for which purposes. Two bands belong to Hizbullah: the 
orchestra Shams el Horriye (The Freedom Sun), which is administrated by 
Hizbullah’s arts section the Risalat; and Firqat al-Kashef (The Scout’s Band), 
which belongs to Hizbullah’s scouts branch. Being part of the organisation 
implies that the songs they produce and perform are severely controlled in 
all instances. Conflicts can occur, one example mentioned being the use of 
drums: ‘In the past, drums were accepted in Hizbullah, but some guys used 
it in a wrong way, so Hizbullah forbid it. One year ago, they have allowed it 
again’ (Samir 2013). This is an example of an issue that had to be discussed 
and solved by the committee. Another task of the committee is to approve or 
reject CDs, which are sold in special shops in the Shia area of Beirut. These 
shops are only allowed to sell CDs consistent with Islamic norms according 
to Hizbullah. Consequently, controlling anāshīd stretches beyond the bands 
and performances, but is related to them.
In Hamas, the control of anāshīd is not as preventative as in Hizbullah, 
but is still managed strictly. The administration concerns both Gaza and the 
diaspora countries.1 The government in Gaza makes all the formal decisions, 
 1 Since Fatah governs the West Bank, Hamas’s management does not concern this area. 
However, the Hamas supporters residing in the West Bank suffer severe punishment, such 
as prison, if it is discovered that they listened to anāshīd supportive of Hamas.
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but since many Hamas leaders reside outside Gaza, particularly in Lebanon, 
discussions are held in various places. As a result, it is difficult to maintain 
coherent management and control of anāshīd, or any issue, within Gaza and 
in the diaspora societies simultaneously. The irregular management means, 
for example, that the anāshīd and songs being used during events are not 
severely controlled beforehand. Hamas’s control of music also goes beyond 
the organisational sphere, but in a different manner than in Hizbullah. In the 
case, for example, of private events, particularly in Gaza, the Hamas police 
force regularly interrupts and closes down celebrations and concerts owing to 
breaches of Islamic norms. This can concern inappropriate music containing 
blasphemy and settings (e.g. where alcohol is consumed or men and women 
mix) (Omar 2012).
Although the band Protectors of the Homeland consists of members 
of the Hamas police academy and rehearses in their venues (The Telegraph 
2007), Hamas does not have official bands such as Hizbullah does. The 
bands performing and producing anāshīd for Hamas are only affiliated to 
the organisation, which makes them spill over to the effective dimension. 
They are mentioned here in relation to the question of how anāshīd are 
managed in Hamas. In Lebanon, for example, there are the bands called 
al-Amjad, al-Waed, Soukour al-Aqsa and Mjaad. Furthermore, in Jordan, 
there are the bands called Yarmouk and Rawabi, and singers such as Abdul 
Fattah Owainat and Ahmad al-Kurdi, who are affiliated to Hamas. These are 
musicians sympathising with Hamas, who, on request, produce and perform 
anāshīd in the name of the organisation. In this sense, they are controlled and 
managed by the organisation’s authority.
An Organising Tool during Events
Anāshīd are used as a way of organising and directing the focus of events in 
Hamas and Hizbullah. The main concern is that the right songs are played 
in order to deliver suitable messages and to stimulate certain moods. Most 
events in Hizbullah are held in the main hall, called Sayed Shuhada, in 
Beirut. One informant expressed the view during an interview that
Hizbullah wants to control each point of the event and the control is related 
to what message Hizbullah wants to send out to the people. The real official 
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messages will be delivered by our leader Nasrallah, but the songs we play 
will always support his speech, which is a request from Hizbullah. (Samir 
2013)
This statement adds to the previous section on how anāshīd are con-
trolled. It is placed here because it shows that anāshīd have the capacity to 
frame and organise the official messages through a medium alternative to 
Nasrallah’s speeches. Another example is the organisation of events by Shia 
villages in the southern part of Lebanon, with Hizbullah being part of the 
organisation. In such situations, Hizbullah can control the set-up, similar 
to those at Sayed Shuhada, and songs based on Nasrallah’s speeches are also 
commonly played at those events.
Even though the events are managed, the observations showed that 
anāshīd reveal emotions. Nevertheless, they constitute a controlled way of 
expressing one’s emotions and triggering people. When anāshīd were played 
during events, people were lively, collectively sang along and screamed out 
slogans. Supporters were particularly loud before and after Nasrallah spoke 
live on the screen, illustrating his popularity (Berg, forthcoming). During the 
events held by both Hamas and Hizbullah, anāshīd are particularly used to 
navigate a collective. For example, during Hizbullah’s martyrs’ day, slogans 
were screamed out, banners and flags were waved, and songs were sung in 
unison with people standing close to each other. Songs about jihad and pride 
were recurring themes, which triggered people to collectively celebrate war, 
violence and resistance, even if the occasion revolves around people who have 
been killed. Hamas employs anāshīd, particularly as a way of organising a col-
lective during events around the issue of Palestine specifically, not forgetting 
the right to return, the occupation, the resistance and the suffering. Hamas 
delivers the concerns of Palestine through anāshīd in order to maintain the 
coherent goals of the organisation, mediated during the events. Songs includ-
ing phrases like ‘We shall not forget’, ‘The land is ours’, and ‘Jointly we will 
resist’ are common.
Political Communication
Another core function of anāshīd is the deliberate communication of poli-
tics, hence influencing thoughts and actions. ‘Yes, we send messages through 
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art’ (Muhammed 2013), stresses the manager of the Risalat in Hizbullah, 
emphasising that they make people feel the message. Adding to the two previ-
ous sections, organisational events are platforms for political communication 
directly controlled by Hamas and Hizbullah. They serve as an arena where 
the organisations can frame and spread their political ideas. Anāshīd com-
municate the core issues of the organisations, such as resisting Israel, showing 
bravery against the enemies of Islam and protecting the land. Furthermore, 
in Hamas’s case, there is the goal of creating a Palestinian state and a return 
to the land, which is also of concern for and hence supported by Hizbullah 
(Hani 2012). Political communication is intertwined with religious mes-
sages. It is essential to bear in mind that anāshīd are at all times managed 
and applied in accordance with Islamic values. One informant emphasised 
this, during a chat in a café, by saying ‘The important things to keep in mind 
about anāshīd are two: To not contradict religion and to not sing about 
religion in a bad way’ (Hussein 2012). Hence, anāshīd lead the way to what 
is appropriate and correct according to the organisations.
Several informants expressed the view that the organisations communi-
cate needs through anāshīd, but also what is about to happen: ‘I felt that if I 
understand what they are singing in the anāshīd and the songs as a whole, it 
means that I understand where our country is going and what is happening 
around me’ (Rami 2013). The same informant continued:
Anāshīd are a very important medium for Hizbullah. They are informative 
and spread information about what the organization thinks. They also show 
the organization’s abilities in terms of resistance. They are about sending a 
message to the people. (Rami 2013)
This can also be achieved through other media. However, it is significant that 
anāshīd reach a large crowd at the same time, while also touching people’s 
emotions through, for example, reality-based lyrics.
As mentioned earlier, anāshīd also affect communication about and with 
the enemy. During an interview, the manager of the Risalat stated: ‘The songs 
about Israel are the ones mainly used during Hizbullah’s political events. 
In these songs, Hizbullah has a very direct message to Israel’ (Muhammed 
2013). Both Hamas and Hizbullah employ anāshīd as a channel, since they 
do not communicate with Israel directly, but know that Israelis listen to and 
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translate their anāshīd. Moreover, ‘Hizbullah makes songs about their victo-
ries in order to underline that we are militarily strong and in order to alert 
Israel that there will be more wars and victories’ (Louai 2013). Hamas uses 
anāshīd in the same way, whereby they inform Israel that they will stay strong 
and firm against any future attacks, just as in the past. In the same regard, 
anāshīd are also used as a form of warfare in order to humiliate and irritate 
the enemy. For example, ‘the [Hizbullah] soldiers used to play loud anāshīd 
beside the Israeli soldiers in southern Lebanon to annoy them and to show 
that we are strong’ (Samir 2013). Hamas frequently draws upon these tactics 
during war too, but also when Israelis patrol in the Palestinian areas.
Furthermore, anāshīd are used before and during missions and  battles. 
‘Some songs are fast and powerful with strong lyrics that will push the 
 soldiers to be tough and give them courage to face the enemy and not 
retreat. The soldiers listen to anāshīd for example at home or just before the 
operations’ (Louai 2013), mainly in order to mobilise strength and bravery. 
One informant who used to live in the south of Lebanon explained that 
during the war with Israel anāshīd were very important for communica-
tion between Hizbullah supporters and their families: ‘The anāshīd alerted 
people about when there was a Hizbullah operation. Through the songs, 
we could understand that something was going on, meaning that locals 
should stay away’ (Louai 2013). People from Hamas made similar state-
ments, concerning when anāshīd are used as a political platform that Israel 
cannot reach or control. ‘It is a relieving feeling that we have a tool, which 
we can use freely. We can say what we want and communicate it to each 
other’ (Hussein 2012). With regard to Hamas, it was also briefly explained 
that anāshīd are a means of communicating with and between prisoners in 
Israeli prisons.
In terms of communication, anāshīd are also used to spreading the word, 
and to remind people about the political history relating to Muslim society 
as a whole. With respect to Hamas, they specifically concern the history of 
the Palestinian land and population, their suffering, and the deprivations of 
rights. The anāshīd about history were depicted as the base or background to 
the struggle and goals of Hamas and Hizbullah. This is particularly impor-
tant for the Palestinian population living in the diaspora, in order that they 
remember the causes, but also in order to assure the people in the Palestinian 
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territories that they are not forgotten and that people are still fighting for the 
rights of the entire population. One informant revealed:
the anāshīd by Hamas are a very important element in Lebanon since they 
are living in a diaspora situation. This means that having different kinds of 
support, such as anāshīd, helps to remember the past and present and the 
struggle for a return to the homeland. (Khaled 2013)
In the case of Hizbullah, narrating history through anāshīd mainly concerns 
ʿAshuraʾ, commemorating the death of imam Husayn (ibn ʿAli), the grand-
son of the prophet Muhammad, who is commemorated for ten days each 
year. ʿAshuraʾ is, so it is argued, the main inspiration for the political struggle 
of Shia Muslims, which is partly imparted through anāshīd (Dabashi 2011: 
3–6). Many informants highlighted the importance of specific ʿAshuraʾ 
anāshīd, which give strength and motivate people to perform difficult tasks 
relating to the organisation in particular, but also to life in general.
The Effective Dimension
Supporters of Hamas and Hizbullah use songs of external composers within 
the organisations as a means of influence. The effective dimension also relates 
to the question how the same or similar anāshīd and songs used within the 
organisations are listened to in the private sphere. On the one hand, anāshīd 
and songs are brought and used outside of their original context. On the 
other hand, since the supporters are deeply rooted in and strictly controlled 
by the religious and political views of the organisations, the ‘original’ public 
context overlaps with the private. In addition, the effective dimension con-
tains the fact that organisational restrictions leave musicians with no choice 
but to keep on making anāshīd if they wish to make a living from music.
Politics through Others
As mentioned previously, Hamas only uses anāshīd and songs that are pro-
duced by affiliated bands. They consist of musicians sympathising with Hamas 
who, upon request, work closely with the organisation. Al-Amjad is the most 
common band to produce songs and CDs for Hamas and to perform during 
events outside of Gaza, particularly in Lebanon where they reside. Hizbullah 
adopts songs and anāshīd produced by Shams al-Horiye and Firqat al-Kashef 
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and, in addition, they also use anāshīd and songs from externally-affiliated 
bands sympathising with Hizbullah, such as al-Wilaya and al-Israq. Just like 
Hamas, Hizbullah hires the affiliated bands for events, and ‘when al-Wilaya 
and al-Israq want to record songs in the name of Hizbullah, it has to be 
approved by the leadership just as when any band wants to perform during 
Hizbullah celebrations’ (Samir 2013). Members of these bands are also occa-
sionally hired to perform together with the Hizbullah bands.
In addition, Hizbullah also uses anāshīd and other songs that are not 
produced by bands or singers affiliated with the organisation. This indicates a 
third level of the use of anāshīd and songs. If Hizbullah wants to use anāshīd 
or songs with messages which are not clear-cut, or which are to be interpreted 
in a manner deviating from the organisation’s goals, they are discussed and 
decided upon within the leadership. There have been situations when songs, 
for example by Fairouz or Julia Boutros, were discussed regarding whether or 
not to play them during an event. In these cases the lyrics have been ques-
tioned in terms of their propriety. In such instances, a few selected persons 
from Risalat’s leadership discuss whether a song can be employed, and, at 
times, whether a song could be used in a censored version (Hamid 2012).
Thus, in Hamas and Hizbullah many so-called external anāshīd and 
songs are applied in order to fit the organisations’ aims. The fact that music 
and anāshīd from the external arena flow into the organisations, being altered 
in order to suit their political and religious goals, illustrates that, after all, it is 
difficult to control music. However, through the organisation’s adjustments 
to external songs, Hamas and Hizbullah still try to maintain control, at least 
of the choice of songs employed within the organisations. The next section 
will show how the control spills over to the private sphere as well, where it is 
even more related to personal ideology and lack of choice.
Politics in Motion
The private sphere refers to a platform outside of Hamas’s and Hizbullah’s 
organisational domain to which supporters have to relate. Anāshīd can either 
be brought from the organisational domain into the private sphere to extend 
the political dimension of the organisation, or vice versa, as explained above. 
Anāshīd and other music can be brought from the private platform into 
the organisations (and adjusted accordingly), hence making them political. 
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Supporters of Hamas and Hizbullah are strictly controlled and are religiously 
and politically dedicated. These two aspects serve as the basis for explaining 
why anāshīd, and no other type of music, are also played in the private sphere. 
Hypothetically, no matter how much Hamas and Hizbullah try to control 
anāshīd and the supporters, people have the ability to listen to whatever 
kind of music they want in their leisure time. However, the data show that 
such potential freedom is rarely used or misused, for two main reasons, as 
indicated previously. Firstly, because of the strong religious devotion and the 
dedication to the organisations, most people listen to the same or a similar 
type of anāshīd and songs to those used in the organisations, even in their free 
time. One informant expressed it like this: ‘we listen to the same anāshīd in 
our private time, mainly due to religious reasons, because the normal songs 
which speak about love, or those songs performed by women, are haram, not 
permitted. But we can also listen to classical music’ (Samir 2013). Being part 
of Hamas and Hizbullah is not a position you walk in and out of: it is an 
identity that follows you at all times.
Secondly, even if a person chooses to listen to other sorts of music, there 
is a risk of being discovered, which is embarrassing and might jeopardise that 
person’s organisational position or affiliation. For example, the conductor of 
the military band in Hizbullah stated: ‘If I hear that someone listens to, for 
example, pop music, I would explain to him that it is disrespectful to play 
it officially. If he does it again, I would tell him to leave the building. It is 
everyone’s choice but it is not ok to let others, who did not ask for it, hear 
it involuntarily’ (Hamid 2012). Several people argued that choice of music 
equals personal responsibility. The statement concerns a public situation, but 
with the consensus that people are expected not to contradict the values of 
their organisation, even when no one can see them.
In the private sphere, anāshīd are listened to, for example, at home, in the 
car, and at weddings. The wedding scene is somewhat special, because instead 
of dealing with the type of anāshīd heard it concerns supporters’ responsibil-
ity for resisting inappropriate occasions where anāshīd or other songs are 
played. One example is from Hamas, where supporters refused to attend the 
wedding of their relative because pop music was played and men and women 
mixed. This implies that although anāshīd were played, the Hamas supporters 
would most likely have resisted attending anyway owing to the mixed setting. 
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One of the resisters stated: ‘It is not about if someone sees me or not. God 
sees me all the time, and if I join the party I will go to hell and have boiling 
metal in my ears’ (Omar 2012). This example stresses religious rather than 
political reasons and draws upon the same religious norms that are applicable 
on the organisational platforms. Another informant, a musician in Hamas, 
explained which kinds of songs are permitted at a wedding:
We sing about love, but we have to sing it in a way that it is mixed with 
religious words, so people accept it. Forbidden issues are those triggering 
sexual activities, which we cannot sing about. When we perform, we can 
sing to men and women at the same time even if they are in the same room, 
but they have to sit separated and cannot sit mixed. (Hani 2012)
Opinions on this varied, however, with some informants explaining that any 
type of mixed setting at weddings or other events is unacceptable and inap-
propriate, specifically if there is other music, or even anāshīd.
At home, social media such as TV, radio and the internet are commonly 
used to listen to anāshīd. Since both Hamas and Hizbullah broadcast their 
own channels, the al-Aqsa and the al-Manar, it is not surprising that their 
programmes are often watched at home, for example as background in the 
living-room or the kitchen. The fact that the organisations control the chan-
nels implies that the same types of anāshīd are heard in the public as in the 
private spheres. However, one musician in a Hamas band stated: ‘When al 
Qassam [Hamas’ military branch] holds festivals and they show it on TV, I 
hear that it is our songs. Not only on the al-Aqsa, but also other TV-channels 
like the al-Quds’ (Hussein 2012). Supporters of Hizbullah reported the same. 
This shows that the music employed in the organisations is transferred from 
this context and used in the private domain by people other than their sup-
porters. Moreover, a common theme addressed in the anāshīd broadcast on 
TV and radio is that of morals, which constitutes a typical subject within the 
organisations as well. The main justification for playing anāshīd about morals 
consciously within both platforms is that ‘they speak about how we should 
act in society and be good humans and Muslims’ (Louai 2013). Anāshīd as 
guides to correct living do not begin or end at the physical borders of the 
organisations. However, if the anāshīd about morals are productions or means 
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of Hamas or Hizbullah that are brought to the private sphere, the political 
dimension of Muslim duties such as jihad are likely to be transferred as well.
Another platform where anāshīd are listened to in the private sphere is 
in the car. On two occasions, a Hamas supporter drove me around in his car 
playing Hamas anāshīd loudly with the windows rolled down. It must have 
been an inappropriate setting, he alone with a woman, but at the same time 
he was delivering the messages of Hamas, to me and to the surroundings. 
When a religious leader of Hamas drove me home, loud pop music came 
out of the speakers as he started the engine. He became very unpleasant and 
turned it off immediately. It cannot be confirmed whether it was a coinci-
dence, or if it was evidence that the religious and political rules of Hamas had 
been ignored. One informant also expressed the view that what is relevant is 
not only what you listen to in the car, but also for what purposes the car is 
used: ‘You can use it to go to nightclubs or use it to visit your relatives or go 
to the masjid [mosque]’ (Saber 2013). If you play anāshīd in your free time 
in the car but use the car to go to a nightclub to hear pop music and drink 
alcohol, the role of anāshīd becomes eviscerated.
Some supporters also expressed frustration because of the obligation to 
listen to anāshīd in their private time, which means that they cannot just listen 
to any music that they like. No matter what the restrictions and control of 
anāshīd and other songs look like in Hamas and Hizbullah, many people are 
musicians, meaning that they are interested in the peculiarities of music. ‘We 
are not allowed to listen to any other music so what choice do we have? If we 
are going on a long car trip, we have two choices: to load anāshīd or to turn 
on the al-Noor radio channel, which will also play anāshīd ’ (Samir 2013). 
This implies an enforced transition of organisational anāshīd into the private 
sphere, where the religious dimension is emphasised, whereas the political sig-
nificance is somehow reduced. On the other hand, one informant underlined 
the fact that, even if he did not have many choices, he would still choose to 
listen to the anāshīd used in the organisations because of the high quality of 
the productions and their clear messages: ‘They produce modern, high qual-
ity audio that is representative and really powerful in spreading the message’ 
(Saber 2013). Thus, there are those who feel bothered by the underlying or 
direct enforcement and those who still feel that they possess control over their 
choice of anāshīd and songs, even if they are somehow limited.
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Lastly, and specifically regarding Hamas, using the same type of anāshīd 
inside and outside of the organisations fulfils the specific function of creating 
a homeland, since Palestinians are spread all over the world:
Anāshīd is a very important element, since many live in a diaspora situa-
tion. This means that having different kinds of support, such as anāshīd, 
helps to remember the past and present and the struggle for a return to 
the homeland. There are also many bands, which are not specifically for 
Hamas, which play just regular anāshīd about Palestine and religious mat-
ters. (Khaled 2013)
Since the struggle for Palestine is a matter of the heart for any Palestinian 
at all times, hearing the political Hamas anāshīd is in general a priority. The 
second part of the quotation indicates that anāshīd which are important for 
the Palestinian cause could also be brought into the organisation externally.
Conclusion
Anāshīd in Hamas and Hizbullah are used as a strategic tool in order to 
ensure, maintain and spread certain religious-political ideals of the organisa-
tions. The study revealed that anāshīd are strictly managed by the leadership 
of Hamas and Hizbullah and deployed during events to enhance political 
messages. According to Pratt (1994) and Street (2012), this is a prerequisite 
for understanding music as a purposive political tool. However, anāshīd are 
also applied and managed in accordance with religious values and restric-
tions, which makes the chants politically effective, also in contexts that are 
not formally controlled by the organisations. Although not created exclu-
sively for political purposes, the anāshīd in this case become a political tool 
owing to their connection to religion and because religion and politics in the 
organisations are intertwined.
The data showed that the main tactic in adopting anāshīd is political 
communication, and the conscious organisation and direction of events and 
of supporters. One core way to achieve the goals is to monitor and steer the 
management of anāshīd by selecting bands and songs with clear intentions 
for specific purposes. However, there is a designated, small division deciding 
which messages should be delivered and what is required to be in sync with 
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the organisations’ goals and values. Hence, the way Hamas and Hizbullah 
communicate through anāshīd is a controlled way of representing the political 
causes. The function of anāshīd for political purposes is often directly related 
to an organisational event or a political situation. During the event itself, in 
addition to organising people, anāshīd fulfil the function of framing the causes 
and creating feelings. However, this function is still controlled by the organisa-
tions or its authority, as Pratt (1994) points out. The use of anāshīd during 
events can be understood as a way of indoctrinating people towards correct 
opinions, thoughts and actions in line with religious-political values.
Another finding is that anāshīd and the collective setting of events together 
have an impact on supporters’ behaviour. In this regard, it is fair to say that the 
management of anāshīd in Hamas and Hizbullah is reflected in the political 
usage, or behaviour, of its people. Restricting the content of the songs accord-
ing to religious and political values and selecting certain songs for specific 
occasions has an impact on the behaviour of the persons hearing the songs. 
You will, for example, never see supporters singing beautifully and dancing to 
the songs. The atmosphere can be heated and people can be active, but always 
within confines. Slogans are screamed out only in accordance with the songs 
and the event. Flags are waved, but they carry the logos of the organisations or 
other politically and religiously correct slogans. This observation also implies 
that the anāshīd songs played during the events have a mutual effect on people 
owing to a common interpretation. Pratt (1994) argues that if this is the case, 
the use of music is politically effective. It is, however, somehow difficult to 
evaluate whether this efficacy is intentional or coincidental.
However much Hamas and Hizbullah exercise intentional influences 
through their management of anāshīd along religious and political lines, this 
study illustrates that the role of anāshīd spills over into the private sphere of 
supporters where it has a function along the effective dimension. Pratt (1994) 
argues that any song can be used for political purposes, which, as a tendency, 
might be correct. But the practice in and beyond Hamas and Hizbullah is 
far more complex. This study has been able to demonstrate that the songs 
used by these organisations are not always their own products, particularly 
in the case of Hamas. However, by changing and censoring the songs to 
fit their agendas, or a specific event, these organisations convert them into 
political tools, utilising the effective dimension in music. As Pratt (1994) 
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argues, music is employed that is not explicitly intended to be used in politi-
cal settings. Nevertheless, Hamas and Hizbullah do not necessarily use an 
original song and interpret it differently, as Pratt (1994) suggests, but rather 
change it strategically and consciously to fit the religious and political restric-
tions. This study has further shown that these restrictions create tensions 
when analysed in the private sphere. The effective dimension should not be 
understood as decoupled from the purposive one in Hamas and Hizbullah, 
as the restrictions are not only a tool for the organisations, but also interfere 
with people’s private lives. The tensions that anāshīd create are an indication 
that the borders between the private and the public are erased or questioned. 
Since the only ‘correct’ music to listen to is anāshīd or other songs that do 
not contradict Islam, even outside of the political sphere, there is an enforced 
overlap between the two spheres. This observation strengthens Pratt’s (1994) 
definition of music that is free for interpretation. Still, it also challenges it, 
since the freedom of people belonging to Hamas and Hizbullah has certain 
boundaries with regard to what type of music they can listen to, even in their 
free time. So, the purposive use of anāshīd ‘spills over’ from public events to 
the private sphere.
The restrictions on freedom, grounded in religion and as a component 
of political organisations, reaching into the private domain, mean a lack of 
choice and acceptance. They are based on respecting the directions of the 
organisations, but also the norms of Islam. This accords with Pratt’s (1994) 
argument that music is intended to frame and mark one’s identity. However, 
in the private sphere, this identity involves more religious than organisational 
belonging. Furthermore, Pratt (1994) argues that the interpretation, or the 
imagery, of songs is what defines individuals and groups within the effective 
dimension. People can accept what they hear, accept parts of what they hear, 
and reinterpret what they hear in order to match their own agenda and make 
the song ‘their own’. If we embrace such an argument, the private usage and 
meaning of anāshīd are a direct reflection of people’s religious affiliation and 
their organisational belonging. This study implies that, for members of Hamas 
or Hizbullah, use of and thoughts about anāshīd within the organisational 
sphere constantly overlap with the private and steadily oscillate between the 
political and the religious. This potential for continual movement between 
the organisational, the private, the religious and the political makes anāshīd 
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an extremely valuable tool for gaining support and knitting the goals of the 
organisation together with emotions and existential questions.
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AWĀRIM AND ITS APPROPRIATIONS
Alexandra Dick and Larissa-Diana Fuhrmann1
Making and Taking IS Anāshīd: The Example of Íalīl al-Íawārim
A singer [munshid2] is there to boost the morale of the combatants. When 
they hear a chant in combat, it lifts their spirits. It gives them confidence 
and they feel important. (from Ashbal –  Les lionceaux du califat, directed by 
Thomas Dandois and François-Xavier Trégan)
This is how Mohammad, who joined the so-called Islamic State (IS)3 at the 
age of thirteen, explains the importance of chants in battle. He participated 
in an IS chanting competition, which he won with an original chant, on the 
occasion of the visit of a high-ranking IS member from Iraq. Interestingly, 
Mohammad uses the Arabic term anāshīd (singular: nashīd) to describe 
chants in the context of IS during his interview. His use of the term reflects a 
 1 We owe our deep gratitude to Marius Botzenhart for sharing his expertise on music, Majd 
Alkatreeb for his research on hadith and support with translations, Yorck Beese and Mirko 
Scherf for sharing their expertise in gaming, and Scott Havener for drawing our attention to 
an IS document on music.
 2 A munshid is a nashīd (= chant, hymn) singer.
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broader twentieth-century trend in which jihadi groups and movements have 
appropriated the genre for their own purposes (Said 2016: 78), even though 
it broadly includes chants or hymns that are not jihadi4 (Shiloah 1993: 975). 
As becomes apparent in the documentary, Mohammad knows several jihadi 
anāshīd by IS, including Íalīl al-Íawārim, which he is shown chanting.
Íalīl al-Íawārim, which translates as ‘Clashing –  or Clanging –  of the 
Swords’, is a well-known IS5 nashīd. It first appeared in the fourth and 
final instalment of the same-titled video series released by the media office 
al-Furqān Media on 17 May 2014 (Pieslak and Lahoud 2018: 279). By that 
time, the group was already following a state-building agenda leading to the 
proclamation of the caliphate slightly over a month later on 29 June 2014. 
In this context, the title might be understood as a declaration of war against 
Arab Muslim governments which, in the eyes of IS, posed an obstacle to 
the idea of a first regional, then global caliphate, where only IS’s interpreta-
tion of Islam would be lived and practised. Even one year after its release, 
Íalīl al-Íawārim still ranked among the anāshīd most frequently appearing as 
‘soundtracks’ to IS videos (Pieslak and Lahoud 2018: Table 3).
While this nashīd was clearly among the most popular in the context of IS, 
it also appeared outside of the group, circulating on pop-cultural social media 
platforms such as YouTube and SoundCloud. The distribution through these 
channels made Íalīl al-Íawārim a popular target of audiovisual appropria-
tion, which led to the creation of various Íalīl al-Íawārim remixes and cover 
versions that were, in turn, disseminated online. While a detailed theoretical 
engagement with the concept of appropriation is discussed elsewhere in this 
volume,6 we define audiovisual appropriation as the act of creating a new 
work by taking visual and/or sonic imagery or elements of imagery from one 
context and re-using or re-arranging them in another context, so that they 
take on new meanings.7
 4 Our use of the term ‘jihadi’ is based on Günther and Pfeifer’s definition in the Introduction 
of this volume.
 5 For the sake of simplification, we use the term ‘IS’ for its predecessor ‘Islamic State of Iraq 
and al-Shām’ (ISIS/ ISIL) as well.
 6 For a theoretical framework of different types of appropriation, see Zywietz and Beese, 
Chapter 4.
 7 This definition was inspired by Hayley A. Rowe (2011).
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In this chapter, we will address a range of audiovisual strategies for 
appropriating IS anāshīd.8 Sonic and visual appropriations typically appear in 
combination, wherein one form is dominant in most cases with regard to the 
complexity of the produced sounds or visuals. In this sense, we understand 
the audiovisuality of appropriating Íalīl al-Íawārim as a spectrum of sonic 
and visual appropriation –  some appropriations are more sonically derivative 
while others are more visual, but we analyse them as a continuum of appro-
priation, not as distinct binaries.
Following Castells’ (2007: 242) conception that ‘the media are not the 
holders of power, but they constitute by and large the space where power is 
decided’, we argue that IS anāshīd and their appropriations together form 
part of a broader struggle over media visibility and cultural power. We 
thereby draw on Al-Rawi’s (2016: 52) concept of Anti-ISIS Humor, in which 
he defines audiovisual appropriations mocking Íalīl al-Íawārim as ‘active 
involvements in ridiculing, countering, and discrediting the terrorists’ ideol-
ogy’ and thus as ‘cultural resistance efforts that aim at countering terrorism’. 
Our chapter complements Al-Rawi’s concept through detailed analyses of the 
distinct appropriation strategies applied to counter IS.
The Jihadi Use of Anāshīd
The origins of anāshīd have, indeed, nothing to do with jihadism. Rather, 
they lie in ‘inshād al-shiʿr, a protracted poetical recitation delivered in a loud 
voice’, a practice that was already widespread in pre-Islamic times (Shiloah 
1995: 4–5).9 The jihadi use of anāshīd, on the other hand, is a relatively 
new phenomenon that emerged towards the end of the twentieth century. 
Jihadi anāshīd are sometimes conceptualised as ‘jihad-hymns’ in literature on 
jihadism (see e.g. Prucha 2018), but this reductionist view leaves out their 
substantial non-jihadi history as well as their religiously and culturally diverse 
manifestations in the present (Ufuq e.V. 2016a,b).
In her chapter in this volume, Weinrich (Chapter 12) argues that the a 
 8 This chapter has already been published as an abbreviated version in German titled 
Íalīl al-Íawārim: Ein Nashīd und seine Aneignungen (‘Íalīl al-Íawārim: A Nashīd and its 
Appropriations’). While the German version only gives an overview of audiovisual appro-
priation, this chapter addresses various appropriation strategies.
 9 For a more detailed description of the term nashīd, see Weinrich, Chapter 12.
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cappella nature of jihadi anāshīd links ‘to the “most pure” religious musical 
genres’. In the view of jihadi groups such as IS, the genre represents sacred 
chants as opposed to worldly music, which they disapprove of. To mark this 
difference, there are generally no instruments used in jihadi anāshīd, includ-
ing those of IS, following Salafi-Wahhabi10 doctrine that forbids the use of 
musical instruments and heavily restricts the use of rhythm instruments (Said 
2016: 78). In January 2014, IS issued a statement titled Bayān ʿan Manʿ 
al-Mūsīqā wa-l-Ghināʾ wa-l-Íuwar ʿalā al-Maªallāt (‘Statement Concerning 
the Prohibition on Music, Singing, and Photos on Shops’), in which its 
stance on instruments and singing is formulated: ‘Know [. . .] that stringed 
instruments11 and song12 are forbidden in Islam because they detract from 
mention of God and the Qurʾan, and they are a source of strife and corrup-
tion for the heart’ (trans. Al-Tamimi 2015).13 Although this document does 
not address the conditions under which anāshīd are permissible according 
to IS, it indirectly suggests a link between text-centred Islamic practices and 
anāshīd. The a cappella nature thus also represents a means for jihadi groups 
to evoke associations of religious practices such as prayers and Quranic recita-
tions (Weinrich, Chapter 12), which place jihadi anāshīd in the realm of the 
sacred.
The IS Nashīd Íalīl al-Íawārim
The sanctifying potency of the nashīd genre even unfolds when topics such as 
jihad and martyrdom appear as lyrics. Although other themes are addressed 
as well –  Ummatī Qad Lāªa Fajrun14 (‘My Umma, Dawn Has Appeared’), 
for instance, primarily aims to spread the ‘glad tidings’ of an approaching 
Islamic State –  fighting is prevalent in IS’s most popular anāshīd. As Pieslak 
10 Salafism describes a religious move ment within Sunni Islam that aims to return to the 
roots of Islam, but at the same time absorbs modern political de velopments (Biene 2015). 
Wahhabism describes a form of poli tical Salafism that is particularly prevalent in Saudi 
Arabia.
11 The word used in Arabic is maʿāzif (singular: miʿzaf).
12 ‘Singing’ and ‘song’ here are translations of the Arabic word ghināʾ, ‘which became the 
generic term for art music’ (Shiloah 1995: 5).
13 There exist, however, several examples of IS videos in which synthesisers are used. Further 
research thus needs to address the legitimacy of instruments against this backdrop.
14 Muʾassasat Ajnād li-l-Intāj al-Iʿlāmī (2013).
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and Lahoud (2018: Table 4) demonstrate in their analysis of seventeen IS 
anāshīd that appeared most frequently in a sample of fifty-eight IS videos 
released between May 2015 and March 2016, thirteen out of the seventeen 
anāshīd cover this theme, among them Íalīl al-Íawārim:
Chorus:
Clashing of the swords: a nasheed of the defiant.
The path of fighting is the path of life.
So amidst an assault, tyranny is destroyed.
And concealment of the voice results in the beauty of the echo.
Verse 2:
So arise, brother, get up on the path of salvation,
So we may march together, resist the aggressors,
Raise our glory, and raise the foreheads
That have refused to bow before any besides God. [repeat line]
(trans. Al-Tamimi 2014)
As the line ‘the path of fighting is the path of life’ (wa-darb al-qitāl †arīq 
al-ªayāt) expresses most clearly, fighting has a positive connotation for IS 
and jihadi groups in general, since death in jihad is perceived as a means of 
obtaining eternal life in Paradise. Furthermore, jihad comes along with ter-
ritorial conquests, spreading the only accepted way of living and practising 
Islam by fighting ‘tyranny’ (†ughāt). This term is often used for Sunni Arab 
governments and regimes, such as Saudi Arabia, that, in the eyes of IS, do not 
practise ‘true Islam’ and represent an obstacle to IS’s notion of an Islamic cali-
phate. IS, on the other hand, does not rely on human governance, but rather 
on divine guidance, as the story goes: they ‘have refused to bow before any 
besides God’. To uphold this self-proclaimed religious legitimacy, theological 
references to the Quran and the hadith15 generally play an important role in 
IS anāshīd.16 In the case of Íalīl al-Íawārim, the use of the term Íawārim is 
15 ‘In Islam ªadīth is the term applied to specific reports of the prophet Muªammad’s words 
and deeds as well as those of many of the early Muslims; the word is used both in a collective 
and in a singular sense’ (Speight 2019).
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remarkable, as it describes a somewhat outdated expression for ‘swords’ that 
appears in the hadith. Finally, the lyrics are inclusive (‘we’) and invite certain 
listeners (‘brother’) to take part in the fight of IS.
The theme of fighting is also reflected in the musical composition of Íalīl 
al-Íawārim and IS’s most popular anāshīd in general. Out of the seventeen 
IS anāshīd analysed by Pieslak and Lahoud (2018: Table 4), ‘eleven [. . .] 
were quickly paced, at 118 BPM [beats per minute] or higher, and this trend 
was somewhat predictable in that lyrical themes about fighting and combat 
seem more suitably set at higher tempi’. With a tempo of 130 BPM, this 
may explain why the nashīd Íalīl al-Íawārim is used in IS videos like Íalīl 
al-Íawārim, Part 4, and Upon the Prophetic Methodology for sequences show-
ing shootings and killings. By using anāshīd with fast tempi for violent scenes, 
IS follows established media rules. Applying Weindl’s (2013: 62) categorisa-
tion of different functions of extradiegetic film music, Íalīl al-Íawārim here 
not only serves as a tool for affectively involving audiences, it also sonically 
labels an openly violent sub-genre of IS videos. In a way, listening to the 
nashīd already indicates what to visually expect from these videos.
In terms of its thematic focus and musical composition, Íalīl al-Íawārim 
can generally be regarded as characteristic of IS anāshīd: it is a three-minute-
long a cappella chant, sung only by men, applying overdubbing, pitch correc-
tion, digital reverb and delay. The main –  or maybe even the only –  munshid 
is known as Abu Yasir. He is one of IS’s two most famous nashīd singers, 
the other being Maher Meshʿal (Pieslak and Lahoud 2018: Table 4). The 
nashīd is mainly composed in the Arabic musical scale maqām al-faraªfazā 
on F, which corresponds with the F natural minor scale of ‘Western’ music 
theory.17 It has a limited dynamic and melodic range and a clear, strophic 
structure that gives listeners orientation and can help them to memorise 
the nashīd: chorus—chorus—verse 1—chorus—verse 2—chorus—chorus—
verse 3—chorus—chorus—chorus—short outro, in which the last line of the 
nashīd and/or its title are repeated. Repetitions are generally common in IS 
17 The notes of maqām al-faraªfazā on F and the F natural minor scale are F, G, A flat, B flat, 
C, D flat and E flat. In Íalīl al-Íawārim, the note G flat also appears in a short transitional 
section, bridging the verse to the chorus, and corresponds with a somewhat curious chord 
shift to the flat II harmony.
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anāshīd. There exists an abundance of examples in which the last line of the 
verse and/or chorus is repeated to mark transitions.
In the case of Íalīl al-Íawārim, the title is furthermore not only repeated 
in a subordinated vocal line throughout the verses, but also literally trans-
lated into a sound through the metallic clanging of swords that appears twice 
in the nashīd. Gråtrud (2016: 1063) argues that this repetitive structure, 
‘coupled with [the] engaging rhythm, [. . .] facilitates internalization of the 
messages’. Similarly, Schinis (2017) calls the use of repetition in anāshīd ‘a 
strategy used by IS to facilitate their memorization by its intended audience’. 
The question remains, however, who constitutes this ‘intended audience’. 
While it is rather unlikely that IS could have strategically used the repeti-
tive structure of anāshīd for indoctrination purposes, it is possible that it is 
meant to reach informed listeners with previous exposure to jihadi contents 
and Arabic language skills. As focusing exclusively on the lyrics would limit 
the potential outreach of IS anāshīd, their musical composition is equally 
important, since it provides a semiotic language that can speak to broader 
audiences.
Cultural Resistance in the Online Sphere
The internet has played an important role not only in the dissemination of 
IS anāshīd and jihadi contents,18 but also in politics in the Middle East and 
North Africa in general, where social media became a driving force of the 
so-called Arab Spring. The internet and other technologies have, indeed, 
changed our whole communication system, allowing for the democratisa-
tion of content production, which has become more accessible, affordable 
and user-friendly as of the 1970s (Jenkins 2006: 11–13). While the indus-
trial communication system was built around mass media with a one-way, 
vertical distribution, the foundation of today’s ‘network society is the global 
web of horizontal communication networks that include the multimodal 
exchange of interactive messages from many to many both synchronous and 
asynchronous’ (Castells 2007: 246). In particular, the emergence of interac-
tive websites such as Flickr, YouTube and Wikipedia in the 2000s enabled 
18 IS built an elaborated digital infrastructure that academics and journalists have already 
described in detail. See e.g. Islamic State: The Digital Caliphate (Atwan 2015).
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a growing number of users to post texts, audios, photos and videos online, 
which is summarised under the terms User-Generated Content (UGC) and 
User-Created Content.19 Furthermore, platforms where amateurs and pro-
fessional artists alike can create parallel (art) worlds independent of tradi-
tional gatekeepers such as curators, editors and gallerists were established 
in the form of social media (Chin-Fook and Simmonds 2011: 21–2). With 
audio and visual editing software just a fingertip away, smartphone users 
are connected to a global network, enabling them to instantly share their 
latest creations. With one tweet, millions of people can possibly be reached, 
potentially overcoming the boundaries of nationality, class, race, gender and 
political affiliation. IS, too, used these affordances of the internet. As a reac-
tion, various actors such as states, political organisations and private users 
began to reclaim the online sphere and engaged in countering IS online. The 
internet provided all these actors, including IS, with an instrument of cul-
tural self-empowerment to contest and negotiate power and counter-power 
anew (Al-Rawi 2016: 56–7).
Appropriating Íalīl al-Íawārim
The categorisation of cultural power and counter-power or resistance is, of 
course, relational. While Íalīl al-Íawārim could also be understood to chal-
lenge mainstream media messages, its audiovisual appropriations, in turn, 
counter IS media (ibid.). Taking Íalīl al-Íawārim as a starting point, we 
understand its appropriations as acts of cultural resistance against IS. We 
follow Duncombe’s (2002: 5) definition of cultural resistance as ‘the use of 
culture consciously or unconsciously, effectively or not, to resist or change 
a dominant structure’, meaning that not the intention, but rather the result 
of breaking with IS doctrine is central when appropriating Íalīl al-Íawārim. 
Our analysis encompasses sonic, visual and audiovisual appropriation strate-
gies that are part of an audiovisual spectrum. While all of the appropriations 
analysed here combine sonic and visual elements, one form, either the visual 
or the sonic, is more elaborate in the respective examples.
19 More on the emergence of UGC can be found in Participative Web: User-generated Content 
(OECD 2017).
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Sonic Appropriation
The fact that IS, according to its Statement Concerning the Prohibition on 
Music, Singing and Photos on Shops, disapproves of ‘stringed instruments’ 
already suggests one strategy of sonic appropriation: by using musical instru-
ments, the produced sound loses its status as a sacred nashīd according to 
IS. The second example presented here follows a similar logic, adding, how-
ever, an inversion of the notes to change the mode from minor to major to 
create a more cheerful version –  at least for listeners familiar with ‘Western’ 
musical traditions.
Using Instruments: Piano Cover
The strategy of using instruments is, for example, employed in the animation-
based piano cover Salil Sawarim (Synthesia piano cover).20 It combines the 
sonic imagery of Íalīl al-Íawārim, played on a piano, with the visual imagery 
of a piano keyboard and the visual representation of music through bar-graph 
scores.
At the bottom, there is the keyboard of a contemporary standard piano 
with the highest (white) key missing. Each key is labelled with the respective 
note. Keys to be pressed are additionally highlighted with colours; those 
played by the left hand are blue, those played by the right hand yellow. 
Drawing on aesthetics similar to those of the popular video game Guitar 
Hero, the notes vertically fly in as bars, allowing the piano player to prepare 
for the following notes. These bars then land on the keys that are to be pressed 
with small visualised ‘explosions’ (Figure 12.1). The length of the bars and 
the vertical distances between them reflect the note value, that is the dura-
tion of a single note, and the rests, the pauses between notes. These elements 
together form the rhythm of Íalīl al-Íawārim.
By visualising these musical features of Íalīl al-Íawārim, the piano cover 
also serves as a tutorial that promotes an IS nashīd and teaches others how to 
play it on the piano. In this regard, the piano cover could represent fan art. 
A closer look at the YouTube comments posted under this video, however, 
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suggests the opposite. One comment stands out, as it highlights the relation-
ality of cultural power and cultural resistance: ‘I asked if I could play a song 
in music class. The teacher gave me access to the piano and I started playing 
this song 😂.’ In educational contexts, teachers are generally in more powerful 
positions than students. This student thus subversively used a jihadi nashīd to 
contest existing hierarchies within a mainstream education system. This does, 
however, not change the fact that using a piano is against IS doctrine, which 
the users commenting on the video seem to be aware of: ‘Stop it! Pianos are 
haram! XD’, ‘My piano is trying to behead me . . . is this normal?’, or ‘My 
piano just blew up’.21
All of these comments refer to IS’s categorisation of instruments as 
unlawful. The Arabic word used in the above-mentioned statement issued 
by IS is maʿāzif (singular: miʿzaf), ‘a term denoting today any string or wind 
instrument or even, more restrictedly, a piano’ (Farmer 1991: 189), which is 
noteworthy in the context of this piano cover. As it is unlikely that the pro-
ducer or the commenters knew about any of this, their awareness of breaking 
with IS doctrine by using a piano is all the more remarkable. Cases like that 
of the Palestinian-Syrian pianist Aeham Ahmad internationally received great 
attention and spread IS’s stance on music. His piano was burnt by an IS 
member when IS, in 2015, seized control of Yarmouk, a suburb of the Syrian 
21 We are fully aware of the brutality of IS and distance ourselves from the content of these 
comments.
Figure 12.1 Video still from Salil Sawarim (Synthesia piano cover).
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capital Damascus. The burning piano became a symbol of living under IS 
rule (see Abdelaziz 2015). While the piano cover possibly also promotes an IS 
nashīd, it even more engages others to commit an unlawful act in the view of 
IS, making it –  as an effect not necessarily intended –  an example of cultural 
resistance.
Inverting Notes: MIDIFLIP Version
Approximately one year after having uploaded the piano cover Salil 
Sawarim (Synthesia piano cover) onto YouTube, the same producer added 
another piano version, applying a sonic appropriation strategy known as 
MIDIFLIP. Accordingly, this version is called Salil Sawarim (Synthesia piano 
cover) –  #MIDIFLIP.22 As the visual imagery applied here does not differ from 
the first version apart from using the full keyboard of a standard piano, we 
will only address sonic alterations. MIDIFLIP describes the idea of inverting 
music around one fixed note that serves as an anchor, ‘so that the low notes 
become high and the high notes become low’.23 In the MIDIFLIP version of 
Íalīl al-Íawārim, this anchor note is A flat. By flipping all other notes, the 
scale is changed from F natural minor to E major.24 This transposition comes 
along with a mode alteration from minor, which ‘is associated with sadness 
for a large segment of Western-enculturated listeners’ (Huron 2008: 59),25 
to major, which may evoke different associations. This altered perspective 
is reflected in the reactions on YouTube: ‘This should be used in an Islamic 
State of Iraq and the Levant/Syria movie at the end when ISIS gets defeated 
and the Middle East thrives more than any other region.’ This optimism is 
also expressed in the comment ‘my exploded piano has come back to life’, 
which almost seems to be a reaction to the comment ‘my piano just blew up’ 
posted under the first version.
22 Available at <https:// www.youtube.com/ watch?v=9AX3xmTg-OM> (last accessed 2 August 
2019).
23 Available at <https:// www.youtube.com/ watch?v=yhsAyVcUJ_ I> (last accessed 2 August 
2019).
24 For the sake of an easier understanding, we will only use the terminology of ‘Western’ music 
theory here.
25 Huron (2008: 59) highlights, however, that ‘not all music in the minor mode has sad con-
notations. [. . .] Moreover, a composer might choose to use the minor key for purposes 
other than evoking or portraying a particular emotion.’
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AUDIOvisual Appropriation
While both piano versions follow the overall structure of Íalīl al-Íawārim, 
our next example re-organises its structure by applying hip-hop sampling 
techniques and modifies its tempo and pitch to ridicule the vocals and mes-
sage of Íalīl al-Íawārim. It also alters Islamist visual imagery, with sound, 
however, remaining the main focus of appropriation.
Speeded-up, High-pitched Hardcore Remix
The hardcore techno version Saleel Al Sawarim –  Hardcore Remix (Full 
Version)26 uses chopping, initially a hip-hop sampling technique, but which is 
today used across various genres, to metaphorically ‘cut Íalīl al-Íawārim into 
pieces’ and re-arrange its structure. ‘“Chopping”, as its name suggests, refers 
to altering a sampled phrase by dividing it into smaller segments and recon-
figuring them in a different order’ (Schloss 2014: 106). In addition to this, a 
percussive hardcore techno beat is added and another, rather simple strategy 
of sonic appropriation applied: it speeds up Íalīl al-Íawārim to the very fast 
tempo of 185 BPM, which is characteristic of the hardcore genre, using a 
higher pitch. Apart from undermining IS doctrine with ‘every beat of the 
bass [that] is a punch in IS’ face’, as one commenter puts it, this version thus 
ridicules the vocals and, in the end, the original message of Íalīl al-Íawārim 
through a faster tempo and higher pitch. While this strategy is unique among 
the examples analysed here, there exist striking structural commonalities with 
other sample-based sonic appropriations of Íalīl al-Íawārim, as the compari-
son with a dubstep remix titled Nasheed Saleel Sawarim –  (sfraxwell remix)27 
demonstrates. This comparison suggests that sample-based appropriations of 
IS anāshīd follow a certain scheme: both versions start with a hit, so that the 
listener familiar with Íalīl al-Íawārim immediately knows that this cannot be 
the original nashīd. Then the first part with the original nashīd follows: in the 
case of the Hardcore Remix, however, already speeded up and high-pitched. 
The transition to the second part is again marked with a hit, which is, apart 
26 Available at <https:// www.youtube.com/ watch?v=j-Q0_ W_ XcYw> (last accessed 2 August 
2019).
27 Available at <https:// www.youtube.com/ watch?v=-823SjzMST0> (last accessed 2 August 
2019).
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from shouts, used for transitions. The second part consists of part one and an 
added beat, here a simple percussive hardcore techno beat. This culminates, 
in the third part, in the complete absorption of the nashīd through the beat. 
In the case of the Hardcore Remix, this beat consists of a constant kick drum, 
to which a lead synthesiser phrase is added that copies the lead vocals of 
Íalīl al-Íawārim. These parts are then slightly altered and combined, until 
the remix ends with the words Íalīl al-Íawārim, eventually returning to the 
original structure of the nashīd.
Although sonic appropriation is clearly the focus of this remix, it also 
appropriates, unlike the examples hitherto introduced, Islamist visual imagery 
(Figure 12.2). The cover picture resembles a ‘flag used by various Islamist 
organisations’ (Quilliam Foundation 2014). It has the same colour scheme, 
that is, black and white, and the same inscriptions, expressing the Islamic 
creed, the so-called shahāda. However, the quantity and the arrangement 
of the word shahāda differs. As it appears eight times, instead of just once, 
and the word ‘hardcore’ is added, it becomes rather obvious that this cannot 
be the ‘official’ flag of any jihadi or Islamist group. The possible association 
with Islamism or jihadism is thus immediately distorted through audiovisual 
 elements that seem odd.
Figure 12.2 Video still from Saleel Al Sawarim – Hardcore Remix (Full Version).
nashī d s
˙
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AudioVISUAL Appropriation
Moving further on the audiovisual spectrum, the main focus of our next 
examples is visual appropriation. Sound is here rather used as background 
music, which is an important difference from the previous examples.
Gamification
Mahrajān al-Íawārim –  Zār Rīmiks | El Sawarim –  Zar Remix28 –  the first part 
of the title meaning ‘Festival of the Swords’ –  uses gamification, that is, ‘the 
use of game design elements in non-game contexts’ (Deterding et al. 2011: 
1), in the form of a fictional game titled Super ISIS Bros, referring to a popular 
Nintendo video game. Right from the beginning, this gamification version 
refers to the audiovisual aesthetics of video games. It first shows the fictional 
brand ‘CIA Games’ including the abbreviation of the Central Intelligence 
Agency. Subsequently, the title of a fictional game follows that is called Íalīl 
al-Íawārim (in Arabic) Super ISIS Bros, which refers to the Nintendo game 
Super Mario Bros (Figure 12.3).
The visual animation of the words ‘press start’ and the accompanying 
28 Available at <https:// www.youtube.com/ watch?v=hqgEIVrQSd0> (last accessed 2 August 
2019).
Figure 12.3 Video still from Mahrajān al-Íawārim – Zār Rīmiks | El Sawarim – Zar Remix.
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sounds further intensify the impression of a video game. The audience plays 
this game through an implicit player whose hands are shown selecting ‘con-
tinue’, using a controller resembling that of Sony’s PlayStation. The viewer 
is then immersed into the animated, fictional game Super ISIS Bros on full 
screen. The player character is an IS member with a black balaclava, military 
vest, and a sword in his left hand. He tries to behead as many other characters 
as possible, all of them resembling Muʿadh al-Kasasba, a pilot of the Royal 
Jordanian Air Force whose aircraft crashed over IS territory and who was cap-
tured and burnt to death in 2016. In this way, Super ISIS Bros inverts the aim 
of the game. While in Super Mario Bros the player (character) kills attacking 
opponents in order to stay alive and finish a level, the IS character in Super 
ISIS Bros aims to kill as many characters as possible. Accordingly, these char-
acters here are no real opponents, but rather victims, who are not attacking 
the player, not even defending themselves. All they can do is run away, look 
back at how the IS character approaches and wait to be beheaded, whereas 
the IS character can increase his size and power through a Super Mushroom, 
a power-up also appearing in Super Mario. This power-up is sonically accom-
panied by an eight-bit lead synthesiser phrase matching Super Mario’s sound 
design. Throughout the game, the high-pitched original vocals of the nashīd 
Íalīl al-Íawārim can be heard, to which an ‘orientalising’ percussion beat 
is added. This ‘orientalising’ impression is intensified through the game’s 
landscape, consisting of sand dunes and cacti. Although the IS character kills 
all the other characters and thereby presumably ‘successfully’ finishes this 
level, the game ends with the words ‘Game Over’, again sonically illustrated 
through a lead synthesiser phrase. This predetermined twist at the end possi-
bly includes the implicit message to IS: ‘No matter how many people you kill, 
you will be “Game Over” in the end.’ In this regard, the gamification ver-
sion interestingly mirrors IS’s use of gamification. The application Muʿallim 
al-Óurūf, for example, is designed to teach children the Arabic alphabet, 
using a reward system of launching a missile at London, Paris, New York 
City or Moscow. The outcome, however, is always the same: either one of 
these cities can be attacked or nothing happens. Although IS-produced games 
generally follow formalised, ludic rules, in this regard they lack a fundamental 
ludic element, namely the condition of winning or losing, so that IS is always 
victorious in the end (Rauscher 2018). However, Super ISIS Bros hijacks this 
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predetermination of IS-produced games by inverting the roles of superiority 
and inferiority. While in IS-produced games the successful outcome for IS 
is invariable, there is no possibility of the IS character winning the game 
in Super ISIS Bros. This is particularly interesting in the regional context of 
this appropriation video. The additional information provided states that the 
three producers come from Egypt. In this regard, Mahrajān al-Íawārim –  Zār 
Rīmiks | El Sawarim –  Zar Remix represents not only an act of cultural resist-
ance, but also a compensation strategy in the face of a regional threat.
Re-enactment
The motive of decapitation is also central in Íalīl al-Íawārim –  ‘Maskhara’ 
Tariyaqa ʿalā al-Dawāʿish bi-Jumhūriyyat Dār al-Salām29 (‘Clashing of the 
Swords –  Mockery of IS Members in the Republic of the Abode of Peace’), 
which demonstrates how closely IS is associated with this form of execution 
and reveals another dimension of appropriation: besides sounds or visuals, 
both videos appropriate ‘acts’ associated with IS, namely beheadings.30 Like 
the previous examples, this version unites sonic and visual appropriation 
strategies. Nevertheless, using a pre-existing remix of Íalīl al-Íawārim as 
background music, the focus of this amateur video is clearly on visual appro-
priation. It depicts several persons re-enacting an IS beheading.31 Four men 
dressed in black with balaclavas stand behind and hold knives to the throats 
of four male persons, who are dressed in shades of red and are kneeling in one 
row (Figure 12.4).
Among the kneeling persons are three children or adolescents, which 
suggests that the protagonists might be from one family. The colour of 
the clothes worn by the perpetrators and victims as well as their spatial 
positioning trigger associations of IS execution videos. The impression of 
29 Available at <https:// www.youtube.com/ watch?v=JZeT1XVr3R8> (last accessed 2 August 
2019). The term Dār al-Salām (‘abode of peace’) used in the title describes, like Dār al-Islām 
(‘abode of Islam’), areas under Islamic rule and jurisdiction as opposed to areas that are part 
of Dār al-Óarb (‘abode of war’) (Albrecht 2016). IS and other jihadi groups use this distinc-
tion to legitimise military conquests (Funke 2018).
30 For an analysis of the visual performativity of violence in IS beheading videos, see Krona, 
Chapter 7.
31 For an in-depth description of a video using the same meme, see Pfeifer, Fuhrmann and 
Wevers, Chapter 8.
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professionally produced IS videos stands, however, in stark contrast to the 
intimate living-room setting and the amateur hand-held camera. These 
factors indicate that this is not a violent video, but rather a parody of 
IS. Nevertheless, the reference to IS execution videos is maintained for the 
first fifteen seconds, in which the protagonists stand or kneel next to each 
other, until the sonic caesura of an Allāh Akbar shout (‘God is greater’) used 
in the Íalīl al-Íawārim remix puts an end to the situation. The hierarchy 
between the perpetrators and victims, symbolised through the rigid position-
ing, disperses immediately and everybody starts dancing in a way that evokes 
memories of the Harlem Shake.32 Apart from the use of musical instru-
ments, dancing, too, is regarded as bidʿa (Wöhler-Khalfallah 2004: 78), 
an unlawful innovation (Krämer 2005: 265) according to Salafi-Wahhabi 
doctrine. In this regard, the protagonists oppose IS in a twofold, audiovisual 
way. Against the backdrop of its regional political context, the video again 
represents both an act of resistance and a compensation strategy. It was part 
of a major internet phenomenon that went viral in 2015, especially among 
Egyptian users, and inspired Arabic-speaking YouTubers to produce their 
32 The Harlem Shake was a popular dance meme some years ago (see Lotan 2013).
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own parodic re-enactment. While the number of protagonists and the set-
tings vary, most of these versions use the same remix of Íalīl al-Íawārim, 
which predetermines the choreography from a re-enacted IS decapitation 
towards an improvised dancing performance. The fact that this version, too, 
originated in Egypt allows the conclusion that engagement in countering IS 
might increase with geographical proximity.
Visual Appropriation
Now that we have finally reached the other end of the audiovisual spectrum, 
our last example demonstrates how visuals can superimpose new denota-
tions onto the original message, even if the sound of Íalīl al-Íawārim is not 
changed at all.
Misheard Lyrics
The ISIS Song Saleel Sawarim Presidential Sing Along Parody33 demonstrates 
the seemingly limitless creativity of online users in making visual contents 
and appropriations. It counters IS without any sonic modifications, solely 
by adding a visual dimension in the form of lyrics to the nashīd to divert 
the viewer’s attention. Such videos are known as Mondegreens (Smith 2003) 
or Misheard Lyrics versions, which ‘are based on amusing mistranslations of 
spoken sounds to written words. These are done by transcribing what the 
words sound like (that is, their phonetics), regardless of their true mean-
ing’ (Shifman 2014: 108). Outside the anglophone context they are also 
known as Soramimi in Japanese (Beck 2014), Mots d’Heures in francophone 
(Weissmann 2014) and Agathe Bauer Songs in German-speaking contexts. 
All these phenomena have in common that the verbalised lyrics derive from 
homophonic translations injecting comical references (Otake 2007). This 
way, as Figure 12.5 shows, the text sung in Arabic, wa-darbu-l-qitāli34 (‘the 
path of fighting’), becomes ‘What, the bull bit Ali?’, illustrated with a Pit 
Bull.
The Arabic lyrics are replaced with humorous and, at times, nonsensical 
33 Available at <https:// www.youtube.com/ watch?v=Ft071uT3hfM> (taken down by 
YouTube).
34 We have slightly modified the transliteration wa-darb al-qitāl to express the Arabic phonet-
ics that are central here.
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translations into English that superimpose new denotations onto the original 
sonic message of the nashīd. In the context of IS anāshīd, this appropria-
tion strategy is particularly meaningful, since the text here represents a key 
element, in order to classify anāshīd as sacred. As is common in sing-along 
videos, the lyrics appear at the bottom of the screen. While changes of colour 
usually indicate the course of a song, here ‘jumping heads’ of former US 
presidents and presidential candidates guide one through the nashīd. The 
politicians move past illustrations of various ‘misunderstood’ words in the 
form of photos, portraits, logos and cartoons to highlight the alterations in 
the denotations (Figure 12.5). Among them are ‘orientalising’ depictions 
such as a jinn coming out of a bottle, heads of pigs, which some Muslims 
might regard as a provocation, and a portrait of the philosopher, cultural 
critic and atheist Friedrich Nietzsche. The partially Dadaesque visual addi-
tions entertain, confuse or provoke viewers, depending on their cultural 
background. Whenever the title Saleel al-Sawarim35 appears, the letter ‘l’ in 
Saleel is replaced by swords to illustrate the ‘Clashing of the Swords’. Having 
fulfilled their purposes and having led through various verses and choruses, 
35 This spelling is used in the video.
Figure 12.5 Video still from ISIS Song Saleel Sawarim Presidential Sing Along Parody.
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the heads of the US politicians are impaled on these swords at the end of the 
nashīd.
Breaking IS (Anāshīd)?
In this chapter, we have introduced the reader to jihadi anāshīd and varying 
appropriation strategies. An in-depth analysis of the Arabic IS nashīd Íalīl 
al-Íawārim has revealed how IS thematically and musically realises the idea of 
fighting. Jihadi media, including IS anāshīd, are disseminated online through 
social media channels. As we have demonstrated through six examples of 
audiovisual appropriation, however, they also face massive cultural resistance 
online. Following Al-Rawi’s (2016: 56 –7) concept of Anti-ISIS Humor, 
according to which these appropriations represent instruments with which to 
contest and renegotiate prevailing structures of power, we discussed appro-
priations of IS anāshīd in the context of cultural resistance. Unlike Al-Rawi, 
however, we focused on identifying the audiovisual strategies applied, which 
we conceptualised as a spectrum of sonic and visual appropriation. We have 
shown how these practices challenge not only IS anāshīd but also IS as a 
whole, with its Salafi-Wahhabi-inspired doctrine and interpretation of Islam.
Our first example was a tutorial-like piano cover that teaches others how 
to play Íalīl al-Íawārim on the piano and thus sonically undermines IS doc-
trine through the use of a musical instrument. Then the same cover followed 
as an inverted version, called MIDIFLIP, transposed to another mode that 
may seem more cheerful than the original for listeners familiar with ‘Western’ 
musical traditions. After that, we introduced a speeded-up, high-pitched 
hardcore version as an AUDIOvisual appropriation which, first, sonically 
ridicules the vocals and message of Íalīl al-Íawārim through a faster tempo 
and higher pitch and, second, uses the sampling technique of chopping to 
metaphorically ‘cut Íalīl al-Íawārim into pieces’ in addition to adding a beat 
and using Islamist visual imagery as a cover picture.
Moving further on the audiovisual spectrum, we analysed an animated 
gamification version called Super ISIS Bros that refers to the aesthetics of the 
Nintendo game Super Mario Bros, in which the player character, an IS member, 
aims to behead as many other characters as possible. Another example of audio-
VISUAL appropriation was a re-enactment of an IS beheading that uses a 
pre-existing remix of Íalīl al-Íawārim as background music. Following the 
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structure of the remix, the video clip turns into a dancing performance that 
adds another dimension of cultural resistance, since IS regards dancing –  just 
like music –  as unlawful. Our final example was a humorous Misheard Lyrics or 
Mondegreen version with visually presented lyrics that are based on homophonic 
translations from Arabic into English. In the process, the original jihadi mes-
sage is superimposed through humorous and, at times, nonsensical denotations 
that are additionally illustrated in some places. By discussing such a broad range 
of audiovisual appropriations of Íalīl al-Íawārim, we hope to have contributed 
to the study of cultural resistance against IS and its religio-political doctrine.
The fact that the producers of two above-analysed appropriations come 
from Egypt is noteworthy in a regional political context, which suggests that 
appropriation here serves not only as an act of cultural resistance, but also as 
a compensation strategy in the face of a geographically close-by threat. Apart 
from this, it is generally difficult to identify the producers’ backgrounds 
and motivations through online research. The users’ anonymity on platforms 
such as YouTube, and the lack of a direct messaging function, prevent us 
from reaching out to them.
In our chapter, we were able to deal with such limitations by drawing on 
Duncombe’s (2002: 5) definition of cultural resistance as ‘the use of culture 
consciously or unconsciously, effectively or not, to resist or change a domi-
nant structure’. Accordingly, with the example of the piano cover, we high-
lighted that it is not the intention that is central for our analysis, but rather 
the effect of cultural resistance. The YouTube comments posted under this 
version, however, allow the conclusion that (commenting) online users are 
remarkably aware both of IS doctrine and of breaking with it. Duncombe’s 
definition further raises the issue of the effectiveness of such appropriations, 
which is hard –  or maybe even impossible –  to measure: can appropriations 
actually help to break IS?
There remain many unanswered questions. In the course of our research 
on YouTube, we also came across one comment, posted under the Hardcore 
Remix, that clearly stood out by even using the correct terminology, although 
with English spelling: ‘lol this nasheed deserves all kinds of covers. hillarious 
[sic].’ Such a comment demonstrates that the knowledge of the actors in our 
research field is generally not to be underestimated. Future research seems 
likely to focus on the producers’ part in order to conceptualise the contested 
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field of jihadi media and its culturally resistive appropriations that express the 
interaction between IS and its opponents.
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